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A bstract of Thesis 
This thesis is a study of the two major texts of Derrida on Husserl's phenomenology. 
Engaging in a close reading of Introduction to the Origin of Geometry (1962) and Speech and 
Phenomena (1967), this thesis tries to bring together, and reconstruct, under the title of speech 
and writing, those Husserlian questions which never stop occuping, motivating and intriguing 
Derrida's thought, from his student studies and the Introduction to Rogues (2003) These were the 
questions or themes of origin and of historicity, of scientific objectivity and truth, of reason and 
responsibility, as well as of the living present, of living speech, of egological subjectivity and the 
alter ego. The question that this thesis raises is the following: why are these Husserlian themes of 
historicity, of the idea of the infinite task, of the living speech, etc., not simply the first objects or 
targets, subsequently to be abandoned, of Derridean deconstruction? Why is deconstruction, the 
event, the advent or invention of deconstruction, irreducible to some methodical or theoretical 
procedure, or to an operation of problematization or delegitimation of transcendental questioning? 
As we show in the first part of the thesis, these questions were investigated and 
developed by Husserl as a "responsible" response to the Crisis of the European sciences and 
humanity. Our investigation into Husserl's teleological discourse of history and responsibility 
shows that this crisis, which is anything but an empirical accident, threatens the very thing that 
Husserl wants to keep safe and sound (or to immuni::e, as Derrida writes in Rogues): the 
transcendental freedom of an egological subjectivity. For Husserl the possibility of crisis (of the 
subject) remains linked with the moment of truth, i.e., with the production and tradition of 
scientific objectitivities, and in fact has an essential link to writing. Husserl's teleological 
determination of writing as phonetic writing is an attempt to limit, tame and economize the 
essential ambiguity of writing: it threatens with passivity, forgetfulness and irresponsibility the 
very thing that makes possible, i.e., the transcendental and ideal community of a we-human-
subjects-investigators-responsible-for-the-history-of-truth/reason. 
In the second part of the thesis, following Derrida's reading of Husserl in Speech and 
Phenomena, in Form and Meaning, Signature Event Context, and Eating Well. we show that 
Husserl's phenomenology of language and of phone is also a great philosophy of the 
transcendental subject. The essential and phenomenological distinctions between nonlinguisitc 
and linguistic signs, sense and meaning, expression and indication, which are at the centre of 
Husserl's doctrine of signification, have also a teleological character: they are destined to define 
the limit, the arche and telos of language, as human language or human (i.e., phonetic) writing. In 
our reading we give great emphasis to Derrida' s phenomenological analysis and deconstruction of 
this unique experience of auto-affection, the experience of hearing oneself speak. This is the 
experience of the human subject, the experience of a free, voluntary, auto-affecting egological 
subjectivity conscious of its voice, its speech and its humanity. 
Denying the possibility of phonic auto-affection of the human subject, in favour of the 
hetero-affection of writing was never the point of Derridean deconstruction. Deconstruction, the 
concept of writing or arche-writing, the graphics of differance, of iterability, are not imposed 
from the outside on Husserl's discourse on the human subject, the zoon logon echon. Rather, 
phenomenology itself interrupts or deconstructs itself, according to Derrida, as soon as it 
addresses the question of time and of the other, of the alter ego. Deconstruction was never only a 
thcoretico-philosophical, or academic affair. In our conclusion, we argue for the right of 
deconstruction, i.e., the right or demand to deconstruction. This right or demand to 
deconstruction, to ask questions about truth, consciousness, language, responsibility and so forth -
so many powers, capacities or possibilities of which the animal is said to be deprived and poor -
and the right or demand to do so performatively, by writing. by transforming and producing new 
analyses. new events and texts. new events of thought in the history of the concepts of man. of 
truth. of the subject and of human rights. is according to Derrida. an ethical and political demand. 
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Introduction 
Derrida throughout his work shows a continuous and insistent preoccupation \\'ith 
Husserlian phenomenology. From his student years and his first publications to his latest texts, 
Derrida persistently repeats the same great Husserlian questions, the questions or themes of 
historicity, of scientific objectivity, of responsibility, of reason, of living speech (and of the living 
present.) In his first publications in the 1960' s all these questions were grouped together, and 
reinterpreted, under the title of writing or arche-writing, the graphics of differance, of iterability, 
and the supplement. And in Rogues, in the second Essa.\' on Reason, forty years later, in 2003, 
Derrida calls his readers to "hear today what Husserl said then" and tries to situate his duty or 
responsibility, as an heir of Husserl's phenomenology and phenomenological reason, with the 
greatest difficulty. The question that this thesis raises is the following: why are the Husserlian 
themes of historicity, of responsibility, of truth and of the infinite task (first part of the thesis), of 
living speech, of intentionality, of sense and meaning (second part), not simply the first objects or 
targets, subsequently to be abandoned, of Derridean deconstruction? Why is deconstruction, the 
event, the advent or invention of deconstruction, irreducible to some methodical or theoretical 
procedure, or to an operation of problematization or delegitimation of transcendental questioning? 
What does deconstruction have to do with this "excessive fidelity", that Derrida acknowledges, 
"to a certain phenomenological inspiration"? 
Derrida's first work on Husserl The Problem of Genesis in Hllsserl's Phenomenology was 
a comprehensive study of almost all of Husserl's published, and also some of unpublished, work. 
It was a "student study", a dissertation submitted "for a diploma of advanced studies" in 1953-54 
at the Ecole Normale. It was the time when phenomenology gained an access and a sort of 
legitimacy in France and in the French Universities mainly through the phenomenology of 
perception of Merleau-Ponty and Sartrean ontology. With The Problem of Genesis Derrida 
introduces and gives privilege to those aspects of Husserl's work and to those questions that the 
then "dominant versions" of French phenomenology had overlooked or indeed seemed to avoid. 
These were the questions pertaining to the phenomenology of genetic constitution: of the genesis 
of mathematical objects, of the genesis of objectivity and science, but also the questions of 
tradition and historicity of the sciences and of ideal objectivity in general (thus, not only in the 
sciences, but also in politics and in ethics). In 1962 Derrida published a translation and an 
Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry, a text which he had already read, commented and 
critiqued, not so "respectfully", we must recognize, in chapter 9 of The Problem of Genesis. In 
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this Introduction Derrida offers a more "respectful" and more nuanced reading of Husserl's 
phenomenology of historicity, while emphasising its originality and radical rationality. 
Derrida has often insisted on the political and strategic character of his decision to 
privilege the genetic and "historico-teleological route" of phenomenonology. In some "auto-
biographical" interviews about his first years at the Ecole Normale ("this strange institution and 
the no less strange 'community' that it housed,") Derrida often refers to the philosophical and 
political map of France in the 1950's and 60's and to his philosophical or political "friendships" 
which made him to "read intensely" Husserl without or in opposition to the readings of Merleau-
Ponty and Sartre. With regard to these political friendships Derrida refers to the names of Trun-
Duc Thao and Althusser (who invited Derrida in 1963-64to give his first courses at the Ecole.) 
His critical engagement with Thao's Marxist approach of phenomenology in "Phenomenology 
and Dialectical Materialism" (1949), however, did not bring Derrida closer to Althusser, but 
rather prompted questions that seemed to pass over Althusser's "concept of history" and 
"scientific Marxism". As Derrida notes in these interviews in Positions (1972), Politics and 
Friendship (1989), The Taste for the Secret (1997) and elsewhere, these were precisely Husserl' s 
critical, transcendental questions about the conditions of possibility of scientific objectivity, of 
truth, of history, etc. 
Derrida's initial engagement with Husserl's questioning of the origin and tradition of the 
ideal objectivities of the sciences has left an ineffaceable trace on a great number of questions that 
we find in Derrida's corpus: the question of the historicity of ideal objects of the sciences and of 
literature in general (but also of the nondiscursive idealities of architecture, of plastic arts, etc), 
the question of writing and living speech, of linguistics and grammatology, of signature, el'ent 
and the context, of archives, of truth and of the Enlightenment to come, and especially the 
question of the irreducible alterity that divides and defers the self-identity of the origin (of the 
living present), a question without which neither ethics nor politics of "deconstruction" would be 
imaginable or indeed possible. 
This Husserlian trace or inheritance is difficult to miss even if we consider the questions, 
the difficulties, and aporias (Derrida will "no longer dare" call them "problems"!) which will not 
stop occupying him till his last work. These are the aporias of responsibility, of invention, of 
democracy, of hospitality, of the gift and of forgiveness, and so forth, which are described by 
Derrida as experiences of the law that binds the possible with the impossible and commands our 
thinking. As we are going to show, it is in the space of transcendental phenomenology. of the 
1 Derrida. Jacques. As If Were Possible, published in Negotiations, translated by Elizabeth Rottenherg. 
Stanford. Stanford Uni\'ersity Press. 2002. p. _~-+9 
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phenomenological question of the transcendental "condition of possibility", that we find Derrida 
for the first time to speak of a certain "condition of impossibility" and to eno-ao-e himself in this 
_ 0 0 
"aporetology" or "aporetography" which links deconstruction to "the dominant thinking of the 
possible in philosophy". In our reading of Derrida here, deconstruction, the deconstruction of the 
powerful concept of the possible in phenomenology, turns up as a certain "aporetic experience of 
the impossible". This thesis will maintain that the question for Derrida was never simply 
"whether deconstruction, the procedures of deconstruction is successful?'" This question would 
suppose that deconstruction is a response, and moreover a possible response, an already 
articulated organization of response, to a problem. The question, as has been formulated in 
numerous texts, and precisely in reference to phenomenology, for Derrida is "is deconstruction 
possible, of the order of the possible,,?2 
Of course, the claim that an understanding of Derrida's subsequent work and thinking 
demands a careful consideration of his engagement with Husserl is not only ours. Rudolph Bernet 
in his highly influential article "On Derrida's Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry", 
(1989) Paola Marrati in her Genesis and Trace (1998), Leonard Lawlor in Husserl and Derrida 
(2002), and Joshua Kate in Essential History (2005), trying to be faithful both to Derrida and 
Husserl, have, more or less successfully, established in the literature the indebtedness of 
Derridean deconstruction to Husserl's investigations concerning the question of history, his 
analyses and descriptions of the movement of temporalization, of the constitution of the ego and 
of the alter ego, etc. As far as the question of history and of the deconstructive critique of the 
metaphysical concept of history is concerned, the above readers of Derrida have identified in his 
work "a thinking of another dimension of history" (Marrati, pp. 20, 24, 31), a thinking of an 
"other sense of history" (Lawlor, p. 132) and "the moment when Derrida decides he wishes to 
depart". to "overcome history, or outdo history" "turn against" and "contest" Husserl's historicity 
(Kates pp. 210, 211, 213). These commentators have this in common: they all refer to the decisive 
role of the infinite Idea in Husserl's phenomenology of history. Marrati finds the Idea too 
idealistic, hvperbolically idealistic and sees Derrida as breaking with this idealism already since 
his Problem of Genesis (1953-4). Kates and Lawlor are in agreement with Marrati on this point. 
except for the fact that Derrida "contests" the Idea, successfully according to them. not in the 
Problem (~f Genesis. not even in the Genesis and Structure (1959) or in the Introduction to the 
Origin (1962). but in his 1967 texts, especially in Speech and Phenomena and in Of 
Grammtology. According to Lawlor, Derrida "'abandons the Husserlian notion of horizon" (p. 
~ Den·ida. Jacques. The University H'itllOut Condition, published in Without Alibi. edited and translated hy 
Pe!2!2)' Kamul, Stanford. Stanford Uni\efsity Press. 2002. p. 2.34. See also Scgotiations. pp .. 192-5. 3)Xff. 
139) and comes up with an "other sense of history". In this "other sense": history is nothing but 
"a series of different eschatoi and teloi," "history no longer makes or has sense", "history, in 
other words, is devoid of direction; there are only histories" (Lawlor, 1996, p. 132). In this thesis 
we will claim, on the contrary, that Derrida has nowhere written that the notion of horizon, or of 
the Telos must be abandoned, or that there is no "heading" or "direction in history". In this thesis. 
engaging in a close reading of Derrida's texts, we will try to be more sensitive toward certain 
aspects of the de constructive rethinking and reworking of the idealist notion of the Idea, which 
can allow us to hear the Derridean warnings, for example in The Other Heading, with regard to 
those discourses which, without second thought, proceed to oppose straightforwardly and head on 
the Idea, the idea of the Telos or of the heading, and announce triumphantly its abandonment. It 
is out of fear of seeing return the "worst", that Derrida in Rogues, and precisely referring to the 
Idea in the Kantian sense, writes "I cannot swear that I will not one day give in to it". 3 
This thesis has two parts, each dealing and focusing respectively on the two major 
Derridean texts on Husserl, the Introduction to the Origin of Geometry (1962) the Speech and 
Phenomena (1967) We are not going to argue for some kind of development, continuity and 
discontinuity, between the 1962 and 1967 work, nor for some kind of periodization between, for 
example, pre-deconstructive and deconstructive texts. The method of reading adopted is one that 
mistrusts such a periodization, and instead tries to respect the stages and sequences of Derrida's 
arguments, while remaining attentive to the letter of the text: its vocabulary, terminology and 
conceptuality. This is also the only way we could remain faithful to the themes and the audacity 
of a thought which makes its arguments, gestures, and lines move not only from one book to the 
next, not only, that is, within a book, a supposedly coherent whole, but at times within a single 
paragraph, or in single footnote. 
The first part of the thesis engages In a close. patient and "dry" reading of the 
Introduction and focuses upon certain Husserlian questions and gestures, around the concepts of 
historicity, responsibility, subjectivity, writing, the Idea of an infinite task, which consistently 
keep their importance for Derrida in texts written at the time and long after his first publication in 
1962. In the second part we read Derrida's Speech and Phenomena and we follow closely, again 
in a classical style of commentary. Derrida's re-inscription and re-interpretation of the great 
Husserlian themes of intentionality, of meaning (Bedeutungsitnentiol1). of the transcendental ego 
and the alter ego, particularly in reference to and in the context of HUl.,serl's Logical 
11ll'£'stigatiol1s and his doctrine of language and signification . 
. l Derrida. Jac4ues. Rogues, Two Essays 011 Reason, translated hy Pascale-Anne Brault and i-.lIchael i\:aas. 
Stanford. Stanford University Press. 2005. p. 83. 
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We will start our reading of Derrida' s reading of the Origin of Geometry and with a claim 
found also in "'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology" (1959). The historico-teleological 
route of genetic phenomenology is not merely one route among others: with the thematization of 
the transcendental and teleological historicity of the sciences, phenomenology has reached a new 
form of radicality. According to Derrida, the originality and singularity of the Origin consists in 
the incomparable rigour with which Husser! thinks and links the question of historicity of ideal 
objectivity and of the sciences with the question of responsibility. As is well known, the motif of 
the Riickfrage, of the radical historical investigation of the origin and tradition of scientific 
reason, the prescription of a rigorous and total repetition (or reactil'ation) of the tradition's origin, 
was perceived and developed by Husserl as a matter of utmost philosophical urgency, as a 
responsible response to "the crisis of European sciences and humanity". And it is, indeed, as a 
response to the crisis of European reason, and from the point of view of a teleology of Reason, 
that is, of the infinite task of Reason, that Husserl relates the adventures and misadventures of the 
transcendental motif (recounted in Crisis: from Galileo and Descartes, to Hume and to Kant). 
Phenomenological reason is presented in Krisis as a criticism of historic reason (and in particular 
of this rationalism of the Aufkldrerei, of which Husserl speaks in such a pejorative fashion in the 
Vienna Lecture), a criticism made in the name of unconditional truth (unbedingte Warheit) and of 
the man of infinite tasks. However, a critical evaluation of the Origin and its singularity would 
remain incomplete, according to Derrida, without reference to the "proper transcendental step" 
which Husserl took with the intentional analysis of writing. This step enabled him to attain a new 
form of radicality, and to situate the question of writing at the heart of what ties the question of 
historicity and of responsibility of the sciences together. 
Not only in the Introduction but also half a century latter, In Rogues (2003), and in 
another context, Derrida speaks again, in the name of reason and of the "Enlightenment to come", 
and with regard to the radical and "unconditional rationalism" of phenomenological reason, of a 
duty and a task, of the responsibility of the heir, of the responsible guardian of this heritage of 
phenomenology and of phenomenological reason. Should one assume, and how does one assume 
this responsibility, how does one respond? Does one remain faithful, does one respond faithfully 
by repeating or by breaking with, by continuing and reactivating the Husserlian gestures or by 
opposing and displacing then? Is there an alternative or a double bind? How did Derrida respond 
to Husserl's Krisi.'!. to the transcendental questioning of historicity and Husserl's discourse on 
responsibility, to the HusserIian call to a philosophical and European responsibility in the 
experience of a crisis of reason and of the sciences? 
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Already in his 1953-4 dissertation Derrida has expressed his suspicions on the concept of 
"crisis" and on HusserI's teleological discourse on history which accompanies it. The \'ery idea of 
crisis in the history of reason seemed very problematic to him: how can there be a crisi~ of the 
transcendental idea? How is it possible? The teleological idea which supports Husserl" s 
thematization of transcendental history should withstand any empirical historical threat. 
According to the young Derrida, Husserl could maintain his discourse on crisis without 
contradicting the premises of his transcendental phenomenology, only if he assigned an empirical 
signification to it: although the teleological idea which opens and orients all history is 
transcendental, its crisis is empirical. Even if Husserl is right in his diagnosis of a sickness of 
European society and culture, the teleological idea and the distinction between transcendental 
history and empirical crisis, which guide his historical analyses, prevent him from thinking the 
"sense of any crisis and of any history,,4 and hence, as Paola Manati writes. from thinking 
"another dimension of history." (Marrati, 20, 22, 31) 
Our reading does not start with Derrida's very first text on Husserl The Problem of 
Genesis. We can justify our beginning with Derrida's Introduction by pointing out a) that in the 
first "problematization" of the concept of "genesis" the themes of speech and writing are absent 
and b) the change of attitude towards Husserl's phenomenology of history. Derrida had not yet (in 
1953-4) acknowledged the new form of radicality that is attained by Husserl' s phenomenology of 
history. With regard to the latter, Derrida' s Introduction can be seen as a self-critical response to 
his own earlier reservations and criticisms in the Problem of Genesis, namely, that HusserI's 
thematization of transcendental genesis or historicity fails because of the very problematic status 
of the telelological idea within phenomenology. 
In the first chapter of the thesis we will try to bring out Derrida's reading of Husserrs 
phenomenology of history as a training in anti-historicism (that is to say in anti-relativism. anti-
empiricism and anti-skepticism). As Derrida demonstrated in his Genesis and Structure. the 
systematic and rigorous critique of historicism, from the Philosophy as Rigorous Science to the 
Origin, was for Husserl a matter of theoretical or scientific rigor, the first axiom of any 
problematic of scientificity. objectivity, or truth. In the Origin. moreover. the critique of 
historicism is articulated along with Husserrs critique of objectivism. According to Derrida. this 
double critique of historicism and objectivism (section 1) is the necessary condition for an 
access to the unique historicity of the ideal objectivities of science. to the sense of their origin and 
~ Derrida. Jacques. The Prohlem (~rGel1('.\i.\ ill Husserl's Philosophy, translated by Marian HllhslHl. 
Lllndoll. The Uni\crsil\ of Chicago Press. 2003. p. 171. see also p. 15-1.. 
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traditionality. It is only by gOIng beyond the alternative between historicism (Dilthey) and 
objectivism (Galileo) that Husserl will be able to penetrate from within the internal history of 
geometrical ideal objectivities and describe the concrete conditions of its possibility. These 
conditions of possibility, however, are not only concrete (since they are always, as Derrida writes 
in the Introduction, experienced under the form of horizon) but also a priori and teleoloxical. It is 
this reduction of history to an eidos or to a te/os which bothers Derrida in the Problem of Genesis, 
but which in the Introduction to the Origin is defended in its rights and dignity. The conclusion 
which Derrida was able to draw from this thematization of historicity, from Husserl's description 
in the Origin of the "apodictic invariants" and "teleological absolutes of historicity"', is indeed 
different in his Introduction. It will be argued that the irreducible and "originary contamination"' 
between the empirical and the transcendental, which Derrida had already described in Problem of 
Genesis (pp. xv, xl, 159) and allowed him to define the limits of phenomenology and to call for a 
new ontology (even though it is not of a Heideggerian inspiration). does not go totally 
unrecognized by Husserl in his teleologico-transcendental investigation of the origin of geometry. 
In the first chapter we also engage with Derrida's argument in the Introduction that the 
sense and the method of the Rtickfrage (section 2), and the historical character of the 
reactivating reduction, must be investigated anew, clarified and even rehabilitated. It will be 
shown that Husserl' s methodological reflections on the eidetic and transcendental reductions, and 
on their essential interplay (Wechselspiel) are seen by Derrida in 1962 in a completely different 
light. In contrast to previous assessments of the phenomenological method, notably that of 
Levinas who denounces the geschichtlose naivete of the transcendental reduction, Derrida, 
looking for "its most radical implications"', shows that the method of the reductions, as it is 
renewed in historical phenomenology, "is not the neutral preface or perambulatory exercise of 
thought, Rather, it is thought itself in the consciousness of its complete historicity."' 
In section 2 we argue that the history of geometry, which Husserl thematizes In the 
Origin, as a non-empirical but "institutive history", as the originary production of sense and its 
traditional sedimentation, is, according to Derrida, the profound area where sense is indissociable 
from beinx, where the de facto is indissociable from the de jure. What Derrida failed to see in his 
earlier dissertation is that what Husserl reveals in his inquiry into the genesis of geometry is 
precisely the "eidetic singularity" of the "first time of geometry", of the originary act of 
geometry. and the indissociability of sense and fact, of the transcendental and wordl." origin. in 
the singularity or oneness of the instituting act of the protogeometer. 
In section 3 we deal with Husserrs treatement in the Origin of the question of 
intersubjecti"ity. speech and writing as the common. interrelated and concrete conditions of 
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Objectivity and traditionality (or historicity). Considering Husserl' s description of the apriori 
structures of historicity, Derrida introduces a set of stipUlations with regard to the transcendental 
role or function of language and of writing. Derrida shows that to the extent that speech, and 
especially writing, does not simply come to express, signify or record, but to produce and ground 
truth's Objectivity, it is not merely an empirical constituted body (Kihper), a constituted means in 
the service of truth. Taken in its pure intentionality, it is also a properly constituting flesh or body 
(Leib), and thereby the sine qua non condition of Objectivity's internal completion. It is the 
indissociability of Verleiblichung and Verkorperung in the constitutive function of language 
(spoken or written) that interests Derrida and leads him to claim that "the transcendental mllst be 
rethought". According to Derrida, Husserl's intentional analysis of language and writing brings 
indeed a breakthrough in the phenomenological studies of constitution. Derrida does not break 
with Husserl, and Kates is right when he emphasises that, on the contrary, Derrida' s defence of 
Husserl's late history program (against Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty and Cavailles) is a major 
contribution to phenomenological discourse generally. In this section we also pay attention to a 
crucial difficulty (underestimated by Kates): The theme of "traditional sedimentation of sense" 
which Husserl introduces in the Origin is not easily reconciled with an axiomatic which, as we 
are going to see in the second part of the thesis, has dominated phenomenology since the Logical 
Im't'stigations, namely the de jure anteriority of sense in relation to meaning and expression, that 
is, in relation to the act of language whose own value or productivity is limited to that of giving 
conceptual expression to sense. 
In section 4 we deal with Husserl's archeo-teleological doctrine of tradition and what 
he calls "the unil,t'rsai a priori of history", "the immense structural a priori" of all traditional 
culture, i.e., the historic present, they are at the heart of the Origin. We will engage with some 
essential distinctions ("real" and "ideal object", "bound ideality" and "free ideality") and some 
more "formal and radical generalities" which, according to Husserl, if correctly investigated will 
lead us to recognize the phenomenological Absolute, the ground of all historicity, i.e., the historic 
present. According to Husserl, the historic present is the most universal and most general form of 
all actual or possible historical experience (Erlebniss). This "universal apriori" of history 
prescribes, for every discourse which moves "within the limits of reason alone", that there is no 
histOlical experience, no possible experience which can be lived by an ego other than in the 
present. This absolute impossibility of h\'ing (of acting, intervening, posing or changing the 
heading of the history in which one finds oneself thrown) other than ill a present. thi.., 
impossibility defines the archeo-teleological limits of phenomenological reason: what will remain 
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for ever impossible and unthinkable. This impossibility becomes themati:ed and thought 
otherwise in Derrida's work on writing, trace, iterability, supplement, exappropriation. 
Examining these "formal and radical generalities", Husserl re\'eals a characteristic 
common to all ideal objectivity, to all forms of culture and science: they move entirely within the 
spiritual sphere of tradition. Geometry itself is a tradition, its progress or de\'elopment is a 
traditional development, defined by Husserl as the originary production and traditional 
sedimentation of its sense. We can understand the privilege given to the science of geometry in 
Husserl's investigation into the origins of our philosophical and scientific tradition, if we pay 
attention to the difference between the mode or style of sense-sedimentation pertaining, on the 
one hand, to the history of a bound ideality (and to the history of all empirical culture in general) 
and, on the other hand, to the history of the absolutely free ideality of geometrical objects or 
states of affairs. The historical advent and adventure of the science of geometry, and of scientific 
reason, represents an "revolutionization of historicity" (Vienna Lectllre), or as Derrida put it, an 
"irruption of the infinite as a revolution within empirical culture". It will be shown that an 
infinitization, a passage to the infinite limit and a certain relation to telos (as aim and as end or 
death) is involved in their genesis and life. The transcendental historicity of the ideal objectivities 
of geometry, as well as "the capacity for reactivation", is opened with writing and this relation to 
death. 
In section 5, Speech, Writing and the Transcendental Historicity of Scientific 
Reason, we present Husserl's description of speech and language as ideal objectivities and we 
investigate how writing, taken as both the Verleiblichung and the Verkorperung of scientific 
sense or truth, defines and completes "the transcendental disquietude of language". Language 
frees the ideality of sense in the very work of its binding: the historical incarnation of the 
ongtnary sense of geometry in a linguistic medium (in Greek language) sets free the 
transcendental constitution of its objects. Speech, spoken language, alone cannot free the absolute 
ideality of geometry's objects from the institutive community in which it appeared in history for 
the first time. Only with the crucial and critical addition or supplement of writing can the 
transcendental history of geometry, and of scientific Reason more generally. be sanctioned and 
complete, at the price however of being exposed to a serious danger. The ultimate merit and the 
most interesting difficulty of the Origin lies, according to Derrida, in Husserl's description of the 
necessity of this exposition of scientific and of philosophical reason to \\ordly inscription. to the 
danger of writing. The phenomena of forgetfulness, of passi\'ity. of crisis are bound to. and ill faCT 
need, the essential possibility of writing. 
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In the second chapter of the thesis Writing and Responsibility we continue our reading 
of Derrida' s Introduction, while keeping an eye to other texts too, particularly to the Economies 
of Crisis (1983), Other Heading (1991), and Rogues (2003), especially to the second Essay on 
Reason, and we engage in Husserl's teleological discourse on crisis (section 1). Derrida in 
section VII of his Introduction refers to the moment of crisis, to the critical moment of writino- in e 
the course of examining the danger or the possibility of truth' s disappearance after it has been 
inscribed in the wordly element of writing. As many commentators have suggested Derrida' s 
discussion of "truth's disappearance" does not "give voice to some linguistic or scriptural 
relativism" (Kates, p. 67). Indeed, we will argue, one of the most manifest and incontestable 
gestures of Derrida is to reaffirm the validity and value of the phenomenological critique of 
relativism and historicism in the name of truth as an infinite task, an infinite task of reason. The 
entire weight of our effort will fall on the following questions: can we criticize historicism 
(scepticism, relativism) in the name of something other than truth and episteme? What happens to 
episteme when the teleological dignity or value of truth have been put into question, not by going 
against reason, but again "in the name of reason", and of reason to come, of a reason which, as 
Derrida put it in Rogues, will not conceal for itself what might come or happen to it. affect or 
indeed infect it, in its sovereignty. in an autoimmune fashion? 
As we will argue, Husserl himself did not assign to the possibility of forgetfulness and 
crisis a merely empirical or factual signification. For Husserl, crisis, the crisis of the European 
sciences, the "ill" or "evil" of objectivist amnesia, has the signification of an ethical 
irresponsibility, that of an ethico-philosophical failure of the subject of Europe, but also (a third 
signification) that of an eidetic necessity: it is prescribed and produced by the very progress of the 
sciences, by the production and traditional sedimentation of ideal objects. This last signification is 
continually emitted or underestimated in the literature. 
It is the concept of the Telos, of the spiritual telos of European sciences and humanity. 
namely. the infinite idea of an infinite task of reason, that we propose to rethink in the following 
sections. Bringing forth Husserl's teleological discourse on the capacity or possibility of the total 
reactivation of the origin of geometry and the teleological necessity of a univocal langllage, we 
will show that, with regard to the history and the present situation of the objecti ve and exact 
natural sciences (of which geometry is an example). the crisis, however serious, is. as Husserl 
writes, only an "apparent failure of rationalism", and it can be "overcome". Reason, 
phenomenological reason is not disarmed or defenceless against the objecti\'ist threat. against 
objecti\'ist amnesia or irresponsibility. This amnesia is a passi\'ity, an inability to be rendered 
"rl'spllnsihle" for sense in an authentic acti\'ity or reacti\'ation of the origin. and it i..., what Hm . ...,erl 
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condemns in the historical progress of the technical activity of the sciences of nature. an immeme 
progress uninhibited or even facilitated by the abdication of responsibility, by the suspension of 
an authentic act of Krinein, of an active, voluntary, responsible and "heroic decision" (\ 'ienna 
Lecture). 
In the last chapters of the first part of the thesis we try to listen to those echoes of the 
Husserlian call resounding between Derrida's Introduction and Rogues, and bring forward what 
binds the rationality and responsibility of phenomenological reason to Husser!" s faith in reason, 
to this "Heroismus der Vernuft " of which Husser! speaks in the Vienna Lecture. As we will show 
in section 2 "The irruption of the Infinite in the Finite, in the Introduction and in Rogues, 
Derrida situates the radicality of phenomenological rationalism in two moments: a) The moment 
that phenomenology, by making the distinction between rigorous and exact knowledge, 
renounces a certain calculability (which is indissociable from the exactitude of mathematics) and 
accepts the possibility of something incalculable, and thereby affirms that the rationality of the 
rational can never be limited to calculability, to reason as calculation, as ratio, as account, an 
account to be given or settled. And b) the moment that a certain unconditionality (that of the 
infinite Idea or of truth) acquires in Husserl' s phenomenological investigations the ultimate honor 
and dignity, and becomes the absolute principle of phenomenological reason. a principle that 
Derrida, in Rogues, calls sovereign. (For it happens that sovereignty is first of all one of the traits 
by which reason defines its own power and element, i.e., a certain unconditionality.) 
We present the process of idealization with which geometry came into being as an 
irruption of the infinite Idea into empirical and finite culture. It is the "strange presence" of the 
Idea, as Telos or Vorhaben for a concrete and finite subject, which, according to Husserl, permits 
the passage to the infinite limit and the production of geometrical exactitude. In effect, as we are 
going to show, the accession of human consciousness to the Idea of an infinite task of reason, is 
announced not only with geometry and philosophy (the institution of geometry is a philosophical 
act), but already in prescientific mankind, in the most elementary forms of human life and history. 
In the course of examining the teleological dignity of the Idea for the totality of human history we 
will consider Husserl's analysis and concrete descriptions in Ideas I of two intentional 
phenomena or experiences: that of external and internal perception. We will show, following 
Derrida, that Husserl's reference to the Idea (in the Kantian sense) designates the infinite opening 
of what is experienced or lived under the form of the hori:.on. the infinite opening of what is to-
come in general from out of some horizon. 
In section 3 we present the profound historicity of the Idea and what bimb it with the 
rationality of phenomenological reason as SelbstiJesinl111llg and \'erantH'Ortllllg. We \\ill shu\\ 
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that according to Derrida, in order to assess the radicality and unconditionality of 
phenomenological reason it is necessary to get rid of those conceptions which take the Idea as a 
thing or an essence (an eidos) and of those conceptions of reason as psychological faculty or 
ability. 
If the infinite idea, we will argue, is neither an existent thing nor an essence, this is 
because the infinity of the idea is offered within phenomenological evidence as the teleological 
condition (itself unconditional) for the emergence and determination of every thing and every 
essence. The fact that the telos of the Idea is not to be fulfilled, and cannot be fulfilled or 
actualized in some plenitude by an intuition of an object, this fact is, according to Derrida, the 
sign of its profound historicity. We want to argue that this Idea does not designate "one 
possibility among others" (as argued by Kates, p. 81), but the opening of the infinite horizon of 
history and of the possible for a concrete, living and finite consciousness in general. It will be 
emphasized that phenomenological consciousness, as consciousness of possibility, is a 
teleological consciousness, a consciousness of the infinite task that is always finite in its factual 
being. We conclude by maintaining that, like the Idea, the teleological reason, which "runs 
throughout all history", is not a positive and actual infinite situated beyond transcendental 
subjectivity and its linguistic objectifications. Reason, for Husserl, is the logos which is produced 
in history, the sense (Sinn) which is produced, expressed and heard as speech by (or in view of) a 
transcendental subject. "It is speech as auto-affection: hearing oneself speak." It is not an 
accidental de facto ability, but the universal and essential structure of transcendental subjectivity 
and transcendental historicity. 
What we aim at showing in the first part of the thesis is far from what readers such as 
Lawlor see as the "inadequacy of phenomenology" but, on the contrary, its juridical, rightful 
priority in all philosophical discourse or thematization of historicity and responsibility. We close 
our reading of Derrida's Introduction, by drawing the most general contours of a 
phenomenological reasoning or program of European responsibility. 
In the Second part of the thesis we will take up again the question of reason, of the 
phenomenological reason of ideality and telos, and reason's demand for sovereignty. for a certain 
unconditionality, for knowledge or truth, now formulated through a close reading of Speech and 
Phenomena. This reason, will be put into question precisely in tem1S of the superpowerful 
suprcmacy of the Idea (of the eidos and of ideality) and of the Telos and with respect this time to 
Husserl's doctrine of signification as it is formed in the First of the Logical Investigations 
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Firstly, we are gOIng to show, following and focusing on Husser!' s logical and 
epistemological concerns as they are fonnulated in his Introduction to the Logical bn·estigatioll5. 
that the intuitionist imperative of Husserl's "authentic theory of knowledge" is essentially 
indissociable from a certain privilege of expression (Ausdruck), from a certain pri\'ilege of verbal 
(sprachliche) expression, i.e., of the phone, a pri vilege which, even though, according to Derrida. 
characterizes the whole history of western metaphysics, in HusserI's hands undergoes a profound 
radicalization. Of course, to the extend that there is no concept of "voice". at least not by that 
name, in Husserl's first Logical Investigation which could assume this profound radicality. is this 
radicalization not rather, we ask, Derrida's contribution to phenomenological studies? One could 
read Derrida's "Le Voix et le Phenomene" as a phenomenological investigation of the constitution 
of the human egological subject through the experience of the (living) voice. and the operation of 
hearing oneself speak, as an investigation similar to the one conducted by Husser! in Ideas /I 
(§§35-42). In Section Two "The constitution of Animal Nature" Husser! investigates the 
constitution of "psychic reality through the Body (Leib),' - i.e., the living. animate side of the 
body proper that is "my own", living and human, the body of an "Ich Mensch", in its solipsistic 
moment - and through the tactile experience of touching-touched. the experience of my fingers 
touching and being touched by fingers. (The Husserlian studies into the tactile constitution of the 
body, the living body of an Ich Mensch, and especially into what "1 can say", from there. "I" "the 
subject of the body", will acquire a prominent place in Derrida's On Touching.) These fingers, 
moreover, the fingers which touch but also show, the showing, signifying or indicating fingers 
are not entirely absent from Derrida's reading of Husserl' phenomenology of the phone and his 
First Logical Investigation into expression and meaning (Ausdruck und Bedeutung). As we are 
going to see, according to Husserl, signs (Zeichen) always refer to the system of Zeigen, to the 
pointing or showing finger and the eye movement. 
The third chapter of this thesis begins with HusserI's discussion of the sign (Zeichen) 
(linguistic or non-linguistic) and of the necessity for a distinction between expression (AIiSdruck) 
and indication (Anzeigen). Derrida insists on the phenomenological and de jure. but also 
teleological. character of "the whole system of distinctions" which supports Husserl's doctrine of 
language (sense and meaning. expression and indication. linguistic and non-linguistic "ign. etc). 
Contrary to what many interpreters (such as Bernet) ha\'e argued. we will show that. Derrida also 
insists on showing the "primary interest" of Husserl's analysis. its complexity and difficulty. and 
especially its "openmindendness toward the more subtly folded pleats of the phenomenological 
experience ". 
1..+ 
At the centre of our interpretation of Derrida's reading of Husserlian phenomenology in 
Speech and Phenomena and in Form and Meaning, is a proposition in Ideas § 12.+ in which 
Husserl, after having brought out that every intentional act has a "logical" core, declares. that is. 
describes and prescribes the arche and telos of language: Logical meaning is an expression 
(Logische Bedeutung ist ein Ausdruck) (chapter 3, section 1). The indicatiye sphere of non-
linguistic signification (gestures, the pointing finger, etc) will represent everything that cannot be 
said, that cannot be brought into meaningful speech or expression, and into the conceptllal 
generality that properly constitutes the logicality of expression. 
In our reading we will bring together Speech and Derrida's Form and Meaning (1967) 
and we will show how Derrida puts into question Husserl's privilege of expression, and the 
teleological idea of expressive language, first as a medium and then as the best medium of 
exteriorization. It is this teleology that excludes gestures and facial expressions from expressions 
properly speaking, i.e., from linguistic expressions. Gestures or facial expressions, according to 
Husserl, are only empirical and subjective media of exteriorization of an internal experience and 
do not belong to the element of universality. The only signifying element which is able to reach 
and express the innermost inwardness of the "solitary life of the soul"' and, at the same time, to 
open itself to universal signification is the element of the voice, the phonic element. Of course, 
when we say voice we do not mean the physically uttered speech, the physical voice, but the pure 
active intention (will, spirit, life) which animates speech and gives it meaning. what Husserl calls 
meaning-intention, Bedellflll1gsintention. 
In section 2 we deal with the reduction to pure and inward expression, to what 
Husserl calls "im einsamem Seelenleben", to the solitary speech and inward life of the subject. 
This transcendental reduction to interiority or ownness (Eigenheit). which is not a simple but a 
most differentiated interiority, will reveal, through the experience of the subject that speaks and 
hears itself, the power or excellence of the voice, whose speech can take the form "S is p." 
We will assess the force of Husserl's argument in the Logical Im'estigafions, that 
expression is more full than indication, that it can function as pure expression in the self-presence 
of solitary speech, by having recourse to his 5th Cartesian Meditation. A text to which Derrida 
repeatedly and insistently returns, from Violence and Metaphysics (1964) up to On TOllching 
(2000) and BelieI' (2003). By contrast to solitary speech, when I listen to another in a real 
communication expression gives away to indication because the sense aimed at by the other and 
his lived experiL'IlCl' are not immediately present to me, and can neyer be. As soon as the other 
appears expression gets contaminated by indication. 
15 
The confinnation of the phenomenological excellence or privilege given to the voice that 
is heard in soliloquy comes forth immediately after the most difficult, most interesting. and less 
commented moment of Husserl's argumentation in §8 of his First Investigation. Derrida situates 
the difficulty and importance of this moment in what Husserl calls in Ideas I the irreality of the 
noema, of the image of the word. Husserl, by going beyond a classical psychology of 
imagination, shows that the interiority of inward expression is the most differentiated structure: 
that the image of the word is intentional but irreal, it exists even less than the imagination of the 
word, which is a reel (and not real) component of lived experience. From the very first 
publications to Speech, Of Grammatology and up to Specters of Marx and On Touching, Derrida 
will not stop measuring the consequences and the deconstructive force of the Husserlian 
"discovery" and thematization of this nonreal inclusion of noemata in the phenomenological life 
(Erlebnis) of consciousness. 
In section 3 The ideality of Speech: Presence and Ideality, we focus on Husserl's last 
paragraph in §8. Derrida devotes three chapters of his Speech (4, 5, 6) to it. In this paragraph 
Husserl invokes two kinds of argument in order to support the essential, de jure and 
phenomenological distinction between inward language (pure expression) and outward language 
(indication). We want to show that neither of these two arguments, nor the whole system of 
traditional metaphysical distinctions which is employed in them, withstand a rational 
deconstruction. What we also want to emphasize is that, in questioning and calling the differences 
which Husserl applies to language (between reality and representation, truth and fiction, the 
represented and the representative, etc.) "illegitimate", Derrida never sought an excuse in them 
that would lead him to a conclusive verdict, or to discredit, disqualify or abandon 
phenomenological work. And this is especially so when this work works against certain axiomatic 
principles of phenomenology. Moreover Husserlian phenomenology is itself, according to 
Derrida, in the grips of autodeconstructive movements, especially when it detennines the 
structure of the sign and of expression in tenns of ideality, the (lower) ideality of the signifier or 
expression and the (higher) ideality of the signified or Bedeutung. The concepts of ideality and 
repetition have been used and worked over in Speech as deconstructive concepts: according to 
Derrida, they offer the locus where what we hold to be deconstructible is constituted. 
We close this section with a brief discussion of Derrida's fourth chapter Signs and the 
Blink of the Eye where Derrida tries to show how the force of HusserI' argument about the 
fullness and immediacy of pure expression emitted in a Jiving present is weakened by his own 
descriptions of the movement of temporalization of sense and of the living present itself. 
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In the last section of the chapter3 "The will to hear oneself speak" (section ~) we 
address the question of the relation between phenomenological voice and being. voice and the 
sense of being (and the word "being"), voice and ideality (of sense and of the object), voice and 
objectivity. According to Denida, the Husserlian reduction to soliloquy, to the inward life of the 
soul, reveals to us the originality and power of the voice (the Bedeutungsintention). of that 
inward expression of the subject that can speak and hear itself saying "S is p" (where "S" is the 
name not of a person but of an object given to perception.) It is the form of expression, the 
predicative statement or proposition "S is p", that receives a major importance in our reading of 
Denida's interpretation of Husserl's distinctions between sense and meaning and between 
expression and indication. It is here that we also find the reason or necessity that pushed Husserl 
to study language from a logico-epistemological point of view, and to determine the predicative 
form of judgement (S is p) as the pure and irreducible core of expression. We believe that it is 
only if one pays attention to the concept of form, and, as Denida has suggested in Form and 
Meaning, to Husserl's profound reactivation of its primordial sense, that we can assess his critical 
project to institute an "authentic theory of knowledge." Husserl is interested in the phone to the 
extent that it can say with words that S is p. That is to say. to the extent that it can constitute 
human transcendental intersubjectivity, i.e., to the extent that it can make llS see and know an 
object "as such", i.e., as the intersubjective consciousness of its objective unity. 
As we will show, in phenomenological interiority, hearing, seeing or touching myself are 
very different experiences. They are different forms of auto-affection. especially with regard to 
what constitutes human, egological subjectivity, the human relation to the self and to the other as 
such. The phenomenological privilege given to the pure spirituality of the living voice, of the 
Bedeutungsintention, is directly related with the questions of man, of the zoon logon echon, and 
of life, the question of animal or human life and the question of human rights, the question of the 
subject, the subject of rights, the sovereign or autonomous subject which gives itself its own law 
and right, the reason and the right of speech, first of all, since the right of speech cannot be one 
right among others. 
Having set out to explain if not justify the phenomenological and human excellence of 
audio-phonic auto-affection and the importance of the radical difference between hearing-
oneself- speak and sl'l'ing- oneself-write or gesture, in the last chapter of the thesis we turn to the 
questions of Speech, Writing, and Subjectivity (chapter ~, section 1) in Husscrl's 
phenomenology. In Speech and Phenomena Derrida also showed that Husser]'s phenomenology 
of the phone is also a great philosophy of the transcendental subject where "the origin of the 
world" is described. after the phenomenological reduction to inl7('1" discourse. as an originary 
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speaking egological consciousness. If the experience of hearing-oneself speak is a unique 
experience of auto-affection this is because the possibility of this experience is. according to 
Husserl, the possibility of transcendental subjectivity. The experience of hearing oneself speak 
and the phenomenon of mastery over the exteriority of the signifier is, according to HusserL the 
experience of a free, voluntary, auto-affecting subjectivity conscious of its voice and speech. 
Derrida will return once again to the Lectures of Internal Time Consciollsness and to 
Cartesian Meditations, to Husserl's concrete descriptions of the movement of temporalization 
and of intersubjectivity in order to speak of a hetero-affection which is at work in the pure allto-
affection of the voice in the living present. Derrida does not only salute Husserl's preference in 
the 5th Meditation "to betray phenomenology (the intuitionism of his principle of principles) 
rather than transform indirect appresentation into direct presentation"'. In a move, that Derrida 
later repeats in On Touching, and in relation to tactile auto-affection, he attempted in Speech to go 
further than Husserl and to extend the field of this appresentation and hetero-affection so as to 
recognize its irreducible interruption or differance even in the supposedly pure, immediate, and 
living auto-affection of the phone. More than any other signifying substance given to 
consciousness, the phone has imposed an hetero-affection, a detour, leading through re-
presentation and a certain "intersubjectivity" to indication and writing, when it was meant by 
Husserl to illustrate the pure audio-phonic autoaffection of the solitary and monadic ego. 
In section 2 The supplement of the subject: speech as writing we continue the 
discussion of differance within the absolute authority of the phenomenological voice and we try to 
investigate the supplementary structure of speech as writing, what Derrida calls, the "dangerous"' 
supplement of origin, the "supplementary differance". According to Derrida, even if Husser! 
recognized the necessity of speech and writing at the origin of sense and truth, he did not ask, or 
he forgot to ask about the ultimate raison d' etre of their prosthesis, the foundation of their 
supplementarilY· 
In order to approach this "dangerous"' supplement Derrida, in the last chapter of Speech, 
returns once again to Husserl' s First Logical Investigation and to his idea of a "pure logical 
grammar"', of a "pure morphology of meaning"', a move which if not entirely underestimated in 
the literature, has given rise to some confusions with regard to Derrida's indebtedness to Husser!. 
In the §9 of the first Logical Im'l'stigation Husser!, according to Derrida, proceeds to one of the 
most rigorous and audacious reductions: Husser! reduces as nonessential components of 
meaningful expression the acts of intuitive cognition which fulfil the act of meaning. As v·:e are 
going to maintain, it is only by following the logic of the distinctions which support Husser!' s 
project of pure morphology of meanIng, 111 particular the distinctions between 
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Gegenstandlosigkeit and Bedeutungslosigkeit, Widersinnigkeit and Sinnlosigkeit, that Derrida can 
bring to light the nonempirical but essential and constitutive possibility of nonintuition, and of 
nonpresence in general (which is also the possibility of the supplement). 
In the last two sections, we undertake to discuss Speech together with Signature E\'ent 
Context (1972), Limited Inc (1977), and Eating Well (1989) and we try to bring forward, by 
introducing the Derridian concepts of differance, iterability and exapprorpiation, the 
deconstructive force of the Bedeutung i.e., its graphematic structure, the essential possibility of 
its functioning being cut off from its origin, i.e., the originary Bedeutungsintention. We will show 
that, given the structure of iteration, the SUbjective intention animating the expression will never 
be through and through present to itself and to its content. We will not conclude from this. 
however, that "there can no longer be any trace of purity, no autoaffection" (Marrati). nor that 
Derrida's deconstruction does not call into question the supposedly "genuinely pure auto-
affection" of the voice (Kates). 
In the last section 3 The non-end: the infinite differance is finite, we take up once 
again the question of the telos in Husserl's phenomenology of the phone. One of our strongest 
claims is that what Derrida questions in the Introducation to the Origin. in Speech. in SEC. 
Eating Well, Rogues, etc., with the concepts of writing. differance. iterability, supplement (or 
pharmakon in other texts and auto-immunity in other), is not intentionality but its telos. This 
telos, like desire, as Derrida writes in On Touching (p. 121), is intuitionistic. And even if it 
responds or corresponds to some absolute necessity or desire, this telos must be questioned and 
rethought. 
What is questioned with the concepts of iterability, differance, exappropriation, etc. is the 
telos as an identifiable heading, namely, a telos which opens, orients and organizes the movement 
of intentionality as well as the possibility of its fulfilment in a plenitude, in the fullness of a 
parousia. The telos of fulfilment in a plenitude, in the experience of adequation between intuition 
and expression. is not separable from intentionality. Husserl was right. Derrida insists. in 
including it in the structure of intentionality described in the first Im'estigation. In the last section 
we examine the subjective expression "I am", a supplement whose raison d'etre is not made clear 
by Husserl. What is clear to him. however, according to Derrida. is the fact that the full presence 
of the Bedeutllngsintention to itself and to its content. the will or desire of the subject to say what 
he means to say and the experience of hearing himself say it. the demand for knowledge (gnothi 
s(, (lliton or cognosce te iPSlll11), for sovereign self-determination. for a sO\ereign and 
reappropriating gathering of self through the voice. belongs to the essence of meaning and saying. 
to the arche and tel os of intentionality. We argue that the graphics of iterability or differanc~ 
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limits the archeo-teleological structure of intentionality: it is the condition of its possibility (of the 
movement of intentionality toward plenitude) and the condition of its impossibility (the 
impossibility of full parousia, of pure re-appropriation of the same). The writing of differance 
determines this re-appropriation as an ex-appropriation and, at the same time, prevents it from 
being stabilized in the form of the human subject. ""Ex-apropriation", as Derrida says in Eating 
Well, "is not what is proper to man." 
Finally and in concluding, one of the goals of this thesis is to show that it is only through 
an engagement with Derrida's reading of Husserlian phenomenology, and especially a 
phenomenology that, where necessary, interrupts its axiomatic principles, that one can begin to 
estimate the importance and audacity of Derrida's ethical and political thought. For we believe 
that in order to recast, if not rigorously re-found, an ethical, political, etc, discourse on the 
"subject", or to ask what the rights of the human subject are (can be and should be), and, perhaps, 
to call for different kind of rights, one has necessarily to go through an experience of 
deconstruction. The great phenomenological themes of intentionality, of the "as such", and of the 
alter ego, are some of the places where deconstruction takes place. The enormity involved in the 
question of ethics, of politics, of the human subject and rights, according to Derrida, always leads 
back to these places. 
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Part I 
Chapter One: Writing and Historicity 
1) The Historicity of Ideal Objects: the Critique of Objectivism and Historicism. 
We will start our reading of Derrida's reading of Husserl with his Introduction to the 
Origin of Geometry.) This text, together with the other texts surrounding The Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,2 especially what came to be known as the VieJlna 
Lecture, belong to the last period of Husserl's oeuvre. This is the period in which the question of 
history, of the history and historicity of ideal objectivities, of the history of truth, of the origin and 
traditional development of scientific reason, of European philosophy and its "crisis" become the 
main and "unavoidable", as Husserl writes, preoccupation of transcendental phenomenology. 
According to Derrida, the originality and singularity of the Origin consists in the incomparable 
rigour with which Husserl thinks and links the question of historicity and the question of 
responsibility of the sciences (and first of all, of the finite philosopher or investigator, the 
responsibility for ones own finite discourse) with the question of writing. 
In "'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology', a lecture delivered in 1959 at Cerisy-
la-Salle, Derrida followed the major developments or steps in Husserl' s phenomenology, from the 
Philosophy of Arithmetic to Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Ideas I and up to the Origin, and 
presented a double motif which runs throughout Husserl's itinerary: anti-psychologism and anti-
historicism. As Derrida maintains in the Introduction and in "Genesis and Structure", this 
persistent anti-historicism, was accompanied by Husserl's elaboration of the transcendental 
question of historicity, i.e., of the origin and traditionality, of ideal objects ("the higher forms of 
products of reason"), and in particular of mathematical objects. The systematic and rigorous 
critique of historicism (as relativism, empiricism and scepticism) is not, however, the only merit 
of HusserI's "unheard-of style of historic reflection" about the about the idea of objecti vity. of 
truth, of science and philosophy (Where does it came from? How are the values of objecti\ity, of 
I Dcrrida. Jacques, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction. translated hy John P. Lean:). 
Jr, Lincoln and London, University of Nebraska Press, 1978. Hcarafter cited as lOG. In this Introduction 
we find also the translation of HusscrJ's Origin of Geometry. cited in our text as OG. 
2 Husscrl Edmund. The Crisis of Europe{/n Sciences {/nd Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction 
to Phl'llo111enological Philosophy, translated by David Carr. E\anston. Northwestern llniversity Pn:ss. 
1970. Hcaraftcr cited as Crisis. 
, Puhlished in Jacques Derrida. Writing {/nd D~fferencc, translated hy Alan Bas", London, R\)utkJge, I Y7H. 
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truth, of episteme, etc., constituted?) Husserl has also brought to light the indispensable role of 
writing as the condition of possibility of scientific objectivity and historicity. According to 
Derrida, Husserl's recourse to writing in the Origin has revealed the most interesting difficulty in 
his phenomenology of history: the description or prescription of "the infinite task of reason", of 
the idea of truth and of universality, is inseparable from the recognition of the necessary 
exposition of reason in a wordly inscription.~ 
Before we present (in sections 2 and 3) what Derrida considers as the ultimate merit of 
the Origin, as the proper transcendental step of Husserl's investigation into the historical origin 
and becoming of scientific reason, we will read his Genesis and Structure together with the 
Introduction in order to show why Husserl has believed necessary to reduce the factual history of 
the sciences in Philosophy as Rigorous Science, in Ideas I, and why Derrida claims that the 
"historico-teleological route of phenomenology" taken with the Crisis and the Origin. which 
maintains the initial reduction of empirical history, reaches a new breakthrough. 
According to Derrida, with the Origin of Geometry, and all the other texts surrounding 
the Crisis, phenomenology reaches "a new form of radicality"": there the "formidable task of a 
universal genetic phenomenology", already prescribed in previous works (notably in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, and in Cartesian Meditations), measures its depth and its seriousness in 
the face of new, more profound and more general problems arising this time from within the 
horizon of universal history, the ultimate horizon, according to Husserl, not only of the history of 
geometry and of all the other sciences, but of all sense and all objectivity. Reading the Origin, 
Derrida attempts an introduction to "the historico-teleological route" of phenomenology where 
every ideal object (logical, mathematical, scientific or cultural in general, technological, political 
or ethical), that is to say, every object capable of being transmitted and indefinitely repeated as 
the same, is considered by Husserl as a historical product, since it appears only in a historically 
determined territory thanks to the temporal and absolutely creative acts of a concrete speaking 
subjecti vity . 
.j Genesis and Structure. p. 166. Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl (p. 47) and Kates Essential Historv (pp. 5'+. 
84) maintain that Derrida's Genesis and Structure is a synopsis, an "abbreviation" of his student 
dissertation (The Problem and Genesis), and belongs to the "pre-deconstructivc" period of Dcrrida's 
thought. According to Lawlor. Derrida even "engages in a classical phenomenological clltique in which 
daims [namely, Husserl's discourse of aU'he and telos of history] are limited with e\idence. with 
presence." (pp .. ~. 1.+1)' We cannot agree with this interpretation. According to our reading. it i" nnt only 
the question of writing. which is not posed in the Problem of Genesis. but also Dcrrida'" reinterpretation of 
the "historico-telcological route" of Hu"serl's phenomenology. and of the Hus"erlian reference to the Idea 
(in the Kantian sense). that make his Genl'sis alld Structure to stand closer to the Introductioll. 
~ lOG. p. 3'+. 
In the Origin an archeo-teleological discourse on European and universal history will 
gradually take shape and its clues from a historical sense-investigation of the genesis of a 
particular science, that of geometry. Even if every ideal object (scientific or not) is, according to 
Husserl, a spiritual product, a historical and cultural formation, geometrical ideal objects wi 11 
stand out as an example, a good example or a model not only for the whole of European sciences 
but also for the historical life of the cultural world in its totality. According to Derrida, the 
exemplary character of the science of geometry in the Origin lies in its fully historical character: 
the possibility of something like a history of geometry, will impose or prescribe a reawakening of 
the question of the history of science and above all of universal historicity, i.e., of the sense of 
history in general. (lOG, p. 27) Also in connection with the example of the origin, i.e., the 
historical creation, of geometry's ideal objectivities (which are among "the highest products of 
reason"), Husserl will disclose the prescription of a more general and universal task or telos. 
within which the science of geometry itself must have been inscribed and from which it derives 
its ultimate ground. Husserl will thereby recognize and affirm that an infinite task of reason, a 
universal teleology of reason was at work in human history well before the advent of mathematics 
and philosophy. (OG, p. 180, and lOG, pp. 131,146) 
The originality of the Origin, what distinguishes it, according to Derrida, from previous 
investigations of "origins", and the new form of radicality that it attains, consists in "the new type 
or profundity of historicity" that this text brought to light. This new and radical reflection on 
history will give us access to the unique historicity of the ideal objects of science, i.e., to their 
origin and tradition. Why Derrida speaks of a new radicality? Because the "unheard-of style" of 
historical meditation which Husserl is obliged to follow, in the Origin, in order to penetrate the 
internal history of scientific objectivities, seems more and more difficult to accommodate itself 
within the regional limits which, since the Ideas I (1913), were prescribed for it. According to 
Derrida, the architectonic relations and the hierarchy of ontologies already established in Ideas I 
and in Formal and Transcendental Logic - according to which all regional and materially 
determined ontologies, for example, that of geometry and of history, are subordinated to a formal 
ontology - seem to be "complicated, if not inverted", with the Origin's exemplary sense-
investigation of the history of geometry. 
In Ideas I (1913), Husserl is concerned exclusively with formal ontology and treats the 
articulation between Objectivity in general, whatever its regional appurtenance (mathematicaL 
psychological, historicaL etc), and consciousness in generaL as the primal region ( Urregion).6 
(:, In Idells I the "ohject ill gelleral" is defined as the final "catl'gory" of en:rything that can he accessible 
and availahle. that can 01'1'('(/" or be for a pure and concrete comciousness. "The realm of transcendental 
23 
He defines the forms of self-evidence in general, that is, the formal a priori supposed by every 
material science, either eidetic or empirical, and thereby seeks to attain, as Derrida says. "the 
ultimate critical and phenomenological jurisdiction, under which the most ambitious genetic 
description later will be subsumed.,,7 In this work, history, as an empirical or eidetic science, is 
still one science among others, a distinct and dependent sector of a more general 
phenomenology. 8 
And again having opened the "logical route" of genetic phenomenology, with Formal 
and Transcendental Logic (1929) in which Husserl describes the transcendental o-enesis of locic o 0 
and, responding to the critical situation of European sciences, prescribes the "radical 
investigation of sense (radikale Besinnung)"9, the architectonic design remains intact: the 
anteriority of formal logic, as the "science of science", with respect to the question of the origin 
of the other sciences seems again unquestionable and legitimate. "These investigations, 
concerning the possible sense and possible method of genuine science as such, are naturally 
directed first of all to what is essentially common to all possible sciences. They should be 
followed secondarily by corresponding sense-investigations for particular groups of sciences and 
single sciences."IO But by admitting also that the logical route is not the only route for genetic 
phenomenology, that "other paths are possible for sense-investigations with a radical aim"ll it 
may seem at first sight that the Origin of Geometry will simply apply to the domain of a material 
ontology, namely that of the science of geometry, the critical motif which orients Formal and 
Transcendental Logic. And yet, Derrida will show that, in the sense investigation which the 
Origin puts forward with regard to the new type of historicity (that of the ideal objects of 
geometry), the rationality of this historicity cannot and must not, if one is to respect its 
consciousness as the realm of what is, in a determined sense, 'absolute' being, has been provided us by thc 
phenomcnological reduction. It is the primal category of all being (or, in our terminology, the Urregion), 
thc one in which all other regions of being are rooted, to which according to their essence, they are relative 
and on which they are therefore all essentially dependent." Ideas I, §76, p. 171. Husserl, Edmund, Ideas 
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, translated by F. 
Kersten, London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1983. 
7 '''Genesis and Strtlctllre' and Phenomenolog:\''' p. 161. (Hearafter cited as GSP) 
x In Ideas I § 60 Husserl suspends the eidetic sciences of history, psychology and sociology as sciences 
which, like the empirical or eidetic sciences of Nature, "have not as yet received a proper grounding:' in 
other words, as sciences that have not asked yet the question concerning the sense and value of their ideal 
ohjecti vities. 
l} "The present condition of European sciences necessitates radical investigations of sense." HusscrI. 
Edmund, Formal and Transcendental Logic, translated by Dorion Cairns, The Hague. Martinus. 1978. p. 
5. Hercafter cited as FTL. See also for the transition from the descripti\'e phenomenology of Ideas I to the 
critical scnse-invcstigation perceived and practiced in Formal and Transcl'ndental Logic Bachclard. 
SU/annc :\ Stud" of Husserl '.I 'Formal and Transcendental Logic, translated hy Lester E. Emhrec. 
hanston. Northwcstern Uni\crsily Press, 1968. p. xl\i. 
10 6 FTL. p. . 
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originality, be directly derived from the previously established hierarchical order between formal 
logic and material sciences. Nor should one, however, as Husserl says, reverse it - such a type of 
reversal (Umkehrung) announces, according to Husserl, nothing less than the phenomenon of 
crisis of European sciences. 12 
With regard to the exemplary character of this "unheard-of' style of historical 
investigation which Husserl practices in the Origin, and the "transgression" of its regional limits 
"toward a new form of radicality" Derrida writes: 
Concerning the intentional history of a particular eidetic science [that of geometry], a sense-
investigation of its conditions of possibility will reveal to us exemplarily the conditions and sense of 
historicity of science in general, then of universal historicity - the last horizon for all sense and Objectivity 
in general. Consequently, the architectonic relations evoked a moment ago are complicated, if not inverted. 
This would demonstrate, [oo.] at what point the juridical order of implications is not so linear and how 
difficult it is to recognize the starting point. lOG, p. 34. 
Before we attempt to deal straightforwardly with the status and the difficulty of every 
starting point of a reflection on universal historicity, before we come across this strange ~ig-zag 
way of proceeding which characterizes HusserI's investigation into the origin and historicity of 
geometry, and in order to assess the originality and singularity of the Origin, we have to point out 
its dependency with regard to previous phenomenological investigations. Derrida will refer 
several times in the Introduction to the dependent status of Husser!' s text, so as to bring forward 
the originality and irreducibility of his phenomenology of historicity. (lOG, pp .. 32, 69, 120, 
123n) 
Husserl first of all supposes the results of previous formal investigations and analyses 
concerning the transcendental constitution of ideal objectivity in general, formal investigations 
which are indifferent to the peculiarities of the various particular material regions of objecti vities, 
and therefore indifferent to the peculiarity and irreducibility of various specialized sciences or 
rationalities and of their historicity.13 He also supposes the investigations concerning the 
correlative constitution of intersubjectivity (correlative since intersubjectivity is the source and 
the concrete condition of objectivity), and of course the method of the eidetic and transcendental 
reductions. 
12 Husserl's investigations in Formal and Transcendental Logic are a response to the modern fl'I'ersal of 
th~ relations hetween logic. as a science of pure normative principles of every possihle science. and the 
particular sciences. The result of this reversal heing not only that the sciences have made themselves 
independent hut also irresponsihle: aiming "at a sort of merely technical productivity". they are unahle to 
understand in a rational way the sense of their practical or theoretical activityand how this activity i" related 
to the sense of liJe. the sense of our whole world and culture. FfL. pp. 4--6. 
11 Derrida. Jacques, Rogues. Two Essays On Reason. translated hy Pascale-Anne Brault and ~1Jchael Naas. 
Stanford, Stanford UnIversity Press, 2005. pp .. 120, 128. 
Husserl's return inquiry (Ruckfrage) in the Origin concerning the historical genesis of 
geometry, is according to Derrida, the "proper historical repetition" of the question which 
inaugurated and defined the very project of phenomenology since the Logical Im'estigatiol1s and 
even the Philosophy of Arithmetic: the question of the phenomenological origin of ideal 
objectivity in general, and the question of the foundation of the objectivity (Objecti\'itiit) of logic 
and of arithmetic in particular, in the concrete and productive acts of a nonempirical and 
constitutive subjectivity.14 This "proper repetition" of the old question will accentuate its 
difficulty to the point of making it "the crucial difficulty" of all Husserl's philosophy of history: 
not only how is the objectivity of geometry possible, but what is the sense of geometry's coming 
to being and appearing as a cultural formation within a historically determined culture? (lOG, p. 
72) 
What Derrida emphasises in his Introduction is Husserl's double critique of objectivism 
and historicism. In the Origin Husserl relied on the interrelation of these two critiques which had 
already been developed separately and put to test, successfully according to Derrida, in previous 
investigations. But when the question of history breaks into phenomenology the conjunction of 
this double refutation of historicism and objectivism becomes decisive for the fundamental 
problem of the radical foundation of objectivity (Objectivitiit): it will bring into light the peculiar 
and unique historicity of the ideal objectivities (Gegenstiindlichkeiten) of science itself. Husserl's 
question in the Origin concerning the historical sense of geometry's origin (and geometry is the 
exemplary index of being-scientific) is not put from an ahistorical point of view. Rather, by going 
beyond the opposition between objectivism and historicism, Husserl opens the space for an 
unheard-of style of historical (historische) questioning of the idea of objectivity, that is, of the 
idea and sense of truth. Where does this idea come from? How is objectivity's value and sense 
constituted? Who is responsible for it? Or how was it constituted in the "spiritual space of a 
single nation, the Greek nation?" Or how is theory's order or authority constituted, how theory 
and the "theoretical attitude" become prevalent in the history of European philosophy? How they 
1-1 For the definition of the phenomenological origin in distinction to genesis in the H'ordl.\' human and 
natural sciences sec L1, I, Prolegomena to Pure Logic, §67, p. 238. Phenomenology is not a wordly science 
hut, according to Fink's formulation a science of "the origin of the world." Fink. Eugen. "The 
Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husser! and Contemporary Criticism". in The Phenomellology o{ 
Husserl, ed .. R.O. EI\'l~tlln. Chicago: Quandranglc Books, 1970. p. 95. For the influence of Fink'.., 
interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology on Derrida's interpretation see also Leonard Laulor "Derrida 
and HusserL The hasic prohlcm of phenomenology", Indiana Uniwrsity Press. 200~, pp. 11-23. Derrida in 
his Illtroductioll will discern the Kantian retrospection towards the origin of mathematic.., from the 
Husserlian Riickfi'ogc hy reaffirming Fink's formulation of the difference hetween the illtr(/\\'()rdlines.1 (lj 
the Kantian critique and Husser!'s investigation llf the origin of the world. (lOC. r .. 42n) 
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have become degraded in an irresponsible theoritism, in the "objectivist attitude"? Ho\\ one 
should respond to the "crisis" of European sciences and philosophy? 
The critical denunciation of objectivist and technicist irresponsibility in the practice of 
science becomes the starting point or the inaugural motif in Formal and Transcendental Logic. In 
the Introduction to this work "the tragedy of modem spirit, the defect in our scientific situation" 
is recognized by Husserl in the fact that "science as a special science has become a theoretical 
technique" and has abandoned "scientific self-responsibility .. ·15 The specialized sciences have 
made themselves independent from logic as "the theory of the pure principles of possible 
cognition and science", and "technical productivity" has been substituted for "the productivity of 
a radical self-testing by normative principles." These emancipated specialized sciences fail to 
understand the necessary "one-sidedness of their productions" (necessary since each science has 
necessarily its own rationality, that is, its own eidetic objectivity and region, method, and 
historicity.) They fail because they do not relate their specialized researches "to the universality 
of being and its fundamental essential unity." Husserl denounces the "objectivism" or "self-
forgetfulness" of the scientific investigator who in his studies and theoretical productions remains 
exclusively within the a priori and objective thematic field of his science, but who lacks "insight 
into the ratio of [his] accomplished production" and "who ... accordingly knows nothing of the 
inwardness of that producing - who lives in producing, but does not have this productive living 
itself as a theme [our emphasis] within his field of vision".16 A formal and transcendental logic, 
as the science of science, must, according to Husserl, reinforce the objective attitude of the 
traditional scientist or logicist with a reflective attitude: a radical sense investigation (radikale 
Besinnung) will criticize the evidences of traditional logic, by returning, once again, to a 
constituting transcendental SUbjectivity and to the clarification of its activities and logical 
productions (Leistungen). 
It is however in the Crisis. in the so-called Vienna Lecture and in the Origin that the 
paradoxical renunciation of objectivism will acquire its sharpest expression. Galileo, that 
"discovering and concealing genius" - whose name in the Crisis is an exemplary index of the 
objectivist attitude - has made possible, by a "revolutionary" invention, the infinite 
mathematization of nature, and the objective-exact science of nature (as an infinite project or 
task), but at the same time he concealed the creative and historical acti vity of a concrete 
subjectivity which alone could be responsible for the creation and tradition of this science. For 
HusserI. on the contrary, the temporal and creative acts of this historical subjectivity are always 
1'i 
. FfL. p. ~. 
It> Ih'd \1 I .. p. _. 
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based on the life-world as a cultural world. Having in fact brought about "the surreptitious 
substitution of the mathematically constructed world of idealities for the only real \\ orld. the one 
that is actually given through perception that is ever experienced and experienceable - our 
everyday life-world (Lebenswelt)", it was "a fateful omission" that Galileo did not inquire back 
into the original sense of the mathematical idealization, into the sense of the subjecti \e and 
historical praxis which engendered it. l ? 
As Husserl describes it, the critical significance of our situation. the failure of our 
sciences is determined less, if at all, as an epistemological problem (related to some 
epistemological conflict inherent In the historical becoming of these sciences) than as the 
detachment, in their theoretical and practical activity, from their bases in the life-H'or/d, as the 
falsification of the sense of their activity and objects, and as the forgetfulness of their origins. 
What is fundamental for a genuine science with radical responsibility is, according to Derrida's 
interpretation, its "sense for life" and "the possibility of being related to our whole world". 
According to Derrida, Husserl acknowledges that 
this freeing of science with respect to its bases in the Lebenswelt and its founding subjective acts 
undoubtedly remains a necessary condition of its conquests (our emphasis). But this freeing also involves 
the threat of an objectivist alienation, which conceals the instituting origins and renders them strange and 
inaccessible to us .... To meditate on or investigate the sense (besinnen) of origins is at the same time to: 
make oneself responsible (verantworten) for the sense (Sinn) of science and philosophy, ... and put oneself 
in a position of responsibility for this sense starting from the total sense of our existence. lOG, p. 31. 
Does this critique of objectivism, however, and the return to history, to the life-world as 
cultural-historical world, compel Husserl to reconsider his criticism of historicism which he has 
formulated already in the Philosophy as a Rigorous Science (1911)? Not at all. According to 
Derrida, the critique of historicism, along with the critique of psychologism in Logical 
Im'csfigafions, is in Husserl's trajectory, but also for the entirety of phenomenology's project, a 
crucial and decisive motif: the essential possibility of philosophy and of science in general is 
what is at stake there. This, however, is not to say that Husserl wished to give up history In 
general, or to relegate it to some relativism or empiricism. Quite the contrary. According to 
Husserl, historicism not only fails to acknowledge the irreducible and unique historicity of 
science and philosophy, but also, driven by "the superstition of the fact,,,18 eliminates it by 
reducing it to a historical factuality (a factuality which can be totally embraced and investigated 
17 Crisis §9h has the titk: "The I{fe-world as the forgotten lIleaningJlllldamellf (~f natural science "p49. "Cl' 
ubn §§ 791, 15. 
IK Phih1"ophy a" Rigorous Scicnce (hen.:after cited as PRS)' in Husser!. Edmund. Shorter H'orks. edited h~ 
Peln Ml' Cormick and Frederick A Elliston. Bright()n. Harvester University Press. 1981. pp. 166-197. [the 
ubove quote is found on p. 193.] 
by an empirical sCIence of facts, a Tatsachenwissenschaft.). And by reducing the ongm and 
history of science to factuality, historicism reduces the question of an infinite responsibility. "the 
responsibility", Husserl says, we philosophers "have in regard to humanity", to a "provisional 
morality. ,,]9 
Husserl's Riickfrage, the sense of the return inquiry and of the question concernmg 
origins, concerning the birth of philosophy, of science and of the idea of truth, cannot be reduced 
to a factual history. Despite its incontestable interest, this history is always reduced by Husserl as 
"factuality or science of constituted and intrawordly factuality." This reduction. however, is not a 
simple refutation: after we have questioned its primordial sense, an empirical history of the 
sciences can be given, by all right, free reign. 
In "'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology" (1959), Derrida follows Husserl' s 
itinerary and reconstitutes the development of the sense of the question of origin from the 
Philosophy to Arithmetic to Ideas I up to the Origin. Derrida discerns two major stages or steps 
in this development: a) the transition from the first genetic investigations tainted by 
psychologism in the Philosophy of Arithmetic to the first phase of phenomenology, with the 
reduction of psychologism in Logical Investigations and of historicism in Philosophy as Rigorous 
Science, and b) the transition from structural analyses of static constitution in Ideas I, to the 
analyses of genetic constitution in Cartesian Meditations, Formal and Transcendental Logic, 
analyses which open phenomenology to a teleological history in Crisis and Origin of Geometry. 
These stages are seen by Derrida as different attempts, different ways of reconciling the 
"structuralist demand" with the "genetic demand".2o Phenomenology throughout this 
development is conceived as a science of eidetic-transcendental structures, of a priori and 
objective essences, but also a science of genesis, of lived experiences, a science which describes 
the origin of the world (the world being the totality of structures and essences) as originary 
ego logical consciousness. 
Despite the extraordinary and undeniable evolution of Husserl's thought on the problem 
of the foundation of the ideal sense-structures of sciences. the steps he took all along his itinerary 
reveal a fundamental continuity and unity: anti-psychologism and anti-historicism. (And Derrida 
has often emphasized the profound influence that these two Husserlian motifs of anti-
19 esp. p. 161. 
2() "Husser! ... ceaselessly attempts to reconcile the structuralist demand (which leads to the cnmprcheO'ol\e 
dL'scription of a totality. of a form or a function organized according to an internal legality in which 
clements have meaning only in the solidarity of their correlation or their opposition l. WIth the genetic 
demand (that is for the (lriglll and foundation of the structure)." esp. p. 157. 
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psychologism and of anti-historicism had on his work and thought).21 Already in his genetic 
researches in the Philosophy of Arithmetic, Husserl poses the question of the origin or foundation 
of "the objectivity of a structure, that of numbers and arithmetical series" by returning to the 
structure of perception (organized in a pre-mathematical level) and the acts of a concrete 
subjectivity.22 This is also the difficulty of the question from which the phenomenological attitude 
will be born: how to reconcile an analysis of the subjective origin of the objects of arithmetic in 
the lived experiences of their production with the recognition of their absolute objectivity and 
ideal normativity? But if Husserl did not as yet resist completely the psychologist temptation, he 
refused to assign to the positive acts, facts or psychic events of an empirical consciousness the 
epistemological validation of the ideal objectivity of arithmetic. 23 For Husserl, and here lies the 
originality of his analysis, ideal mathematical objectivities have their original place neither in 
some topos ouranios nor, however, in the natural operations of a psychological consciousness. 
The sense (Sinn) of the number is not bound to the intentionality of a factual consciousness. This 
sense, as the ideal objectivity and normativity of the number, is, on the contrary, independent and 
absolutely free with regard to every de facto empirical or psychological consciousness. 
According to Derrida, the transition to the phenomenological and structuralist attitude, 
reached in Logical Investigation and especially in Ideas I, was not an easy route since Husserl 
"had to navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis of logicizing structuralism and psychologistic 
genetism". The former would, "in the then Platonic or Kantian style", uproot the ideality of 
numbers (or of logic) from all concrete subjectivity and history and the latter would reduce it to 
the empirical facts of a psychological subjectivity.24 The transition is accomplished only with the 
discovery of a concrete, but nonempirical, transcendental subjectivity which would be 
constituting, the absolute and living source of all sense and all ideal objectivity. Husserl prepared 
the access to this constituting SUbjectivity through the practice of diverse reductions which were 
presented initially as neutralizations of all psychological and factual subjectivity. Similarly. to the 
extent that every genesis is considered to be associative (in the sense of empirical psychology), 
causal, factual or, what Husserl calls, wordly, it is also reduced, as the domain of 
~I Sl.:e for the anti-psychologist attitude in Derrida's thought in A Taste for the Secret (translated by 
Giacomo Donis. Polity Press, 2001) p. 35-6, Speech and Phenomena. pp. 10tf. and for the anti-historicist 
attitude. which is also an anti-relativism. in Positions (translated by Alan Bass, Chkago. The University of 
Chicago Press. 1981) p. I ()-l-105. and Negotiations. p. 156-7. 
" 
-- GSP. p.161. 
2~ .•... he basL's his entire psychological analysis on the already given possibility of an objective et\l'as 
iihnhallpt . ... which designates the intentional dimension of objecti\ity. the transcen~ental rdation.tl: the 
objl.:ct that no psychological gcnesis can institute but can only presuppose 1Il It-. own possIbIlIty. 
Cl;nseljuently the respect for arithmdical sens£'. for its ideality and its normati\'ity. forbids Husser! any 
~sychological deduction of the number." Ibid .. p. 158. 
-~ G.\'?, p. 158. 
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Tatsachenwissenschaften, in view of a transcendental genesis or origin. As Derrida says. even in 
the beginning of Husserl's itinerary, "it is not genetic description in general which is disqualified. 
but only the genetic description which borrows its schemas from naturalism and causalism, and 
depends upon a science of 'facts' and therefore on an empiricism; and therefore, concludes 
Husserl, depends upon a relativism incapable of insuring its own truth; therefore. on a 
scepticism. ,,25. 
According to Derrida, Husserl's critique of psychologism was followed by a refutation of 
historicism in Philosophy as Rigorous Science and by the reduction of factual history in Ideas I. 
In Philosophy as Rigorous Science posing the question of the ultimate theoretical foundation of 
the idea of philosophy and science, Husserl has recognized the seductive power of Dilthey's 
Weltanschauungsphilosophie. By making the radical distinction between natural reality and 
history of the spirit (an essential and decisive distinction for the possibility of the science of 
history itself), by making the distinction between physical structures and mental structures, by 
avoiding causalism (as the principle of all relationships in natural reality), Dilthey criticized the 
positive naturalization of the life and history of the spirit. Furthermore. Dilthey also renewed the 
structuralist project by recognizing "that there exist totalitarian structures endowed with a unity of 
internal sense, cultural worlds all of whose functions and manifestations are solidary and to which 
Weltanschauungen correspond correlatively,,,26 and by making them, according to Husserl, 
"understandable" and "explicable" by means of investigating "the spiritual moti vation" that 
determines them and "by reliving them from within ... 27 
Dilthey's "instructive" structuralism, however, remained a historicism: the spiritual 
structures or essences of finite totalities and the typology of cultural totalities (as figures of spirit) 
remain relative or "bound" to empirical history.28 It is only by means of historicism, Husserl says, 
that Dilthey can remain exclusively within the factual sphere of the empirical life of the spirit and 
confuse it with the ideal value and history of truth (i.e., of philosophy and science). But then 
Weltanschauungsphilophie, by reducing the idea and value of truth to a historical factuality, can 
avoid neither relativism nor scepticism.29 Contrary to the historicism of 
2) Ihid .. p. 159. 
'n h'd 
- I I .. p. 160. 
'7 
- PRS. p. 186. 
2X Ahout the difference hetween the "hound ideality" of Weltanschaaungen and the "free ideality" of 
sl'ielltitic ohjecti\ities we will speak extensively helow. 
2') Husserl ~rites "I do not understand how he [Dilthey] thinks that from his so instructi\e analysis of the 
structure and typology of Weltanschallllllgen he has ohtained decisin: arguments against sn:pticism. For 
[".J a humanistic science that is at the same time empirical can argue neither for nor against anything 
laying claim tn ohjeL'li\e \alidity," PRS. p, 197n. "The science of history. or simply humanisti~ science In 
~eneral. can of itself decide nothing. either in a positi\ L' or in a negative sense. as to whether a dlstlnctHlIl IS 
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Weltanschauungsphilosophie which remains dependent on an empirical history, on a history as 
Tatsachenwissenschajt, the phenomenologist and "certainly the mathematician too will not tum to 
historical science to be taught about the truth of mathematical theories. It will not occur to him to 
relate the historical development of mathematical representations with the question of truth. ,,30 
Faithful to this anti-historicism, Husserl will announce in Ideas I, and precisely 
concerning the question of geometry's history or heritage, the distinction between an empiricist 
extrinsic circumspection and a phenomenological intrinsic penetration of history. In §25 Husserl 
criticizes the empiricism, both psychologistic and historicist, which remains "outside" the 
internal history of the purely eidetic science of geometry. "One must not philosophize and 
psychologise about geometrical thinking and intuiting from outside instead of livingly entering 
into these activities and determining through direct analyses their immanent sense. ,,31 Once 
factual or extrinsic history is reduced or neutralized, in order for the ideal normativity and 
objectivity of geometry's sense to be revealed, Husserl can proceed to the penetration of the 
internal, i.e., essential, sense and its historicity. According to Derrida, this initial neutralization of 
factual (or wordly) genesis and history "will never be removed in the Origin [. .. J This is because 
"Philosophy as Rigorous Science" was concerned with responding to the kind of historicism 
which reduced norm to fact, and Ideas I, with situating geometry in an exemplary fashion among 
the pure essential sciences. Since no existential thesis (Daseinthesis) was necessary or permitted, 
these sciences were immediately freed from all factuality. No sensible figuration in the world, no 
psychological experience, no factual [evenementiel] content have, as such, any instituting sense" 
(lOG, p. 44). 
From Ideas I, then, up until the Origin, the essential phenomenological distinction 
between wordly and transcendental genesis (or origin) remains irreducible, and factual history is 
granted only a mediocre interest, since it remains extrinsic and in the best case strictly parallel to 
the internal history of the geometrical eidos. But it remains for us to see, however, how in the 
Origin Husserl will complicate this distinction by returning to the constitutiwc' history of 
geometry, and by investigating the history of geometry as a cultural form and tradition. In Ideas 
I, Husserl describes geometry's truth only in a negath'e way, but in the Origin "the positiYe 
ground of truth" will be "investigated for itself'. (lOG, p. 44n) In Ideas I Husserl describes the 
to he made hetween art as a clllrural formation and mlid art, hetween historical and \alid law, and finally 
hctwL'cn historical and valid philosophy." Ihid .. p. 187 
~() Ihid .. p. un. 
~I Idem I. ~25 p. 46. 
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nondependence of geometrical truth with regard to all factual existence, its autonom\ compared 
to natural reality and the lived experience of perception. 32 
As we are going to see, a perception of the immediately present, natural shape of a real 
thing can, to be sure, ground idealities, but only bound idealities, i.e., bound to an empirical 
subjectivity and to the sensible reality that it intents. It cannot ground absolutely geometrical 
idealities, which are free idealities, absolutely free from every empirical subjectivity and factual 
reality. Husserl's merit, however, and the difficulty of his historical investigation consists. 
according to Derrida, in revealing the apriori system of self-evidences pertaining to the 
empirically perceived or intuited (and always culturally informed) world of bodies, the "uni\'ersal 
life-world a priori ,,33 as the ground of all theoretical life, the ground, in particular, of the 
geometrical idealization of lived space. Without this grounding, the apriori system or systems of 
mathematics are hanging "in mid-air". (Crisis, § 36, p. 141, lOG, p. 119) 
And yet Husser1' s itinerary from Ideas I, the transition from the structural and static 
phase, which justifies the reduction of wordly history, to the Origin, to the historico-teleo10gical 
route of phenomenology, according to Derrida, "is still a simple progress which implies no 
'surpassing' and still less an opttion, and especially not a repentance.,,34Derrida will often 
emphasize in his Introduction the indispensable character of the previous structural descriptions 
for the genetic project itself: the ambition of the latter depends on the former, on the rigor of the 
distinctions and method of structural phenomenology. (JOG, pp .. 5] ,55, 97) Before we attempt to 
follow this "movement interior to phenomenology" and the transition to the historical 
investigations, we should emphasize the radical "impossibilit), of closing a structural 
phenomenology", as well as, the "transcendentality of the opening" which characterizes, 
according to Derrida, the structure of all transcendental consciousness, the infinitely open 
structure of consciousness which Husser] describes in Ideas 1. 35 Without this transcendental or 
32 In Ideas I §7, p. 16, Husserl describes the eidetic intangibility of geometry's truth by having recourse to 
halluc i nation . 
. ,3 Derrida will emphasise that the Husserian return or reduction to the pre-scientifice life-world does not 
ahdicate "scientific quality in general". Contrary to the "irresponsible empiricism" of those 
"phenomenologies of prescientific perception. Husserl's "'thematization' of the Lebenswelt must be 
·scientific"'. that is. it must disclose the "uni\'ersal life-world a priori". lOG. p. 120. 
'-l GSP p. 156. The phenomenological description and the constituti\'c analyses of pure consciousness (as 
the Ur-regioll) in Ideas I arc static in their n:ry design. they are de\cloped. as Husserl says. from within a 
"constituted temporality" (koll.lfiruiterter Zeitlichkeit) §~5, Also in Ideas I §81 Husserl indicates. while 
justifying them. the limits of static description and the necessity of passing to the gellctic descriptioll. See 
also C'Sp, pp. 167. ~~~, and lOG. p. l)h . 
. ,~ GSP, p. 16.~. 
essential opening of consciousness itself, no genetic preoccupation of the phenomenologist would 
ever be possible or, indeed, necessary. 
After the discovery of the transcendental reduction in Ideas I, Husserl will describe 
transcendental intentionality as "an original structure, an archi-structure (Ur-Structure) with four 
poles and two correlations: the noetico-noematic correlation or structure and the morphe-hyle 
correlation of structure.,,36 Now these two structures are totally open, they are two poles of 
opening, and Husserl, according to Derrida, describes them as the very possibility of genesis 
itself, i.e., as the possibility of consciousness to exercise its intentional activity as well as the 
possibility of noema or sense in general. We will come back several times to it. For the moment 
let us underline the impossibility of closing this "structural phenomenology", an impossibility 
which, according to Derrida, is principled, essential and structural. The impossibility of closure, 
that is, of fulfillment or realization of a lived experience in a plenitude. in an experience of 
adequation, belongs to the telos of all experience, and is indicated by Husserl with his reference 
to the Idea in the Kantian sense, to the idea of the infinite horizon of a lived experience. With 
regard to the infinite opening of the telos (of the teleological Idea) which guides Husserl's 
description of transcendental experience, Derrida writes: 
It is the infinite opening of what is experienced, which is designated at several moments of 
Husserlian analysis by reference to an Idea in the Kantian sense, that is, the irruption of the infinite into 
consciousness, which permits the unification of the temporal flux of consciousness just as it unifies the 
object and the world by anticipation, and despite an irreducible incompleteness. 37 
As we are going to see, this philosophical teleology, guided by the Idea in the Kantian 
sense and intimately bound up with the Husserlian theme of intentionality, develops into a 
veritable philosophy of history in the Crisis and in the Origin where it is linked to the idea of a 
philosophical task. Derrida here follows Paul Ricoeur's "Husserl and the Sense of History", in 
which the latter recognizes the unity of Husserl' s thought, from the reduction of factual history in 
Ideas I to the historical phenomenology of the Crisis, in "the mediating role between 
consciousness and history which is assigned to Ideas (to Ideas in the Kantian sense.)" 3X 
Derrida will not follow Ricoeur, however, in his critical assessement of Husserl's 
conception of history and of the teleological Idea as a "theoretical project" and as failing to 
understand "the historicity of history", as "sacrificing the ethical and aesthetic aspects and the 
other cultural traits of the Idea.,,39 As Derrida will emphasise several times, and, in particular. in 
.~fl Ibid. p. 162. 
17 Ibid., 
~X. Paul Ricoeur in Paul Ricueur. Husserl: All Analysis of His Phmomell%gr. translated by Edward G. 
Ballard and LCSILT L Embree. E\anslon, Northwestern Uni\'ersity Pres'>, 1967, p. 1-'+5. 
w Ihid .. p. 169-70 
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a crucial footnote referring to Levinas, the Idea (in the Kantian sense) is "the common root of the 
theoretical and the ethical. ... theoretical consciousness, is nothing other, in itself and thoroughly 
understood, than a practical consciousness." (lOG, p. 136n) 
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2) The Sense and the Method of the Question of Origin: the Riickfrage 
According to Derrida, Husserl in his radical investigation of the primordial and original}' 
sense of geometry discloses and describes the prescription of a more general and uni \'ersal task of 
reason: a universal teleology of reason was at work in human history well before the ad\'ent of 
mathematics, of science in general and of philosophy. The phenomenological sense of history, of 
the sciences but also of all human production, will be shifted so as to be indissociable from its 
teleological sense. This shift is not irrelevant to a certain concept of writing, which in the Origin 
will have a decisive role. According to Derrida, HusserI's "original merit" in these historical 
meditations concerning the genesis of geometry lies in his description, "in a properly 
transcendental step (in the sense of that word which Kantianism cannot exhaust), [of] the 
conditions of possibility for history which were at the same time concrete" (lOG. p. 117). 
This transcendental description of the conditions of possibility goes beyond Kantianism 
for two basic reasons. Firstly, because these conditions are not only formal but also, as Derrida 
writes, concrete: they are always lived or experienced under the form of the hori;:,oll. And 
secondly, Husserl was able to make the concrete, but non empirical, historicity of geometrical 
ideal objects his theme, and to acquire an access to the eidos of historicity in general, only by 
taking the decisive transcendental step with an intentional analysis of language and, especially, of 
writing. 
In connection with one particular example, namely that of the ideal objectivities of 
geometry, HusserI will demonstrate that writing is not an auxiliary means in the service of science 
but first of all the condition of the possibility of ideal objects and therefore of scientific 
objectivity. Before being a means or an object of science, writing is the condition of episteme. 
But even further, if it is not just a mnemotechnical devise for the archivation and historical 
sedimentation of truth, if truth, but also every spiritually (i.e., culturally) constituted sense in 
generaL could not exist before or outside it, writing is the sine qua non condition of history, and 
of the historicity of truth itself. It is also on the basis of HusserI's analysis of writing in the 
Origin that Derrida will attempt to demonstrate in Of Grammatology "that historicity itself is tied 
to the possibility of writing; to the possibility of writing in general, beyond those particular forms 
of writing in the name of which we have long spoken of peoples without writing and without 
history. Before being the object of history - of an historical science - writing opens the field of 
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history - of historical becoming. And the fonner (Historie) presupposes the latter 
(Geschichte). ,,40 
HusserI's "unheard-of style" of historical investigation, this new reading and discourse on 
the origin and tradition of scientific idealities will proceed according to the movement of a 
radical sense investigation, of a radical Ruckfrage. According to Derrida, we can disclose the 
radicality of the Ruckfrage if we pay a closer attention to some methodological reflections. which 
for Husserl are nothing but some ''formal generalities" - "This return inquiry (Ruckfrage) 
unavoidably remains within the sphere of generalities, but, as we shall soon see, these are 
generalities which can be richly explicated" (OG, p. 158). If the explication, clarification and 
sense investigation of these generalities or "trivialities ", as Husser! calls them in Crisis (§9h). 
acquire such an important significance in a historical retrospection into the birth of the sciences, it 
is because they have been forgotten and buried by the objectivist naivete of all modern science 
and philosophy: the question of the responsibility of the sciences themselves is at stake here. 
According to Derrida, Husser! is a philosopher of the method. But, as he also notes, 
"despite certain appearances, philosophers of method are perhaps more profoundly sensitive to 
historicity, even though they seem to remove digressions from history's path" (lOG, p. 38). We 
should not take this method as some "neutral preface or perambulatory exercise of thought". 
Rather, as Derrida will try to show, "phenomenology as method of discourse ... is thought itself 
in the consciousness of its complete historicity. "41 These methodological reflections devoted to 
the history of geometry in the first pages of the Origin, are not only exemplary for sense-
investigations pertaining to other sciences, but also fully historical in character: they concern the 
phenomenon of history in general, the phenomenal system of "what happens in general", of what 
can appear for a concrete and constituting consciousness, they concern. as Derrida puts it in 
Violence and Metaphysics, the origin and legitimacy of all scientific discourse (and therefore of a 
,)11 Jacques Derrida. Of Grammatology. translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, London. The John 
Hopkins University Press. 197-+. p. 27. At the same time Derrida will point to a writing that "is" older than 
"truth", and even older than "history," which is always the history of man, the animal rationale. This 
arehc-writing - as the graphics or "the processes of difJerance, trace, iterability, ex-appropriation ", that is. 
thc processes which are not proper to man alone - is what provided. according to Derrida. the most 
formidahle difference. and ncver stopped threatening the philosophical project of truth or knowledge since 
its inception . 
.j 1 lOG. p. 1-+7. The Derridean affirmation of the historical character of the n:ductions comes to correct an 
interpretation of thc Husserlian method which has hecome dominant since Le\inas. who in his first work 
writes that "the historical role of the reduction and the meaning of its appearance at a certain moment of 
L'\istence are. for Husser\. not even a prohlem." The Theory (~r Intuition in Husser!'.1 Phenomenology, 
translated n\' Andr0 Orianne. E\anston. North\\cstem University Press. 1995. p. 157. 
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discourse on history), and ultimately, as Derrida puts it in the Introduction, "phenomenology's 
juridical priority in all philosophical discourse" (lOG, p. 152). 
According to Derrida, Husser's Riickfrage in the Origin puts into practice the method of 
the reactivating reduction: its aim is to reactivate, reawaken and bring to present evidence the 
primordial sense of the instituting acts of geometry, of the subjective and historical acts which 
created the science of geometry. As we are going to see, reactivation, the "capacity for 
reactivation that", as Husserl says, "belongs originally to every human being" (OG, p. 164), is an 
essentially voluntary operation: it signifies the will, the freedom, the decided return of the subject, 
of the scientific investigator, back to the forgotten sense, and to the hidden historical ground of all 
scientific objectivity in general. For the phenomenologist, reactivation signifies the possibility or 
ability to open and penetrate a hidden historical field, the intentional and internal history of a 
nonempirical object, that of geometrical objectivities. 
The return inquiry (Riickfrage) into the instituting or founding acts which bestowed 
geometry with its originary sense cannot be contained within an empirico-historical determination 
of the factual beginnings of geometry. Husserl is not interested in the empirical content of the 
origin, he does not seek to determine the empirical facts of the birth of geometrical sense and 
truth, he does not ask what were in fact the first geometrical acts or who were in fact the first 
geometers. Historical information about names, dates, places, and documents can certainly be 
provided and thereby confirm the de facto rootedness of geometrical representations, i.e., of truth, 
in intrawordly factuality, in a historical here and now, but it can say to us nothing, we learn 
nothing, Husserl says, about the sense of its originary and instituting acts: a sense which is 
necessary and compared to which all the facts of the world related to geometry can have only an 
exemplary signification. In comparison 'rvith the sense or the truth of geometr.Y. whose proper 
historicity Husserl wishes to grasp, all facto-historical interconnections of geometrical 
representations should be variable at will. 
In order for an empirical history of geometry to be conceived of, one must already have 
an understanding, an implicit and more or less dogmatic pre-comprehension of what geometry 
and history is, of what is the sense of its origin and historicity, and under what conditions they 
are possible. The classical historian of science, who investigates and utilizes factual givens (the 
first geometrical documents and writings, but also other geographical or cultural gi vens), does not 
ask this question and hence precipitates the answer by presupposing a phenomenological 
clarification which has not yet taken place. Husserl will attempt to disclose the presuppositions 
which e\'cry empirical investigation necessarily implies in its very possibility and enactment. 
Furthermore, empirical history remains caught up in the self-evident truth of geometry without 
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making this truth itself, and the how of its origin a theme of sense-investigation (Besinnlll1g).~2 
After the illumination of the sense of this origin, empirical history can be given free reign. 
Phenomenological critique as the apriori determination of formal and material essences, as the 
investigation of the "sources" of different regions of being and of the ontologies that belong 
therewith, should de jure precede every empirical investigation, and therefore every material 
historical investigation. In this sense, the phenomenologist has no need of the historical facts as 
such, of the historical content of the fact, in order to bring back the historian to the unnoticed 
presuppositions of his discourse and to reveal to him the apriori sense of his investigation and 
objects. 
HusserI's Riickfrage is not a historico-empirical question. The reference to the Greek 
origin of geometry, to the historical birth place of science and philosophy, does not have for 
Husserl an external, historico-empirical sense. The notion of internal or inner historicity of sense, 
as it is elaborated by Husserl in Ideas I and in the Origin, and precisely by freeing himself from 
all historical factuality and from all historical authority, forbids us to understand this return to 
Greece as a historicism or even an Occidentalism. The truth of science and philosophy does not 
depend upon its relation to the actuality of the Greek event: the latter is only the factual index of 
an internal sense of origin, of an internal history of sense. We can say that, on the contrary, 
Husserl gains access to the Greek or European eidos through "the irruption of philosophy and its 
branches, the sciences." This is "the irruption of the infinite as a revolution within empirical 
culture" (lOG, p. 59), i.e., the irruption of, what Husserl calls in the Vienna Lecture, "a new sense 
of infinity" and of "a new sort of praxis" which have brought about nothing less than a 
"revolutionization of historicity" itself. The eidos of Europe, the "spiritual figure" of Europe, 
refers to the ideal of a "new sort of praxis," to the idea of an infinite task as philosophical theoria, 
to what has also inaugurated the perpetual transformation of mankind into "a mankind with 
infinite tasks". The origin of European eidos merges then with the spiritual telos of European 
humanity, "in which the particular telos of particular nations and of individual men is 
. d"~' contmne . -
As an archeo-teleological reading of history (of geometry and of the sciences in general), 
the phenomenological Riickfrage would have to show and clarify, according to Derrida, before 
everything else three things: 
~~ The meaning of the Riickfrage can not he reduced to an investigation of a general concept of geometr) 
that eould be "extracted or ahstracted from various known geometries." Rather it is the "primordial 
concrl'fc essence of geometry". which is the ohject of Husserl's investigation. and which "makes such a 
generalizing operation possihle" (lOG. p. 52). As we are going to sec, in order to question the sense of its 
llri!2in. Husserl will also get rid of constituted geometry and of all geometrical hahits. 
·n '~Thl' \ 'ienn{l Lecture" puhlished in Crisis pp. 273, 275. 279, 283. 
1) that history, as empirical science, is, like all empirical sciences, dependent on phenomenology - which 
alone could reveal to it its fund of eidetic presuppositions. 
2) that history - whose own content (contrary to that of other material and dependent sciences) is, by \irtue 
of its sense of being, always marked by oneness and irreversibility, i.e., by nonexemplariness - still lent 
itself to imaginary variations and to eidetic intuitions. 
3) that, in addition to the empirical and non-exemplary content of history, a certain eidetic content has been 
produced or revealed in a history which irreducibly inhabits its being-sense. (my emphasis) lOG, p. 30. 
Let us explicate how the question of the arche. or the origin of a sense-structure (of "an 
eidetic content") is indissociable from the question of its telos, how they are mutually implicated 
and merge into each other. The Husserlian Riickfrage, as we saw, de jure precedes and conditions 
the empirical determination of the historical facts of geometry. (OG, p. 158) Now this juridical 
and methodological priority of the Riickfrage does not contradict the factual priority of the history 
of geometry, on the contrary, in a sense which we have to make precise, it supposes it: before and 
in order for the phenomenologist to pose the question of the sense of geometry's origin, there 
must always have been the fact of the history of geometry, the fact that the eidos of geometry has 
already been created in the past, and the fact that it has been transmitted, developed and reached 
its present-day form through generations of geometers. 
As a phenomenologist I find myself in a sort of a circle: I can perform an eidetico-
teleological reading of geometry only after the fact that geometry has already been constituted, 
transmitted and given to me in its present day form by tradition. As a matter of fact, I do have 
experience of this "ready-made, handed-down" geometry as one cultural formation among others 
given to me beforehand, as a cultural tradition bearing within it its sense. "I must already have a 
nai"ve knowledge of geometry and I must not begin at its origin.".+4 According to Husserl, I must 
start with existing, ready-made geometry in order to go back through it, following a ~igzag way of 
proceeding, which is the way of the phenomenological reductions, so as to attain to and question 
the origin of its sense (as well as the sense of its origin and its tradition). The phenomenologist, 
then, finds himself in a circle, which is, according to Derrida, "only the pure form of every 
historical experience" (lOG, p. 51). Husserl writes: 
Thus we tind ourselves in a sort of circle. The understanding of the beginnings is to be gained 
fully only by starting with science as given in its present-day form, looking back at its development. But in 
the absence of an understanding of the beginnings the development is mute as development of sense. Thus 
we have no choice than to proceed forward and backward in a 'zigzag' pattern: the one must help the other 
in an interplay (Wechsespiel) ... (our emphasis).t5 
.j.j lOG. p. 38. I do not produce geometry, I do not perform the inaugural and instituti\\~ of the science of 
geometry reduction: this reduction - a reduction which. according to Husserl is the highest form of culture 
_ which frees the ~eometrical eidos form all sensible and imaginary space. i.e., from all lived space. by an 
act of ideali/ation~or inliniti/ation. this reduction has already been done by the absolutely creative acts of 
the protogL'ol1lcter. 
·I'i C .. /;C)/ el' 
nll,\, ~ • V .10. 
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Let us emphasize this last word. It is important in order to understand the relation 
between the eidetic and transcendental reductions, as they are practiced by Husserl in the Origin, 
and see that there is no question of priority of one reduction over the other, but only an interplay 
of reciprocal inspiration, an interplay which underlines the difficulty of every starting point 
guiding investigations on historicity and which forces Husserl to go back to the oriain throuah a 
b b 
series of zigzags. 
If, as Derrida stresses, the phenomenological method (in its two aspects, the eidetic and 
the transcendental) takes de facto its starting point in historical factuality (and the historical 
production and tradition of the geometrical eidos is such a fact), if the Ruck/rage is put or has 
meaning only after the fact, 46 this means that an "irreducible delay" (starting from the fact, after 
the fact) which is neither a mere accident nor a misfortune, has a fundamental and constitutive 
value for the historico- phenomenological project, for its method, its discourse and its 
responsibilities. Now this irreducible or inevitable delay of phenomenology, as the method of 
Ruckfrage, this after the fact, does not signify, as Husserl insists, any real dependency on the 
historical content of the fact, it is rather an eidetic dependency or limitation. 
(We have to see up to what point we can say that Kant and Husserl are in agreement here, 
and how Husserl's project, as Derrida says, is "more hazardous" ~7 than Kant's: they both 
recognize the necessity to start from the fact of constituted geometry but in order to return back to 
a nonempirical origin. Due to the absolute objectivity of the geometrical eidos, the factual content 
and the de facto subject of the first geometrical act or evidence are equally indifferent both to a 
Kantian and a Husserlian historical retrospection towards origins. Also both Kant and Husserl 
are attentive to the historical, i.e., the first, emergence of science or truth, whose birth or coming 
on the scene in a historically determined territory inscribes and prescribes omnitemporality and 
. I' 48) 1I1111'Crsa Ity. 
~6 "We havc translated [Rtickfrage] by return inquiry (question en retour). Like its German synonym. 
return inquiry is marked by the postal and epistolary reference or resonance of a communication from a 
distance. Like Ruckjrage, return inquiry is asked on the basis of a first posting (enmi). From a recei\ed and 
a/read" rcadable document, the possibility is offered me of asking again, and in return, about the 
primo;dial and final intention of what has been given me by tradition." lOG, p. 50. 
-17 Even to the point of being mad, as Derrida writes in Cogito and the History oj Madncss: the mad 
audacity of the Husserlian reduction in the Origin of the totality (i.e., of c\cry factual stage of the histor) of 
constituted geometry and of each determined factual tradition) which precedes the reduction. in order to 
havc access and to think the sellse of the totality, the primordial and final sense of its historicity. Cogito and 
the History (~lM(/dness, published in Writing and Difference, p. 60. 
-IX Speaking of this "transformation (UmGndenmg)" which gave birth to mathematics, Kant writes" ... thc 
transformation must havc been due to a re\'O/utioll brought about by the happy thought of a single man. thc 
c\pLTimcnt which he dC\'ised marking out the path upon whieh the science /lllist enter. and by following 
which, seeure progress throughout all time and in endless expansion is infallibly sccurcd." Kant. lmmanud 
41 
This nondependency (on the pure materiality of the historical fact) far from denoting a 
forgetfulness or a negation, rather manifests the radical theoretical freedom of the reductions, 
which is at the basis of phenomenology's methodological revolution. (lOG, pp. 70n. 125n) The 
historical fact does not disappear, it is merely preserved or retained in its essential structure or 
possibility: the eidetico-transcendental reduction, which operates by imaginary variation, will 
simply make the exemplariness of the fact emerge and hand over the sense of the fact outside the 
factuality of the fact. 49 In this phenomenological delay or limitation of the reductions (starting 
from the fact, after the fact), it is the character of the after that we will have to make more precise 
in the course of this chapter: to the extent that, as Derrida writes, the "a priori normativity of 
history is recognized starting from the fact, after the fact, this after is not the indication of a 
dependence. The fact does not teach us through its factual content but as an example. It is due to 
this after's own specific character, to the necessity of preserving transcendence or reduced 
factuality as clue, that the particular historicity of phenomenological discourse is announced ... 'iO 
So if we say that in a historical retrospection toward the origin of geometry the factual 
priority of history would finally be irreducible this should not be taken as meaning that we "must 
learn from the facts", as Merleu Ponty would have wanted it. s1 If the eidetic reduction is never 
abandoned but always supposed in this "unheard- of style" of historical investigation, this means 
that historical facts continue to operate in the Ruckfrage, to be sure, not as such, not in their 
untamed factuality, but still as variable examples, as possibilities in a historico-eidetic intuition 
which seeks to attain to the sense of the fact. And it is "in order not to fall back into the 
philosophical nonsense of irrationalism or empiricism," that we must recognize the authenticity 
of the eidetic limitation. " ... phenomenology alone, by going to the end of eidetic determination, 
Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan, 1929, Preface to Second 
Edition, p. 19. 
49 lOG, pp 48-9, 113. See also for the eidetic reduction in phenomenology Bernet's An Introduction to 
Husserlian Phenomenology. pp. 77ff. 
50 lOG, 50n, see especially pp. 149. 153. 
51 Merleu Ponty writes "The eidetic of history cannot dispense with factual historical investigation. In the 
eyes of HusserL philosophy. as a coherent thought which leads to a classification of facts according to their 
value and truth. continues to have its final importance. But it must begin by understanding all lived 
experiences." Cited in lOG. p. 112. What we want to demonstrate in our reading of Derrida's Introduction 
is that Husserl was never interested in historical facts. in factual lived experiences, or in "how it really 
was", that he morL'o\'Cr never dreamt or pretended "to deduce factuality a priori" or "to foresee, hy some 
eidetic reduction, all the facts", that this dream and this pretension would "contradict the very premises of 
phellomenology." (ihid.) What we want to show is that Husserl's indifference to factual histnr) is at the 
hasis of "phenomenology's methodological revolution" and of Husserl's thematiz-ation of the "apriori 
essences of historicity concerning every possible culture, every possible language, e\cr) possible 
tradition." lOG p. 112. For a similar approach to the differencL' hetween Derrida's and Merlcau-Ponty's 
intLTpretatioll of Husserl's thought of history see also Kate's Esscntial Histon', p. 55-56. 
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by exhausting itself, can strip pure materiality from the fact. It alone can avoid the confusion of 
pure factuality with such and such of its [material] determinations" (lOG, p. 152n). 
But here, in the Origin, the question remains: what happens if the historical fact (about 
which we are wondering whether it can be used otherwise than as a contingent example in a 
historical intuition) concerned the historical origin and institution of the geometrical eidos itself? 
What if this historical fact were institutive and creative, what if it concerned the fact of an event, 
the event of the instituting act of geometry? 
We will be able to understand Husserl's response to this question, if we take into 
consideration the difference we alluded before with regard to Kant's return to the nonempirical 
origin of the (nonempirical) object of mathematics. Even if they are both equally indifferent to the 
factual origin, while recognizing at the same time its historical dimension, its revolutionary and 
prescriptive nature, there is a crucial difference.52 For Kant this "revolution," the historical 
genesis of geometrical truth, could only be a profound "revelation" for the first geometer, it was 
not produced by him. The construction to which the geometer gave himself was only "an 
operation of explication of an already constituted concept", it was not a founding. (JOG, p. 40) 
But for Husserl, the first geometrical idealization, the first intuition of the geometrical essence, 
the first geometrical Wesensshau, is absolutely constitutive and creative. For Kant, on the 
contrary, it is due the a priori nature of the geometrical concept (it is free from all empirical and 
material sensibility) and its essential structure of a priori prescription that something like a 
geometrical intuition could be possible or could make any sense. The geometrical concept is not 
produced by the intuitive acts of a concrete subject, it is always already constituted for any factual 
consciousness, for any factual geometer and gives sense to his acts: it is always already made 
possible and prescribed by the ideal nature of the geometrical space or object. This is not the case 
with Husserl who takes the exact ideality of geometrical space to be the result of a new sort of 
praxis, and the first geometer, the proto geometer, as the primally instituting (urstiftende) 
geometer, as a subject responsible for the historical (because it happened for the first time) 
production of an ideal (pure and exact) space, that is, for the historical production of the science 
of space which, taken together with philosophy and philosophical reason, represent a rupture, a 
radical and creative origin in the history of mankind and its reason. Derrida writes: 
Undoubtedly, Husserl's production (Leistullg) also involves a stratum of receptive intuition. But 
what matters here is that this Husserlian intuition, as it concerns the ideal objects of mathematics. is 
52 With reeard to historical dimension of the nonempirical origin see Critique of Pure Reason, p.19. 
An(lther si~1ilarity concerns the fact that for Kant geometrical space is not imaginary, it is nllt "a mere 
creation of our poetic imagination." Kant. Immanuel. Prolegomena to Ally Future ,\letaphysics. translated 
oy Lewis White Bl·ck. Indianapolis. The Booos-Merrill Company. 1950. § U. p. 3'+. 
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absolutely constitutive and creative: the objects or objectivities that it intends did not exist before it: and 
this "before" of the ideal objectivity marks more than the chronological eve of a fact: it marks a 
transcendental prehistory. lOG, p. 40. 
The original place of the absolutely objective and universal eidos of geometry is not to be 
found in some topos ouranios or in a divine mind. Husserl has refused from the very beginning an 
ahistorical rationalism according to which science's eternal truths are only the deployment of an 
infinite reason which first exists in its plenitude in some intelligible heaven and then descends 
into history. The origin of geometry is historical through and through. It is so because the 
universal structure or eidos of geometry does not pre-exist the acts of a every subjectivity, and 
because, on the contrary, the intentional and indeed intuitive acts of a concrete and !it'ing 
subjectivity, in which the originary sense of geometry must have appeared as et'idence. have 
precisely the character that define historical facts, namely, "singular and empirical existence, the 
irreducibility of a here and now" (lOG, p. 47). 
Going beyond Kant then, Husserl will attempt to thematize a history that remains hidden 
for Kant, the concrete and transcendental, i.e., institutive history of nonempirical objects, "a 
history for which the consideration of facts themselves would be indispensable, because here for 
the first time, as singular historical origin, the instituting fact would be irreplaceable, therefore 
invariable. History as institutive would be the profound era where sense is indissociable from 
being, where the de facto is indissociable from the de jure. " And Derrida adds "the notion of 
'origin' or genesis could no longer be recognized in the pure phenomenological sense that 
Husserl so doggedly distinguished" (lOG, pp. 46-7). 
We can say therefore that in the Origin of Geometry, where the constitutive or 
transcendental history of an nonempirical science (geometry) is in question, where, that is, the 
intentional acts of a concrete constituting subjectivity are taken as the ultimate ground of all 
Objectivity and all sense, not only is there no conflict between the factual priority of history and 
the phenomenological, juridical question of (its) essence but that they are essentially 
indissociable, they overlap. Husserl acknowledges that a pure and internal history of the 
instituting sense of the first acts is indissociable from an empirical or external history of facts and 
he affirms the "inseparability of fact and sense in the oneness of an instituting act"' (lOG, p. 
47). But is he not also justified to maintain that a de jure distinction between internal history of 
geometry's sense and external history of facts is always possible? Possible as well as necessary 
hccause otherwise the sense of the institutive acts of the protogeometer would be for ever buried 
under the immens~ density of centuries of factual history and denied to us, impenetrable by all 
return inquiry and all reactivation, But what would a history of geometry. and a consciousn~ss of 
its historicity, he if access to its origin were radically prohibited? 
Let us insist a bit more on the phenomenological character of the fact of "the first time of 
geometry", What if this fact, then, were institutive and creative, what if it concerned the event of 
the instituting act, the absolutely irreducible and irreplaceable here and now of the "first time"' of 
geometry? How should we understand Husserl's firm indifference to empirical knowledge at the 
same time that he affirms the indissociability of sense and fact in the singularity of an instituting 
act? How can he still believe that he can reduce the factual content and interconnections of 
geometry's real history once he has admitted that the instituting act is absolutely unique and 
irreducible? By practicing the imaginary variation, which both reductions (the eidetic and the 
transcendental) require, do we have the right to substitute another fact as an example in order to 
decipher the essence of this unique fact? Absolutely not, since the uniqueness of this fact consists 
in creating, as we just said in relation to Kant, for the first time a sense that did not exist before it. 
Is the path to the originary act, to the first production of sense, then barred for the 
phenomenological reductions? Is the eidetic attitude to be abandoned from there on? Certainly 
not, since this instituting act which is, in its empirical existence and factual singularity, 
irreplaceable, irreversible and cannot be repeated as such53 , this inaugural act has created an 
essence, "a certain eidetic content", that is, an ideal object which can always and in principle be 
intentionally and voluntarily repeated or transmitted as the same through absolutely other 
moments or subjective acts, The first instituting act, which has the irreducibility of a here and 
now, this irreplaceable fact, or factual invariance of an inaugural signification, which can never 
be repeated as such, is, nevertheless, necessarily inseparable and indissociable from its eidetic 
invariance, i.e., from its sense, which is always reproducible whatever its de facto content may 
be. As we are going to show, it is the universal structure of the constituted eidos of geometry and 
the absolute ideality of its sense (its sense-of-being as truth, which is not in the world) which 
ultimately will authorize Husserl to reduce the opacity of the instituting fact (its factllal 
singularity or invariance) so as to affirm and show the apriori necessity of the eidetic singularity 
of the first production of geometrical sense. It is this extraordinary operation, the production of 
an eidetic content, of an infinite eidos, which gives Husserl the right to speak of geometry's pure 
history of sense, of pure interconnections of sense, which remain radically independent with 
), This factual singularity as such will remain opaque and impenetrable and therefore kept forever in a 
darkness which will ne\'er offer itself to phenomenological light. For phenomenology, "the singular." that 
is. the oneness of the fact in its pure factuality, pure existential factuality as wild singularity (which docs 
not ohey the ruk of the strict. eidetic suhsumption, OG, p. 159), "is eternally the apeirofl. Phenomenology 
can nxogni/e with ohjective validity only essences and essential relations, and therehy it can accomplish 
'" whalncr is necessary for a correct understanding of all empirical cognition and of all cognition 
whalsoner (Philosophy as Rigorolls Scil'llce. p. 183). Sec also Ideas I . . ~ 13. 
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regard to all empirical subjectivity and all factual life. This is why he can also maintain that a de 
jure and phenomenological distinction between pure and factual history is possible and necessary. 
It is here that we should think the interplay (Wechselspiel) of the two reductions (i.e., of 
the eidetic and the reactivating or transcendental reduction), an interplay which is (at) the heart 
of the Riickfrage, and through which Husserl opens the way for an unheard of style of historical 
questioning of the transcendental history of geometry (and even of a transcendental pre-history. 
We can discover this pre-history only after Husserl's final reduction in the Origin: the reduction 
of the scientific superstructures and, therefore, of their history too, and the discovery of the 
nakedness of the prescientific world, "the world of immediate intuition and experience. "i-l 
On the one hand, with the eidetic reduction we can determine once and for all, in a static 
and structural analysis, the universality of the geometrical phenomenon or eidos and the sense or 
noema of geometry constituted as an eidetic science, by imaginatively varying the actual here and 
now of the pure spatial figure as well as the psychological lived experiences of the geometer H'1l0 
was not its inventor. On the other hand, with the historico-transcendental or reactil'{lting 
reduction we can disclose the pure and singular eidos of geometry's origin, i.e., of the institllting 
acts of the geometer who must, then, be conceived of as its inventor. The reactivating reduction, 
which must maintain the eidetic reduction, "if one is to know what one will continue to speak 
abouC'i'i, will reveal to us, in the absence of every factual knowledge, the dependence (a 
dependence which has a juridical and transcendental signification) of the constituted and 
objective eidos and sense of geometry on the inaugural and intuitive act which brought about this 
sense for the first time. 
If the eidetic or iterative reduction - which reveals the eidetic intangibility of the 
geometrical object, the fact that it remains free from all empirical or psychological consciousness, 
and uprooted from all sensible ground in general - can teach us something about the essential 
structure of constituted, ready-made geometry as such, about the constituted eidos of geometry, it 
can say nothing to us about geometry in the act of being instituted, nothing about the sense of its 
founding. A founding, moreover, that must have been preceded necessarily by a sort of non-
geometry, an institution that sprang from the soil of pre-geometrical experience. We reach this 
soil of pre-scientific experience only with the reduction of constituted geometry. As we are going 
to see, although the geometrical eidos may be produced starting from the traditional, i.e .. 
~~ Husser!. Edmund. Experience and Judgment, translated by James S Churchill and Karl Ameriks. 
E\Llnston. Northwestern University Press. 197.3. § 10. pp . .+4-45. The title of * \0 is "The retrogression to 
tht' seU~e\'idel/ce of ('\!,aiel/Cl' as retrogression to the life-world. Destructio1l of the idealizations which 
"t'il the life-world" (my emphasis.) Sec also Crisis. §9h. 
~~ 1 '. esp, p. 16 .. 
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spiritually shaped, materials of the pre-scientific world, this facto-historical departure in an 
empirical culture is nullified as a ground, as the fundamental founding within constituted 
geometry, within the internal history of geometry. (lOG, pp .. 95, 97, 125) The insight, howewr. 
into the sense of this founding will be the purpose of the reactivating reduction which will reveal 
the pure consciousness of the origin as an intuition of an essence or eidos, the infinite eidos of 
geometry. This inaugural intuition which, as we saw in contrast to Kant, is absolutely constitutive 
and creative, i.e., historical, must therefore be distinguished from an iterative Wesensshau. 56 The 
latter is possible only because an inaugural act of idealization has already created the geometrical 
object, whose eidos or essence, within constituted geometry, can be reproduced and determined in 
an iterative intuition, i.e., in a noncreative geometrical act. (lOG, p. 135) The purpose of the 
reduction of constituted geometry then will be to attain to a constituting historical subjectivity 
which, on the basis of the prescientific and intuitively given surrounding world, creates 
nonempirical objects by inaugurating a new sort of praxis and a new sort of attitude, the purely 
theoretical attitude. 
Let us now underline the apriori and transcendental necessities concernmg the 
nonempirical singularity of the origin of geometry, the necessities that, according to Derrida, only 
a phenomenological history of geometry can bring forth through the interplay of the reductions. 
To be attentive to these necessities is, on the one hand, to familiarize oneself with those formal 
generalities or commonplaces, of which Husserl speaks, and whose "essential indigence" will 
mark the whole content of his return inquiry. But, on the other hand, the requirement to recall the 
"apriori banalities" which are buried by scientific and cultural naivete, is the demand of a science 
with radical responsibility. 
The eidetic necessity of a past fact, of the singular and unique origin of geometry, of the 
first time of geometry is threefold. Before and beyond all historical knowledge of facts, we know 
a priori and with absolute certainty at least three things: 
a) that geometry, the eidetic and exact science of pure space, did not exist since ever, that it must 
have "sprang from the soil of pregeometrical experiences", b) that geometry not only must have 
an origin in the past, in the lived experiences and productive acts of a concrete and historical 
)(J In the Kantian "revelation"' of the birth of mathematics, the operation of the geometer which is historical. 
i.e .. the synthetic explication of the geometrical concept. is contrasted to the a priori concept of geometr) 
which is not historical and within which the first geometer ("he he Thales of some other"') must operate. 
This synthetic explication resembles Husserl's eidetic or iterative H'esellsschau. But for Husser! this 
concept is not re\'ea/ed to the protogeometer. revealed as free with respect to empirical and material 
sensibility. this freedom is itself produced only hy him. This is why Husser! now needs the reacrimrillg 
reductinn in order to re\ealthe sense of this inaugural. i.e .. historical production. (lOG. p. 135) 
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subject, but also, c) that it must have such an origin, such a sense of origin, that the creative acts 
of the protogeometer bestowed such a sense that the science of geometry issued from them \\'ith 
the sense as we know it today. (lOG, p. 48) 
Without asking, for the moment, about the historical content of the instituting sense, of 
the act or evidence which inaugurated geometry, we should note that this last necessity 
concerning the past fact of an instituting sense, the necessity "of an apriori prescription" assigned 
to a past fact, is at the centre of Husserl' s archeo-teleological discourse on tradition, which as 
Derrida says, is at the heart of the Origin. 
This instituting act, which is determined by Husserl as the origin or arche of geometry, 
has the double sense of commencement (there where history commenced) and of commandment, 
of an eidetic prescription. This is what is, for Husserl, extraordinary about the institutive and 
historical acts of the protogeometer: the creation of geometrical aprioriness, the inscription and 
prescription of geometry's infinite eidos and infinite historicity. What is extraordinary about the 
first acts or significations is the production of the unified sense of the geometrical eidos: they 
opened and at the same time prescribed the unity of geometry's truth as the unity of an infinite 
project or tradition of sense. This tradition of sense has, according to Husserl, the unity of an 
"infinite horizon". The notion of "horizon" describes not only the totality of the science of 
geometry as an infinitely open totality, i.e., as open to its own future metamorphoses or 
revolutions, but also the totality and unity of the communal subjectivity which makes itself 
responsible for it in a transcendental adventure. 
That the unity of geometry is infinitely open means, for Husserl's teleology, that this 
unity will be for ever to come, through the acts of a constituting subjectivity, but only on the basis 
of a sense that has been produced in its origin. Geometry's primordial sense is only its final 
sense, or telos, the opening of the horizon of knowledge as that of an infinite project or task 
(Vorhaben, Aufgabe). As we are going to see, Husserl determines the unity of geometry, the unity 
of geometry's sense as that of tradition, i.e., as the unity of traditional sedimentation of sense. 
In effect, it is of little importance for Husserl that we know nothing of the "first 
inventor". Husserl believes that, because they have produced a transparent and absolutely free 
ideal object, the sense of the first productive acts can, de jure, be rigorously reactivated or 
reawakened, even if the factual origin of these acts is forever lost or forgotten under the infinite 
mediations, passivities, and sedimentations of intentional sense which have been produced all 
along the immense historical de\'e\opment of geometry. (For Husserl will not fail to name the 
danger. an interior and intimate danger. which accompanies geometrical sense in its originary 
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constitution and traditional sedimentation in language and writing: failure of reactivation, 
passivity and forgetfulness, in a word, the phenomenon of crisis.) 
In the Origin, faced with something like a history of a purely eidetic science (geometry), 
a history which with regard to the factual and empirical content of its real progress, its forward 
development and marvellous advances, remains absolutely singular and irreversible, Husserl will 
maintain that a phenomenological i.e., an eidetic and teleological reading and discourse of this 
history is possible. To be sure, "Husserl did not invent such a possibility; it was simply disclosed 
as what implicitly has always conditioned the existence of ideal objects of a pure science and thus 
of a pure tradition, and consequently of a pure historicity, the model of history in general" (lOG, 
p. 66). Such an archeo-teleological reading is moreover possible since this irreplaceable and 
irreversible factual history of geometry is inhabited in its being-sense by an eidetic content, i.e., it 
is the history, the birth and development of the absolutely objective eidos of geometry, of the 
ideal and exact essences of pure spatiality. 
Now an eidetic science of history, or a science which acquires access and treats the eidos 
of historicity in general, cannot be one science among others; its object cannot be assigned to a 
distinct, delimited material and regional ontology, which would still remain dependent and 
subordinated to a formal and transcendental ontology. This science having to treat eidetic 
singularities, the eidetic singularities of origins, namely of the instituting acts of sense and 
Objectivity in general and, therefore, of all eidetic sciences, "is the most independent, the most 
concrete, and the first of the sciences" (lOG, p. 49). Having considered the method and the sense 
of the question (Riickfrage) that guides him in this historical investigation of the origin of 
geometry, Husserl writes "We stand within the historical horizon in which everything is 
historical, however little we may know about determined things .... This inquiry prescribes all the 
possible specialized questions, thus including, for the sciences, the inquiries back into ongm 
which are peculiar to them in virtue of their historical manner of being" (OG, p. 172). 
According to Derrida, what Husserl attempted to demonstrate in the Origin, and in Crisis, 
is that the region of history is not one region of being among the others, that history is prescribed 
for the infinite totality of being and sense, that being itself (and the totality of its specialized 
sciences or regional ontologies) is constituted as history. as the movement of the interweaving of 
original productions and sedimentations of sense, but also, as an infinite task or project, i.e., as a 
teleological ought to be. 
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3) Intersubjectivity and Language as the Conditions of both Objectivity and 
Historicity 
Husserl writes, "[ ... ]we enquire into that sense in which it appeared in history for the 
first time ", "Clearly, geometry must have arisen out of a first acquisition, out of first creatil'e 
activities" (OG, p. 158). For a phenomenology of history to return to the "positive ground of 
truth", to the historical ground and the primordial origin of geometry's truth, means then to return 
to a historical, constituting subjectivity whose experience, i.e., the production and evidence of 
geometrical sense, even if it is unique and buried under infinite acquisitions and linguistic 
sedimentations of sense, should be able, de jure, to be reactivated. Such a history should start de 
facto and de jure from the eidetic singularity of the instituting acts, i.e .. the creative experiences. 
the interconnections of sense and the evidences, of a monadic ego. (lOG, p. 63n) In the Origin 
Husserl speaks of a "primary intrapersonal origin", of an "original self-evidence", and of "the 
originally self-evident production, as the pure fulfilment of its intention." "Self-evidence means 
nothing more than grasping an entity and the consciousness of its original being-itself-there 
(Selbst- da)" (OG, p. 160-61). Husserl's reference to evidence is absolutely crucial here. It 
recalls, Derrida writes, phenomenology's "principle of all principles", the a priori of a prioris, 
and is the "ultimate court of appeal" for the whole of the phenomenological discourse on history. 
According to Husserl, before even asking what is their historical content. we know a 
priori the form of these creative experiences and the form of this evidence: this evidence, the 
instituting evidence of geometry, according to the axiomatic principium of phenomenology, as it 
is defined in Ideas I §24, cannot not have, like all evidence in general, the form of a presence to 
intuition, the form of a primordial, immediate and actual presence of sense itself. (lOG, pp. 62, 
99n, 137) 
The aim of the Ruckfrage, then, is nothing other but to go back through the constituted 
and wordly factuality of geometry's real history to the simple and absolute origin of its sense: an 
egological, historico-transcendental subjectivity will then be revealed as "the absolute origin, the 
constituting and present source" of geometry's sense or truth. 57 To be sure, this historico-
transcendental subjectivity, which is not to be confused in its pure possibility with any de facto 
".7 To he sure. as Derrida writes. "egological suhjectivity cannot he responsihle for this development [ ... J 
Only a cOlI/lI/unal suhjecti\'ity can produce the historical system of truth and be wholly responsihle for it. 
However this community. whose unity must he ahsolute and (/ priori (otherwise e\en the slightest truth 
would he unimaginahk) is hut fhe common place of all egological subjecfivities. whether actually present 
(ll' possihle. wh~ther past. present or future. whether known or unknown." "Phenomenologically. the 
transcl'ndental Wl' is not something other that the transcendental Ego" lOG. pp. 60-61. 
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empirical subjectivity, resides in the historical life-world, in the sense that its "temporal and 
creative acts are based on the sensible world and the life-world as cultural world" (lOG, p. 60). 
Now after he has determined the sense and the method of the question of origin, Derrida 
tells us, "Husserl performs a detour which may seem disconcerting" (lOG, p. 62). It should not, 
however. Although he has affirmed not only that the objective sense of geometry had its origin in 
the absolutely productive acts of a concrete subject, but also that this first production of sense 
must have appeared and presented itself as evidence in the individual consciousness of the 
protogeometer, Husserl does not proceed head on to describe the historical content of this 
inaugural and unique operation or evidence, neither its primordial sense. This is to be done much 
later and only after the most general conditions of the Objectivity of all sense in general or the 
conditions of all traditional development in general have been sufficiently investigated and 
illuminated - and not just of geometry's sense, which is nevertheless taken by Husserl as an 
exemplary guide in this investigation. 
As Derrida writes, underscoring once agam Husserl's methodological concerns, only 
after the latter has accounted for the conditions of Objectivity in general he gives himself the right 
to return to one of these ideal objectivities, that of geometry, and to engage in a more concrete 
description concerning the conditions of geometrical ideality itself and the sense of the subjective 
praxis which has engendered it. It is not until the last pages of the Origin that HusserI's 
descriptions starting from human, historical praxis draw near to the constitution of geometrical 
protoidealities in the prescientific sphere of the cultural world. (lOG, pp. 62-3, 118) 
So Husserl will provisionally abstain before the historical content of the first act 
(Erstmaligkeit) of geometry, and instead he will ask, how can the sense of this act, and indeed, 
how can the sense of every subjective and intentional act become objective, i.e., how it can enter 
into an intersubjective circulation and thereby be repeated and verified as the same sense by any 
concrete subject whatsoever? (lOG, pp. 85-6) 
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In the Origin the phenomenological question of Objectivity58, how can sUbjectivit) go out 
of itself in order to encounter or constitute the object59, will be repeated as the historico-
teleological question of Objectivity, which is at the core of Husserl' s doctrine of tradition. As 
soon as he returns to a constitutive history of ideal objectivities (either scientific or cultural in 
general), Husserl needs a doctrine of tradition, he needs to describe the movement of history. a 
movement which is necessarily a rational and a teleological movement, the vital movement, as he 
himself describes it, of the originary creation and traditional development of an ideal objectivity. 
The detour then is necessary, it is the necessary path or way of the Ruckfrage: the ::.ig:;.ag 
way of proceeding back to the origin, to the creative acts of a historico-transcendental 
subjectivity. How the ideality of sense proceeds, then, from its subjective origin and evidence to 
its Objectivity? Derrida will formulate this historico-teleological question linking gradually 
Objectivity, intersubjectivity and history or tradition: "how can the egological-subjective 
evidence of sense become objective and intersubjective? How can it give rise to an ideal and true 
object, with all the characteristics that we know it to have: omnitemporal validity, universal 
normati vity, intelligibility for 'everyone', uprootedness out of all 'here and now' factuality, and 
so forth?" (lOG, p. 63) "How could ideal sense, already constituted in subjective immanence. be 
objective and engage in history and in the movement of intersubjectivityT (lOG, p. 118) 
For the moment then Husserl does not ask about the conditions of the inaugural act of 
geometry, of the idealizing and theoretical act which produced the geometrical ideality itself 
58 We can find its first formulation in Logical Investigations when the epistemological clarification of pure 
logic revealed its dependency on the most general question of knowledge, on the question of objectivity: 
"How are we to understand the fact that the intrinsic being of objectivity becomes 'presented', 
'apprehended' in knowledge, and so ends up by becoming subjective?" LI, Vol II, Introduction, §2, p. 25'+. 
According to Levinas, when Husserl in Philosophy as Rigorolls Science asks "Was besagt dass 
Gegestandlichkeit sei". he raises the essential question of phenomenology. Levinas recognizes in The 
Theory of Intuition the great philosophical merit of the question of objectivity in the fact that it is raised and 
linked by Husserl with the problem of constitution, which is also the "ontological problem": "The problem 
of being thus arises with the problems of constitution. To analyze the constitution of an object is to follow 
the intention of the life which is directed toward it and the meaning these intentions give to it. Existence is 
but the mode in which consciousness meets its objects or the role played by objects in the concrete life of 
consciousness, since the very origin of being is in life." Theory of Intuition, pp. 131-32. I5-:+' According to 
Derrida, it is to the notion of a "constitution of an alter ego" that Levinas refuses any merit. One encounters 
the Other, Levinas would say, one does not constitute it. 
~l) In Husserl's phenomenology there is no choice to be made between "encounter" and '·constitution". In 
an important footnote in Violence and Metaphysics. with regard to "Husserl's philosophical prudence" 
Derrida writes "constitution is not opposed to encounter. It goes without saying that constitution creates, 
constructs, engenders. nothing: neither existence. nor the fact, which is evident. nor even meaning, which is 
kss evident b~Jt equally certain, provided that one takes some patient precautions, and provided that one 
distinguishes the moments of passivity and activity within intuition in Husserl's sense, and the moment in 
whichL the distinction becomes impossible. That is. in which the entire problematic opposing encounter to 
constitution is no longer meaningful. or has only a derivative and dependent meaning." Violence and 
!IIl'faphy.lies (herl'aftcr cited as VM), published in Writing and D!tlerellC(', p. 316. 
within the individual consciousness of the protogeometer, but about how it can "afterwards" enter 
into history, about the conditions for geometrical ideality in an intersubjective horizon (lOG, p. 
86). What Husserl is interested above all to demonstrate with this question is that the conditions 
of the Objectivity of an ideal objectivity are also, and at the same time, the conditions of its 
traditionality or historicity. These conditions are at once a priori and teleological: an 
intrasubjectively created sense can enter into history only ifit can become an absolute object, i.e., 
only if it can be freed from the ties which binds it to the de facto and actual subjectivity of its 
inventor, and be handed over. Derrida writes: "The conditions of Objectivity are then the 
conditions of historicity itselr' (lOG, p64). What are these conditions? 
As soon as he has affirmed that the "original self-evidence" of geometrical ideality 
"occurs purely within the subject of the inventor", Husserl adds a precaution which is absolutely 
decisive and which complicates the question of a simple and absolute, self-present ongm of 
geometrical ideal Objectivity. 
But geometrical existence is not psychic existence; it does not exist as something personal within 
the personal sphere of consciousness: it is the existence of what is objectively there for "everyone" (for 
actual and possible geometers, or those who understand geometry). Indeed, it has, from its primal 
establishment, an existence which is peculiarly supratemporal and which - of this we are certain - is 
accessible to all men, first of all to the actual and possible mathematicians of all peoples. all ages." (GG. p. 
160) 
So there is not first a subjective evidence of geometrical sense which, having been fully 
constituted as such within the head of the proto geometer, may afterwards, following a factual 
chronological order, become objective or enter into history. 'This is only a fiction". There is 
geometrical evidence only if the originary production of sense can be put into an intersubjective 
horizon, and thereby become a true object, only if the originary production is "a production of a 
common object, i.e., of an object whose original owner is thus dispossessed" (lOG, p. 78). 
Derrida writes, 
thus only retroactively and on the basis of its results can we illuminate the pure sense of the 
suhjective praxis which has engendered geometry. The sense of the constituting act can only be deciphered 
in the weh of the constituted object. And this necessity is not an external fate, but an essential necessity of 
intentionality. The primordial sense of every intentional act is only its final sense, i.e., the constitution of an 
ohject (in the broadest sense of these terms). That is why only a teleology can open up a passage. a way 
back toward the beginnings. (my emphasis) lOG, p. 64. 
The intersubjective circulation and recognition of geometrical evidence. its uprootedness 
from every here and noH' factuality and actuality, is not an empirical possibility which mayor 
may not accompany the subjective origin or genesis of geometry. a contingent. happy eventuality: 
it is the a priori and cine qua nOI1 condition for the possibility of geometrical objecti\ity itself. 
(This again repeats an original theme of phenomenology: the possihility of objectivity involves 
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always already the possibility of transcendental, i.e., nonempirical, intersubjectivity: they are 
interrelated possibilities.) From the first moment of its production, then, the value of this ideal 
objectivity is such that it must be able to alienate itself from its original inventor and owner, so as 
to be (re)appropriated and reworked by any geometer, by any subject whosoever, and thereby to 
capitalize on itself ad infinitum. Paradoxically, the possibility of this originary alienation of 
objectivity from the factual subject who alone could claim absolute responsibility for it, permits 
the freeing of its ideality. The ideal value of objectivity then stems from that which in a historical 
development and capitalization delimits itself, that which exceeds every factual and sensible 
limit, the particularity of a determined historical totality and every particularity in general in order 
to open into the infinite and give rise to the universal. 
The question of Objectivity will now become: what is the condition that allows the 
communication and transmission of the ideal Objectivity of sense among several individuals and 
among generations of investigators no matter how distant they are? How can the absolute 
subjectivity of sense open itself to the horizon of intersubjectivity, and thereby to the horizon of 
history, and how is intersubjectivity itself possible? 
It is here that language (and/or writing) IS necessary: the possibility of (human) 
intersubjectivity and history is for Husserl the possibility of language: they are interrelated 
possi bilities. This necessity of language has not an empirical but an eidetic and 
transcendental signification: language is prescribed for all constitution and sedimentation of 
sense, and therefore for all history. "Ideal formations", Derrida writes, "are rooted only in 
language in general, not in the factuality of languages and their particular linguistic 
incarnations" (lOG, p. 66). 
According to the Origin the ideality of sense comes to its Objectivity "b.Y means of 
language, through which it receives its linguistic flesh" (OG, p. 161). Husserl speaks of 
Sprachleib and he refers precisely to the proper body, the living body, to the proper body (Leib) 
of language and not to its Karper, the inanimate and soulless body, which left to itself is without 
signification, without meaning (Bedeutung). 
The insertion of the analysis of language into the context of the historical constitution of 
objectivity means that Husserl is first of all concerned with the possibility of pure, constituting 
language and not with constituted language, i.e., the factual and empirical language which is 
actually spoken in a historically determined territory. Husserl makes the essential and 
phenomenological distinction - a distinction which as Derrida demonstrates is indispensable to 
the phenomenological project of the critical reinstitution of metaphysics - between 
"transcendental language" or constituting language and the constituted body of language (which 
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in its ideality is always bound to an empirically determined historical community of speaking 
subjects). Husserl in the Origin seems to have reversed the traditional procedure: to the extent 
that speech, linguistic expression does not simply signify or record, but produces, deposits and 
grounds truth's Objectivity, it is not merely a constituted body, a means in the sen'ice of truth, 
but also a properly constituting flesh, the flesh of a living sense-truth. (lOG, p. 97) Considering 
the possibility of pure or transcendentallanguage,60 Husserl refers to this pure and intentional act 
of consciousness which, in view of the presence of the signified (sense or object), gives meaning 
to an expression by giving or breathing life into its sensible constituted body, making it pass from 
the state of inert corporeality to that of an animated, living proper body (Leib). This pure 
meaning-intention, this living and life giving act, what Husserl calls Bedeutungsintentiofl and 
Derrida has translated as vouloir-dire61 , is, according to Husserl, the soul of language. Husserl has 
distinguished them rigorously even if he had to defer for ever the problem of their mysterious 
unity: in a spoken word, as in an animal body, Leib and Korper are in fact one and the same 
existent. The absolute and traditional distinction between soul and body is at the centre of 
Husserl's analysis here. However, language, as constitutive language is always a Verleiblichung 
as well as a Verkorperung. Since the sensible aspect of language, the corporeal exteriority of the 
sign (phonic or writen) is always given over to the world as something audible or visible, since it 
is "straightforwardly", "sensibly" and "intersubjectively experienceable" (OG, p. 164), the 
ideality of sense (which is nonwordly, i.e., free from sensible spatiotemporality) can be 
sedimented and deposited there and communalized. With sensible embodiment, sense and truth 
are gathered into linguistic signs, into the language of words or expressions (bedeutsame 
Zeichen.) We could provisionally utilize Finks formulation and say, with regard to the peculiar 
virtue of language (and of the linguistic event): "in sensible embodiment occurs the 'localization' 
and the 'temporalization' of what is, by its being-sense, unlocated and untemporal.'·62 
Now Husserl did not pose the problem of the origin of language in the Origin, even if he 
writes that it "arises here". "We shall not go into the general problem which also arises here of 
the origin of language in its ideal existence and its existence in the real world grounded in 
utterance and documentation" (OG, p. 161). There are essential reasons for this reluctance or 
deferral to treat the specific problem of language, both that of its origin and that of its usage in 
h!l Dnrida writes: "Here we are speaking of transcendental language insofar as, on the one hand. the latter is 
"constituting" compared with ideal Ohjectiyity [which is always "constituted"], and. on the other hand. 
insofar as it is not confused in its pure possihility with any de facto empirical language" (lOG, p. 77n). 
(,1 Derrida. Jacques. Speech and Phenomena. Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husserl's 
Phenol1lenology, translated hy Da\id B. Allison. E\'anston. North\\'estem University Press. 19n. p. 18. 
We will come hack to this in the second part of the thesis. 
h2 Cited in lOG. p. ~l). 
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transcendental phenomenology.63 "At bottom," Derrida writes, "the problem of geometry's origin 
puts the problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity on par with that of the phenomenological 
origin of language" (lOG, p. 79). The creation of ideal objectivities, of objects capable of being 
put into an intersubjective horizon, of being infinitely repeated or transmitted as the same in a 
traditional development, is one with the historical origin of language, that is, with the ad\'ent of 
the phone. 64 Now the origin of language is certainly indissociable from the origin of historical 
humanity, and both must have preceded the origin of geometry. For the moment according to 
Husserl, it is enough to know, if not how, at least that language and intersubjectivity, language 
and consciousness of being-in-community are indissociable possibilities and already gil'en to the 
proto geometer (and to his fellows) the moment he instituted the science geometry. (OG, p. 162) 
Without the pure possibility of language the "original self-evidence" of geometry's sense 
would remaIn an absolutely empirical and subjective moment, a sense which, even though 
indubitably given and present in the personal consciousness of its creator, would remam 
ineffable, for ever private and hidden therein, "an empirical formation imprisoned as fact in a 
psychological subjectivity - in the inventor's head" (lOG, p. 77). But since the possibility of 
language is already given to the protogeometer, he can express the sense he has produced in 
himself and assure its transmissibility first by means of speech, and then also by writing. By 
means of this linguistic expression another geometer can always reawaken and repeat the original 
sense, that is, the act of pure thought which created the ideality of sense. Husserl writes in the 
Origin, "In the contact of reciprocal linguistic understanding, the original production and the 
product of one subject can be actively understood by the others,,65 (OG, pp. 163-4). 
Now it might seem (at least in Fink's formulation we quoted above) that geometrical 
sense as it has been produced, Husserl says, "within the conscious space of the first inventors 
soul" pre-exists the act of speech, or, better, that geometrical sense can be fully constituted before 
and independently of its ability to be linguistically incarnated. It seems as if linguistic 
t13 If Husserl "did not first ask himself about the meaning of his operative instruments in genera!, it is not 
due to naivete, dogmatic precipitation, or a neglect of the historical weight of language." GSP, p. 167. The 
reasons why language (as also writing) does not become a theme of phenomenological description will 
appear clearer in the course of our thesis. 
h There is an unfailing complicity, Derrida writes in Speech and Phenomena, between the production of 
ideal objeeti\'ities and speech (or phone) and, since sound is the element of speech, between idealization 
and sou~d, a complicity which supports Husserl's entire discourse on history: "The passage to infinity 
charactLTistic of thc idealization of objects is one with the historical advent of the phone . ... What makes 
the history of the phone fully enigmatic is the fact that it is inseparable from the history of idealization, that 
is, from the "history of mind", or history as such." SP, p. 77. This question is also raised in Ot" 
Grammato!ogy, p. 12. . 
t1e; With regard to this essential connection between the problem of constitution and the problem 01 
language or expression sec also HUSSLTJ's Logical Inl'{'stigations, I, Introdllction §§2,3, Ideas I ~ 12-L and 
Formal alld Transecndl'l1ta! Logic §73. 
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embodiment, the effective use of speech which puts sense into intersubjective circulation, will 
come as an exterior cloak to sense, like a body to a soul. As we are going to see in the second part 
of the thesis, Husserl indeed believes that, even though, in fact, sense and speech are always 
interwoven, in order for the communalization of sense to be possible, a rigorous and 
phenomenological distinction between sense (Sinn) and expression (Ausdruck) is, i17 principle, 
possible. Since the Logical Investigations and Ideas I, Husserl maintains in his description of 
transcendental experience a pre-expressive or pre-linguistic substratum of sense, an intuitive and 
silent ground of the presence of sense, a base of silence upon which the expressi \'e, 
supplementary and superstructural stratum of language can firmly stand and operate. And 
language can operate only, as Husserl writes since the First of his Logical Investigation, "when a 
speaker produces it with the intention of expressing himself about something (itber etwas sich 
.. ),,66 aussern. 
Considering this aspect of Husserl's work which is dominated by the metaphysical theme 
of full presence, and the intuitionist "principle of principles", Derrida writes "it would be absurd 
for sense not to precede - de jure - the act of language whose own value will always be that of 
expression." 67 This is also, according to Derrida in Speech and Phenomena, what follows directly 
from phenomenology's principle of principles: the immediate presence of sense to primordial 
intuition as the experience of the absence or uselessness (Zwecklosigkeit) of signs, namely of 
indicative signs, since only an indication (Anzeigen) is truly a sign for Husser1.68 According to 
Derrida, however, the Origin demonstrates precisely this: how difficult is for Husserl to reconcile 
this limitation of language to a secondary and reproductive stratum of experience with the 
thematic of the traditional sedimentation of meaning, i.e., with the necessity of linguistic 
sedimentation, a thematic that we are to pose and follow in the next sections. Geometrical 
propositions, writes Husserl, "like other cultural structures, appear on the scene in the form of 
tradition; they claim, so to speak, to be sedimentations of truth-meaning .... ,. (OG, p. 170) 
This difficulty to determine the status of meaning in relation to sense, the difficulty and 
even impossibility of maintaining a rigorous and essential distinction between pre-linguistic sense 
and linguistic expression or meaning is, according to Derrida, what puts the principium 
hh L/, §7. pp. 276-277. 
h7 lOG. p. 69n and Form and Meaning. published in Speech and Phenomena. p. 118. 
hI! Derrida discusscs the Husserlian "essential distinction" between "indication" and "expression" in his 
Speech and Phenomena. Already in the Introduction. however. Derrida has pointed to the importance of 
this distinction for the interpretation of the phenomenon of crisis. lOG. p, 92n. SP, pp . .f2, 80-81. and 
Form and "'('{ming. p. 118. 
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phenomenology, the axiomatic principle of intuitive, actual and immediate presence of sense into 
question. 69 
69 This crucial difficulty is important for us for another reason. According to Kates, who follows a 
developmental approach, or rather a chronological one, as he himself maintains several times (pp. xvii, 
200, 241 n2l), and examines the development (the "continuity and discontinuity" (pp. 43, 84) of Derrida's 
reading of Husserl, the Introduction belongs to the "pre-deconstructive texts", it does not break 
"definitively" with the "unthought axiomatic of all Husserlian phenomenology". Kates claims, for instance, 
that "the notion of sedimentation points back toward the construal of the sign solely as {eib (79). We cannot 
help but be astonished with this claim: how can there be any proper density to history, how can there be any 
traditional and especially written sedimentation of sense without the sensible surfaces of language, without 
the corporeal exteriority of signs in which sense can be deposited and communalized? Corporeal 
exteriority, Kates is right, does not constitute the sign as such, "but in a sense that we must make clear, is 
indispensable to it." (Derrida's emphasis) (lOG, p. 94) Kates in order to defend his "Essential History", and 
its essentially chronological and linear understanding of development of Derrida's thought will maintain 
innumerable times in his text that Derrida "arrives at" or "invents deconstruction" in 1967 (pp. 66, 81) In 
p.73 we sec the impass of this approach: Derrida invents deconstruction "in 1966 or thereabouts"(') ,writes 
Kates, forgetting however to cite any text of Derrida from this year, as if this deconstruction tooke place 
"outside the text". The fact that he is obliged to accept in a footnote that Derrida did raise the "problem" of 
the "unthought axiomatic" of phenomenology, does not change his basic thesis: as he writes. it did not 
"hold the center stage" of the Introduction, it was only raised in some footnotes and "on the works 
outskirts." (p. 235n23) In this thesis we are going to maintain that. if deconstruction has something to do 
with the event. with what is to come. if deconstruction is possible otherwise than as some guaranteed 
mcthod or opcration of problematization. or as a pre-organized and programmed response to a problem. if 
deconstruction is possible then "this is because it mistrusts any sort of periodization and mmcs. or makes 
its ,!;l'stures. Iincs. and di\"isions mmc. not only within a corpus in generaL but at times within a single 
sentcllL'l'. nr a microscopic clement of a corpus" Taste for the SecreT. p. 9, sec also, As f! iT u'cr(' possible. 
in Negotiation.1 p. 358. 
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4) The Archeo-Teleological Doctrine of Tradition. The Historic Present. 
In the Origin Husserl defines intersubjectivity and language, and, as we are going to see, 
the capacity of reactivation, as the interrelated but also concrete conditions of possibility of both 
the Objectivity and the traditionality (or historicity) of geometrical sense. Before we enter into 
these interconnected "structural aprioris ", as Husserl calls them (OG, p. 174), of tradition and 
genesis itself, before we enter into the discussion of how the ideality of sense proceeds with the 
help of language from its subjective origin to its Objectivity, or how, as Husserl put it, does 
"linguistic embodiment (sprachliche Verleiblichung) make out of the merely intrasubjective 
structure the objective structure ... " (OG, P 161), we have to consider the fact that ideality (or 
ideal objectivity) is a characteristic not only of geometry's sense but the essential characteristic of 
all cultural formations, of all language, and of sense in general. The structure of all culture, 
scientific or not, can be described by Husserl only in terms of ideality. The science of geometry is 
first presented in the Origin as an indistinguishable example of the cultural world in general, as 
one cultural ideal formation and as one form of traditional culture among others. But even if it is 
a traditional culture, its ideal character should not be confused with that of a de facto empirical 
culture; geometry and science in general have "quite another manner of being, quite another 
temporali ty. ,,70 
It is as early as the Philosoph}' as Rigorous Science (1911) that Husserl elaborated some 
essential distinctions, which are very important for phenomenology in general and for a 
phenomenology of history in particular, and with which he attempts to disentangle once and for 
all the confusions involved in every empirical or historicist investigation of Dilthey's type: the 
confusion of value and existence,7) of all types of realities and all types of idealities. In the Origin 
Husserl supposes the distinctions between several types and degrees of Objectivity, and most 
importantly the distinction a) between real object and ideal object, and b) between bound ideal 
objectivity and free ideal objectivity, on the bases of which he be able to present the exemplarity 
of the science of geometry and its historicity. 
70C' . ')78 rrSIS, p. ~ . 
7) Speaking for that feeling of power of the historian who evaluates the work of a past philosopher and 
judges its relative worth, Husser! writes "we obviously still maintain that the principles of e\t~n such 
relative cvaluations lie in the ideal sphere, which the evaluating historian who will understand more than 
mere developments can only presuppose and not - as historian - justify. The norm of the mathematical lies 
in mathematics, for the logical in logic. for the ethical in ethics. etc." PRS, p. 188. 
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With the first distinction, which partially72 corresponds to the difference between natural 
reality and spiritual culture, Husserl (like Dilthey) will react against naturalism and causalism, 
against the positive naturalization of the life of spirit. The ideal objectivities of science (but also 
of culture in general and of language itself) cannot be reduced to a mode of being which pertains 
to the sensible existence of the real and transcendent thing belonging to nature. 73 Since spiritual 
culture, which is constituted as the domain of ideal objectivities, intersubjectivity, tradition and 
responsibility, is not a natural reality, it cannot be subsumed under the category of external 
causality. 
From very early Husserl condemns in a Platonic manner those who can "understand by 
"being" (Sein) only real being, and by objects only real objects.',74 Here we must be careful: 
whenever Husserl affirms the non-existence and non-reality of ideal objectivity it is always in 
order to recognize not that it is a nonbeing, but, on the contrary that, ideality is a ~my of being 
that is irreducible to sensible existence or empirical reality: ideality is unreal, but it is - as object 
or as sense present for an egological subject, for an indubitable cogito. 
With the second distinction between bound and free idealites Husserl wants first of all to 
save the ideal Objectivity and truth of science (and philosophy) from historical relativism. In 
Philosophy as Rigorous Science Husserl attacks Dilthey who reduces the Idea of truth, of 
philosophy and science, which is an infinite Idea, to the subjective immanence of the 
Weltanschauung, to the doxa, or even wisdom which belong to the cultural-world's subjective-
relative truths. Undoubtedly, Weltanschauung (and Weltanschauungs -philosophie) is not like a 
real thing in objective time and space, even if it belongs to the real world: it is an ideal formation 
with its own origin and tradition, a "sense-structure" which remains bound to a determined 
historical totality by the finitude of its very project. It is this finitude in the project of prescientific 
cultural objectivities which make them unfit, or less exemplary, to provide a guide for a sense-
investigation of "universal historicity" - the ultimate horizon, according to Husserl, for every 
science, and for all sense and Objectivity in general. A finitude not only in their project, but also 
72 We say partially since the distinction between ideality and reality is necessary also for thc analysis of all 
cultural objects. Husserl writes "We call real in a specific sense all that which. in real things in the broader 
sense, is, according to its sense, essentallly individualized by its spatiotemporal position; but we call irreal 
el'en' determination which, indeed, is founded with regard to its spatiotemporal appearance ill a 
spec'ijically real thing but \\'hich can appear in defferent realities as identical - and not merely as similar." 
For example. "the same geometrical proposition can be uttered as often as desired: c\ery real utterance has 
... identically the same sense." Experience and Judgment, Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, translated 
by James S Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Evanston. Northwestern University Press. 1973, p.266. 
7.~ Naturalism reduces the mode of being of consciousness and of ideal objects to the mode of being of thL' 
physical world: to exist means to belong to nature and to be subsumed under its categories. such as time. 
srace , and causality. Sl'e also PRS. p. 179. and LC\'inas's Theory (~f Intuition. pp. 8fT 
7 L/. pp. 330. 3-+5. 
60 
in the recollection of sense: the capacity of their reactivation is, as Husserl would say, of "an 
obvious finitude." (OG 168) 
We have mentioned already that Husserl's historical meditations on the question of the 
birth and tradition of geometry begins with "the most obvious commonplaces" and remains 
"unavoidably", as he writes, "within the sphere of generalities" (OG, plS8-9). What authorizes 
the reactivating reduction with respect to the originary sense of the first geometrical acts (but also 
with respect to all instituting acts) are some formal, but "radical generalities" concerning the 
subject of tradition. Why radical? Because if these generalities are investigated correctly they will 
lead us, according to Husserl, to the ultimate juridical instant in which the most radical unity of 
history is announced: the universal and concrete a priori of history, i.e., the historic present. (OG, 
p 174) As the primordial itself, the historic present is the phenomenological Absolute of history, 
the ground of all historicity: the ultimate, universal form 75 outside of which no egological 
constituting subjectivity can go since it is that within which, toward which and starting from 
which every possible historical experience or adventure (of heading off, of taking the initiative, of 
setting and keeping the direction or of changing the heading) can be lived as its own. This 
universal a priori of history also prescribes that there is no historical experience which could be 
lived by an egological subjectivity other than in the present. The very notion of a historic past or 
future whose sense could not be thought in the form of a (past or future) present, defines for 
phenomenology the unthinkable and the impossible itself, the absolute limit of historico-
phenomenological reason. 
Moving within the limits of reason alone, Husserl's historical investigation of the origin 
of geometry, "continually calling us back to the unnoticed presuppositions of ever recurring 
problems" (lOG pS2), will exhaust itself in a sense-investigation of "generalities" and, as Husserl 
says with regard to a science with radical responsibility, it "can be only a delimiting form; it can 
only plant fences, the crossing of which indicates absurdity or aberration.,,76 
One of these generalities concerns a characteristic common to all ideal objectivity, to all 
forms of culture and science: every cultural ideality moves entirely within the spiritual space of 
tradition. Husserl writes, "Our human existence moves within innumerable traditions. The whole 
cultural world, in all its forms, exists through tradition. These forms have arisen as such not 
merely causally" (OG, p. 158). 
75 For the concept of form. for the profound. as Derrida hdie\'es. phenomenological reinterpretation of the 
traditional concept of form (eidos. l11orphe) sec Form and Meaning. especially pp. 107-109. 127-128. and 
SP. p6. We will come hack to this in the second part of the thesis. 
76 6 FfL. p .. 
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Now these generalities, as a priori and structural determinations. retain their 
"unconditioned (unbedingten/7 general validity" (OG, p. 159), despite the absence of every 
material, factual-historical determination. On the subject of tradition in general we have, as we 
were saying before with respect to the eidetic singularity of the origin of geometry, an absolutely 
indubitable knowledge extending beyond all historical factuality. We know a priori that eyery 
ideal-cultural formation we can encounter for ourselves in our surrounding historical world, 
whatever its materially determined content, has its origin in the past, in the productiYe acts of a 
historical subjectivity. It is also evident in advance that these productive acts were able to create 
an ideal objectivity that it did not exist before "only by disposing of raw or already traditional. 
i.e., spiritual shaped, materials" (lOG, p. 57). A reference to the origin. to the inaugural 
production of sense, is necessarily inscribed, then, in the very sense of every ideal formation and 
its historicity. Every cultural ideality is born "out of a first acquisition"' of sense, "out of first 
creative activities" (OG, p. 158). This sense must have first been created and presented itself as 
evidence in a primordial and constituting act in such a way so as to be then linguistically 
expressed and communicated among different subjects. Now without, for the time being, asking 
about the historical content of this originary evidence, we know a priori the form of this evidence 
as well as that its content is already, precisely with the help of language, transmitted and 
acquired. Were this transmission and acquisition never take place or were it impossible, no 
objectivity and no history would ever appear or make any sense whatsoever. 
But apart from the form of the original self-evidence and its ability to be transmitted, we 
also know a priori the form of the movement which pertains to the transmission of its content. 
This movement is analogous, if not the same, in all cultural objectivities, scientific or 
prescientific. Moreover, the sense-content of a science like geometry, just like that of every other 
constituted cultural formation, is transmitted according to a movement that pertains also to the 
primordial temporalization of egological consciousness. Were we to respect and to repeat 
Husserl's descriptions concerning the primordial production and the form of development of 
geometry and of traditional culture in general, Derrida tells us, we would be led back to the 
description of the unique and essential form of temporalization: the living present (lebendige 
Gege11ll'art) of consciousness, the ultimate ground of all constitution. For Husserl every historic 
present, every cultural and every scientific present, is grounded in the \iying present of an 
77 We will come hack to this "unconditional rationalism of the unconditional, .. to this great theme. Derrida 
savs. of unconditionality, which for Husser! remains the absolute principk of pure reason (either theoretical 
or-practical). It is al th~ center of Derrida's reading of Husser! in Rogues, in the second ~ssay on Reason. 
Let LIS simply say here that the i'~finite task of philosophy as science and theory. as It IS de"LTlhed or 
prescrihed hy Husser\. especially in thL' Crisis and in the so called Vienna Lecture. is ihclf unconditional. 
(Rogul's. p. 1.14.) 
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egological and historical consciousness. All history passes, it cannot not pass, de facto as well as 
de jure, through the intentional and inner history of the totality of egological subjectivities: "The 
historical world is, to be sure, first pregiven as a social-historical world. But it is historical only 
through the inner historicity of the individuals, who are individuals in their inner historicity, 
together with that of other communalized persons" (OG, p. 174). 
In the course of this thesis, we will have the chance to return many times to Husserl's 
descriptions of the movement of temporalization, i.e., of the temporality of the synthetic 
interconnections of sense. (We will have particularly to see what binds these descriptions with 
Husserl's descriptions of the constitution of intersubjectivity especially in Cartesian Meditations. 
and also with the problem of signification.) For the time being let us underline that this movement 
of temporalization of the living present is, according to Derrida, dialectical through and through: 
the indefinite and mutual implications of sense- retentions and sense- protentions (of "pri mary 
memory" and "expectation") (lOG p 152). As the ultimate, universal and absolute form of 
transcendental experience in general, and as, we must not forget , the most primordial and 
concrete lived experience, the living present is nothing but the indefinite maintenance of this 
dialectic. 
Here we find once again the peculiar virtue of language: as the means for a sedimentary 
depositing of sense, it takes this dialectic movement of sense beyond the individual finitude so as 
to make its transmission or tradition in the communal world possible. As the condition for the 
constitution of the ideal identity of sense in thought, language permits the intra-egological 
permanence or sedimentation of sense as well as the traditional sedimentation of sense in the 
communal world. (lOG, pp. 85-86, 143) The proto geometer can produce the pure ideality of the 
geometrical object in his thought and, at the same time, assure its transmissibility to other 
geometers only by means of (unequivocal) speech. 
According to Derrida, the themes of intentional history of sense, of sedimentation, of 
passivity and reactivation, as they are dealt in the Origin, make explicit this dialectic of 
protention and retention described in Husserl's lectures on the Phenomenology of the 
Consciousness of Internal Time (1905). This description, after the reduction of psychological 
temporality as successiveness in objective time, will reveal the h\'ing present of consciousness as 
the "primordial Absolute of temporality": as the absolute maintenance or nmmess of the origin 
which has the power of synthesizing protentions and retentions and of incessantly reassembling 
them under the llnil'crsality of its form. Derrida writes: 
The present appears neither as the rupture nor the effect of the past. hut as the retention of a 
present past. i.e .. as the retention of a retention. and so forth. Since the retentional ~nwcr .01' Cllnsl~iousne"s 
is finik. this consciousness presenTS significations, "alues. and past acts as hahttuahtles (habltlls) and 
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sedimentations. Traditional sedimentation in the communal world will have the function of ~!Oing beyond 
this retentional finitude of individual consciousness. Of course, sedimentary retention is '-not '-only the 
condition of the possibility of protention: it also belongs essentially to the general form of protention. which 
is itself conceived under the absolutely unique and universal form of the Living Present. The latter. which is 
the primordial absolute of temporality, is only the maintenance of what indeed must be called the dialectic 
of protention and retention, ... lOG, pp. 57-58. 
The absolute of the Living Present then is only the indefinite maintenance of the mutual 
implications of protentions and retentions, the form in which an infinite diversity of (materially 
determined) sense-contents can be produced. Without this dialectical and indefinite implication of 
sense protentions and sense retentions, always lived and unified by an egological subjectivity in 
the absolute and concrete identity of the living present, which is nondialectical in itself78, no 
production and no transmission of sense could ever be possible. 
Now what is said of the living present is, according to Husserl, also valid for the historic 
present, since the latter is grounded in the living present of egological subjectivity (that is, in 
intra-egological sedimentations of sense). In order to translate the synthetic style of the movement 
which pertains to the totality of the life-world as cultural world, Husserl uses the geological 
Image and metaphor of sedimentation. (lOG, pp. 60, 98-99) Sedimentation in the traditional 
world has the form of a produced and acquired sense that is continually and internally 
recapitulated: cultural objectivities, scientific or not, are sedimented traditions. All ideal 
objectivities in general "have the mobility of sedimented traditions" (OG, p. 171). 
With regard to the tradition of sense of a constituted ideal formation let us note "the most 
obvious commonplaces." We know that the sense which enters into tradition, the sense which can 
be transmitted to and acquired by another speaking subject, is continually and internally 
recapitulated within every new historical acquisition and sedimentation, that is, we know that 
every acquisition is unceasingly worked upon, again and again, by a subjective activity of 
producing new structures of sense out of the old ones and of handing them down; we know that 
this traditional sense extends enduringly through time "since all new acquisitions are in turn 
sedimented and become working materials" (OG, p. 171). Geometry's progress or development is 
a traditional development as sense-sedimentation: every enrichment of sense retains a 
sedimentary reference to the past and acquired sense at the bottom of the new sense and does not 
dispense with it. (OG, p. 166) 
Whatever our ignorance on the subject of the actual history of a cultural formation, we 
know a priori that, the traditional development of every cultural formation is brought about by 
7K The movement of tcmporalization, "as nery authentic dialecticity wants," is, Derrida writes, "only the 
diakctic hetwecn thc dialectical (the indefinite mutual and irreducihle implication of protentions and 
retentions) and thc nondialectical (the ahsolute and concrete identity of the Living Present. the unin:r"al 
form (If all consciollsness."' lOG, p. I·B. 
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the penn anent totalization and repetition of its acquisitions, and that the unity of this unceasing 
traditionalization is always brought about in the universalform of the historic present. As Husserl 
writes "the whole of the cultural present, understood as totality, implies the whole of the cultural 
past ... it implies a continuity of pasts which imply one another, each in itself being a past 
cultural present. And this whole continuity is a unity of traditionalization up to the present which 
is our present as [a process ot] traditionalizing itself in flowing-static vitality" (OG, p. 173). From 
these generalities and self-evidences result, as Husserl writes, the universal a priori of history (das 
universale Apriori der Geschichte): "The historic present is the historical Absolute - the vital 
movement of the coexistence and the interweaving of original formations and sedimentations of 
sense" (OG, p. 174). 
Similarly, this is how Husserl describes the unity of sense pertaining to the production 
and to the becoming of the ideal Objectivity of geometry: it has the unity of a tradition, geometry 
is a traditional system of ideal objectivities. What is acquired through scientific activity, which is 
not something real but ideal, is serviceable as material for the possible production of idealities on 
a higher level. Husserl writes: "We understand our geometry, available to us through tradition 
(we have learned it, and so have our teachers), to be a total acquisition of spiritual 
accomplishments which grow through the continued work of new spiritual acts into new 
acquisitions. We know of its handed-down, earlier fonns, as those from which it has arisen; but 
with every fonn the reference to an earlier one is repeated. Clearly, then, geometry must have 
arisen out of afirst acquisition, out of the first activities" (OG, p. 159). 
Clearly then, the objectivities of geometry are, like any other fonn of empirical culture, 
spiritual productions which move necessarily in the space of tradition. And Husserl immediately 
adds, in order to describe the unique style of the synthetic interconnections of sense pertaining 
exclusively to the tradition of geometry (or to the tradition of an objective and exact science): 
"We understand its persisting manner of being: it is not only a forward process from one set of 
acquisitions to another but the continuous synthesis in which all acquisitions maintain their 
validity, all make up a totality such that, at every present stage, the total acquisitions is the total 
premise for the acquisitions of a new level" (OG, p. 159). 
For HusserI's dialectics the creative activity of sense implies always a passivity regarding 
constituted and acquired sense. It belongs to the essence of the results of each scientific stage not 
only that their ideal sense "in fact comes later" but that, since sense is grounded upon sense. the 
antecedent sense gives something of its validity to the new sense and becomes part of it. 
"Geometry necessarily has this mobility and has a horizon of geometrical future in precisely this 
style: this is its meaning for every geometer who has the consciousness (the constant implicit 
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knowledge) of existing within a forward development understood as the progress of knowledge 
being built into the horizon" (ibid.) 
The logic of exemplarity is at the centre of Husserl's archeo-teleological doctrine of 
tradition: geometry is one example of traditional culture among others and a good example, a 
teleological model. According to Husserl we should distinguish between the spiritual productions 
of science from that of prescientific and empirical culture. The latter have only a passing 
existence in the surrounding world, "death is possible for them alone" (lOG, p. 94). In opposition 
to them, an essential privilege is reserved for the sciences and for philosophy. "Philosophy, 
science, is the title for a special class of spiritual products." "They are imperishable.,,79 A certain 
infinitization, a certain passage to the limit, and a certain relation to telos, is involved in their 
genesis and life. 
Geometrical acquisitions, then, have another manner of being, another temporality and 
they bring about, Husserl writes, a "revolutionalization of historicity." The origin of geometry has 
been marked, Derrida writes, by an "irruption of the infinite as revolution within empirical 
culture" (lOG, p. 59). As we are going to see, this infinite had already broken through, it was 
already at work in the first idealizing acts of the proto geometer who produced the geometrical 
object; these inaugural acts were already an infinitization. Geometrical sense, even if it is always 
produced within the individual consciousness of the scientific investigator, has "the miraculous 
new way of containing intentional infinities" within itself. A new form of communal subjectivity 
appears in history, one which, "living in finitude, bears within itself the future horizon of 
infinity". This subjectivity, always finite in its factual being, "lives towards poles of infinity. ,,80 A 
new type of communalization of finite subjects arises, one which, being guided by the neH' sense 
of infinity, that is, by the idea of an infinite task or project, is not bound to the soil of the national 
tradition, and is not inhibited in its spread by any national boundaries. 81 This new sense or idea of 
infinity is a practical and unconditional idea, and indissociable from the "new sort of praxis", 
which is nothing but that of "the universal critique of all life and all life-goals, all cultural 
products and systems that have already arisen out of the life of man; and thus it also becomes a 
critique of mankind itself and of the values which guide it explicitly or implicitly.",82 
79 Vienna Lecture. p. 276ff. 
KO Ihid .. p. 277. 
KI Ihid .. pp. 277. 286. As infinite idea or project. philosophy postulates a universal beyond all relativism. 
culturalism. ethnocentrism. and especially beyond or against nationalism. 
K' Ih'd '")v ~ 
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Why insist here on the peculiar structure of the ideal objectivities of mathematics? Since 
we have affirmed (in the second section of this part of the thesis) the eidetic singularity and 
uniqueness of the origin of geometry, and the indissociability of fact and sense in the inaugural 
act, a very important question has been left hanging over us: what authorizes the return inquiry? 
How the reactivation of the originary or instituting sense is possible if it is buried under the 
infinite history of geometrical acts and sense-structures whose sedimentations are superimposed 
and implicated in their totality in each stage? What authorizes and permits the reactivation of the 
originary sense of geometry is what makes it possible. For Husserl this is the possibility of a 
twofold inquiry a) into pure tradition, into "the possibility of a pure history of sense" and b) into 
the possibility of pure language and of univocity. What makes geometry the exemplary index of 
being-scientific and the exemplary case for a sense-investigation on universal history is precisely 
the absolute ideality of its objectivities, objectivities which, since they are free from any sensible 
and factual limit, may appear to offer the chance for a pure tradition of truth and for peifect 
univocity, i.e., for infinite traditionality. 
Furthermore, the sense-sedimentation pertaining in the tradition scientific truth, whose 
ideality is absolutely normative, is rigorously distinguished from the sense-sedimentation 
pertaining to a de facto empirical culture, a sedimentation which "does not exclude the fact that 
validity (which is rooted in language, terrain, epoch, and so forth) can become dated" (lOG, p. 
59). The successful description of the latter was in fact what Husserl was conceding to Dilthey's 
historicism with regard to the relative and subjective validity of all Weltanschauungen. All world-
views are ideal cultural formations whose internal sense is definitely motivated in the given 
historical relationships by the acts of a total, factual subjectivity. As a cultural formation, a 
Weltanschauung is also an ideal formation that is concretely and traditionally valid or true for the 
total historical subjectivity in question. As such it has "the relativity proper to the historical 
world", it comes and goes; it belongs to the time and changes with the time, the consequence 
being that, since its validity is "bound" to an empirical, determined temporality, "the absolute 
validity of any particular form of life-interpretation, of religion, and of philosophy disappears." 
What was once held valid (by a historical community) is not at the present (or is not for another 
historical community). 'The factual truth of what is said here" Husserl writes, "is obviously 
indubitable." Historical relativism still can claim its rights, but it will never be "the last word of 
. 'f' kId ,,8~ SClentl 1C now e ge '. 
Both the Weltaschauul1g and the empirical cultural world, the determined historical 
totality to which the Weltaschauul1g corresponds correlatively, are sedimented traditions of sense 
K.~ PRS, p. 186. 
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animated by an "idea", by a project. But in prescientific culture there are no infinite tasks, "no 
ideal acquisitions whose infinity is itself the field of work." "Extrascientific truth, culture not yet 
touched by science, consists in tasks and accomplishments of man in finitude. The openly endless 
horizon in which he lives is not disclosed; his ends, his activity, [ ... J all this moves within the 
sphere of finitely surveyable surrounding world.,,84 The idea or the project which animate the 
Weltanschauung, which together with "wisdom" belong to the cultural community and to the 
times, is marked Husserl writes in Philosophy as Rigorous Science by an irreducible finitude: 
"Weltanschauung, too, is an 'idea', but of goal lying in the finite, in principle to be reali;ed in an 
individual life by way of constant approach .... ,,85 
Now what happens with the sense-sedimentation pertaining to the culture and tradition of 
truth? The ideality of truth, by contrast to the ideality of Weltanschauung, is absolutely 
normative: if "the 'idea' of Weltanschauung is a different one for each time ... The 'idea' of 
science, on the contrary, is a supratemporal one, and here that means limited by no relatedness to 
the spirit of one time [ ... J Science is a title standing for absolute, timeless values. ,,86 Likewise in 
Vienna Lecture, Husserl has shown that the idea of "unconditioned truth" (unbendingte 
Wahrheit), the idea of truth and of science, is an infinite idea and one cannot account for it on the 
basis of a determined historical totality, since, on the contrary, the history of science or truth is 
the transcendence of all finite historical and cultural totality. The exemplarity of geometry, and of 
every objective-exact science in general, consists in the fact that it is /lot proper to any 
determined historical culture, that it is made possible, as the highest possibility of all culture in 
general, by the reduction of every empirical cultural determination. This latter reduction was 
made possible by the inaugural idealization or infinitization of the protogeometer which created 
the geometrical object or eidos, "by the irruption of the infinite as a revolution within empirical 
culture" (lOG, p. 59). This is again what is so extraordinary about the institutive and historical 
acts of the protogeometer: the creation of geometry's infinite eidos which opens the horizon of 
geometrical knowledge as that of an infinite project. It is therefore only in contradistinction to the 
X.J Vienna Lecture, p. 279. 
X5 PRS p. 191. To be sure, Weltanschauung, according to Husserl, gives "the relatively most perfect answer 
to the enigmas of life and the world, that is, leads to a solution and satisfactory clarification, in the best 
possihle way, of the theoretical, axiological, and practical disagreements of life, which experience. wisdom, 
and pure apprehension of life and the world can resolve only imperfectly. [ ... ] In the urgency of life, in the 
praL'lical necessity to take a position, man cannot wait - perhaps for millennia - that science be there. 
supposing that he already knows the idea of rigorous science." Likewise in the Vienna Lecture Husserl 
speaks of those forms of knowledge not yet touched by science, the forms of mythical or mystical 
knowledge, a speculatin' knowledge that aims to serve the life of humankind: "all this speCUlative 
knowkdge is meant to serve man in his human purposes so that he may order his wordly life in the happiest 
possihle '-way and shidd it from disease. from nery sort of evil fate, from disaster and death" (Crisis. p. 
2X4). 
X6 PRS, p. 191. 
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finite unity of the bound idealities of empirical and de facto culture and its history that the 
infinitely open unity of the history of geometrical idealities will stand out as the model for every 
other traditional development. But even here we must be careful, we must not forget Husser}" s 
ambiguous attitude before the science of geometry. Even though Husserl has valued geometry as 
an infinite project, on the other hand, the whole Crisis tends to show how geometry, the ground of 
the mathematization of nature, hides true Nature. 87 
If, then, the possibility of reactivation is illuminated by Husserl in the Origin it is because 
the instituting' fact opacity can be reduced from the very beginning, because the instituting 
evidence to be reactivated is that of a created and absolutely objective ideal formation, namely the 
geometrical eidos "pure spatiality", whose being-sense is precisely independent from all 
factuality, and first of all from all empirical culture and from the here and now subjective act 
which intends it. Undoubtedly the case would be very different were he to investigate the origins 
of a nonmathematical object, of a created, but still bound to a certain de facto historical culture, 
ideal objectivity. In its origin and possibility, the ideality of sense and its validity would remain 
for ever dependent and relative to a de facto temporality and the factuality of the SUbjective acts 
which intend it, for ever dated and contingent. And its history would never constitute a pure unity 
and continuity of its own, since it will always have let itself be intrinsically, i.e., in the becoming 
of its sense, affected by the empirical content of a real history, by determined cultural 
interconnections, by determined subjective motivations and interests (which are themselves valid 
and ongoing projects) to be realized in a finite individual or communal life. Its unity and the 
totality of its becoming would always be finite and empirical, an empirical aggregate of finite and 
accidental units. 88 Husserl writes about this difference between bound empirical culture and free 
culture of truth: 
Even cultural systems are not always completely free idealities, and this reveals the difference 
between free idealities (such as logicomathematical systems and pure essential structures of every kind) 
and bound idealities, which in their being-sense carry reality with them and hence they belong to the real 
world. [ ... ] When we speak of truths and of the fact that validity "once and for all" and "for everyone" 
belongs to their sense as the telos of judicative stipulation, then these are free idealities. They are bound to 
no territory, or rather, they have their territory in the totality of the universe. In what concerns their 
reactivation, they are omnispatiai and omnitemporal. (my emphasis) 89 
Only the creation of a transcultural ideal objectivity, i.e., a cultural ideal objectivity 
which is not proper to any de facto historical culture, may appear then to offer the chance, which 
is also the Telos or the infinite task, of universal intelligibility, omnitemporality, absolute 
117 Crisis §9h, p. 51, sec also lOG, pp. 33n, 118n. 
HH Husserl does not deny the historicity or genuine traditionality of those cultural systems or formations, he 
simply dOL'S not find in them the transcendental "allie (lOG, p. 82). or the transcendental depth (lOG. p. 89) 
that he finds "in logieo-mathematical systems and pure essential structures of every kind." Experience and 
Jlldgl'l1lellf. §65, p. 267. 
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univocity and infinite translatability, i.e., of pure and infinite traditionality. This would also be the 
chance or task for man's communal being to be "lifted to a new lever" and to become a 
transcendental we" 
70 
5) Speech, Writing and the Transcendental Historicity of Scientific Reason. 
As we saw in section 3 with regard to the conditions of both objectivity and traditionality. 
according to Husserl, the ideal formations of culture, scientific or pre-scientific, are rooted in 
language, but language itself, which offers the chance for intersubjectivity and history, is also an 
ideal objectivity, an ideal formation through and through. Only as ideal objectivity can language 
provide the milieu within which the ideal sense of a cultural formation can be deposited and 
sedimented so as to offer itself, in the form of persisting linguistic acquisitions, to be heard or 
read, to be translated and worked upon again and again, and so indefinitely. There is no aspect of 
the cultural world, no moment of human life in general which could resist "the seduction of 
language" (OG, p. 165). Speaking of a whole class of ideal formations of the cultural world, 
Husser! says that they belong to "the broadest concept of literature" since "it belongs to their 
objective being that they be linguistically expressed and can be expressed again and again; or, 
more precisely, they have their objectivity, their existence-for-everyone, only as signification 
(Bedeutung), as the sense of speech (Sinn von Reden)" (OG, p. 160n). Husser! refers to the 
"broadest concept of literature" to the "literary object" which includes everything written, not 
only "fine literature" but also scientific literature. The literary object, which is taken by Husserl in 
the Origin as a clue for analyzing the ideality of cultural objectivities, is a nonmathematical or 
non-mathematizable object, and also an object that differs from objects of technical art, like tools, 
and from objects of plastic or musical art. 90 
As we are going to see in the second part of the thesis, the structure of language and of 
speech has been described by Husserl, already since the Logical Im'estigations. in terms of 
ideality, or rather in terms of more or less free ideality. In the Origin he writes: ..... language 
itself, in all its particularizations (words, sentences, speeches), is, thoroughly made up of ideal 
objectivities, for example, the word Lowe occurs only once in the German language; it is identical 
throughout its innumerable utterances by any given persons" (OG, p. 161). 
Derrida discerns three degrees of ideal Objectivity. We must pay attention here. 
a) There is, first, what Derrida calls prirnary idea lit)" the ideality of the word (or 
expression). of its sensible form - or, as Saussure would say. of the signifier, of the acoustic 
'>0 "What is literature? And first of aIL what is it to write? How is it that writing can disturb the vcry 
question "what is"!" and even "what does it mean? ... " These are questions which Derrida was able to 
formulalL'. dnclop and sharpen only \\'ith the help of transcendental phenomenology. Phenomenology. 
especially in its preoccupation "with the history of ideal objects and of truth" is. "as I still see it today. in a 
different way. a discipline of incompatible rigor." Punctuations: The Time for a Thesis in De~nda. Jacq~e". 
Er('s of the Uni\"('1"sitr. Right To Philosophy 2, translated by Jan Plug & Others. Stanlord. Stanlord 
University Press. 2004. p 117. 
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image91 . The identity of the signifying form (of the word LOwe), what allows it to be recognized 
as the same word through the multiplicity of its real and sensible embodiments (phonetic or 
graphic), is not real, it is ideal. But this ideality, what allows a certain identity in repetition that is 
independent of the multiplicity of the factual events, of the word or expression is still \'ery far 
from being a free ideality, since it is still relative and bound to a certain factuality, that of a 
German speaking community. Derrida writes: 
Only within a facto-historical language is the noun "Lowe" free, and therefore ideal, compared 
with its sensible, phonetic, or graphic incarnations. But it remains essentially tied, as a German word. to a 
real spatiotemporality; it remains interrelated in its very ideal Objectivity with the de facto existence of a 
given language and thus with the factual subjectivity of a certain speaking community. lOG. p. 70. 
b) We pass beyond this sensible spatiotemporality of the word LOwe and factual linguistic 
subjectivity (the German speaking subjectivity) when we consider that the ideality and unity of 
the sense LOwe, of its intented sense or signified, can be made accessible to several languages 
(lion, leo, etc). The ideality of sense, of the signified, which Derrida calls secondary, is therefore 
a higher, a more free ideality than that of the word /signifier, and what therefore allows the latter 
to be translated. "The same content can be intended starting from several languages, and its ideal 
identity assures its translatability. This ideal identity of sense expressed by lion, leo, LOwe. and so 
forth, is then freed from all factual linguistic subjectivity" (lOG, p. 71). However heterogeneous 
are the essential structures of several constituted languages or cultures, translation is, in principle, 
a possible task. 
But even this ideality of sense lion, the ground and condition of its translatability, is not a 
completely free ideality since it is still bound to an empirical subjectivity. This is why, "even if 
all men had been able to and could in fact encounter and designate the lion", its translatability 
would never be absolute and universal. This is because the object lion, the flesh and blood lion, 
which is neither the word nor the sense lion, is not an ideal objectivity but a real and natural 
objectivity, a wordly existent. It is not an "objectivity of the understanding" but an "object of 
receptivity", according to a distinction that Husserl makes in Experience and Judgement (§63) 
and which corresponds to the difference between ideal and real object that we mention earlier.92 
Because it is a natural and contingent reality, the ideal Objectivity of the sense lion will remain 
marked (even if, as we just said, it has freed itself from all factual linguistic subjectivity) in its 
91 The equivalences signifier/expression and signified/Bedeutung could be posited here were not the 
bedeutell/ Bedeutung/ sensei object structure much more complex for Husserl than for SJussure. See also 
Speech and Phenomena. p. 46n. . ... . 
9_ As Derrida comments on the §63 of Experience and Judgement. "The ob]ectl\ltles of the understandmg 
arc on a 'higher lever than those of reL'epti\ity. They are not preconstituted. like the latter, in the pure 
pas:-.ivity of sensible receptivity, but in predicatin: spontaneity. 'The mode of their original preghenf/ess is 
their productioll ill predicatil'(' actil'itr (~(rhe Ego ... '" (lOG. p. 71 n). 
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very origin and possibility, by another contingency, that of the lived experiences of an empirical 
subjectivity in which the factual existence of a lion may be posited, apprehended, and expressed. 
The expression lion would be marked by an "unavoidable" equivocation that no translation would 
ever overcome. 'The translatability of the word lion, then, will not in principle be absolute and 
universal. It will be empirically conditioned by the contingent encounter in a receptive intuition 
of something like a lion. The latter is not an 'objectivity of the understanding', but an 'object of 
receptivity.' The ideality of sense and of what it evokes irreducibly adheres to an empirical 
subjectivity" (lOG, p. 71). 
c) Finally, we attain to the ideality of the object itself, to a tertiary ideality, with the 
historical constitution of the ideal objectivities of geometry. With the ideal object of geometry we 
pass beyond the bound ideality of language (both of the signifier and of the signified concept or 
sense) and beyond all factual and empirical subjectivity and thereby we can assure infinite 
translatability and infinite traditionality. 
With the objects of geometry, the "objects of understanding" we pass beyond all de facto 
empirical subjectivity because we also pass beyond the finite and factual limits of the sensible 
intuition of the real object, beyond the constitution of the natural Objectivity of a wordly existent, 
for example, that of the lion. We pass beyond empirical subjectivity because the object of 
geometry, constituted as it is by the acts of a concrete historical subjectivity, is more objective 
than the natural existent lion.93 "For if the latter resists or opposes anything, it would always be". 
Derrida says, "a de facto empirical subjectivity. Therefore, the real object can never attain that 
absolute Objectivity which can be proposed for all subjecth'it...." in general in the intangible 
identity of its sense" (lOG, p. 67). The difference between the constitution of the ideal object and 
the constitution of "objects of receptivity" is also a difference in their temporality. Unlike the real 
object which has its individual place in the objective time of the world, the ideal objectivity of 
geometry is totally free of factual, wordly temporality (or spatiality), it is Zeitlos, says Husserl in 
Experience and Judgement, §64. But this timelessness of the objectivities of the understanding. 
their being "everywhere and nowhere", i.e., their supratemporality (Oberzeitlichkeit) is only 
another "mode temporality", namely omnitemporality (Allzeitlichkeit). In what concerns then 
their possible reactivation (and, we could add, translation), they are omnispatial and 
omnitemporal. (§65) 
If absolute translatability is denied to a supposedly pre-cultural and natural objecti\'ity we 
cannot say the same thing with regard to a transcultural object like that of geometry, whose 
'H Thc Ii\'cd experiences and acts of this concrete and constituting suhjecti\,ity always presuppose "the 
predicati\L' acti\'ity llf the Ego", which is common to the constitution of natural and ideal ohjectivities, and 
of which Husserl speaks in Experiencc and judgement, §63. 
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Objectivity is absolute, removed from all real and subjective contingency, and therefore without 
any kind of limits - a cultural fonnation which is not proper to any determined historical culture. 
Husserl writes: 
The Phythagorean theorem, [indeed] all of geometry, exists only once. no matter how often or 
even in what language it may be expressed. It is identically the same in the 'original language' of Euclid 
and in all 'translations"; and within each language it is again the same, no matter how many times it has 
been sensibly uttered, from the original expression and writing-down to the innumerable oral utterances or 
written and other documentations. OG, p. 160. 
But we should not confuse the ideal Objectivity of language, of the geometrical 
expressions or propositions, which is bound to a factual linguistic community (geometry was first 
spoken in Greek) with the ideal Objectivity of the sense, with "the theme" of these expressions, 
which here, in the case of the exact science of geometry, is identicaL with the object itself, with 
the absolute ideal Objectivity of the geometrical object itself. Husserl specifies in an absolutely 
decisi ve paragraph: 
But the idealities of geometrical words, sentences, theories - considered purely as linguistic 
formations - are not the idealities that make up what is expressed and brought to validity as truth in 
geometry; the latter are ideal geometrical objects, states of affairs, etc. Wherever something is asserted, 
one can distinguish what is thematic, that about which it is said (its sense), from the assertion, which itself, 
during the asserting, is never and can never be thematic. And the theme here is precisely ideal objectirities, 
and quite different ones from those coming under the concept of language. OG, p. 161. 
So geometrical truth, the ideal Objectivity of the geometrical object or state of affairs is 
beyond every particular and factual language as such (Greek, German, and so forth,) and 
therefore also beyond all factual subjectivity or factual speaking community: and this is the 
reason why it is also universally translatable, namely, the reason why we can speak of a 
geometrical tradition, of a pure tradition of sense that is free from historically determined cultural 
interconnections. This freedom is necessary for geometry to be transmitted, exported or delivered 
to every possible language and every possibLe cultural tradition in general. 
But even though the geometrical object has given us the chance to go beyond the bound 
ideality of a historically detennined language, the latter was necessary for the constitution of 
truth: how is that? This is the paradox which Derrida, after Husserl, invites us to think: instead of 
binding it, historical incarnation in a factual and constituted language sets free the transcendental 
constitution of truth. The transcendental must be rethought. (lOG, p. 77). Here we are faced 
with the most interesting difficulty of the Origin. For if geometry was born and inscribed in a 
particular language, if it has a root in Greek language and culture, its project or task consisted. 
from the very heginning, in liberating itself from its territorial. cultural or other detenninations. in 
a will to deracination. in pulling up. uprooting the roots and in making it such that what has been 
thought or written in Greek is deli\'t~red and acquired into se\'erallanguages. 
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The grounding of geometry's ideal objects, i.e., of objects capable of being expressed, 
transmitted and infinitely repeated as the same, in and through the intentional acts of a 
constituting historical subjectivity, could not be possible without the element of language. What, 
therefore, makes Husserlian idealism infinitely more interesting for Derrida is not simply the 
absolute privilege accorded to pure consciousness as the absolute origin of sense and history, 
since this consciousness would not be possible without the addition or supplement of speech. In 
the investigation of the origin and tradition of geometry's sense, Husserl will return to the 
primordiality of the speaking subject as what constitutes geometrical Objectivity and the whole 
sphere of ideal Objectivity. Put otherwise, in the constitution of ideal Objectivity the element of 
consciousness and the element of language are indistinguishable. Now this supplement is 
dangerous, it has an ambiguous or indeed a threatening value. 94 
Husser! has shown that, since the ideality and the sense of, for example, the Pythagorian 
theorem is not fully constituted, is not fully objective (i.e., intelligible for everyone), as long as it 
is not linguistically expressible, as long as it is not able to be set down in the world, to be 
embodied and deposited in linguistic signs, then the act of language cannot be simply restricted to 
the secondary and unproductive function of reproducing, reflecting and depositing a pre-
expressive constitution of sense, that is of a sense which would not wait for speech in order to be 
what it is, i.e., an absolute object. But if "to constitute an ideal object is to put it at the permanent 
disposition of a pure gaze" 95, the linguistic incarnation of speech, the act of language, which 
brings sense into an intersubjective horizon, and which thereby makes sense accessible and 
available for every consciousness whatsoever, is constitutive through and through: "Whether 
geometry can be spoken about is not, then, the extrinsic and accidental possibility of a fall into 
()4 The supplement is ambiguous: sometimes the supplement (speech as natural supplement or writing as a 
technical supplement) adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching an other plenitude. namely the 
presence of sense to intuition and of intuition to itself: it cumulates and accumulates presence, but, at other 
times, if it is not at the same time, the supplement supplements the for-itself (fur sich) of self-presence. it 
adds (first speech and then writing) only to replace, it takes (the) place and intervenes in-the-place-of (jiir 
etll'([s). In the case of the history of geometry, it takes the place of or usurps geometry's absolute origin, the 
constituting and present source of its truth. Language (and writing in which the truth of geometry is 
sedimented) would suhstitute themselves for their own origin, for that which engendered them and has heen 
engendered from itself: the living present of a constituting transcendental consciousness. We will come 
hack to it in the seeond part of the thesis. 
()~ lOG, p. 78. If, for HusserL sense is neither an "in-itself' nor a pure spiritual interiority, if it is an ohject 
through and through, if. as Derrida writes a few pages earlier. "the sense of sense in general is here 
determined as object: as some thing that is accessihle and available in general and first for a regard or gale" 
then "the wordly image of the ga~.l' would not he the unnoticed model of the theoretical attitude of pure 
consciousness hut, on the contrary. would borrow its sense from that attitude. This is \ery much in accord 
with the initial direction of phenomenology: the ohject in general is the final category of nl.?rything that 
can appear, i.e., that ean be for a pure u)tlsciousness in general" (lOG, p. 64). 
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the body of speech or of a slip into a historical movement. Speech is no longer simply an 
expression (Aiisserung) of what, without it, would already be an object: caught again in its 
primordial purity speech constitutes the object and is a concrete juridical condition of truth" 
(lOG, p. 77). 
To be sure, going beyond the bound ideality of language (Greek, German, etc.,) toward 
the infinite pole of geometrical Objectivity or truth is itself precisely an eidetico- transcendental 
reduction, which makes the unconditionality and eidetic intangibility of truth appear with respect 
to all de facto historical culture and language. "Undoubtedly geometrical truth never keeps the 
ideal objectivity or identity of its particular de facto linguistic incarnations compared to which 
remains free. But this freedom is only possible precisely from the moment truth can in general be 
said or written, i.e., on condition that this can be done" (lOG, p. 90). As we have already seen, 
this independence of truth from all factuality (and from all factual subjectivity) is marked in 
phenomenology by a juridical and transcendental dependence: it refers to the concrete and 
constituting acts, to the pure linguistic acts of speaking or writing, of a transcendental 
subjectivity. So we can say that the pure history of geometrical truth resists the reductionist 
attempts of historicist relativism to the extent that it does not let the purity of its sense to be exiled 
for ever in the bound ideality of its de facto language. But it can certainly provide such a 
resistance only if this truth is able to be said, only on condition that it can be embodied and 
deposited (with the danger of becoming alienated) in sensible spatiotemporality. 
We should therefore reverse Fink's formula we mentioned before (that In sensible 
embodiment occurs the localization and the temporalization of what is by its being-sense, for 
example geometrical truth, unlocated and untemporal) and say together with Derrida that "the 
ability of sense to be linguistically embodied is the only means by which sense becomes 
nonspatiotemporal" (lOG, p. 90). All cultural and historical production, scientific or not, of the 
spirit is necessarily involved in the essential ambiguity, the transcendental disquietude of 
language: "As the process of that essential and constitutive capacit)'for embodiment, language is 
also where e\'ery absolutely ideal object (i.e., where truth) is factually and contingently 
embodied"(lOG, p. 92). 
We cannot therefore say that language can be subjected to truth or even that there can be 
a truth of language or of signification in general. Inasmuch as truth has its origin and exists only 
in language, "in the pure and simple right to speech,,96, it can be found nowhere else. This is what 
l)h lOG. p. 92. The right of sp.eech (to~~ther with the totality of "human rights'") ~s ob\i~)~.sly. for Husse.~1 
and for the whule philosophIcal traditIOn (and we should not forget that the Idea of human rIghts . 
76 
Derrida has inherited from Husserl and gave us to think: sense or noerna in general must await 
being said or being written in order to inhabit itself, and in order to become, by differing from 
itself and by running all sort of risks, what it is, i.e., sense. So it seems that Husserl - when he 
affirms that the sign is the possibility of truth, that there is theoretical truth only in statements, 
that the activity of linguistic expression conditions the origin, the movement and the concept of 
truth - reverses the traditional and the most classical procedure of philosophy according to which 
signification is only a representation, a modification of the simple and full presence of sense in 
truth. 
Now, although spoken language, verbal expressIOn is an essential presupposition for 
intersubjective thinking, it is not enough to ground the absolutely free Objectivity of geometrical 
truth and its tradition. It allows the circulation of sense within a given, factual community of 
speaking subjects, it certainly frees the ideality of sense from an individual empirical subjectivity 
but still leaves it bound to the synchrony of an exchange, to an oral communication within the 
determined community from which it arises. The Objectivity of geometrical sense is still not 
complete with oral, that is, with synchronic, immediate and present, communication among the 
first geometers. It is not complete because the ideal Objectivity of sense in oral, present 
communication has not yet freed itself from an actually present speaking subjectivity in general. 
According to the Origin, only the possibility of writing, the possibility of being written permits 
the ultimate freeing of geometrical ideality from all factuality and sensible spatiotemporality. 
Without writing, not only geometry's truth, but all cultural formations and all language (and 
therefore all sense) would remain for ever bound to the de facto and actual intentionality of an 
empirical community of speaking subjects. This is how Husserl takes, according to Derrida, the 
proper transcendental step in this "unheard of' style of investigation into the nonempirical 
history of geometry. Husserl writes 
Now we must note that the objectivity of the ideal structure has not yet fully constituted through 
such an actual transferring of what has been originally produced in one to others who originally reproduce 
it. What is lacking is the persisting existence of the "ideal objects" even during periods in which the 
inventor and his fellows are no longer awake to such an exchange or even, more universally. are not longer 
alh'£' (my emphasis). What is lacking is their continuing-to-be even when no one has reali:ed them in self-
evidence (my emphasis). OG. p. 164. 
Now what is this "thing" which can offer the possibility for truth to be fully objective. 
i.e., to enter into tradition, to be intelligible for all and indefinitely perdurable over and abO\e any 
to\.!dher with the institutions which try to implement this idea. is essentially one of the most powerful 
p,;i/osophell1cs. a philosophical idea through and through) denied to animals. The simple right to speech. 
then. as the quasi-transcendental condition of all other human rights (i.e .. as their condition and as one right 
among others). is resenl'll only for the suhjectiyity of man. 
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determined community of speaking subjects? What is called this "thing" within which truth is 
gathered and which can make truth perdure (and we must not forget, that perdurance or 
persistance is the very element and sense of truth itself) even when no empirical geometer has 
realized or thought it in act or in fact. or, and this amounts to the same thing. even when all actual 
and present geometers are dead? 
Writing is the common name for signs which function despite the total absence of the 
empirical subject because of his death, which continue to be legible or readable and to produce 
effects when the subject no longer answers for them, for what he has written (in his name). It is a 
mark that subsists, which does not exhaust itself in the moment of its inscription and which gives 
rise to iteration in the absence of the empirically determined subject.97 
Because writing frees the geometrical sense or truth from its actually present evidence for 
a real subject or for a real community of subjects, because this truth, in order to be what it is, can 
and must perdure or survive in its written body beyond the death of its actual author(s), "the 
conditions of its survival," Derrida tells us "are included in those of its life" (lOG, p. 90). Truth is 
imperishable inasmuch as it can be inscribed or deposited in real spatiotemporality, in a certain 
historical linguistic idiom, but also inasmuch as the possibility or necessity of the death (or the 
absence) of its actual author is already and in some way announced in the actual event of its 
written inscription. His death or absence is not merely an empirical possibility or eventuality, but 
structurally necessary to the writing of the geometrical protodocument. Geometrical ideality and 
truth (as an infinite task or project) is constituted by and appears to the acts of a pure, 
transcendental subjectivity only insofar as the later is finite in its factual being.98 Geometry and 
science in general, and language are possibilities only for a mortal being. 
Now what we said about the death of the writer holds also, and for the same reasons, for 
the reader or receiver. For the writing of the proto geometer, the protodocument itself must be 
readable not only after his death, but also after the death of any of its receivers, better it must be 
legible or iterable after the absolute disappearance of any empirically determined addressee or 
collectivity of receivers. A truth which can be written and cannot remain readable or iterable 
beyond the disappearance of the actual community of speaking subjects from which originally 
arose, and beyond the death of all actual receivers or readers, this "truth" would not be absolutely 
lJ7 The possibility of a certain non-presence. of a non-actuality, pertains to the structure of the functioning of 
the mark (oral or written). What is the structure of the mark that renders the factual non-presence or death 
of its author possible? And is this possihility an empirical possibility. a possihility qua el'cntua/ir(;. or a 
structural. i.e .. Ill'cessary and essential possibility. a possibility qua necessity? We discuss more extensively 
Derrida's concept of "iterability" in the second part of the thesis. 
'IX "The transcendental end can appear to itself and he unfolded only on the condition of mortality. only on 
the condition of a relation to finitude as the origin of presence and ideality." The Ends o/Man. in ,\/argins 
p. 123. and SP. p. 55. 
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objective truth, and its history or tradition would remain for ever bound to a de facto empirical 
community, and like the latter, for ever vulnerable to factual destruction. Husserl writes about the 
transcendental effect or value of writing: 
The important function of writing. documenting linguistic expression [writing for Husserl is 
always an indication, it indicates or refers to an already constituted unity, that of the oral expression] is that 
it makes communication possible without immediate or mediate personal address. it is communication 
become virtual. Through this, the communalization of man is lifted to a new level. OG, p. 164. 
This virtuality is ambiguous, since, on the one hand, writing, as one of the most 
powerful technical mediations, communicates or circulates a thought-content to those that are 
absent, extends infinitely the domain and the power of the voice and of oral communication, 
makes telecommunication and the infinite transmission of truth to the most distant aenerations 
b ' 
possible. It makes thereby a transcendental community possible, i.e., a possible task. But, on the 
other hand, by absolutely virtualizing dialogue, by freeing communication from all present and 
actual intentionality, in other words by breaking with the horizon of communication as 
communication of presences, i.e., as communication of the actually present intention of the 
subject to say what he means (vouloir-dire), writing makes passivity, forgetfulness, and all the 
phenomena of "crisis" possible. (This is indeed the crisis of the subjectivity of the "we", of the 
European philosophy and humanity of which Husserl speaks in Crisis. We will come back to it.) 
But then writing, as what produces an absolutely ideal Objectivity and as the place where 
Objectivity or truth dwells, can no longer be a simple, continuous and homogeneous modification 
of presence, a progressive extenuation of presence, a site of potential presence, of the author's 
intention to what he has written and of the receiver's reading: the death or absence of the author 
and of the receiver is always already inscribed in the structure of writing, in the very possibility of 
its functioning, i.e., of signifying something.99 The field of transcendental history, the origin and 
the transcendental telos of a productive act of writing opens only on the condition of a relation to 
finitude as the origin of presence and of ideal Objectivity. 
The specific spatiotemporality of writing (a spatiotemporality which, as Derrida writes, 
escapes the alternative of the sensible and the intelligible lOG, p. 90) then completes and 
sanctions the constitution of absolutely permanent ideal objectivities and their traditionality as the 
place from which every present subject, every present evidence of sense, and every present 
reading can be absent. Thereby, the space for a pure and transcendental history of sense is opened 
in all its enigmatic depth. This is the enigma of the parallelism between empirical and 
l}l} Sec Si~lIature El'mt Context where Derrida links the value or effect of transcendentality tll the 
rossihili~y of writing and of death, thus analysed. Signature EI'ellt Context is published in Limited Inc. 
translated hv Salllual Weber. E\anston, Northwestern Uni\l~rsity Press. 1988, pp. 8, -+~. 
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transcendental history, the parallelism which respects both the perfect correspondence between 
the two and their nonconfusion. 100 
With regard to this writing effect (or transcendental effect of writing), i.e., the absolute 
virtualization of dialogue, of communication and, therefore, of tradition, Denida invokes. 
following Jean Hyppolite, the essential possibility and necessity of a "subjectless transcendental 
field". (lOG, p. 88) Writing, as precisely what constitutes such a subjectless transcendental field 
is, Derrida writes, one of the conditions of transcendental subjectivity, of a transcendental, i.e., 
nonempirical but constituting, "we". In this sense Husserl can say that the authentic act of 
writing, its primordial and! or final sense, is a reduction (of all factual existence and of all 
empirical subjectivity) performed by and in view of the transcendental H'e. 
This absence of subjectivity from the transcendental field of writing. IS the factual 
absence of a determined empirical subjectivity, i.e., "an absence whose possibility frees absolute 
Objectivity" (lOG, p. 88). But the text, in order to be what it is, must be readable and intelligible 
for a transcendental subject in general. Derrida writes 
The originality of the field of writing is its ability to dispense with, due to its sense. every present 
reading in general. But if the text does not announce its own dependence on a writer or reader in general 
(i.e., if it is not haunted by a virtual intentionality). and if there is no purely juridical possibility of it being 
intelligible for a transcendental subject in general, then there is no more in the vacuity of its soul than a 
chaotic literalness or the sensible opacity of a defunct designation. a designation deprived of its 
transcendental function. lOG, p. 88. 
What we said about the structurally indispensable role of language in the intersubjective 
constitution of ideal Objectivity of sense is true, a fortiori, for writing: historical incarnation in 
language, in a linguistic idiom sets free the transcendental. Analyzed in its pure intentionality, 
writing, as constitutive writing, is not merely a sensible phenomenon, the sensible body (Korper) 
of the letter, the constituted bound ideality of the graphic sign, the milieu in which truth is 
embodied and sedimented, "but a properly constituting body (Leib), the intentional primordiality 
of the here and now of truth" (lOG, p. 97). Inasmuch as writing permits the absolute freeing of 
the ideal Objectivity of sense, i.e., of truth, from its actually present evidence for a real subject, 
this writing cannot be only a mnemotechical aid to truth, a technical prosthesis in the service of 
(spoken) truth, the exterior redoubling of the actual presence of truth to afull speech, 
The possibility or necessity of sense to be incarnated in a graphic sign is no longer simply 
extrinsic and factual in comparison with ideal Objectivity: it is the sine qua non condition of its internal 
l'omp1etion. As long as ideal Ohjectivity is not. or rather. can not be engraved in the world - as long as 
ideal Ohjectivity is not in a position to he party to an incarnation (which. in the purity of its sense, is more 
than a system of signals or an outer garment) - then ideal Objectivity is not fully constituted. Therefore, the 
IOn For the notion of parallelism which defines the relation hetween the empirical or \\ordly consciousnes<., 
and the transcendental consciousness as the origin of the world. and how the first illcorporaTes the latter 
without heing confused with it see Derrida's InTroducTioll to Speech and Phenomena. pp. 10-12. 
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act of writing is the highest possibility of all "constitution," a fact against which the transcendental 
depth of ideal Objectivity's historicity is measured. (my emphasis) lOG, p. 89. 
According to Derrida then, writing defines and completes the transcendental disquietude 
of language to which we referred before: "as the process of that essential and constitutive 
capacity for embodiment, language is also where every absolutely ideal object, i.e., truth, is 
factually and contingently embodied." Writing, both as Verleiblichung and as Verkorperlll1g, 
frees the ideality of sense (or of truth) at the same time that it binds it to a certain idiom, i.e., at 
very work of its historical binding. In order for geometry's truth to be what it is, in order for 
geometrical sense to attain infinite universality and infinite omnitemporality (lOG, pp. 73n, 77n), 
it must be able to be set down and inscribed in the world, to be deposited in sensible 
spatiotemporality (that of the de facto existence of Greek language). Derrida writes: "From then 
on sense is gathered into a sign, and the sign becomes the exposed, wordly residence of an 
unthought truth. We have previously seen that truth can perdure in this way without being 
thought in act or in fact (our emphasis) - and that is what radically emancipates truth from all 
empirical SUbjectivity, all factual life and the real world" (lOG, p. 92). 
Here also lies, according to Derrida, the ultimate merit of the Origin of Geometry: it 
describes the necessary exposition of truth, i.e., of the infinite task of philosophical and scientific 
Reason, in the wordly inscription of writing. This exposition, which is structurally necessary to 
the emergence and indefinite development of sense, i.e., to the progressive advent of Reason, is 
also the danger to Reason. A danger both interior and intimate to reason. As the condition or the 
chance for the constitution of truth of geometry, the condition of the historicity and 
traditionalization of its ideal Objectivity, sense sedimentation in writing is simultaneously a 
threatening value, a trap, what opens the possibility of passivity and forgetfulness, the possibility 
of crisis or absence of sense: what makes the subjective and historical origins of the ideal 
objectivities of geometry become strange and inaccessible to us. 
For Husserl this possibility of crisis, the possibility of the crisis or absence of sense - that 
IS, the crisis of reason: where reason looses its sense, looses itself or gets lost, where 
consciousness, conscience, or science, i.e., lucid, responsible sense-investigation or reacti vation, 
is lost or forgotten - remains linked with the production and tradition of scientific ideal objects 
i.e., with truth, with the progressive and infinite becoming of reason: it is thereby bound up with 
the essential possibility of writing. The iterable structure of writing, writing cut off, as we said, 
from its original production, i.e., from the original and actually present intention of its author. 
forbids or devastates the possibility (the power. capability, potentiality) or \alue of absolute 
responsibility. This is why it is condemned by Plato in the Phaedrus: \\riting signifie<., 
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forgetfulness, it is a mnemotechnic means (hypomnesis), a supplement of good, hYing and 
spontaneous memory (mneme).101 Some centuries later, writing will still be recognized as a 
critical moment for the history of reason and truth. For Husserl, writing, the written inscription, 
which is not simply an hypomnesis but as we said the essential condition of truth, the khora of 
truth, makes forgetfulness the faithful shadow of the progressive advent of reason. 
It is as if, according to Husserl, nothing else but reason itself made itself run such a 
danger, as if it wrongly gave itself reason to transgress with writing the factual finiteness of its 
historically determined figures, acts and events, and to consider itself, in its purity. as un-
conditional and infinite, as an infinite idea or task. 102 
Let us examine more closely this strange possibility, namely, the possibility that scientific 
reason itself and as such would ever come to acquire the power to threaten itself, the power to 
throw itself into crisis, to inflict upon itself such a disease, such an ill or evil, "in an autonomous 
and quasi-autoimmune fashion", as Derrida writes in Rogues. Before Husserl we knew that 
reason had the power (dynamis) to immunize itself, to protect itself from irrationalist prejudices, 
madness and from the doxa of the times, to throw light and dispense once and for all with the 
violence of the night, and therefore the power to save the world and the humanity of the world, 
but we had never examined the possibility of it being suicidal, we never thought that reason had 
the power to autoimmunize itself, "to threaten itself, to lose the meaning and the humanity of the 
world".103 
101 Plato. Plwcdrus. pp. 27..+c-275e. 
I(J~ RoglIl's. Two Essays 011 Reasoll. p. 126 ... 
III, ihid. p. 12.i. SL'L' also t:collol1lic.1 ojCnsl.l. pp. 70-73 
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Chapter Two: Writing and Responsibility 
1) The Issue of Responsibility: Husserl's Archeo-Teleological Discourse on Crisis 
In his Introduction to the Origin (section VII) Derrida refers to the moment of crisis, to 
the critical moment of writing in the course of examining the danger, namely the possibility of the 
disappearance of truth after it has been inscribed in the wordly element of writing. Derrida 
examines the hypothesis of radical forgetfulness, of the death of the absolute Objectivity of 
geometrical sense by the destruction of all factual writings (in which geometrical truth has been 
inscribed and sedimented) but also by the death of all actual geometers. How can the infinite task 
of the science of geometry protect its truth from factual corporeal disaster?I04 
Derrida here repeats a fiction which Husserl has used in his famous §49 of Ideas I in 
order to bring to light the eidetic intangibility of pure consciousness as the absolute origin of 
sense and of the world. In Ideas I Husserl reveals the essence of transcendental consciousness 
after the reduction of the totality of the existing world in general. (We will come back to this 
reduction or fiction in the second part of the thesis in our discussion of the Husserlian reduction, 
in the first Logical Investigation, to the "solitary mental life" of the speaking subject. After the 
employment of a certain type of fiction (Phantasievorstellung,) Husserl reveals the experience of 
solitary speech, of the subject hearing-himself-speak as a nonwordly experience, as a 
phenomenon which has already suspended the existential thesis of the world. Hearing- oneself 
speak is an experience which even though is produced in the world, it is also the origin of the 
world, since without it no world would ever appear as such.) According to Derrida, this fiction of 
the annihilation of the existing world does not have any other purpose but to "reveal to the Ur-
Region - transcendental consciousness - the essential relativity of the world's sense (the world 
being the totality of regions). Since transcendental consciousness can always and with complete 
freedom modify or suspend the thesis of each (therefore of all) contingent existence and of each 
1114 In "Essential Histon''' Kates gives a great emphasis in this Derridean fiction in order to make the point 
that Derrida continues ·to affirm the Husserlian distinctions and the constituti \'e role of pure writing, that 
Derrida is still a Husserlian, albeit a rather unorthodox one" (pp. 73. 83). Derrida's intention were ne,er to 
"gi\'e \'oice to some linguistic or scriptural relati\'ism" (67) Derrida in the Introduction. "will ne\'er he ahle 
to impugn the transcendental function of writing" (p. 70). We agree, not only in the Introduction though: 
the question for Derrida was never to "impugn" the transcendental function of writing but to see what 
writing. precisely in its transcendental function. still owes to phone. As we are going to show in the second 
part of the thesis, for Husserl writing is only phonetic writing, in the sense that outside the horizon of the 
phone (of what Husser! calls Bedeututngsintl'ntion) writing means nothing. 
83 
(therefore all) transcendence, its very sense is de jure and absolutely independent of the whole 
world" (lOG, pp. 95-96). 
Likewise, it is also In Ideas I that Husserl put the geometrical object. the truth of 
geometrical objectivity, to the test of hallucination in order, once again, to reveal its eidetic 
intangibility. To claim for example that "whether I am hallucinating or not a square has only four 
sides" means that no existential thesis in the real world and no psychological experience will ever 
be relevant to the constitution of truth. 105 But hallucination can be truth' s accomplice only in a 
static world of constituted significations. When Husserl in the Origin turns his attention to the 
sphere of sense and its traditional sedimentation, the true contrary of hallucination, is not the 
clear, distinct and immediate perception of the thing itself but history: the lucid consciousness of 
the historicity of ideal objects and the reawakening of origins. (lOG, p.46) 
Well in his Introduction to the Origin, Derrida repeats this fiction of the destruction of the 
world in order to reaffirm the eidetic intangibility of the geometrical eidos and its history, its 
independence from all empirical historical subjectivity: What would happen if the graphic sign, 
the guardian or guarantee of genuine objectivity and truth, was in fact destroyed, and all actual 
geometers were in fact dead? Would such a factual destruction have any effect on the sense of 
geometry itself? "Even if all geometrical documents - and as well all actual geometers - had 
come to ruin one day to speak of this as an event 'of geometry would be to commit a very 
serious confusion of sense and abdicate responsibility for all rigorous discourse" (lOG, p. 97). 
Geometry, in its sense-oj-being as truth which is not in the world, and in its pure being-Jor a 
transcendental subject, can survive the death of factuality to which it has been originally 
entrusted. 
This hypothesis of such a factual destruction would not have the transcendental 
signification it has for the case of scientific objectivities, if this same hypothesis were to be 
applied to another cultural ideality which is bound to a determined temporality or factuality. For 
this ideality. and for this we are certain, "a universal conflagration, .,. or a catastrophe of 
monuments or 'documents' in general" would intrinsically ravage them as well. Because they are 
still bound to some wordly factuality, these idealities, in their very sense. would share the same 
10:; Before HusserL Plato in Theaetetus (l90b) and Descartes in his First Meditation had also recourse to 
dream: "whether I am awake or asleep" "the odd is not even" and "two and three add up to five"; and it 
seems impossible. Descartes says, to suspect the obviousness of the truth of geometry: the latter is 
invulnerahle to natural douht. Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy. translated hy John 
Cottingham, Camhridge. Camhridge Universtity Press. 1996. p. 1'+. Plato. Theaetetlls. Sophist. translated hy 
Harold North Fowler,~Camhridge, Harvard Unin.:rsity Press. 1921, p. 181. See also Cogito and the HistorY 
(~r Madlless pp. -l7. 49. But whereas for Descartes "the primordial ground of th~se. eonstit~ted truths ..... . 
will he delegated to a \eracious God" for HusserL on the contrary. the ground of thiS truth IS the hlstoncal 
and Instituti~g acts of a transcendental suhjectivity. 
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fate with the idealities of "prehistoric arcana and buried civilizations" (lOG, p. 88): these ideal 
formations, bearing within themselves their sense, would not survive the death of the community 
in which they had originally arisen and developed, forgetfulness would be radical, their sense 
would never be possible to be reactivated and brought back to life. Since the essences of finite 
totalities (of empirical culture) will always be idealities bound to empirical history, then "death is 
possible for them alone and has the transcendental signification we just now granted it, but only 
insofar as the bound ideality is animated or traversed by a transcendental intention, only insofar 
as it is guided by the Telos of an absolute freeing which has not been yet fully attained" (my 
emphasis) (lOG, p. 94). 
What is this transcendental signification of death? This transcendental signification 
concerns the constitutive activity of writing and the relation to death which this constitutive 
writing necessarily implies in its very possibility, in its very enactment. It concerns the 
constitution and sedimentation of an ideal Objectivity in and through the finite acts of a new sort 
of intersubjective transcendental community, which is responsible for the historical system of 
truth that it itself produces; it concerns a community of the transcendental we that uproots itself 
from the soil of every determined historical totality and every national tradition and lives, even if 
it is finite in its factual being, "towards poles of infinity".lo6 With writing "man's communal 
being is lifted to a new level" (OG, p. 164). 
The problem of the disappearance of truth is quite shifted. Since death, as factual disaster, 
IS not possible for geometrical Objectivity or truth (precisely because its sense and value is 
independent from all factuality), the forgetfulness which follows the destruction of truth' s wordly 
embodiment (and of the actual community of the geometers who thought and practiced geometry) 
will never be as radical as in the case of bound idealities. By contrast to the finiteness of 
historically constituted bound idealities, the primordial evidence and sense of geometrical ideality 
may de jure be brought back to life, i.e., it may be actively reactivated or rediscovered with a new 
infinitization or idealization: "If geometry is true, its internal history must be saved integrally 
from all sensible aggression. Since geometry is tied neither to this moment here, nor to this 
territory here, nor to this world here, but to all world (Weltall), nothing will ever stand between 
the wordly experiences which incarnated geometry and what they have begun again: discovering 
afresh (without any traces after the shrouding of this world here) the paths of the adventure buried 
in another real history" (lOG, pp. 95, 97). 
lOt. C .. '177 1"1.'1/.'1, p. _ . 
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Now we should emphasize that this fiction of the destruction of wordly and empirical 
existence belongs to the necessary and provisional phase of the phenomenological Ruckfrage, 
where historico-empirical subjectivity has to be neutralized in order for the infinite idea of truth 
(here the truth of the idealized space of geometry) to come into light. As we are going to see 
Husserl does not stop there. With a new reduction this time he will come back to a constitutina 
b 
historical subjectivity which lives and creates in the cultural world. This fiction belongs to the 
"objectivist" period or moment of thought, or even to that objectivist "tendency:' which even 
though offers the target of Husserl's critical denunciation, is nevertheless "only a period, an 
essential, and therefore irreducible, movement of thought" (lOG, p. 83)107 
The danger of which Husserl speaks concerns a forgetfulness that threatens the historical 
system of truth in the world, i.e., the truth which has been gained through the speech and writing 
of a historico-transcendental SUbjectivity. The historical movement of truth that Husser! 
describes, and which is in danger, would be nothing outside the concrete and instituting acts of a 
transcendental (inter)subjectivity, outside its linguistic, either spoken or written, objectifications 
and sedimentations. The foundations of this history of truth, which is also a (rational) history of 
reason, are always, for Husserl, "the temporal and creative subjectivity's acts based on the 
sensible world as cultural world" (lOG, p. 60). The creative and intentional act of actual 
signification, of speaking or writing, of wanting or meaning to say the truth (what Husser! calls 
the Bedeutungsintention, and Derrida has translated as vouloir-dire, i.e., the living and life-giving 
act, the Lebendigkeit , the spiritual act which animates and bestows an expression with meaning), 
the free will to say or ex-press the truth, is for Husser! the ultimate authority, the absolute ground 
of truth and of all sense, and is absolutely responsible for its history, for the internal becoming 
and tradition of sense. Derrida writes 
In order to grasp the nature of the danger threatening truth itself in its constitutive speech or 
writing, ill order not to leave "internal" historicity [my emphasis], Husserl is going to track down the 
intention of writing (or of reading), in itself and in its purity; [ ... ] only in the intentional dimension of a 
107 Derrida's reading of Husserl in the Intoduction to the Origin is not a criticism of his objectivisim as 
Lawlor claims in his Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2002, p. 112). On the contrary what Derrida is trying to bring forth is the importance and 
audacity of Husser!' s last reduction: the reduction of the ideal sedimentations of objective-exact sciences in 
order to return to and reveal their historical ground in the life-world. Husserl' s merit, moreover. lies in his 
insistence that the return and thematization of the life-world should not abdicate "all scientific quality in 
general and all philosophical dignity." Derrida's intention cannot be clearer at this point. Marking his 
distance from that "irresponsihle empiricism" to which "all the 'phenomenologies' of prescientific 
perception are condemcncd" Derrida writes "The return to the structures of prescientific experiences must 
continually keep alive the question: How call the apriori of scientific Objectivity be constituted strartillg 
from those of the life world? (Derrida' s emphasis) (lOG. pp 119-120.) 
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proper~y animate body, of the geistige Leiblichkeit, more precisely, in the Geistigkeit of the Leib (to the 
exclusIOn of all factual corporeality), is sense intrinsically threatened. lOG, p. 98. 
Now what Husserl calls crisis is not a mere accident since it affects what is absolutely 
essential: it threatens, or rather, it happens to this historical subjectivity which is responsible for 
the advent and adventure of scientific reason. This ultimate foundation, the origin of the 
instituting, historical and subjective acts of objective science as cultural or spiritual formation is 
precisely what objectivism forgets, neglects or conceals. Hence the paradoxical character of 
Husserl's critical denunciation of nai've objectivism and naturalism: the amnesic evil called 
objectivism is an essential accident, it is born on the inside of scientific reason itselfl08 it is , 
produced by reason itself, i.e., by the production and written sedimentation of ideal objects which 
"as if' by themselves cover over and conceal their relation to the Lebenswelt and to the institutin a b 
or founding historical and subjective acts. As we have already said, writing is the condition for 
the constitution and history of ideal Objectivity as the place from which the actual intention to say 
what one means (vouloir-dire, Bedeutungsintention) may be absent. How can we determine the 
possibility or necessity of this absence? 
According to Derrida, the possibility or necessity of forgetfulness, of this amnesic evil 
that threatens the historical movement of truth in the world, has taken in Husserl's work three 
significations. 109 It is an empirical possibility or necessity, an accident that befalls the factual 
history of the sciences, and in this sense it has the character of "an extrinsic necessity, one which 
is thereby contingent in comparison with the sense and teleology of reason." (lOG, p. 36n) It 
happened, without foreseeing it and without calculation, in the course of a long history of 
scientific reason, and it happens again. This crisis is a massive and serious historical fact but it is 
not an "impenetrable destiny", and, illuminated by the teleology of reason it can be understood 
and eventually overcome. But this irresponsible forgetfulness can be overcome (this is the second 
signification) only by a voluntary Selbstbesinnung or return back to the origins, only by a 
decisional act of judgement, by a heroic decision of reason, as Husserl writes in the Vienna 
10K "The reason of the failure of a rational culture lies in its entanglement in 'naturalism' and 'objecti\ism' 
(in seiner Versponnenheit in 'Naturalismus' and 'Objecti,'ismus')". Crisis. p. 299. See also Derrida's 
interpretation of this metaphor of "vcrsponnenheit" in Rogues, pp. 130-131. 
109 Sec the very important footnote in p. 36 of Derrida's Introduction concerning the three significations of 
"forgetfulness in general" in the work of Husserl, "each varying according to text and context". This note 
has puzzled Marrati who has quoted it twice in her Genesis and Trace. in p. 24 where she mentions only 
the two and omits the third signification of forgetfulness, and in p. 40 where she presents this time along 
the other two and the third signification mentioned in Derrida's footnote: the eidetic, structural necessity of 
forgetfulness. But nell now she seems less willing to accept that Husserl himself has identified. "although 
rather less often" as she writes. a structural necessity of forgetfulness. and therefore. of crisis. Her 
reluctance to accept Husserl's recognition of crisis in any other way than in the form of a suhjective fault or 
accidL'ntal forgetting shows us how much her reading of Husserl OWeS to Derrida's 1953-4 dissertation 
rather than to the Introduction. 
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Lecture. And finally, the third signification of forgetfulness in Husserl's historical investigations 
is that of an "eidetic necessity: the necessity of sedimentation prescribed and for all constitution 
and all traditionalization of sense, therefore for all history. This prescription in tum is sometimes 
valued as the condition of historicity and the progressive advent of reason, sometimes devalued as 
what makes origins and accumulated sense become dormant. It truly is a threatening value." 
(lOG, p36n) With writing, reason, reason itself and as such, acquires the power to threaten itself. 
This amnesic evil called objectivism is inevitable, a "transcendental evil", a necessary possibility 
since it remains linked with the very movement of truth and the production of ideal objectivity, 
since it is prescribed by the constitution and development of science itself, since it is inflicted by 
reason itself to itself. Derrida writes in Rogues, in the second Essa.\' on Reason, 
Husserl knows it and says it: objectivist naivete is no mere accident. It is produced by the very 
progress of the sciences and by the production of ideal objects, which as if by themselves. by their 
iterability and their necessary technical structure cover over or consign to forgetting their historical and 
subjecti ve origin. Scientific reason, in its very progress spontaneously produces the crisis. It is reason that 
throws reason into crisis, in an autonomous and quasi-autoimmune fashion. I 10 
Far from denoting a simple negativity then, the concept of crisis, as forgetfulness of 
origins, is not without a certain ambiguity. To the extent that it remains necessarily linked with 
writing (and therefore with the absence of every present act of signification or reactivation) it is 
the positive condition of the history of ideal objects. According to Derrida, there is an entire 
aspect of Husserl' s work that makes us think that the concept of crisis understood on the basis of 
a dialectical and teleological reading of history, is not only ambiguous but also more suspect than 
ever. The question for us, however, is: what is it in this transcendental and teleological 
investigations of the origin of European reason and philosophy, that allows Husserl to describe, 
recognize, and in one and the same move efface, this essential or necessary possibility of crisis, 
the possibility of nonintuition and nonpresence in general? It is the concept of the Telos, of the 
spiritual telos of European philosophy and humanity, namely the infinite idea of an infinite task 
of reason, that will be of major importance for us here. 
If the Husserlian concept of crisis remains ambiguous, perhaps the only possible 
conclusion one could draw is that the crisis of European sciences (and of European humanity). 
however essential and serious, can be overcome. Especially with regard to the science geometry, 
the model of exact and objective sciences of nature, which is responsible for the naturalization of 
the psychic sphere (lOG, p. 33n). a sense investigation or reawakening of its origin as a cultural 
historical formation would protect us from the irresponsibility of objecti vist nai vete which having 
lost its own rational sense of life borders on irrationalism. As we are going to see, if naturalism 
IIOR 1"17 aglle.l, p. - . 
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and objectivism are denounced by Husserl as irrationalist perversions of reason this is because, as 
Derrida writes, the "risk that is run has to do with what links the ideality of the object to 
exactitude and thus to a certain type of calculability."lll Now only an archeo-teleological 
conception of history could reduce this ambiguity of crisis into a provisional, accidental threat. or 
into an apparent defeat of reason so as there to be any chance of limiting or delimiting it, of 
economizing it, or of taming it, and, finally, of overcoming it .112 
According to the teleology that commands the Husserlian discourse on history. sense 
sedimentation and objectification in writing, in "letters and signs" (Crisis, §9g), offers not only 
the chance for an infinite history of sense, but also involves the danger of passivity and 
forgetfulness: it provides the occasion of the technicist's and objectivist's irresponsibility which 
had degraded science with radical responsibility to "a game" (ibid.) By means of written 
inscription one should always be able to repeat or reactivate the original sense of the subjective 
and inaugural act of idealization which created and bestowed sense to the ideal Objecti\ity of 
geometry.113 But with the possibility of progress that the written sedimentation of sense allows, 
and to the extend that science moves away from its beginnings, i.e., to the extent that its 
structures of sense are accumulated more and more at higher levels, it becomes more and more 
difficult to reactivate, Husserl says, the "primal beginnings." With infinite traditionalization 
assured by writing there is the ever growing risk of "forgetting" and loss of sense. With the 
immense development of the sciences there comes the time when the act or capacity of 
reactivation fails. "Unfortunately this is our situation, and that of the whole modern age" (OG, p. 
169). 
If "crisis" does not imply stagnation in the history of science this is because, the geometer 
can learn to use signs, to handle mathematical symbols, and thereby produce new results, new 
theories, new propositions, even if those signs or symbols are void of their primordial sense, that 
is, even when the sense of the instituting acts has been lost or buried under sedimentations and 
passil'ities I14 . But if to reactivate writing is always to reactivate the linguistic expression of sense 
111 Ibid., p. 132. 
11'2 Derrida, Jacques. "Economies of Crisis". published in Negotiations, pp.69-74. 
I U Husserl writes" ... Sentences give themselves in consciousness as reproductive transformations of an 
original meaning produced out of an actual, original activity; that is in themselves they refer to such a 
genesis" (OG, p. 168). 
114 With regard to the danger that arises with the written sedimentation ot: geometry's .se~~e. Husserl makes 
the distinction between. on the one hand. "passively understanding the wntten expressIOn and. on the other 
hand, "making it sc(f-evident br reactivating its sense." The question then is what happens ."It.h the 
tradition of a science like geometry (where sense is grounded upon sense) when geometncal thmkmg IS 
"supposed to produce something new without first being able to reactivate the previous levels of ~owledge 
hal'k to the first'.)" This problem then concerns the possibility of a tradition of geometry empty of I1s ... ense. 
of its heing dynamically developed throughout centuries and "still not he genuine", The moment of cml ... 
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which arose out of the instituting evidence, i.e., to reanimate the spoken expression (the 
expression as the fulfilling of the instituting truth-intention) in the body of the letter, the latter as a 
symbol may empty itself from sense (lOG, p. 92n), take flight from reactivation, and may remain 
forever closed and mute. As we are going to see in our discussion of Speech and Phenomena, the 
distinction between, on the one hand, sign-expression in living speech, in which the in\,estigator 
actualizes the clear evidence of sense and the full presence of the signified in its truth, and, on the 
other hand, sign-indication in writing, in which the investigator may use letters as symbols, i.e .. 
empty of sense, is absolutely decisive here. The empty symbolism of the written notation in 
mathematical technique (Crisis, §9g, p. 46), the degradation of a diaphanous expression to an 
opaque indication, is the most dangerous obstacle to Sebstsbesinnung and Verantwortllng: it is 
what exiles the investigator from the clear and present evidence of sense, from the actual 
intention to say and write the truth, and thus what opens up the possibility of crisis. The 
investigator's intention to say and write the truth means, for Husserl, nothing more than the 
actual and present intention to reactivate any passively received sense given by tradition and to 
take upon himself the transmission of sense. Objectivist and technicist irresponsibility, the crisis 
or emptiness of mathematical sense in the theoretical and practical activity of the natural sciences, 
does not pose limits to their technical progress. Husser! will refer to the "fateful omission" of the 
putatively rationalist investigator who moves freely within the naivete of mathematical 
aprioriness, who inherits, utilizes and advances a historical system of truth (with its symbols, 
concepts, propositions etc) but who remains "insensitive to the problem of origin" (OG, p. 170n) 
and does not ask himself "what am I in the process of doing", who does not occupy himself with 
questions about his responsibilif)'. about the historicity or origin of this truth, of his praxis and 
discourse. In the Crisis the name of Galileo becomes the exemplary index for this attitude, for this 
na'ive and irresponsible objectivism. Indeed one could say that the whole weight of the Crisis (see 
especially §36) falls upon the "epoche" of the objective sciences, upon the reduction which, 
without renouncing all scientificity, has no other purpose but to reactivate their historical and 
b· t' ... e to bn'ng back to light the primordial ground concealed under the su ~ec Ive ongm, 1. ., ~
sedimentary deposits of scientific culture and objectivism themselves. 
doL'S not entail a halt in sL'ientific production. on the contrary. an immense expansion of its conquests is 
possihle even when its primordial SL'nsL' is "forgottL'n". '"The inhe.ritancL'. of pr~position~ an~ of the mct~()d 
or logically constructing new propositions and idealities can contInue without InterruptIon fr~m one pL'n~)d 
to the next. whik the capacit)' (or reactimting the primal hqiinnings. I.l' .• the sourCL'S of meanIng for 
everything that comes later. has not been handed dOH'n ~\'ith it. What i~ ~acking is thus .precisely \\ hat ~aJ 
!..!i\'en and had to gin.' SL'IlSL' to all propositions and theones. a sense anslllg trom the pnmal \(!urCl'S wll/ell 
;'(/1/ be iliad£' .ll'I{e\·idcnt m:ain and again" (OG. p. 170). 
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This crisis here has the character of the "sickness" that Husserl talks about in the Vienna 
Lecture: "The European nations are sick; Europe itself, it is said, is in crisiS."115 This crisis. 
according to Derrida's commentary, has the ethical sense of an abdication of responsibility. "the 
profound ethical sense of a fall into 'passivity', of an inability to be rendered 'responsible' for 
sense in an authentic acti vity or authentic reacti vation. Technical acti vi ty (that of science also) as 
such is a passivity in comparison to sense; it is the agitation of the sick and, already, the tremors 
of delirium" (lOG, p80n). Husser! here utilizes the vocabulary of medicine, even if this sickness, 
which is the sickness of reason itself, as he says, is not natural and gets no relief from "natural 
doctors. ,,116 
This crisis, however, can become understandable, as Husser! says, and even transparent 
only on the basis of a teleological or intentional history. "By developing the philosophical-
historical idea (or the teleological sense) of European humanity" it will appear that it is neither 
"an obscure fate" nor "an impenetrable destiny."II? The teleology that guides the analysis of 
history and the very history of crisis is itself guided by the idea of transcendental community, for 
which Europe would be at once the name and the exemplary figure. What Derrida writes in The 
Other Heading for Paul Valery is true for Husserl as well: to say crisis is to appeal to the subject 
of Europe, to recall it to itself, to its unity and its freedom. 118 
The failure of reactivation, Husser! says, is a historical fact, it happens "today" (but not 
only in his days, Husser! mentions the whole modern age, and of course we always have to ask 
ourselves if this is happening today). It is moreover a historical accident that nobody was 
foreseeing, an accident without expectation and without calculation, an event. 119 It happened, it is 
happening, and one must suspect that affects what is essential, it is an essential accident. But this 
115 Crisis, p. 270. For a Derridian critique of nationalism. of ethnocentrism, and of relativism see Rogues, 
especially p. 149. This critique is inspired by a reading Crisis and especially of the Vienna Lecture in which 
Husserl alluded not only to Europe and the rest of the world but also, and most importantly for us here, to 
the national communities and nations states, whose "supposed rationality" Derrida writes. "formed the 
horizon of the lecture." (Rogues, p. 154) 
116 Ibid. This medical or biological vocabulary would, in the first instance, justify Derrida's use of the tenn 
"auto-immunity" and his speaking of "transcendental pathology" already in the lOG (p. 80) but especially 
in Roglles. With respect to the crisis or sickness of European reason, Derrida writes "I would risk speaking. 
in the wake of Husser!, of a transcendental pathology and even a transcendental autoimmunity." (p. 125) 
"As I have done elsewhere, I have here granted to this autoimmune schema a range without limit. one that 
goes far beyond the circumscribed biological processes by which an organism tends to destroy, in a quasi-
spontaneous and more than suicidal fashion. some organ or other. one or another of its own immunitary 
~rotections." (p. 124) 
17 Vienna Lectllre. p. 299. 
11M Derrida, Jacques. The Other Heading Reflections on Today's Europe. translated by Pascale-Anne Brault 
and Michael B Naas. Bloomington. Indiana University Press. 1992. pp. 31-35. See also Economies of Crisis 
in Derrida. Jacques. Negotiations. translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford. Stanford University Pre,- .... 
2002. pp. 69-73. 
III) R I" Oglll'.l. p. __ . 
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failure, however serious, is not an irreversible one. It is more a lapse than a defeat of scientific 
reason, and even though it affects what is essential to it, it is only an apparent defeat, an "apparent 
failure,,]2o. A failure, however, on what is essential, and therefore one that calls, on its behalf. for 
a responsible decision and Selbstbesinnung: for a philosophical or European coming to 
awareness, for a reflection by which, in regaining consciousness, the subjectivity responsible for 
the history or adventure of truth (the captain, the headman at the head of the crew and the ship 
that he commands), finds again its lost heading, its direction or sense (sens), and the pole for a 
safe return back to the shore, i.e., to the origin, in order to re-embark, to head off again by 
keeping or changing the heading. Husserl speaks of the "crisis of European sciences," of "the 
crisis of European humanity" in view of a decided, calculated and voluntary return to the 
forgotten sense and to the hidden ground or origin of scientific objectivity, i.e., in view of the 
responsibility and freedom of a transcendental historical sUbjectivity. 
According to this arche-teleological programme, as Derrida writes in his Introduction to 
the Origin, "forgetfulness of truth itself will thus be nothing but the failure of an act and the 
abdication of responsibility. Forgetfulness will never be radical, and sense can always, be 
reactivated" (lOG, p. 98). Let us follow the phrasing of this programme in the Origin. Husserl 
writes "In view of the unavoidable sedimentation of mental products in the form of persisting 
linguistic acquisitions there is a constant danger" (OG, p. 165). This is the danger of passivity 
(we just mentioned) and of equivocation of linguistic expression. In reading the sign is first of all 
given in the pure passivity of sensible receptivity, and then is again passively awakened to a 
familiar to us signification through association. The possibility of giving way to this first 
expectation of sense is a lasting danger. But only the freedom of the transcendental subject could 
let itself to be threatened in this way. The transcendental SUbject, however, is always free to 
reawaken any passively received sense and transform it back into the corresponding activity 
which has originally produced it: this freedom is "the capacity of reactimtion that belongs 
originally to et'ery human being as speaking being" (OG, p. 164). 
We can therefore say that t'oluntar:v reactivation is, in the domain of tradition, of the 
traditionalization of ideal objectivities. the very act of sense-investigation (Besinnllng) and of 
responsibility (Verantll'ortllng). Reactivation permits bringing to life. under the sedimentary 
surfaces of linguistic and cultural acquisitions, the sense arising from instituting e\idence. What 
is at stake here is nothing but the question of responsibility. Now responsibility for the tradition 
of sensl' and for its reacti\'ation is for Husserl co-responsibility: it engages the one who recei\'l's 
1~1l C .' "W9 f'/.\'/S. p. _ ':I , 
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the sense, certainly, but also and first of all the one who creates it and assures its transmissibility 
by speech and then by writing. "The danger [involved in the sedimentation of mental products] is 
avoided if one ... assures oneself form the start, after the self-evident primal establishment, of its 
capacity to be reactivated ... This occurs when one has a view to the unil'ocity of linauistic 
_ b 
expression" (OG, p. 165). 
The sedimentation of mental structures threatens the transmitability and translatability of 
the constituted sense "only insofar as there are surfaces for this. The equivocity of expression is", 
Derrida writes, "the chosen field of sedimentary deposits" (lOG, p. 100). Now if equivocity is 
"unavoidable" in the language of every day life and not just a chance ambiguity, this is because, 
as Husserl says in Logical Investigations, it consists mostly of "essentially occasional 
expressions" i.e., of expressions whose actual meaning is bound "to the occasion, the speaker and 
the situation.,,121 This unavoidable equivocity is of subjective origin, it depends on original 
intentions, on always new lived experiences which animate the ideal identity of sense (as we said 
before with regard to the ideal objectivity of the sense lion), and make it enter into unforeseeable 
and multiple interconnections or associations of sense. But if equivocity is "the congenial mark" 
of every empirical culture, one could suppose that the mission and power of scientific expression 
consists in mastering and overcoming it, so as to permit the possibility of a limitless and exact 
translatability of sense. 122 
Geometrical expressions are objective expressions, expressions where the circumstances 
in which they have been uttered, the context, and the situation of the speaking subject do not 
affect their univocity. Univocity and exactitude are overlapping notions for Husserl. Only the 
exactitude of a sense, for example, that of geometrical theorem. can assure the exactitude or 
univocity of expression. Geometry, the model of the sciences whose objects are exact, can attain 
univocity more easily than the descriptive sciences, phenomenology in particular. (lOG, p. 102n) 
Now if for the constitution of geometry's sense, and of the sense of science in general, 
speech and writing are indispensable, its functionaries should not allow the slightest deformation 
in the submission to them either. The equivocity of expression provides the occasion for the 
deformation or obliteration of sense, it signals the crisis of science itself. This is why the 
protogeometer and all geometers after him must assure the transmissibility of the sense that they 
121 Logicallllrl'stigatioIlJ. L §26. "Essentially occasional and objective exprcssions", p. J 15. We. will comc 
back to the difference between subjcctivc and objectivc expressions in the second part of the theSIS. 
1~2 It belongs to thc csscnce of ~cicnce to demand strict univocity. an absolute transparenc.y o.f logos. 
Scientific sense needs language. i.e., ex-pression. as pure. logical meaning (bedeuten or vouhm-dlre). but 
this languaee. according to Husserl. sencs only for guarding and prescrving the sense that science alone 
has conkrr~'d it. Nowhere can specch he closcr to its telos. i.c .. more productive and simultaneously more 
unproductive. than as an (transparent) element of theory. (Ideas I, §12-1) 
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themselves create by using a univocal language, and secure "by a very careful coining of words, 
propositions and complexes of propositions, the results which are to be univocally expressed." 
"In accord with the essence of science, then, its functionaries maintain its constant claim the , 
personal certainty, that everything they put into scientific assertions has been said 'once and for 
all,' that it 'stands fast,' forever identically repeatable, usable in evidence and for further 
theoretical or practical ends- as indubitably able to be reactivated with the identity of its genuine 
sense" (OG, pp. 166-167). 
The problem with the capacity of reactivation is essentially linked with the question of 
univocity: without a minimal transparency of speech or writing how could any reading. whose 
aim would be not simply a minimum of comprehension but also an adequate understanding of the 
intended meaning, and how could any reactivation of the original meaning ever be possible? 
Derrida will try to show that the Husserlian imperative or demand for univocity, the 
demand for the reduction of the equivocal sense of natural language should not be interpreted as a 
refusal of history: it does not refer to an impoverished factual language that would not let itself 
be touched by history but to a language that should maintain its univocal and translatable 
elements as transparent as possible so as to permit the constitution, transmission and reactivation 
of sense. Univocal language refers then to a language reduced or limited to what by being 
transmittable, i.e., able to be placed in tradition, constitutes the condition for all historicity. 
The exactitude or univocity of geometrical expressions removes the absolute objectivity 
and exactitude of geometry's sense out of history's reach, out of the empirical content of a real 
history and of determined cultural interconnections. It allows the exactitude of translation and 
thereby the unrestricted and pure communication among generations of investigators no matter 
how distant in time or different in their cultural backgrounds and national languages. So what 
might appear at first sight as refusal of history, the value of univocity conforms to and respects 
historicity'S own peculiar signification and possibility: "the very moment univocity", Derrida 
writes, "removes sense beyond the reach of historical modification, it alone makes pure history 
possible, i.e .. as the transmission and recollection of sense" (lOG, p. 102). But if Husserl readily 
admits that absolute equivocation would surely preclude any history (since history would be then 
an empirical accumulation of untranslatable idioms) he also knows that absolute univocity. as 
Derrida says, "would sterilize history in the indigence of an indefinite repetition" (Ibid.) The 
distinction between de facto equivocity and absolute univocity has only a purely teleological 
value. 
HusserI then admits an "irreducible, enriching and always renascent equivocity into pure 
historicity" (lOG, p. 103) and poses absolute univocity as an infinitely inaccessible ideal. as an 
9-+ 
Idea in the Kantian sense. Not only then Husserl admits that equivocity is irreducible in the 
historical praxis of science, but he also recognizes that it is wrong to say that de facto equivocity 
is an obstacle to the development of science and therefore that it should be reduced by the 
teleology of scientific speech. On the contrary Husserl says that the telos of scientific speech 
itself and as such demands this "renascent equivocity". There is a pure history of geometrical 
ideal Objectivity, infinitely open to its future acquisitions and metamorphoses, only in so far as 
the linguistic idiom into which this Objectivity is inscribed and sedimented is irreducible, in so 
far as the de facto and pure equivocity, which comes always with the medium of language and 
with every factual language, is irreducible. 123 Every new investigator of geometry, who comes to 
work upon and enrich the sense he has received from the tradition, and who thereby pushes 
forward or changes the direction of an infinitely open project of knowledge, by constructing and 
handing down new geometrical propositions out of old geometrical propositions. deals with 
something which is absolutely ideal, namely with geometrical objects or state of affairs (which is 
the theme or sense of his propositions).124 And as we have underlined, with regard to the 
noncoincidence between the bound ideality of language and the free ideality of the object, the 
ideal identity of the geometrical object or Sachverhalt, which is empirically unchangeable and 
absolute, should not be confused with the linguistic ideality of propositions and words, whose 
ideality is always that of a "thematic index" and not a theme. Derrida writes: 
If, in fact, equivocity is always irreducible, that is because words and language in general are not 
and can never be absolute objects. They do not possess any resistant and permanent identity of their own. 
They have their linguistic being from an intention which traverses them as mediations. The "same" word is 
always other according to the always different intentional acts which thereby make a word significative. 
lOG p. 104. 
To the extent that the absolute ideal objectivity of geometry needs the body of a historical 
and factual language in order to inscribe and thereby constitute itself, equivocity, which depends 
on original, subjective and historical intentions (bedeuten), on the intentions of the investigator 
who works within the infinite horizon of his scientific field, will always be irreducible. Absolute 
univocity is interminably deferred or delayed, like absolutely objective knowledge is an infinitely 
l~l Derrida will return to the problem of univocity in Speech and Phenomena and Form and Meaning. 
Particularly in Form and Meaning Derrida shows that the conceptual form. the formality of logical 
expression and meaning is the condition for scientific univocity: there is univocity to ~he extent that the 
complete repetition of the pre-linguistic sense (which is always subjective) in expreSSIOn and wnttng IS 
given up. FM. pp. 120fT . . . . . 
12-1 Geometrical ideality docs not keep and will never keep the ideal IdentIty of Its partIcular de facto 
latH.!u<ll!c. compared to which remains always free. e\'en if. as we have said. this freedom is possible Olllr 
Oil Lthe
L 
condition thar truth call be said or written. Once this ideality is constituted in writing (a" 
\'nleihlichllng and as \'crkiirperllllg) it conditions. in its tum. the latter as an empirical fact. 
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removed ideal. As Husserl writes, "objective, absolutely firm knowledge of truth is an infinite 
idea" (OG,p. 166). 
Any factual geometry, as any factual science, that exists at a given historical time is a 
more or less successful attempt to realize the guiding idea of infinity, i.e., of universality. 
Scientific (or teleological) reason and the rationality of its history is for ever destined, and for 
every possible future and development, to contend with the interminable difference which 
separates science as an infinite idea and science in the factual finiteness of its determined figures. 
As Husserl says in the Vienna Lecture, the idea of the truth of science "wants to be unconditioned 
truth. This involves an infinity which gives to each factual confirmation and truth the character of 
being merely relative, of being a mere approach in relation precisely to that infinite horizon in 
which the truth-in-itself counts, ... as an infinitely distant pole.'·125 (my emphasis) 
Now Husserl not only has admitted that within the pure tradition of geometry's sense 
equivocity cannot, in fact, be reduced, that this "equivocity grows in the very rhythm of science" 
(lOG, p. 104) but also that the individual and social capacity (or power) of reactivation of "the 
primal beginnings" is necessarily finite. Husserl speaks, with regard to geometry and its 
extraordinary development, of an "obvious finitude of the individual and even social capacity to 
transform the logical chains of centuries, truly in the unity of one accomplishment, into originally 
genuine chains of self-evidence ... " (OG, p. 166). Like what we said before with regard to the 
demand of univocity, "a total recuperation of origins", as Derrida writes, "is still only a 
teleological horizon" (lOG, p. 105). 
Is this "obvious finitude" the essential finitude which we can never go beyond? What if 
we took this obvious finitude as the starting point for our reflection on the history of geometry? 
Should we also conclude then that the reactivating reduction is radically impossible, that the 
l~.~ Crisis, Vienna Lecture, p. 278. Here the reference to infinity, to the infinite idea. to the infinite telos or 
horizon does not signify a dissimulation of the "primordial finitude" as many commentators of Derrida' s 
reading on Husserl have tried to show, following and staying closer rather to the "young" Derrida, to his 
""/('f1u;irc" , his very first work on Husserl, The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Phenomenology (l953-~) 
See especially Marrati. Paola. Genesis and Trace, Den'ida Reading Husserl and Heidegger, translated by 
Simon Sparks, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005, p. 41-42 and Hobson, Marian. Opening Lines, 
London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 51, 52, 54. But according to Derrida, in Rogues and as we are trying to show 
in the lOG. the reference to infinity and to the telos of scientific objecti\e reason not only does not conceal 
the rclation to finitude but. on the contrary, reveals the possibility of it being suicidal. "For the Husserlian 
diagnosis implicates an nil that concerns the \ery thing that. in inaugurating a 'perceptual transformation 
in the form of a new type of historicity (Crisis. p. 277). inscribed and prescribed the spiritual telos of 
European humanity. naml'ly the infinite idea (in the Kantian sense) of an infinite task as theoria ... ~\l\\ .. y 
is precisely this ideal of a 'new sort of praxis' (Crisis. p. 283). namely. Husserl says. 'unl\ersal s~lentlhc 
rL'ason'. that produces this nil as if hy an irresistible internal secretion that is nothing other than flnilude. 
finitudL', that is. the ine\itahlc forgetting of the origin of suhjL'L'li\e and historical acts." Rogues. p. 125. 
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possibility of pure history of geometry's sense should be, de facto but also de jure, doubted, and 
that Husserl's Ruckfrage is nonsense? 
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2) The Irruption of the Infinite in the Finite: the Idea in the Kantian Sense 
Husserl does not reduce or "neutralize" this obvious finitude, as it has been argued by 
Paola Marrati, in the name of an infinite idea. 126 If for Husserl the primordial finitude of a 
constituting historical subjectivity, as Derrida comments, "can appear precisely in its 
primordiality only given the Idea of an infinite history" (lOG, pp. 105-106), we have to examine 
the process of idealization or infinitization with which the history of geometry begins and with 
which the horizon of geometrical knowledge is opened as an infinite project or task. We have to 
show that "the openness of the infinite is only, on the contrary, the openness of history itself, in 
the utmost depths and purity of its essence" (lOG, p. 131) 127. 
We need a better understanding of this "new sort of praxis" which authorizes a move 
beyond finitude, beyond the "obvious finitude" we mentioned above, and permits, as Husserl 
says, "in a certain sense its infinitization" (OG, p. 168). This is the praxis with which 
philosophical and scientific reason "revolutionizes", as Husserl writes, universal historicity, i.e., 
the whole historical culture and the whole manner in which humanity creates culture. By turning 
his attention to this move by which scientific reason gives itself the right and the power to go 
beyond finitude, by pointing to this decisive passage to infinity as the essential characteristic of 
the idealization of space (but also of the idealization of all objects), Husserl does not neglect the 
finitude of consciousness responsible for the idea of infinity, rather this is the only way he can 
make its finitude appear in its primordiality and irreducibility. 
We need to have a closer examination, then, of this "extraordinary revolution" which 
inaugurates and grounds the history of the ideal objectivities and eternal truths of science and 
which will disclose a "primordially constituting finitude. " (lOG, p. 45n) This history, Derrida 
says. will take its sense from an infinite Telos. But we should not think that this infinite is a 
positive or actual infinite which first exists in some heavenly place, in the plenitude of its full 
presence in order afterwards to be inserted in history, in the event or historical fact of geometry's 
becoming. 128 For Husserl this infinite, which is given as an Idea in the Kantian sense, and which 
12(1 If the power of reacti\'ation is of an obvious finitude. according to Marrati. "Derrida is able to draw the 
conc\lI~ion that the possibility of a pure history of sense is a decidedly unlikely one." Marrati. Paola. 
Genesis alld Trace. p. 41. 
127 See also Dcrrida. Jacques. Positions. translated by Alan Bass. Chicago. The Univcr~ity of Chica~\) 
Prcss. 19H I. p. 59. 
12X As many commentators of Derrida' s work on Husserl ha\e sufficiently noted. Derrida has written 
e,tellsi\'dy on the question of the Idea. and on the question whil'h the Idea poses for the whole of 
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is at work in geometry's origin, maintains within itself the indefiniteness of the ad infinitum, the 
negati vity of the indefinite, of the apeiron. 129 The infinity of the Husserlian telos has the form of 
an infinite opening, i.e., it offers itself without any possible end (as factual limit) to the neaativity b _ 
of constitution, the negativity of an indefinite, endless objectification which is synonymous, as we 
have seen in the Origin, with indefinite traditionalization. 
We have to ask then how the historical origin of philosophical reason, in which Husserl 
sees "the primal phenomenon of spiritual Europe", announces a new sort of historicity, and how 
the phenomenological sense of this historicity, the eidos of historicity merges with its teleological 
sense. According to Derrida, they merge for two reasons: a) because "the eidos of a historicity 
and thus of the movement of sense - which is necessarily a rational movement - can only be a 
norm, a value more than an essence,,130 and b) because the origin of philosophy, which has 
conditioned that of geometry, is inscribed within a more universal Telos which runs throughout 
all historicity and which precedes, animates and goes beyond the philosophical one. 
If for Husserl the history of the sciences signifies first of all the Idea of an infinity of 
tasks, then we can understand better his ambiguity before the objective sciences, and especially 
the exact science of geometry: in Crisis he demonstrates how geometry, the ground for the 
idealization and nai've objectification of nature, hides true nature, that geometrical idealities are 
nothing more than a "garb of ideas", which without a proper grounding in the world of immediate 
intuition and experience they are "in mid_air".131 Husserl values science as a project, the project 
of universalization, i.e., the universal project of a will of deracination or liberation from its 
territorial, ethnic, linguistic and cultural limitations, and not in its capacity to cover over or 
conceal. 
As we saw (in our chapter I, section 2) with regard to the sense and the formal 
generalities of Husserl's return inquiry (Ruck/rage), we have an a priori knowledge, "a truly 
apodictic certainty" concermng the most general form of historical development. 
Intersubjectivity, language (and/or writing), tradition and the capacity of reactivation were 
presented then as the invariants of the most universal eidos of historicity. Insofar as there is no 
humanity without language, without community and tradition, without the transmittable capacity 
of reactivation, i.e., memory or recollection, historicity is the essential horizon of all humanity. 
phenomenology, since his \'l~ry first work. his "memoire" on Husser!. The Problem (~I Genesis in Husserl's 
Phl'noll1l'nologY. (Hereafter cited as PGHP) See particularly Marrati's Genesis and Trace. p. 20 and 
Hohs()n's Opening Lines, pp . .f61l. 
I~l) PGHP. p. 196. and. especially. ""I. pr. 114. 119ff. 
I ~(1 -GSP. p. 16). 
Dl Crisis. pp. 51. l.f I. 
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Husserl was able to question and penetrate the pure sense of universal history, its 
essential and teleological structures, by having recourse to the phenomenological method. 132 With 
this method he can have access not only to the peculiar historicity or traditionality of scientific 
sense-structures and ideal objectivities, but also bring to light the a priori structures of the 
prescientific, cultural world on the basis of which scientific objectivity has been produced and 
developed, the transcendental pre-history of geometry. 
We need then above all to contemplate on this mutual interrelation, about which Husser! 
speaks in the Crisis §36 between the two truths, between the objective or scientific truth, 
science's unconditioned truth, truth in itself, and, on the other hand, Lebenwelt's subjecti ve-
relative truths and finitudes, in order to a) comprehend this "irruption of the infinite as a 
revolution within empirical culture" and b) in order to avoid the objectivist naivete and 
irresponsibility. 
In order to avoid the naivete of objectivist science which "takes what it calls the objective 
world for the universe of all that is without ever noticing that no objective science can do justice 
to the very sUbjectivity which accomplishes science", a naivete which thereby becomes 
irresponsibility, we have to ask how can the a priori of scientific Objectivity be constituted 
starting from the a priori of life-world?13-~ With regard to the very remarkableness of Einstein's 
naivete, Husserl asks "where is that huge piece of method subjected to critique and clarification 
that leads from the intuitively surrounding world to the idealization of mathematics and to the 
interpretation of these idealizations as objective being? Einstein' s revolutionary innovations 
concern the formulae through which the idealized and naively objectified physis is dealt with. But 
how formulae in general, how mathematical objectification in general, receive meaning on the 
foundation of life and the intuitively given surrounding world - of this we learn nothing; and thus 
Einstein does not reform the space and time in which our vital life runs its course.'·13-1-
112 'Through what method do we obtain a universal, fixed a priori of the historical world which is always 
llfiginally gelluine'? Whenever we consider it, we find ourselves with the self-evident capacity to rellect - to 
tum to the horizon and to penetrate it in an expository way. But we also have, and know that we ha\'e. the 
l'apacity of complete freedom to transform, in thought and phantasy. our historical existence and what is 
thLTl' exposed as its life-world. And precisely in this activity of free \ariation, and in running through the 
l'nnceivable possibilities for the life-world. there arises, with apodictic self-nidence. an essentially general 
set or ekments going through all the variants: and of this we can com'ince ourselves with truly apodictic 
certainty" (OG. p. 177). 
111 Crisis, f~6 has the titk "How can the IUe-warld. after the epoche a/the objective scicnccs. become the 
slIbjt'('f matter (~f a science? The distinction in principle between the objecth'e-logical a priori and the a 
priori ojrhc life world. pp. U7-1-l1. 
I q C .. -H)S 
n.1/.I, p. _ ., 
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Here we arrive at the last zigzag of Husser's Riickfrage in the Origin: having brought to 
light the formal and radical generalities concerning the traditional development of scientific 
culture, Husserl will reduce the scientific naivete (that is, all scientific superstructures and their 
traditional sedimentations) in order to bring to light the world of prescientific experience within 
which alone the products of science acquire their ultimate sense. Ultimately Husserl will reveal 
that, however heterogeneous in themselves, the truth of doxa and the truth '"in itself' of episteme. 
as Derrida writes, "science's truth 'in itself' is not any less truth-Q[ the subjective-relative world 
in which it has its bases" (my emphasis) (lOG, p. 119). 
Let us see now how Husserl in the Origin returns to the soil of pre-scientific experience 
in order to make it his theme without, however, renouncing or "abdicating all scientific quality in 
general and all philosophical dignity." Derrida insists on this: the epoche of objective sciences 
does not signify forgetfulness, negation or "devaluation of what it methodically de-sediments or 
neutralizes" (lOG, p. 119). 
What are the invariants of the prescientific world, the finite sense-structures which the 
protogeometer had at his disposal and which conditioned his "new sort of praxis" (the praxis of 
pure thinking), the first geometrical idealization, i.e .. the first passage to the infinite limit? The 
essential structures of the prescientific world can be discovered by a double reduction, that of all 
determined factual culture and, more importantly for us here, that of the scientific idealizations or 
superstructures. These prescientific finitudes have the world of natural reality as their lowest 
stratum and the cultural world as their highest stratum. The natural world is a world of real and 
transcendent things disposed of according to an anexact space and time,135 these things (that is, 
stones, animals, plants, human beings) have corporeal forms, they are bodies l36, and these bodies 
have spatiotemporal shapes (shapes of motion and "alterations of deformation") and "material 
(sfl~ffliche) qualities (color, warmth, hardness, etc.) which concretely fill out the spatiotemporal 
shapes. Also the prescientific world is a cultural world, a world of bound, i.e., finite idealities. 
among which the most important for us here are: language, values, the practice of measurement, 
of induction, and of imaginary variation. In the prescientific (and finite) life of practical needs 
l.l~ Crisis, pp. 25.1 ~9. OG. p. 178. As Derrida writes, it is scientific or objectivist naivete which causes this 
anl'xactitude of prescientific detcrmination to be considered an inexactitude, a defect. See also Lninas' 
Theory (~f Intuition. p. 118. "Husserl's essential idea is to assert the primacy of anexact morphological 
l'SSl'ncl'S OVl'r the exact mathematical l'ssences." 
Dh Corporl'ality. hodily cxistence is a particular determination of thinghood (Dinglichkeit) in general. But 
since. aCl'ording to Hussl'rl. cuiturl' already had to have left its mark on the world (becau~c language and 
intersuhjectivity must ha\c pn.:ccded geometry). corporeality does not exhausti\e!y overlap lhinghood: 
"silll'e the necessarily clll'xisting human heings are not thinkahle as mere hodil's and. like C\l'n the cultural 
OhJccts which helong to them ~tructurally. are not l'xhausted in corporeal heing" (OG. p. 177). Sl'e also 
Cri~is. p. 292. 
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and interests the perception, preference and production of certain shapes or types of shapes and 
their progressive improvement by a real and empirical praxis of perfecting "again and again" 
were accompanied by the empirical technique of measuring, surveying, calculating, predicting. 
Now "such a technique is always already there, already abundantly developed and pregiven to the 
philosopher", Husserl writes in the Origin, "who did not yet know geometry but who should be 
conceivable as its inventor" (OG, p. 178). 
With the philosopher protogeometer a new attitude toward the intuitive actual world is 
born, the purely theoretical attitude. From the world of immediate intuition (or experience), the 
world of real praxis, the geometer passes to the world of the ideal praxis of pure thinking and he 
remains exclusively there. There is a paradox here with regard to "applied" geometry: as 
absolutely ideal, i.e., totally estranged from our world of immediate perception and imagination, 
geometry becomes a method of knowing the real, sensible space. Whence the difficulty to 
distinguish the idealized and exact space of geometry from the lived (and anexact) space of "true 
nature": "so familiar to us is the shift between a priori theory and empirical inquiry in everyday 
life that we usually tend not to separate the space and the spatial shapes geometry talks about 
from the space and spatial shapes of experiential actuality, as if they were one and the same.',137 
Now geometrical space is neither a sensible nor an imaginary space. By sensible intuition 
and imaginary variation we do not obtain exact essences of space (for example, circles) but only 
anexact shapes and "vague" morphological types (roundness). In the intuitively given 
surrounding world we never encounter pure geometrical shapes, triangles or circles, but only 
sensible idealities, sensible shapes and types of shapes. No doubt the morphological type 
"roundness," attained with imaginary variation, is free from pure sensible reality, and therefore 
should not be confused with the mUltiplicity of natural shapes which more or less correspond to it 
in sensible intuition. But pure sensible ideality must still be situated on a pregeometrical level: no 
matter how arbitrarily we transform these natural shapes in fantasy, the free and ideal possibilities 
we thus obtain are anything but geometrical ideal possibilities. Morphological types are 
conceivable and determinable in imaginative- sensible idealization only as qualitative gradations, 
as more or less perfect shapes. as more or less round, more or less straight lines, and so on. And 
this gradualness is going to reverberate in the technical capacity of perfecting: the capacity to 
make the straight straighter. As long as the ideal of perfection is pursued further and further "we 
have an open hori~ol1 of conceivable improvement to be further (immer weiter) pursued, .. 138 But 
L~7 (' ,. &9 '1 1 
n.1/.I". ~ a. p, _"t, 
I~K Ihid. And Husserl immcdiately adds "out of thc praxis of perfecting. of freely pressing toward the 
horiwlls (11' eoneei\ahk perfecting again and again (immer wieder) limit shapes emerge toward which the 
partinJlar series of perfecting lend as towards in\ariant and ne\er attainah1e poles," 
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even if with imaginary variation we are free to go beyond sensible reality we cannot go, as 
Husserl says, beyond the limits of sensible ideality, we "can transform sensible shapes only into 
other sensible shapes.,,139 Imaginative-sensible idealization then "can only give rise to an 
unforeseeable and inorganic proliferation of morphological types", of anexact spatial shapes and 
types which, since they are not absolutely objective, cannot reassure us that "we have not two but 
only one universal form of the world.,,140 Now even if this universal form and objective unity of 
the world is anticipated in imaginative-sensible description of space, it cannot be affirmed or 
recognized as such but only through the exact science of geometry. 141 
These morphological anexact idealities or essences are the object of a descriptive 
scientific investigator, of a descriptive or morphological science of space, of "geography". Here 
belongs also the very important (for our discussion of equivocity, of translation and of the 
possibility of reactivation) difference between descriptive concepts and exact concepts: 
Geometrical concepts are 'ideal' concepts, they express something which one cannot 'see'; their 
'origin,' and therefore their content also, is essentially other than that of the descriptive concepts as 
concepts which express the essential nature of things as drawn directly from simple intuition, and not 
anything' ideal'. Exact concepts have their correlates in essences, which have the character of 'Ideas' in the 
Kantian sense. Over against these Ideas or ideal essences stand the morphological essences, as correlatives 
of descripti ve concepts. 142 
The geometer constructs the exact object of his science (and the project of geometrical 
univocal language would be unimaginable without the exactitude of its object) by abstractly 
directing his gaze to spatiotemporal shapes, i.e., by disregarding the concrete totality of the bodily 
things which are always given to immediate intuition not only in their spatial shapes but also in 
their sensible and material qualities. 143 But by idealizing the world of bodies, in respect to what 
has spatiotemporal shape in the world, he creates an infinite totality of ideal objects (i.e., of 
Dl) Ibid. §9a, p. 25. 
I,j() Ibid., §9c, p. 34. Speaking again of this "amnesic evil"' of objectivism Husserl writes that "it was 
overlooked that this method of idealization in the end accomplishes nothing other that an anticipation. 
infinitely extended, of what is to be expected in experience." El, § 10, p. 44. 
I,ll Speaking of the mathematics of spatiotemporal shapes as leading the way for Galileo's mathematization 
of nature Husserl writes: "out of the undetermined universal form of the life-world, space and time, and the 
manifold of empirical intuitable shapes that can be imagined into it. it [mathematics] made for the first time 
an objectil'e world in the true sense - i.e., an infinite totality of ideal objects which are determinable 
IIl1il'Ocally, methodically, and quite universally from everyone. Thus mathematics showed for the tirst time 
that an infinity of objects that are subjectively relative and are thought only in a vague, general 
representation is, through an a priori all-encompassing method, objecti\ely determinable and can actually 
he thought as determined in itself or . more exactly, as an infinity which is determined. decided in advance. 
in itself. in respect to all its ohjects and all their properties and relations." Ibid .. §9b, p32. 
142 Ideas I, *7-1-. p. 166. 
14~ "1:,actitude is always a product deri\ed from an operation of 'idealization' and of 'transition to the 
limit' which can onlv concern an ahstract moment, an abstract eidetic clement (spatiality. for example) of a 
thing materially det~rmined as an objecti\e body, selling aside. precisely. the other eidetic elements of a 
hodv in !.!cneral." GSP, p. 162. 
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possible shapes), which are determinable, through an a priori method, univocal(\' and universally 
for everyone, 
Now Husserl, as Derrida writies, does not pose the question of the origin of the sensible 
types that we find in prescientific cultural world even if the exactitude of geometry is not only 
grounded but also anticipated there. In order not to leave and to respect geometry's internal 
history in its originality, Husserl must start from the first production of a nonsensible ideality. a 
production which effects a radical discontinuity from its past conditions and from all sensible 
(i.e., finite) ground in general. Geometry's internal history, the pure and infinite tradition of its 
sense, therefore, started the moment its objectivities uprooted themselves from every factuality 
and every sensible reality, and, first of all, from the finite and de facto empirical subjectivity 
which has actually produced them in a determined space and time. The origin of sensible 
idealities, and of the idealizing ability of imagination which pertains to all empirical subjectivity, 
is not, then, what is absolutely fundamental for the production of geometrical truth as such, it can 
therefore remain, as Derrida writes, "provisionally in the dark." 
Although this origin is the origin of what precedes and conditions geometry, It IS not to be 
confused with the origin of geometry itself and all of its related possibilities; it only authorizes what we 
earlier called a geography, In every phenomenological regression to beginnings, the notion of an internal or 
intrinsic history and sense lets us delineate some safety catches, as well as articulate, if not avoid, all 
regressus ad infinitum, The internal sense of geometry, which provides us with a static analysis l ')'), 
prescribes that the question of geometry's origin stop at the constituted sense of what has immediately 
conditioned geometry. (lOG p125) 
Although geometrical ideality, for instance, the "circle", has been produced starting from 
the ideal morphological type "roundness" by an operation of "substruction", the "circle" as a 
nonsensible, higher, exact, absolutely objective spatial figure (or essence-limit) has been 
produced without the help either of sensibility or of imagination. Rather it broke away bova leap 
from every subjective, sensible or imaginary, intuition, The geometrical ideal object was made 
possible by an act of pure thinking, by an operation of pure and exact idealization, and the 
accomplishment of a decisive "passage to limit." With the production of the geometrical exact 
essence, the essence-limit circle we pass to the ideal and infinite limit of the subjective (and 
finite) imaginative-sensible intuition of roundness1-l). Starting from the anticipatory structure of 
imaginative idealization (a structure present already to all prescientific experience of space), the 
protogeometer goes beyond anexact essences toward a pure ideal limit which functions as a pole 
1-1-1 This is one of the occasions in which Derrida will remind us that the static and structural analysis. 
practiced espL'L'ially in Ideas I. always functions for Husserl as the indispensable guard rails for e\er~ 
genetic project. . 
1-1~ Cieometrical idealization or production. Husserl writes, "gin's ideal essences as ideal 'limits'. whICh 
callilot on principle he found in any sensihle intuition, and to which on occasion morphological e'osences 
approximate more or less, without e\er reaching them" (Ideas L * 74. P 167), 
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for infinite approximations. The institution of geometry, Husserl says, could only be a 
philosophical act. The philosopher is the man which inaugurates the pure theoretical attitude. 
Now from the moment Husserl is given both the prescientific cultural world (with 
language, imaginative morphological types, the art of measurement etc) and the philosopher as 
proto geometer (as the man who performs, under the guidance of the Platonic doctrine of ideas, 
the inaugural reduction, the reduction of the lived, sensible-imaginary space, the man who 
inaugurates the purely theoretical attitude), as the indispensable conditions for geometry's origin, 
"the absence of all concrete description of the institutor's acts", Derrida says, "should not be 
surprising. Nor disappointing" (lOG, p. 132). 
This is how Husserl describes exhaustively in two sentences the sense of the inaugural 
and instituting act of geometry: the finite ideal-cultural formations which the protogeometer 
philosopher has at his disposal 
as formations developed out of praxis and thought of in terms of perfection, clearly serve only as 
bases for a new sort of praxis out of which similar new formations grow. It is evident in advance that this 
new sort of formation will be a product arising out of an idealizing, spiritual act, one of 'pure' thinking, 
which has its materials in the designated universal pregivens of this factual humanity and human 
surrounding world and creates 'ideal objectivities' out of them. (OG, pp. 178-179) 
In the last stage of Husserl' s investigation into the internal historicity of an eidetic and 
exact science, we are in front of an institutive and infinitizing operation "whose activity has never 
been studied for itself and whose conditions are never to be so studied" (lOG, p. 133). This is so 
because it is an operation which must have immediately conditioned the ideal Objectivity, i.e., the 
geometrical eidos, it itself created; an operation which, by accomplishing the "decisi ve passage to 
the limit", must have been radically emancipated from all empirical subjectivity and from all 
factual historical life, that is, an operation which must have immediately and decisively uprooted 
itself from its past conditions. As we are going to see, the Idea in the Kantian sense, and the 
mathematical inaugural idealization which supposes it, are operative but not thematic concepts: 
they are not phenomenalizable, i.e., they do not offer themselves to phenomenological light. This 
is why, as Derrida says, they are kept in an "essential darkness". (lOG, p. 137) 
The correlative of this inaugural idealization, Derrida tells us, is an Idea in the Kantian 
sense. i.e., both an infinite theoretical anticipation and an infinite practical task 146, an infinite 
horizon of ideal repetitions, transmissions and acquisitions of sense, whose infinity is itself the 
field of scientific work. This Idea acquires in HusserI's phenomenology the highest teleological 
I-Ill As Dcrrida will continually confirm, from lOG (p. 136) to Rogues (pp. 12fl. 131). theoretical 
L'Unsciolisness is a practical consciousness through and through. a consciousness of an infinite task and "the 
sill' of ahsolute valuc for itself and for humanity as rational suhjcctivity". 
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value and dignity, since it is nothing but the regulative pole of every infinite task: the infinite 
Telos from which all internal and intentional history takes its sense, its direction or heading. 
The presence of the Idea in the Kantian sense, as Telos or Vorhaben, which opens the 
intentional and internal history of geometry, indicates for Husserl the essential and irreducible 
infinite overflowing of the historical horizon which, by reason of an absolute necessity, ne\'er can 
be completed by an immediate intuition or perception of an object. "Even by God's intuition,',I.P 
This infinite horizon cannot become an object given to intuition since it is the unobjectifiable 
source of every constituted ideal objectivity, that is, the pure possibility of its infinite 
determinability. 148 
Now only the production of an absolute ideality which has cut itself from e\'ery finite, 
factual totality can open "an infinite, yet self-enclosed, world of ideal objects as a field of 
work. "J49 Only an absolute ideal objectivity can sanction the pure openness and unity of the 
infinite geometrical horizon, i.e., the constitution of a sense whose historical repetition or 
tradition is opened ideally to infinity. Absolute ideality then is the correlate of a possibility of 
indefinite historical repetition. "There is no ideality without there being an Idea in the Kantian 
sense at work, opening up the possibility of something indefinite, the infinity of stipulated 
progression or the infinity of permissible repetitions."15o The origin of ideality is the possibility of 
repetition of a productive act (and the relation to finitude or death which this origin implies). 
The unity of geometry's history is given as an Idea in the Kantian sense, i.e., it is 
teleologically prescribed as totally open, as always to come on the basis of and through the 
indefinite historical acquisitions of the geometrical eidos and sense which have been announced 
in its origin. This is why the history of the eidetic science of geometry acquires such an 
exemplary signification for Husserl: by virtue of the exactitude of geometrical ideality and its 
eidos (namely spatiality, which as we said concerns only an abstract moment of the material 
determined thing in general), the sense of its origin is always rigorously implicated with its 
teleological sense. This is why every new idealization or production of sense in the history of 
geometry, every move forward, every advance toward the horizon is at the same time, in effect, a 
return to or a genuine reactivation of its primordial sense. This again means that the primordial 
117 \'iolence and Metaphysics, p. 120. 
I~X Husserl rigorously distinguishes Idea from eidos. The Idea, then. is not essence, and still less an existent. 
Hence the difficulty of an intuitive grasp or evidence of what is neither an existent nor an essence. But it is 
abo I1l'cessary to say that the Idea has 110 essence, for it is only the openness of the horizon for the 
elllen.!l'nCe and the determination of en:ry essence, and of every factuality. This is why Derrida writes in 
Viol(,~'('(' alld MetaphYsics that, "in phenomenology there is ne\er a constitution of horizons, but horizons 
or constitution." p. 120. 
I~l) M·' h' " C·''' .., .... Y emp aSls. I L\lS, p. _\I. 
I ~Il c") 'I' 
, SPCl'dl alld Phenomella, pp. _1_1 . 
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sense of the instituting act of geometry is only its final sense, that is, the constitution of an 
absolutely objective objectivity free from all de facto cultural and historical determinations: the 
ideal and exact eidos of space. And since the possibility of the Objectivity of the geometrical 
eidos is also the possibility of its indefinite traditionality (or translatability), the unity of 
geometry's sense necessarily corresponds with the unity of its tradition or history, both of which, 
as we have said again and again, are irreducible to empirical history. 
That is why geometry is this extraordinary operation: the creation of an eidetic. It follows that 
geometry's infinity history will always see its unity prescribed by the eidetic structure of a region, or more 
precisely, by the unity of an abstract 'moment' (spatiality) of a region. This unity certainly is not historicaL 
it is empirically unchangeable. But it is only the unity of the infinite historical development of the eidetic 
called geometry. It is nothing outside the history of geometry itself. (lOG p13S) 
Now if the science of geometry and its history have the openness and the unity of an 
infinite horizon, this openness and unity suppose, according to Husserl, the horizon of the H'orld 
itself as their ground. The historical advent and adventure of the science of geometry as cultural 
formation is inscribed within the horizon of the worldI5I i.e., within the infinite horizon of all 
possible experience in space, whose unity too is always given as an Idea in the Kantian sense. In 
the last analysis, the infinite project of geometry is itself always grounded in the primordial 
movement of temporalization of egological consciousness, "the ultimate ground of all 
constitution." As Derrida writes, the movement of geometrical idealization, of the production of 
essence-limits and their launching into an infinite tradition, "is analogous to the constitution of 
the unity of the world's infinite horizon or (beyond the finite interconnection of retentions and 
protentions) to the constitution of the evidence for a total unity of the immanent flux as an Idea in 
the Kantian sense" (lOG, p. 106). Derrida writes "analogous": we should then take into 
consideration the difference between exactitude and rigor, between geometrical essences and the 
essences of pure consciousness, between the closed infinite totality of all possible formations in 
geometrical space and the open infinite totality of possible experiences in lived space, which can 
b d . d IS2 never e mastere or appropnate . -
Phenomenology as an eidetic, material and descriptive science of the essences of pure 
consciousness, may be a rigorous science, as Husserl has detemonstrated in his Philosophy as 
Rigorous Scicence, but can never be an exact science. Rather, phenomenology is necessarily 
I.'il The world Husserl is talking ahout is not the real world. the world right here. whose factuality is. for 
phellomenology. anything hut a variahle example: it is the world "not as a finite totality of sentient heings. 
hut as the infinite totality of possihle experiences in space in general" (lOG. pp. 52. ~-+). This world. "the 
wnrld- horimn". which is historical through and through. as Husserl taught us in the Origin (pp. 161 ft} is 
not the factual. real world of which the historical suhject would he a prisoner. hut the infinite totality of all 
p.0ssihk historical experiences: it is the infinite horizon of history and of the possible. 
'i~ esp. p. 162 and Rogues. p. 1.12. 
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anexact due to no defect on its part. Phenomenological, i.e., rigorous description and knowledge 
concerning the transcendental and concrete structure of all consciousness can be indubitable but it 
cannot and must never claim exactitude. Geometry, on the contrary, is an exact science because it 
is also an "abstract" science: from the concrete totality of the corporeal thing isolates, idealizes 
and treats only certain of its eidetic components (shape) and disregards others (the "matterial" 
IStojjliche sensible qualities of the thing) For Husser! not only it will be wrong and absurd for 
someone to try to establish something like an exact science of phenomena, "a mathematics of 
phenomena", or a ""geometry" of mental process, ,,153 but also irrational and extremely 
irresponsible. Geometry, as the model of objective sciences, not only is responsible for the 
naturalization of the psychic sphere but also, as the ground for the mathematical idealization of 
Nature, hides true Nature too. A descriptive or morphological science of space, geography, 
works with inexact, vague and descriptive concepts which do not compromise its rigor. Husserl 
writes: "the most perfect geometry and the most perfect practical mastery of it cannot enable the 
descriptive natural scientist to express (in exact geometrical concepts) what he expresses in such a 
simple, understandable, and completely appropriate manner by the words 'notches.' 'scalloped,' 
'lens-shaped,' 'umbiliform' and the like - all of them concepts which are essential(-'.'. rather than 
accidentally, inexact and consequently also non-mathematical.,,154 
Now why the essences of consciousness cannot belong to the structure pertaining to 
mathematical phenomena? For Husser! it is a question of calculability and incalculability, of 
opening or of closure. Husser! writes in Ideas I 
With the help of the axioms, i.e., the primitive eidetic laws, it [geometry] is then in a position to 
derive purely deductively all the spatial shapes existing, that is, ideally possible shapes, in space and all the 
cidetic relationships pertaining to those shapes in the form of exactly determining concepts which take the 
place of the essences which, as a rule, remain foreign to our intuition. The generic essence of the province 
of geometry. or the pure essence of space, is of such a character that geometry can be completely certain of 
dOll/inating actually by its method all the possibilities and of determining them exact!)'. In other words, the 
multiplicity comprising all spatial formations has a remarkable fundamental logical priority, indicated in 
the names, "definite manifold" and "mathematical manifold in the pregnant sense", which we hereby 
introduce. Such a manifold is characterized by the fact that a finite number of concepts and propositions 
dcrivable in a given case from the essence of the province in question, in a manner characteristic of purely 
(/nalrric necessity completelv and unambiguouslv determines the totality of all the possible fonnations 
helo~lging to the province so that, ofessentialnecessit)" nothing in the province is left open. 155 
If naturalism and objectivism are denounced by Husserl as irresponsible pen'ersions of 
reason, this is because they are indissociable from the project of exactitude and. therefore, from a 
certain power and force of calculation. For Husserl, on the contrary, as Derrida writes in Rogues. 
l.~·~II I ~7') I~I (l'as . 'S _. p. \1 
1~4 Ihid .. *74 Sel' also Levinas' Thl'01y of Intuition. pp. 117-119. 140. whcre this quotation from Ideas I 
SL'("\'L'S as a rcspOIlSl' to Bergson' S critiquc of conceptual thought. 
I~~ My emphasis. Ideas I . . ~72 p 163. See also Crisis §9. p 27.33 
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in the second Essay on Reason, the rationality of the rational was never limited to calculability. 
Within Husserl's phenomenology, which is a philosophy both of essences (which are always a 
priori and objective but anexact) and of experience (i.e., of the origin, of becoming, and 
ultimately, of the temporal flux of what is lived), a rational incalculability presents and 
announces itself, an incalculability, Derrida says, which defies appropriation and resists, in the 
most rigorous way, the objectivist reason of the sciences as the technical control of nature, as 
calculation, as ratio or as account, an account to be given or settled. 156 Derrida writes 
in opposition to the lived space in which the indefiniteness of the adumbrations is a transcendence 
that essentially can never be mastered, the idealized space of mathematics allows us to go immediately to 
the infinite limit of what is in fact an unfinished movement. Thus, the transcendence of every lived future 
can be absolutely appropriated and reduced in the very gesture which frees that future for an infinite 
development. ... The developments of mathematical space will never de jure escape us; that is why it might 
seem more reassuring, more our own. But is that not also because it has become more foreign to us? (lOG, 
p. 136) 
In opposition to the closed field of mathematical reason (lOG. p 130n), Derrida, after 
Husserl, demonstrates the principled, essential, and structural impossibility of closing a structural 
and transcendental phenomenolog/ 57 • Or passing very quickly to a vocabulary that at first sight 
might appear foreign to phenomenology: phenomenological reason is a welcome, insofar as it 
welcomes the idea of infinity, And this welcome is always rational. 158 
In his Introduction to the Origin, Derrida examines two cases of intentional phenomena 
in which Husserl refers to the Idea in the Kantian sense. This reference, according to Derrida, 
indicates nothing but the "infinite horizon" which is virtually present in every consciousness, the 
infinite openness of what is experienced or lived: the external perception or intuition of the 
transcendent, extended thing and the internal, immanent perception of a lived experience 
(Erlebnis) occurring within the horizon of the flux of consciousness. In both cases it is the Idea of 
infinity, which unifies the indefiniteness of the adumbrations of the transcendent thing by 
anticipation, and which permits the unification of the temporal flux of consciousness, despite 
their irreducible incompleteness. In both cases it is a matter of the irruption of the infinite into a 
finite consciousness, a matter of an opening, or rather of the transcendentality of an opening, an 
opening from Il'ithin the transcendental structure of all consciousness that can never be mastered 
or calculated. 
151> R ' . \ ~ ") \ ~ ~ Oglll,\. p .. _- __ 
157 GSP, p. 16~. . 
15X Derrida, Jacques,:\ H'onl (~t Welcome in Adieu. translated by Pascak-Anne Brault and MIchael Naas, 
Stanford, Stanford UniHTsity Press. \999, p, 26. 
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Considering the case of external perception, Husserl notes that it belongs to the \ery 
essence of transcendent, extended things existing in space that they should be given to perception 
(i.e., to a lived experience which is not something spatial) only through a multiplicity of one-
sided views and "orientations" or adumbrations (Abschattungen).159 Now in an perceptual 
process, which intends the spatial thing itself as a whole, new adumbrations always succeed 
previous ones without, however, being able anyone of them, nor in their totality, to bring about a 
complete givenness of all sides of the thing. However successful and in accordance160 with one 
another these adumbrations are, however certain we are that we perceive and confront always the 
same thing, there is always a hidden side of it, an essential and indefinite incompletion in its 
perception, which is irreducible. Now the possibility of going around to see things from the other 
side, the possibility of an originary perception of their hidden side is, in principle, an open 
possibility, i.e., a possibility experienced and anticipated by the perceiving subject as sense itself. 
The (finite) thing itself, as it is described by Husserl in Ideas I § 143 (Adequate Physical Thing-
Giveness as Idea in the Kantian sense), functions as an Idea in the Kantian sense, i.e., it is only 
indicated by an anticipation through which the perceptual process is regulated H'ithout e\'cr 
attaining it intuitively. To be in infinitum incomplete or "imperfect in this manner is part of the 
unanullable essence of the correlation between 'physical thing' and perception of the physical 
thing" (Ideas, §44, p. 94). Although "all realities" belonging to Nature "cannot be given in 
complete determinedness and, likewise, in complete intuitiveness in any limited finite 
consciousness" "as Idea its perfect giveness is nevertheless predesignated .... ,,161 
What is of great importance for us here is that whether this strange evidence of the Idea 
concerns the incomplete giveness of the transcendent, real and finite thing belonging to nature or 
the infinitely open unity of geometrical Objectivity, this absolutely indubitable evidence cannot 
but be rational and finite: it appears only, and therefore cannot be described by phenomenology 
otherwise than, in the concrete and finite acts or intuitions of a concrete and constituting 
egological consciousness. 
I SlJ "It is neither an accident of the own peculiar sense of the physical thing nor a contingency of 'our 
human constitution,' that 'our' perception can arrive at physical things themselves only through mere 
adumhrations of them, Rather it is evident and drawn from the essence of spatial physical things .. , that. 
necessarily a heing of that kind can be given in perception only through an adumbration. [ ... ] A spatial 
heing can "appear" only in a certain "orientation," which necessarily predelineates a system of possible 
new orientations. [ ... ]" And then Husser! writes about this essential incompleteness which characterizes the 
concrL'le perceptions of the external thing: "to their essence belongs the ideal possibility of their changing 
into dL'lerminabk ordered continuous multiplicities of perception which can always be continued. thus 
which arc Ilever c011lplete." Ideas L §§~1-~2. pp. 90-1. 
IIl() To be sure. discordance is also an essential possibility in the way external things appear to perception. 
See Lninas' Theo/~), (~f'llltllition. p. 27. 
Ihl Ideas L * 143. p. 342. 
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Is not the same movement, the same Idea (in the Kantian sense), involved in the internal 
(supposedly adequate) perception of a lived experience (Erlebnis) as occurs within the immanent 
flux? Unlike the perception of external things, a mental process is not adumbrated (ein Erlebnis 
schattet sich nicht ab); an immanent perception as it is lived in the present instant is absolute and 
adequate. 162 Such an adequate perception of self by self would suppose, however, that the self-
presence of experience is always produced in the present taken as a now, in the undivided unity of 
a temporal present. That each lived experience of the immanent flux is adequately given means 
that the identity of experience is instantaneously and immediately present to itself. This 
adequation then refers to the self-same identity of the living present taken as a noH'. According to 
the principle of principles of phenomenology, to the original self-giving evidence, the idea of 
primordial presence (of the living present) always refers to this noH' as the "source point", that is, 
h b I . . 163 as tea so ute ongm. 
But how does the Idea of infinity announce itself within the phenomenological self-
giving evidence of the living now as the Absolute of phenomenological consciousness, as the 
absolute origin of all sense?164 Supposing that a single lived experience can be adequately given 
in an immanent intuition or perception, and be determined in phenomenological evidence, how is 
the continuous, endless flux of lived experiences given to consciousness as a unity? Husserl in 
Ideas I, §83 (Seizing Upon the Unitary Stream of Lived Experiences as "Idea "), writes: 
We do not seize upon [the flux of mental processes as a unity] as we do a single lived experience 
hut rather in the manner of an idea in the Kantian sense. It is not something posited or affirmed hy chance; 
it is instead an absolutely indubitable givenness. Even though it is also grounded in intuition, this 
induhitahility has a source entirely different from that which exists for the being of lived experiences, 
which therefore hecomes given in the perception of the immanent. It is precisely the peculiarity of the 
162 If a lived experience, say a feeling, is not given through Abschattllllgen, this is because a feeling is not 
something spatial, so there is no place for discordance here: "The perception of an Erlebnis is a simple 
seeing of something which is (or can hecome) perceptually given as something absolute, and not as 
something identical in modes of appearance by adumbrations. Everything we have worked out ahout the 
)!ivcnness of the physical thing loses its sense here and must make that fully clear to oneself in detail. A 
feeling is not adumbrated. If I look at it I have something absolute; it has no sides that could he presented 
sometimes in one mode and sometimes in another." Ideas I, §44, p. 95-96. 
1fl, Compare Ideas L §24 and On the Phenomenolog)' of Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), 
translated hy John B. Brough, London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, § 10. 
164 To he sure, this necessary and ahsolute privilege of the lit'ing. actual present or 110\\' is not exclusi\ely 
Husserlian. According to Derrida, "within philosophy there can he no possible objection concerning the 
privilege of the present now, it is el'idence itself, conscious thought itself, it governs every possible concept 
(~f' truth alld sens£'. No sooner do we question this pri\ilege than we hegin to gel at the core of 
uHlseiousness itself from a region that lies elsewhere than philosophy. a procedure that would rem()\e 
every possible security and ground from discourse" (SP, p. 62n). How can one hegin thinking the 
unthinkahle or the imp()ssihk. that is, how can one take the first step (as if it were a matter of a step, of 
crossing (lr trespassing an identifiahle and indi\isihle horder. or of crossing something that can he LTo'>'>ed 
and left hehind), outside of philosophy, outside of the thinking of the possihle, of what am I capahle of. i.e" 
of capal'ity, potentiality, power. of the masterly and so\ereign I can or I CilIlIlO(! This question constitutes 
the wider horizon of this thesis. 
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ideation which sees a Kantian 'idea' that it does not on that account, perhaps, lose the insight because the 
adequate determination of its content, here the stream of lived experiences, is unattainable. wi 
As in the case of perception of the transcendent thing belonging to nature, whose unity 
can be given only as an Idea, the unity of immanent flux, the indefinitely open unity of the 
movement of internal-time consciousness cannot phenomenalize itself, it cannot present itself 
immediately and "in person" in a finite intuition. The unity of the temporal flux can only be 
animated by the Idea, that is, given or anticipated as an Idea, as the anticipated unity of an 
essentially indefinite movement of temporalization. But how are we to understand 
phenomenologically this absolute certainty of an egological consciousness concerning the total 
unity of its own immanent flux, its "absolutely indubitable giveness", if this unity is, by all rights, 
infinitely open and therefore impossible to phenomenalize itself, impossible to appear as such or 
to be contained in the living present of this finite consciousness? How can we understand this 
finite certainty of the infinite openness of every livedfuture which, nonphenomenalizable in itself, 
is the condition of phenomenalization of time itself? 
Before we refer to the questions which this absolute certainty without evidence (this 
"absolutely indubitable giveness" of what can never appear and be determined in a 
phenomenological evidence) poses for the whole of phenomenology, let us see how the Idea 
permits the unification of the temporal flux of consciousness despite its irreducible openness. We 
have already said that for Husserl the movement of temporalization of consciousness is dialectic 
through and through, that the living present of consciousness (as the phenomenological Absolute) 
is nothing but the indefinite maintenance [nOH'l1essj of the dialectic of protentions and retentions 
(themselves horizons of potential presence.) 
But this Maintenance itself appears as such, it is the Lh'ing Present, and it has the 
phenomenological sense of a consciousness only if the unity of this movement is given as indefinite and if 
its sense of indefiniteness is announced in the Present (i. e., if the openness ofthe infinite future is, as such, 
a possibilitv experienced as sense and right.) [my emphasis] Death1nn will not be comprehended as sense 
out as a fact extrinsic to the movement of temporalization. The unity of infinity, the condition for that 
temporalization, must then be thought, since it is announced without appearing and be contained in a 
Present. This thought unity, which makes the phenomenalization of time as such possible, is therefore 
always the Idea in the Kantian sense which never phenomenalizes itself. lOG, p. 137. 
If, then, the Absolute of the living present, as the indefinite maintenance of protentions 
and retentions, cannot simply appear to itself, cannot be identical with itself and can only be 
lh.~ Ideas I, *83. p. 197. 
Ihh WL' will be dealing with the problem or "aporia" of death (or telos or end, which has not onl) the sense 
of a factual anthropological limit. as it is the case in this paragraph) in the next chapter. and only after \\ e 
ha\L' rethought, as Derrida is asking us to do in Limited Inc (p. 129), the infinite Telos which for Husser! 
"LTe IlC\'L'I" a p(lsiti\'L' infinite. As Dcrrida writes in Speech and Phenomena. only "compared tll the idealit) 
of the p(lsiti\l~ infinite. this rclation to my- death oecomes an accident of empirical finitude." SP. p. 102. 
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announced as the infinite pole of all repetition, if the form of presence to consciousness (the 
presence of the thing and of consciousness to itself) can be indefinitely repeated without eyer 
being attained or actualized in some plenitudinous, self-identical instant or stigme, this means that 
the Absolute is present only in being deferred, that the living present is, in fact. really, effectiYely 
deferred ad infinitum, that the Absolute was never meant to designate the full presence of positive 
infinite but only the form of a Telos - that is an Idea in the Kantian sense. 167 
What Derrida is interested to show, with respect to Husserl's dialectical description of the 
movement of temporalization and with respect to the original infinitization and historicity of 
geometrical sense, is the "strange" presence in both cases of this idea of infinity (as an infinite 
pole of determination and as a task or project of reason) for a concrete and finite historical 
consciousness. Phenomenology would then, Derrida tells us, occupy the place between "the 
finitizing consciousness of its principle of principles" 168 and "the infiniti:ing consciousness of its 
final institution (Endstiftung)", i.e., the ethico-teleological prescription of the infinite task. (lOG, 
p. 138) 
As the "final institution" of phenomenology "indefinitely deferred in its content and 
always evident in its regulative value", the Idea cannot, however, be accounted for, and even less 
grounded by phenomenology itself, since it is "the basis on which phenomenology was set up in 
order to achieve the final intention of philosophy" (lOG, p. 141). 
This Idea of infinity, that is, of the infinite task of theoretical and practical reason which 
is inseparable, let us recall, from the negative form of infinity, of the indefiniteness of the ad 
infinitum, never became a theme for phenomenological description by Husserl. But there are 
essential reasons for this nonthematization or nonphenomenalization of the Idea. Derrida in the 
last two sections of his Introduction examines the phenomenological status and value of the Idea 
and describes the phenomenal system of its nonphenomenalization. 
According to Derrida, if Husserl never directly defined the type of the Idea's presence or 
evidence for a transcendental consciousness, if he had nothing to say about the Idea itself, if its 
status within phenomenology remains rather strange and mysterious, it is not by chance, or 
167 'The impossihility of resting in the simple maintenance of a Living Present, ... thc inability to livc 
cnclosed in the innocent undividedness of the primordial Absolute, because the Absolute is present only in 
heing d(ferred-delayed [differantJ without respite, this impotence and this impossibility are given in a 
r~imordial. and pure co~sc~ousness ~)f ~iffere~ce.·' lOG. p. I5:i.. ." 
Accordlllg to the princIple ofprlnClples ot phenomenology, the unIversal and an.:hetypal form ot 
evidence, the original self-giving nidence. is the immediate presence of the thing itself "in person" in a 
rinilL' intuition. "Implicitly", this presence of the thing itself "in person" for a finite consciousness refers to 
the presence, as Derrida writes. "of the phenomenally defined or definahle thing. therefore thejll1ite thing. 
(The motif of the finitude has perhaps more affinity with the latter implication that it first seems to have 
with phenomenology's principk of principles.)" lOG, p. 1 :i8. 
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because Hm,,,erl has overlooked its actual signification. If the Idea, which has no essence and is 
neither an existent thing nor an essence, never phenomenalizes itself, if, that is, it cannot be given 
"in person" nor determined in an evidence (as an existent thing or an essence, by all rights, can) 
this is because the Idea is nothing but the pure possibility of evidence, the possibility of an 
infinite determinability of every thing or essence, the openness of the horizon for the encounter 
and the determination of every object (real or ideal). The Idea, according to Derrida, can only 
have a purely regulative value: it is the Telos of the infinite determinability of beings as objects 
for a finite and constituting consciousness. The certainty of its presence for a finite consciousness 
is to be found only in what it regulates (i.e., the infinite determinability of the object in general) 
and not in the evidence of its content, since the content of this Idea is not, and can never be, a 
present determined object. If, therefore, it is essentially inaccessible to all finite intuition, i.e .. if it 
can never be phenomenally defined or definable, it is because the Idea is the hori:.on of every 
intuition in general, sensible or eidetic, the horizon for the appearance and determination of every 
"finite thing" in general (or to use a platonic language, the Idea is the invisible condition of 
visibility, of sensible or intelligible visibility). But from the fact that an adequate determination of 
its content is radically impossible one should not, Derrida insists, conclude that there cannot be a 
rational evidence of the Idea as regulative possibility. Rather one can rightfully say that there is 
concrete evidence of the Idea for a concrete consciousness, i.e., there is "a concrete and lived 
evidence" of the infinite, only insofar as this evidence is finite and formal (i.e., without a 
materially determined content.) Since the Idea is nothing outside the intentional and productive 
acts of a historico-transcendental subjectivity, phenomenology cannot "direct!.v describe it 
otherwise than in its finite acts, intuitions, results or objects." Nothing, Derrida says, can be 
added to this formal definition of the Idea: 
In the Idea of infinity, there is determined evidence only of the Idea but not of that of which it is 
the Idea. The Idea is the pole of pure intention, empty of every determined object. It alone reveals, then, the 
heing of intention: intentionality itself 
Thus, for once, nothing appears in a specific evidence. What does appear is only the regulative 
possihility of appearing and the finite certainty of infinite phenomenological determinability, i.e., a 
certainty without a corresponding evidence, [The Idea] as the infinite determinability of X, is only relation 
with an object, It is in the hroadest sense, Objectivit)' itself lOG, p, 139, 
It is only on the basis of this finite certain(\' that the historicity of geometry. and the 
historicity of sense in generaL i.e., of Reason, are set free from all historical factuality, from its 
ethnic, geographicaL etc .. limits. This finite and teleological certainty, this "certainty without 
corresponding [i.e" materially determined] evidence" of the infinite detemlinability of objects in 
generaL this pure and empty from any adequate intuition intention. this intentio/l{/lity. pertains to 
and defines cyay consciousness of the infinite task, The infinite task of Reason, then, is always 
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entrusted to "a concrete consciousness which is made responsible for it despite the finitude of that 
consciousness, and insofar as it grounds transcendental historicity and transcendental 
intersubjectivity" (lOG, p. 141). 
As the invisible condition of (sensible and intelligible) visibility, and as the unconditional 
condition of evidence itself, the Idea will remain, for Husser! as it was also for Plato, for ever 
epekeina tes ousias. (Republic, Book VI, 509b) "As the Telos of the infinite determinability of 
being, it is but being's openness to the light of its own phenomenality, it is the light of light, the 
sun of the visible sun, a hidden sun which shows without being shown. And it is no doubt what a 
Plato muted of Platonism tells us about" (lOG, p. 144). As in the platonic discourse of "the idea 
of the Good", the Husserlian reference to the Idea of infinity, indicates for Derrida the 
hyperbolicl69 moment of phenomenology, the Endstiftung of phenomenology, and reveals to us 
the Idea as to ep'arkhen anypotheton (5l0b), as the of first figure of the unconditional which 
conditions all the phenomenological possibilities or capabilities: of consciousness, presence, 
evidence, originary and unitary intuition or perception, sense and meaning, etc. 170 
This Idea is the common root of theoretical and practical reason. Or better, the idea of 
"unconditional truth," the unconditionality of the Idea of truth as an infinite task or duty 
(Aufgabe) of philosophy as theoria, remains what binds practical reason to the theoretical reason 
it subordinates and exceeds 171. As Derrida affirms from the Introduction to Rogues, theoretical 
reason, for Husserl as for Kant, is first of all a practical reason, a practical ideal, a prescriptive 
task through and through. 
This is what Husser! writes in Philosophy as Mankind's Self-Reflection, in a constative 
and prescriptive mode: humanity '"is rational in seeking to be rational; [ ... ] this signifies an 
infinity of living and striving toward reason; reason is precisely that which man qua man, in his 
innermost being, is aiming for, that which alone can satisfy him, ... ", and he adds 
169 It is immediately after Socrates has defined the Idea of the Good, as the sovereign (Kurion, basileus), 
superpowerful (dullamei hyperekhontos ) (509b) origin of reason, that Glaucon cries out loud "Heavcn save 
us, hyperbole can no further go. (daimollias hyperboles)" (509 C). Plato, Republic, books 6-10, translated 
by Paul Shorey, Harvard University Press, London, 2006, pp. 106-7. Marrati. Lawlor, and Kates did not 
rL'act very differently from Glaucon when they maintained that Derrida has critiqued Husser!' s recourse to 
the Idea because "Husserl does not obey his own principle of principles" Lawlor p.141. Marrati, p. 4 \-42, 
Kates, p. 57, 238n 14. For a different. and closer to our reading, interpretation of Husser!' s refererencc to 
the Idea see Bernet's On DCr!'ida's Introduction, pp .. 149ff. 
170 But if Husser! is ready to accept this hyperbolic instant of his discourse "how can he distinguish his 
idealism as a theory of knowledge from metaphysical idealism .... Husser! doubtless would respond 
thinking of Plato. that the ideal was reali::ed within metaphysical idealism. that is, that it was substantified. 
hypllstasi/L'd. as soon as it was not understood cssentially, in each of its aspects. as noema. as soon as one 
imagined that it could bc without in some way being thought or envisagcd." Violence and Metaphysics. p. 
135 
171 Rogues. pp. 126. 131. 1,~4 
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reason allows for no differentiation into 'theoretical', 'practical', 'aesthetic,' or whate\'er ... : 
being human is teleological being and ought-to-be, ... this teleology holds sway in each and e\'er)' activit) 
and project of the ego." (Crisis, pp. 340-1) 
We can therefore interpret Husserl's teleological discourse on history as the prescriptioll 
and as the transcendental description of the fact of prescription. According to Derrida' s 
interpretation of the ethico-teleological dignity of the Idea, Husserl "locates the space where 
consciousness notifies itself of the Idea's prescription and thus is recognized as transcendental 
consciousness through the sign of the infinite: this space is the interval between the Idea of 
infinity in its formal and finite, yet concrete, evidence and the in fin it), itself of which there is the 
Idea" (lOG, p. 140). 
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3) The Historicity of the Idea and the Question of European Responsibility 
According to Husserl then, this "strange" presence of the teleological Idea authorizes not 
only the origin of geometry, i.e., the inaugural, idealizing act which has produced the geometrical 
eidos with the decisive passage to the infinite limit, but also prescribes the total unity of 
geometry's tradition as the production and indefinite transmission of an originary sense. 
But what would that mean for the historicity of geometry and of its origin, indeed for the 
historicity of every ideal cultural formation? Is the origin and the historical sedimentations of 
geometry's sense, the concrete history of the science of geometry, such as it has been inscribed in 
the totality of its productions and sedimentations, in the totality of its factual writings, a foreign 
place where the metaphysical transcendence and plenitude of an absolute Idea would let itself 
descend, expropriate or differ from itself so as to re-appropriate itself? 
Does this "strange presence" mean to say that this teleological Idea is an "ahistorical 
Idea", an "eternal" or absolutely independent and objective Idea, which lies beyond all concrete 
and non-formal SUbjectivity, beyond all concrete and constitutive history? Is this a supratemporal 
or timeless l72 transcendental Idea, which, like the "absolute Logos," occurs in a wordly history, or 
passes through factual historical temporality as a foreign empiricity, and from which it will let 
itself, at the end of the infinite pole of history, be derived?173 
Derrida writes "The presence of the Idea alone, therefore, authori;.es the leap to pure 
ideali(\', a fact that could give rise to doubts about the origin's specific historicity. Are we not 
confronted then with an ahistorical Idea? What we tm(\' need is to investigate the sense of the 
Idea's profound historicity"(IOG, p. 141). In the last chapter of his Introduction Derrida will 
investigate and demonstrate the transcendental sense of the Idea, i.e., "the Idea's profound 
historicity", and what binds it with the radical rationality of phenomenological reason as 
172 WI.: should I.:mphasize here - with regard to the mode of temporality which pertains not only to the Idea, 
hut also to every ideality, and most significantly for us here, to the ideality of sense (Sinn) - that. according 
to HussnL "timelessness" (Zeitlosigkeit) and "supratemporality" (Uber~eitlichkeit) are defined in their 
nl.:gati,ity or transcendence only in relation to wordly, factual temporality, i.e .. in relation to the 
temporality pertaining to real ohjl.:cts. Once factual temporality is reduced, they appear as omnitemporality 
(AII~eitlichkeit), which for Husserl is hut a mode of temporality. (Experience and Judgement ~64c p258-
2(1) More importantly still. omnitemporality and supratemporality are the characteristics of time itself: my 
/il'ing present is "die IIr~eitlichl', iihl'1':citliche 'Zeitlichichkei"" says Husserl (cited in lOG, p. 148n). 
m Husserl in fact has written: "The ahsolute polar ideal Idea, that of an ahsolute in a new sense, of an 
absolute which is situated heyond the world. heyond man. heyond transcendental suhjectivity: it is the 
ahsolute Logos. thc ahsolute truth ... as 111111111, \'£'ru111, honlllll ... " Cited in lOG, p. 146n. 
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Selbstbesinnung and Verantwortung. 174 At the same time, Derrida will recognize there, and within 
the horizon of the infinite idea as an infinite task for practical reason, an extremely powerful 
teleology. 
In this last chapter Derrida discusses the last page of the Origin where Husserl deals with 
"the great and profound problem-horizon of reason" (~C, p. 180). In effect the inaugural 
infinitization which created geometry, and which also freed geometry and its history from 
empirical culture, the irruption of the infinite as a revolution within empirical culture, that is, the 
accession to human consciousness of the infinite task of reason, Husserl tells us, is always already 
indicated in prescientific humanity. Reason, like the Idea, is present in every man and in the 
totality of his history, although it is also "hidden", Husserl writes in Philosophy as Mankind's 
Self-Reflection, "in a state of concealment, of nocturnal obscurity.,,175 
And having invoked once more the "absolute a priori" of history (and a bit further on, the 
concept of internal (innere) history) as what alone could authorize and give sense to the 
establishment of historical facts related to geometry, Husserl asks "Do we not stand here before 
the great and profound problem-horizon of Reason, the same Reason that functions in every man, 
the animal rationale, no matter how primitive he is?" All communities, all types of factual 
community, Husserl writes " ... facticities of every type have a root in the essential structure of 
what is universally human, through which a teleological reason running throughout all 
historicity announces itself. With this is revealed a set of problems in its own right related to the 
totality of history and to the total sense which ultimately gives it its unity"' (OG, p. 180). 
This teleological Reason, like the teleological Idea, was already present to human history 
and civilization well before the advent of philosophy, before the irruption in spiritual Greece of 
the infinite telos of scientific and philosophical rationality. Philosophy as the sense investigation 
of the historicity of this teleological reason, i.e., as the sense investigation or the awakening of 
what was already there in obscurity, "marks a rupture and, consequently, a radical and creative 
origin"' (lOG, p. 146) By investigating the sense of pure history as well as the unity pertaining to 
its movement, in a word its rationality, Greek or European philosophy has awakened history to its 
own proper telos: universality, infinite traditionality, infinite translatability and infinite 
174 The rationality of phenomenological reason is not that of the AufkJarung which, according to what 
Husserl said in the Vienna Lecture. is totally unable for this radical universal self-understanding of science 
in the form of "responsible universal science." This rationalism of the Aujkliirerei. as Derrida note" 
undcrliniIl~ the pejorative character of this word in the Vienna Lecture. in fact shares the responsibility for 
"the critical situation of European sciences and humanity." It is rational prejudices and presuppositions 
whidl share the responsihility for the crisis of Europe. (See Rogues p126) Husser\. on the contrary. wants 
to he more "radical" and more "re\olutionary" than those consef\ati\(~ and reactionary rationalists of the 
Autkliircrl'i. Crisis. p. 290. 
17~ C ' , ~ ~o nSls. p ... o. 
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discursivity. According to Derrida, the philosophical sense-investigation "which awakened 
Reason to itself, announced the pure sense of historicity, i.e., the very sense of Reason. to 
history." (Ibid.) This idea of philosophy, as the sense investigation of the most universal eidos of 
rational historicity, is also a European idea. Within the universal eidos of historicity, Husserl will 
discern three degrees of differentiation, three stages of historicity. The first stage (Stufe, stage or 
step, a notion which has both a structural sense and a genetic sense) is that of prescientific 
humanity, i.e., "historicity in the most general sense as the essence of all human existence, 
inasmuch as human existence necessarily moves in the spiritual space of culture or tradition" 
(lOG, p. 115). Within this stage any society at all can serve as an example, i.e., can be taken as a 
guide in an eidetic recognition of historical rationality.176 The second stage is the Greek or 
European moment, i.e., that of the philosophical or scientific project, of the infinite task of 
reason. The third and last stage would be "the conversion of philosophy into phenomenology". 177 
Thus philosophy is nothing other than rationalism, through and through. but it is rationalism 
differentiated within itself according to the different stages of the movement of intention and fulfilment; it 
is ratio in the constant movement of self-elucidation [Selbsterhellung}, begun with the first breakthrough of 
philosophy into mankind, whose innate reason were previously in a state of concealment, of nocturnal 
b . 178 o scunty. 
Now in order to assess the radical rationalism of phenomenological reason (which is not 
the "old rationalism" of the Aufkliirung) and of the infinite Idea (as an infinite task), and in order, 
at the same time, for the particular historicity (or finitude) of the phenomenological discourse 
itself to appear, we have, according to Derrida, to get rid of those conceptions of the Idea as 
"some thing", as something existent, and of reason as some "psychological faculty or ability" 
(lOG, p. 144). 
The Idea in the Kantian sense which is "present" to consciousness and which, as Husserl 
says, is eternal, is neither an existent thing nor an essence. The Idea is not given the wayan 
essence is given, it is, as we said, epekeina tes ousias. Rather, it is even less existent than an 
essence, since an essence is always given, phenomenology's principle of principles tells us, "in 
171> It is only with the revolutionary step of philosophy that Europe acquires an exemplary signification for 
univcrsal historicity. Husserl writes "Just as man and even the Papuan represents a new stage of animal 
nature. i.e .. as opposed to the beast. so philosophical reason represents a new stage of human nature and its 
reason." Crisis. p. 290. 
177 Cited in lOG, p. 115. Derrida makes two very important points here. Firstly. at each stage or step "the 
rnolution which overthrows the previous project by an infinitization is only the sense inn:stigation of a 
hidden intL·ntion." And secondly. the three stages which "are stratifying structures of different heights. [ ... ] 
are not in fact mutually cxc1usin.:: not only do they coexist in the world. but one and the same society can 
make 1 Ill' 111 cohabit within itself. in the differentiated unity of an organic simultaneously." 
J1~ Crisis. Philosophy (/.1 M(/I/kind's Se~f-Ref7ectioll. p. 338. 
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person" in a finite intuition, whereas the Idea is not and never will be. Being without essence, the 
infinity of the Idea is offered within phenomenology as the concrete condition (itself 
unconditional) for the determination of every thing and every essence or eidos in general, or, in 
other words, as the ideal and infinite horizon for the appearance of every object for a 
consciousness, as the horizontal seeing-come of the eidos, or of the form of what remains to 
come. It is not simply "one possibility among others" as Kates writes l79, but the opening of the 
infinite horizon of history and of the possible for a finite and pure consciousness in general. 180 
If, as phenomenology teaches us, not only the possibilities of factual reality but also the 
possibilities of essence or eidos must have a noema (or sense) for a concrete consciousness in 
general, if therefore every determined object and every determined essence supposes the 
possibility of noema in general, we should perhaps try to think the irreality of the Idea, its 
"strange presence" for a transcendental living consciousness, together with the general possibility 
of noema, which is neither an object nor a subject, neither real transcendence nor real 
immanence, neither of the world nor of consciousness, and certainly not of any other world either. 
The ideality or irreality of the eidos 181 is not the irreality of the noema. The irreality of the 
noema, which Husserl described in Ideas I (§§ 88, 97ff.), characterizes the type of inclusion, a not 
real (reell) inclusion, of every noema in a concrete and essentially finite lived experience, 
whatever the type of the intended object (a real or an ideal object.) "However there is no doubt", 
Derrida writes, "that this non-reality of the noema (a very difficult and decisive notion) may be 
what in the last analysis, permits the repetition of sense as the "same" and makes the idealization 
of identity in general [of a real thing or of an eidos] possible." The Idea's iterative structure of 
179 Essential History, p. 81. 
lHO The Kantian Idea refers to an infinity that constitutes a horizon, to the infinity of the horizon. And, as its 
Greek name indicates, a horizon is both the opening and the limit; it defines either an infinite, unending 
development or a limit from which one can see what is coming, a limit from which one can foresee or know 
heforehand the form that will have to be taken by what is still to come. The horizon - both as the possibility 
of the infinite opening of the future and as the limit from which one experiences, i.e., anticipates, the future, 
pre-comprehends it and waits for it - is given to a lived evidence, to a concrete knowledge, which, as 
Husserl says and Derrida stresses, is not one evidence or knowledge among others. (OG, p176, lOG. p. 
117) It is, rather, a knowledge that is never "learned", that is a primordial evidence or knowledge 
concerning the totality of possible historical experiences, concerning, that is, the form of what is still to 
come during or after the life of a concrete and finite consciousenss: the form of the living and historic 
Present as the universal form of every possible historical experience. This limit of the horizon is also the 
limit or phenomenological reason, a definitive and absolute limit: the impossibility of a future that would 
be lived other than in the present. According to Derrida, the notion of a future whose sense could not be 
thought II1 the form of a future present marks the impossihle and unthinkable of phenomenology and 
defines the very limit of phenomenological reason, as well as the power of the phenomenological limit. 
IHI The ilTeality of the eidos, which according to Husserl is nonimagillary. "is Ilothing other thall the sense 
and possihility (~l factual reality to which it is always related, immediately or not. as the rigorous 
prescription of the eillos' essential mode of appearing." lOG. p. 1'+'+. 
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"again and again," the possibility of the indefinite repetition of the same, "belongs to the evident 
structure of the noema of the thing in general" (lOG, p. 135n).182 
In that sense we can say that the transcendental sense of the infinite Idea, its eternity and 
omnitemporality, is a purely teleological value for a constituting historical consciousness: it is the 
Telos of the infinite determinability of being in general, the possibility of being, of any object or 
sense whatsoever, appearing for any concrete and finite consciousness. This value, or 
transcendental norm, is not a static or a determined value which would make possible. order, 
inform and orient from the outside the unity of sense's movement, its production and tradition. 
The Absolute of the Idea, which Derrida writes "is the Absolute of historicity," is not an 
independent, objective Absolute that is disclosed in the finite acts of a subjectivity which is 
relative to this Absolute, waits for it and conforms to it. Rather the production and tradition of all 
sense, and in particular geometry's sense, is inscribed within the horizon of an infinite Idea as the 
infinite task of universal reason which, according to Husserl, in its tum is grounded in the lh'ing 
present of egological consciousness, the "ultimate ground of all constitution." (This teleological 
reason also runs throughout the unity of the hi story of the ego.183) Since, in the institution of a 
science like geometry (as in the production of every cultural formation), this Telos of the Idea, as 
Vorhaben, i.e., as the common root of theoretical and practical reason, is indefinitely and totally 
open, or is openness itself to future metamorphoses and revolutions, the "supratemporality and 
omnitemporality" of the Idea is only the regulative and the most concrete possibility of 
geometry's history appearing and having or acquiring sense for any consciousness whatsoever. 184 
The Idea of infinity, as the indefiniteness of an "ad infinitum", as what opens the possibility of 
something indefinite or unending, the infinity of historical progress for a constituting subjectivity, 
is not an actual infinity. The infinite opening of what is experienced by a historical subjectivity, 
and the opening of the "absolute subjectivity of sense to History", i.e., to the indefinitely open 
traditionalization of sense, is not a positi ve infinite, and therefore is nothing outside the history 
that it makes possible. 
Its transcendence, therefore, is not a real transcendence but a teleological one. it is 
heyond only compared with the constituted moments of historicity, with the constituted and 
sl'dimented sense which, however, appears and acts as such only within the infinite project of a 
new production or constitution. It is a transcendental norm, the infinitely distant "pole jar itse(f of 
IS~ [)a~tur. Francoise. Finitude (lnd Repetitioll ill Husserl and Derrida. The Southern 10urnal of 
Phil~osophy (1993) Vol. XXXII. Supplement. p. 122. 
III.l ('artesian Meditations. §37. p. 75. 
111-1 The teknlogical Idea is. as Dl'rrida writes. "the most powerful structural a priorI of historicity .... It is 
the L'oncrl'tl' pl;ssihility, the \cry hirth of hi~tory and the sense of hecoming. It is structurally genesis itself. 
as origin and as heL'oming." esp. p. 167. 
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constituting historicity and constituting subjectivity. " Husserl will not hesitate to call this pole 
GOd. 185 Derrida writes about the omnitemporality or profound historicity of the Idea: 
Undoubtedly the Idea and the Reason hidden in history and in man as "animal rationale" are 
eternal. Husserl often says this. But this eternity is only a historicity. It is the possibility of (Derrida's 
emphasis) history itself. Its supratemporality - compared with empirical temporality - is only an 
omnitemporality. The Idea, like Reason, is nothing outside the history in which it displays itself, i.e., in 
which (in one and the same movement) it discloses and lets itself be threatened. Since the Idea is nothing 
outside history but the sense of (Derrida's emphasis) all history, only a historico-transcendental subjectivit; 
can be made responsible for it. The Absolute of the Idea as the Telos of infinite determinability is the 
Absolute of intentional historicity. lOG, pp. 141-142. 
The question about the transcendental sense or historicity of the infinite Idea can be 
repeated analogously in the direction of the historicity, i.e., the eternity and omnitemporality, of 
Reason. Is intentional, transcendental historicity and its correlative, transcendental speaking 
subjectivity, only the medium through which Reason appears to itself, i.e., expresses and hears 
itself as logos, so as to regain possession of itself, re-appropriate itself through this subjectivity 
and its objectifications? Is this (infinite) logos a positive and actual infinite which is situated 
"beyond transcendental subjectivity," a real transcendence which is self-present in the plenitude 
of its essence before descending or condescending to a wordly history and historical 
discursiveness? If we take into consideration what we said above with respect to speech and 
writing in their constitutive value, and about the necessary exposition of truth, i.e., of the 
progressive advent of reason, to the factual contingency of its wordly inscription, then the answer 
to the above questions is certainly not. Derrida writes: 
Logos is nothing outside history and Being, since it is discourse, infinite discursiveness and not 
actual infinity. and since it is sense. Now the irreality of sense was discovered by phenomenology as one of 
its very own premises. Inversely no history as self-tradition and no Being would have sense without the 
logos which is the sense which projects and proffers itself.186 
By describing the historic Present. which is the universal form of every possible historical 
experience. and the Absolute of all transcendental history, as rational and dialectical as it gets. 
i.l' .. as "the vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving of primordial formations and 
sedimentations of sense" (OG, p. 174), by discovering the irreality of sense or noema, and hy 
rcco<Jnizino the transcendental necessity of linguistic and written sedimentation for all formation 
l::' 2 '-" 
and all traditionalization of sense, and especially for the constitution of ideal objects and of truth. 
for the lIn\'t~iling and the progressi\'e ad\'ent of reason, in a word for all histol)'. Husserl makes. 
lK'i lOG. pp. 45n.147. 
INfo C;SP. p. 166. 
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according to Derrida, intentional historicity appear as rational and infinite historicity, "as infinite 
discourse and infinite dialecticalness" (lOG, p. 152). 
If there cannot be any intentional history (as the pure and indefinite tradition of sense and 
speech toward an infinite polar telos, that is, as the infinite history of an ideal objectivity) without 
the acts, the linguistic objectifications and sense-sedimentations of a concrete and constitutino 
e 
historical subjectivity, if there can be no history without the rational acts of a speakino eoolooical 
e e e 
subjectivity and no reason outside history (which is always the history of an ideal objectivity) it is 
because reason is not an "ability concealed in the shadows of a historical subjectivity or in the 
subworld of becoming" (lOG, p. 144). Rather, according to Husser], reason is historical through 
and through, the universal structure of transcendental historicity and, correlatively, of 
transcendental subjectivity. 187 Reason, as Husserl writes and emphasizes in the Cartesian 
Meditations, "is not an accidental de facto ability, not a title for accidental matters of fact, but 
rather a title for an all-embracing essentially necessary structural form belonging to all 
transcendental subjectivity. ,,188 
The "teleological Reason," which traverses universal history, but also "the unity of the 
history of the ego", is the logos, the sense which is produced and inscribed in history, the logos 
as sense which expresses and hears itself in the living present of its self-presence. Hearing-oneself 
speak is the teleological destiny of all sense and the essence of all speech or discourse, i.e., the 
teleological essence of Reason. Hearing oneself speak is precisely the condition of subjectivity, of 
transcendental living subjectivity, of the for-itself (jur sich) of self-presence, of the presence to 
itself of a living, sense-giving and speaking subjectivity. As Derrida writes: 
Reason unveils itself. Reason. Husserl says. is the logos which is produced in history. It traverses 
Being with itself in sight, in sight of appearing to itself, that is, to state itself and hear itself as logos. It is 
speech as auto-affection: hearing oneself speak [my emphasis). It emerges from itself in order to take 
hold of itself, hearing oneself constitutes itself as the history of reason through the detour of writing. Thus 
it d!ffers from itself in order to reappropriate itself The Origin of Geometry describes the necessity of this 
exposition of Reason, and of the becoming of Reason. in a wordly inscription. An exposition indispensable 
to the constitution of truth and the ideality of ideal object. but which is also the danger to sense from the 
. d f' h . "I Xl) outSI e 0 t e sIgn. 
Before we speak, once agaIn, of this danger which reason seems to make itself run, 
before we speak of this danger which seems to be interior, intimate and immanent to the very 
IX7 "If Reason is the essential structure of the transcendental ego and the transcendental we. it is. like them. 
historical through and through. Comersc\y. historicity. as such. is rational through and through." (lOG. p. 
1.+5) At this point we may ask again 1I'lIy is an cx.periencc (transcendental or empirical) which could not be 
li\ed hy an ego\ngica\ cnnscillusness in general impossible? This impossihle is again nothing less than the 
I i mit of rt'ason in genl'fal. See \'iol £'lIce (llId ;\/ etap/n'sics pp 125. 1.31. 
IXX C\!, f~.3. p. 57 ~ . 
IXlJ esp. p. 166. 
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progress of the SCIences and to the production of ideal objects, we should note that the 
"supratemporality and omnitemporality" of the Idea is a characteristic which is not peculiar to 
this phenomenological history of reason alone, to the rational historicity of an intersubjectively 
constituted sense. Rather, it is a characteristic which can be peculiar or proper to it, only because 
it is ultimately the characteristic of Time itself, of the living present, the irreducible and pure 
place and movement, the ground of all constitution and traditionalization of sense. Husserl's 
description of the rational and teleological movement of universal historicity develops, as Derrida 
says, his discovery of intentionality. Now intentionality, the intentional activity of Husserlian 
subjectivity, appears, after the most radical transcendental reduction, "'at its greatest depth." as the 
dialectical movement of the temporalization of the living present. 190 If that is so, we perhaps do 
not have to wait long to see that the danger which reason (as the essential structure of all history, 
egological or communal) faces in its advent and in its very becoming has its "ultimate reason" in 
the very structure of the present and of all life, in the temporality of the living present. 191 
This danger threatens the Absolute of all transcendental life, the absolute origin of all 
constitution, the absolute origin of the world, which has been described by phenomenology as 
transcendental and living egological SUbjectivity. The life of the transcendental ego, all egological 
life has as its absolutely universal form the living present. 
Following Husserl's descriptions of the movement of temporalization, of the constitution 
of intersubjectivity, and, as we will see in the second part of the thesis, of the movement of 
signification, Derrida will bring forward at the heart of what ties these descriptions together "an 
irreducible nonpresence as having a constitutive value [for the history of reason and of truth 
itself], and with it a nonlife, a nonpresence or nonself-belonging to itself of the living present, an 
irreducible nonprimordiality." According to Derrida, we can discern three instances of 
nonpresence, with regard to the relation to self and to the other in the temporalization of lived 
experience, in the experience of the other, and in hearing-oneself-speaking, three instances where 
"'the lack of foundation is basic and nonempirical."l92 As Derrida insists, these instances do not 
simply accompany or befall the self-identity of the living present, they rather destroy any 
possibility of such a simple self-identity, and of a simple and simply present to itself, living and 
Il)O "For phenomenology alone can make infinite historicity appear: infinite discourse and infinite 
dialecticalness as the pure possibility and the very essence of Being in manifestation. It alone can open the 
absolute subjectivity of Sense to Being-History by making absolute transcendental subjectivity appear (at 
thl' end llf the most radical reduction) as pure passive-active temporality. as pure auto-temporalization of 
the living present, i.e .. as we already saw. as intersubjectivity. The discursive and dialectical 
intersubjectivity of time with itself in the infinite multiplicity and infinite implication of its absolllte origins 
entitles ncry other intersubjecti\ity in general to exist..." lOG, p. 152. 
I'll \';olence 'IInd I\letaphysi~'s, p. I:LI and Roglles. p. 127 
I'I~ SP,pp.6-7. 
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absolute origin of sense. By detennining teleologically this essential possibility of nonpresence as 
crisis, so as to limit it, domesticate it and tame it, one simply protects or immunizes oneself 
against a more fonnless and more norrnless threat, against an unforeseeable im-possibility: the 
im-possibility of full presence. One cancels out a future, "the world of the future", which always 
proclaims itself at present beyond the closure of this teleology as presence. 'The future can only 
be anticipated in the fonn of an absolute danger. It is that which breaks absolutely with 
constituted nonnality and can only be proclaimed, presented, as a sort of monstrosity.,,193 
Toward the end of his Introduction Derrida presents once again what is the originality 
and singularity of the Origin of Geometry: the link between the question of historicity. of 
language/writing, and of responsibility. Husserl responds to the "crisis of European sciences" 
with a call for a voluntary, calculated and radical return to the origins of the tradition. for sense-
investigation which would reactivate and bring back to light, i.e., to present evidence, what lies 
still hidden and dissimulated beneath the sedimentary surfaces of their real history: the 
primordial sense of the sciences, of their development or becoming. The method of the reduction 
(the Wechsespiel of the two reductions and the zigzag way of proceeding) and the reactivation of 
the tradition's origins is the prescriptive discourse of phenomenology, always brought forth in the 
name of "a new humanity made capable of an absolute self-responsibility".)LJ4 
The reactivating reduction is, as we saw, always a reduction which is practiced by, or 
toward, a transcendental subjectivity of an "ego" or a "we", that is in view of a community of 
responsible egological subjectivities, for which Europe would be at once the name and the 
exemplary figure. Europe would be, in a constitutive way, this very responsibility. In its spiritual 
(and not natural) geography, Europe is inhabited exclusively by the animal rationale, the man of 
infinite tasks. As it is presented in the Vienna Lecture, Europe is nothing but the name of this 
archc or telos, or rather of their merging in 
a new sort of praxis, that of universal critique of all life (unit'ersale Kritik alles Lebens) and all 
life-goals, all cultural products and systems that have already arisen out of the life of man; and thus it also 
hecomcs a critique of mankind itself and of the values which guide it explicitly or implicitly, Further, it is a 
praxis whosc aim is to elevate mankind through universal reason. according to norms of truth of all forms, 
to transform it from the hottom up into a new humanity capable of absolute self-responsibility on the basis 
I, h I h . I' . h 19~ o· a so ute t eoretlca mSlg ts. . 
19~ 
. Of Grammatology, p. 5. 
)'14 C .. ')V'} 
nSfS, p. ~(),", 
)95 Ihid . Contrary to \vhat many commentators of Derrida's reading of HlisserJ's discourse of the spiritual 
l'S~l'lll'C of Europe maintain, namely Derrida's alleged attempt to "prohlemati/c" and correct HlIs~erl's 
Ideological discourse hy evoking the empirical facticity or historical existence of Europe (sec Bernet's "On 
Dcrrida's Introdul'Iion" p. 152 and Marrati'~ Genesis and Structure p 40-7), wc would like to note 
DLTrida's insistencc, from thc Introduction (p, 114-0) to The Other Heading (p. 71-5), to strcss the 
"amhiguity" and the "capital paradox" of the European "example", which Husserl himself has hrought to 
This phenomenological discourse on crisis in the Krisis (and especially in the Vienna 
Lecture) which presents itself not only as the discourse on European tradition, but also as the 
archeo-teleological autobiography of Europe, is as Derrida writes in the Other Heading, an 
archeo-teleological programme of European discourse about Europe. 196 
Having brought forward HusserI's affirmation that a teleology of reason runs throughout 
all history, and first of all throughout the history of the ego, that a living transcendental 
consciousness as the absolute origin of sense can only be a teleological consciousness of 
historicity and of crisis, and Husserl's diagnosis with regard to the danger which reason, i.e., the 
movement of sense, faces in its genesis and historical becoming, in its linguistic or written 
sedimentations, the threat of forgetfulness and passivity, Derrida draws the broadest contours of a 
phenomenological, arche-teleological discourse on historical responsibility, i.e., of a discourse or 
programme of European responsibility. 
According to Derrida, only phenomenology - or phenomenological reason, the reason of 
the eidos and of the idea, the reason of ideo-logy and of teleo-Iogy, of the infinite becoming of 
ideal objectivities, the reason of what presents itself in the horizon or of what announces its 
presentation according to the eidos, the ideality, the idea, the regulative ideal or the telos - can 
disclose the possibility of history simply as the possibilit.\, of pure tradition of ideal objectivities, 
i.e., as the possibility of infinite discursiveness and infinite dialecticalness. This possibility, 
however, is marked and traversed by the danger of a perverse and amnesic use of reason, or, in 
other words, by the im-possibility of full and immediate intuition, the im-possibility of presence 
or of absolute responsibility. What Husserl calls "Krisis", the crisis of European science or 
light. Man and the name of man. the man of universality. i.e .. of infinite tasks, is, according to Husserl, the 
European man, the man who assumes the responsibility of testifying for universality. This name, the name 
of European man, is reserved neither for the Greeks, nor for the Germans, nor, to be sure, for the 
Europeans. The man who is commited to universal reason and to a "new sort of praxis". and who is 
prepared to respond. to respond before the other. to be responsible for and to what has inherited from the 
tradition (i.e., from the other), this man does not reside in the natural geography of Europe. Everything that 
Husser! says on the question of "spiritual Europe" seems to suggest that it is the concept of responsibility 
which marks the origin of Europe, which is responsible for a European birth certificate. Moreover, insofar 
as the European philosopher complies with the demand of universal reason and assumes responsibility for 
it, hc is also. Husserl writes, "a functionary of mankind" (Crisis, p. 17). 
)96 According to Lawlor's interpretation of Derrida's reading of the Origin, Derrida shows. in particular in 
the passagL' we are to quote in a moment. the "inadequacy of phenomenology". Since what is at stake here 
is the "responsihility" of phenomenology we ask Lawlor: is there an adequate discourse to what we call 
responsihility? "What is disturbing" and motivates Derrida's thought is not that the Husserlian conception 
of historicity n)' suhjectivity is inadequate, "rather it is the case that there is not nor there should be an 
adequate L'lmcept to what \\L' call responsibility". Eating Well, p. 272. HowL'Yer, according to L.l\\ lor in the 
Introduction "Den'ida concei\'L's responsihility in terms of a response to a question" and thi~ "shows that 
epistellllllugy L'Yen ahsolute knowledge. still oriellts him in these closing pages." Dcrrida alld Husserl. pp. 
133, l~l. 
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humanity, the crisis of reason which is produced in history as logos is the moment of sounding 
the alarm, of awakening, but also the moment of decision, the moment of Krinein, the constitutive 
moment of a we-voluntary-responsible-historical-human-subjects or philosophers. If Husserl 
affirms that the movement of "our" history is indefinite, infinite discursiveness, "the passage of 
Speech, the pure tradition of a primordial logos toward a polar telos" (lOG, p. 149), he also 
recognizes that 
This movement is also Danger(ous) as the Absolute fl' Absolu d'un Danger]. For if the light of 
sense is only through Passage, that is because the light can also be lost on the way. Like speech, light can 
be lost only in an inauthenticity of a language and by the abdication of a speaking being. 
And Derrida immediately adds 
In that respect, phenomenology as Method of Discourse is first of all Selbstbesinnung and 
Verantwortung, the free resolution to take up ones own sense, regain consciousness, in order to make 
oneself accountable, through speech, for an imperilled pathway. This speech is historical. because it is 
always a response. Responsibility here means shouldering a word one hears spoken, as well as taking on 
oneself the transfer of sense, in order to look after its advance. In its most radical implications, then, 
Method is not the neutral preface or preambu/afary exercise of thought. Rather, it is thought itself in the 
consciousness of its complete historicity. lOG, p. 149. 
We must ourselves be responsible for this discourse on responsibility, as Derrida says, 
"we bear the responsibility for this heritage, ... , we did not choose this responsibility; it imposes 
itself upon us, and in even more imperative way, in that it is, as other, and from the other. the 
language of our language,',197 And in order to be the responsible guardians of this heritage, we 
should not accept it unquestionably: rather we should be worried and critical about the ideology 
and teleology of this Reason, about the unconditional supremacy or sovereingty of idea and of 
telos, of the Reason (or logos) of ideality and of telos that tends to annul or neutralize what 
announces itself as im-possible, what "presents" itself in its unpresentable, formless or 
monstrous, demonstrable as un-monstrable character: a future thought otherwise than in the form 
of the future present. 
In The Other Headillg. pp. 27-28. 
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Part II 
Chapter One: The Arche and Telos of Language 
1) Expression as Logical Meaning 
In the second part of the thesis we are going to read Speech and Phenomena and take up 
again the question of reason, of the phenomenological reason of ideality and telos, and reason's 
demand for knowledge, for capacity (dynamis, potential, Vermogen), for the power to know. for 
knowledge as power.l This reason, which is also the raison d' etre of phenomenology itself, will 
be put into question precisely in terms of the superpowerful supremacy of the Idea (of the eidos 
and of ideality) and of the Telos and with respect this time to Husserl's doctrine of the Logos and 
of signification in general as it is formed in the first of the Logical Investigations. 2 Taking now 
the opposite direction in the chronological order of Husserl's itinerary, moving from his latest 
texts to his first major work, we will try to show the extraordinary continuity and consistency 
which characterizes his thought, especially with regard to what bounds the phenomenological 
question of the origin or constitution of scientific objectivity and of truth to that of speech and 
writing. 
In the first section we are gOIng to take up the logico-epistemological interests of 
Husserl's doctrine of signification and argue that the intuitionist motif or imperative of his critical 
project of an "authentic theory of knowledge", the imperative of the presence of sense to a 
I Already since Plato, as Derrida reminds us in Rogues, in the second Essay on Reason, "this question about 
dynamis" is first of all a question "about a force and a power but also about the possible and its limits, 
about the possible and the impossible, about a sovereign 'I can' and an 'I cannot', about the potential and 
the virtual." In the Republic this question or concern of Socrates about dynamis. was a question about "a 
power assured of knowing or assured by knowledge", a question concerning "the cause (aitian) of science 
and truth in so far as they are known." See Republic (508e) and Rogues, p. 137. 
2 We insist in putting the question of reason, of the phenomenological Logos and rationality. of the 
phenomenological rationalism of the unconditional, and of a "rational deconstruction" of this rationality of 
the Idea and of the Telos, in order to stay clear from and denounce a certain tendency of some of Derrida' s 
rl'aders to "re-christinize" his interpretation of Husserl. See for instance Lawlor's attempt to chrisitianize 
the imperative of deconstruction as an injunction of thinking that "does not come from reason but 
elsewhere", i.e, from the "generocity" and "compassion" of the heart, "the Sacred Heart of Jesus." (Lawlor. 
"With My Hand Over My Hear, Looking You Right in the Eyes. I Promise Myself To You ... : Some New 
Reflections on Dcrrida's Interpretation of Husserl". in Husserl and the Logic of Experience. edited by Gary 
Banham. Palgra\e Macmillan. 2005. pp .. 268. 270) Our effort. on the contrary. throughout this thesis. is to 
show Derrida' s faith in reason. This faith. however. "is another way of keeping \I'ithin rcason [raison 
gardcrj". It has to do first of all with this experience "that consists in being responsible f(lr a reason [here. 
the phenomenological reason, the reason of ideality and of telos] of which we are heIrs." Rogues. p. ISO. 
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primordial intuition, is essentially indissociable from a certain privilege given by Husserl to the 
medium of expression, to verbal expression (sprachlichen Ausdruck) or to phone. We will argue, 
following Derrida, that the essential distinctions which support Husserl' s doctrine of signification 
in the firs Investigation, the distinctions between linguistic and non-linguistic sign (Zeichell). 
expression and indication (Anzeigen), (and the distinction in the Weisen, between Beweis proper 
to expression and Hinweis proper to indication), have a teleological character. On the basis of 
these distinctions, which are also oppositions, Husserl is able to determine the limit or horizon, 
the arche or telos of language as logical language, as logical meaning. 
With regard to the question of language and of signification in general, the Logical 
Investigations opened a path which was, according to Derrida, to be followed by Husserl up until 
his latest texts, especially the Origin of Geometry. We have already seen Husserl's insistent return 
to the primordiality of a speaking subjectivity, and the essential and basic function which is 
assigned to linguistic, and especially written, signification with respect to the historical 
constitution of scientific objects and of truth itself. By recognizing in language the indispensable 
condition for the constitution of ideal Objectivity, i.e., of truth, Husserl was unable to see in it just 
one problem among others. "In this area more than elsewhere. a patient reading of the 
Investigations would show the germinal structure of Husserl's thought. ,,3 Indeed, 10 the 
Introduction to Logical Investigations Husserl begins by uprooting thought in generaL and the 
phenomenological insights and results of these Investigations in particular, from what they would 
be "solely ... in the acts of verbal expression", but in order to emphasise that these results could 
not become "truth" without "stating such results" and "communicating them to others", (§3) 
about which he also wrote in the Origin of Geometry. In the second paragraph of the Introduction 
Husserl writes: 
All theoretical research, though by no means solely conducted in acts of expression 
(ausdriicklichen Acten) or complete statement (Aussagen). none the less terminates in such statement. 
Only in this form can truth, and in particular the truth of theory, become an abiding possession of science. a 
documented, ever available treasure for knowledge and advancing research. Whaten.:r the connection of 
thought with speech may be. whether or not the appearance of our final judgements in the form of verbal 
pronouncements has a necessary grounding in essence, it is at least plain the judgements stemming from 
higher intellectual regions. and in particular from the regions of science, could barely exist without verbal 
exprcssion (sprachlichen Ausdruck) ... 
. 1 Specch and Phcnomena [hereafter cited as SP]. p. 3. 
I Husser! hllllund. Logicallm'cstigatiolls I. Introductioll to Vol II of the German edition. translated by LN. 
Findlay. New York. Humanities Books. 1970. p. 250. Hearafter cited as LI 
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But it is not only the question of spoken language and "verbal expression" which allows 
Derrida to claim that in the Logical Investigations we find the germ of Husserl's later \\ork.5 It is 
also the question of the phenomenological method. For the method, far from being a neutral 
preface of thought, shelters, under the guise of a technique, an anticipated view of the sense of 
being which one encounters, here the being of language. As Derrida has shown, the 
phenomenological practice of the reduction, in its eidetic and transcendental aspect, as well as the 
essential distinctions in which the reductions are articulated (reality/ ideality, factuality/ 
essentiality, wordliness / nonwordliness) are, in effect, already present in Chapter One "Essential 
Distinctions" of the First Investigation, which bears the title Expression and Meaning (Allsdruck 
und Bedeutung). 
Now, according to Derrida the question or problem of language (as expression), far from 
being one question or problem among others, defines the totality of phenomenology's horizon. 
All the essential distinctions (reality/ ideality, factuality/ essentiality, etc) which define and 
delimit the very space of the phenomenological question, and which constitute the source of its 
value and legitimacy, presuppose the possibility of language. These distinctions do not exist 
outside or before the question of language so as to then be applied to it, enter into it "as into an 
already bounded domain or as one problem among others; they are discovered only in and 
through the possibility of language" (SP, p. 21). In Speech Derrida tries to show that the sense, 
the value and the right to these distinctions depend entirely on language, and in language on the 
validity of the radical, essential distinction which Husserl poses, in the first page of his First 
Logicallnl'estigation, between expression and indication. 
Chapter One, Essential Distinctions, opens precisely with an essential and rigorous 
distinction between two concepts of the sign (Zeichen) which, in ordinary as well as philosophical 
language, "are often treated as synonyms," Husserl says, and improperly attached to a single 
word. The phenomenologist begins his investigations by disentangling this ambiguity which 
confuses the concept of expression (Ausdruck) with that of indication (An:eichen). In Chapter 
One, the phenomenological distinction and description of essences, the essence of indication 
(§§2-4) from the essence of expression (§§5-16), will have to bring forward a ground that would 
absolutely and plainly found both types of signification, expressive and indicative, a ground of 
non-signification, an intuitive or perceptual and silent ground. This ground is recognized and 
5 For example. in Formal and Transcendental Logic we read: "The problem of constitution is again 
hroadened when we recall that ,'erbal expression. '" is an essential presupposition for intersubjcctil{, 
thinking and for an intersubjectil'ity of the theory accepted as ideally existing: and that accordingly an ideal 
identi(iabilir" of the expression, as expression, must likewise raise a problem of constitution." (my 
emphasis) *7:'. p.188. 
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defined by Husserl's phenomenology as the source and guarantee of all value and sense, as the 
primordial self-giving evidence. 
According to the logico-epistemological programme of the Logical Im'estigatio17s. 
"Phenomenology ... discloses the 'sources' from which the basic concepts and ideal laws of pure 
logic 'flow' and back to which they must again be pursued in order to provide them with 'clarity 
and distinctness' needed for an understanding, and for an epistemological critique of pure logic." 
(Logical Investigations, Vol II, Introduction, § 1, p. 249) These sources are nothing other than the 
intentional and lived experiences (Erlebnisse) in which the logical objects, laws and concepts, are 
intuitionally given: "logical concepts, as valid thought-unities, must have their origin in intuition: 
they must arise out of an ideational intuition founded on certain experiences."' (ibid., §2, pp. 251-
2.) But since not only logical objects but all kind of ideal objects must lead us back to intuition 
and to the intentional lived experiences of a concrete subject, the epistemological clarification of 
pure logic is necessarily confronted, Husserl writes, with "the most general questions of basic 
concern to the theory of knowledge." (ibid., p. 253) In the next paragraph (§4) Husserl stresses 
that the interest of his studies lies with logical lived experiences (logischen Erlebnisse) which are 
not "mere expressions" but fully meaningful experiences in the function of Bedeutungsintention, 
and that the relation between Bedeutung and Ausdruck (as well as the association between the 
"sensuous linguistic side" of expression and its purely spiritual side, the "meaning that animates 
it") must be made analytically clear. And in §7, which closes the Introduction, HusserI poses the 
freedom from presuppositions as the principle of an authentic "theory of knowledge" (Das 
Prin;.ip der Voraussetzunglosigkeit erkenntnistheoretisher Untersuchungen). This principle of 
presuppositionless phenomenology demands that one "return to the things themselves" only by 
means of respect to the sole authority of intuition. According to HusserI then, the authority of 
intuition should not be understood as a presupposition, not even the last one: it is neither 
presupposed, nor posited, nor given, but originally giving. This reminds us of phenomenology's 
"principle of principles" defined by Husserl in Ideas I and which Derrida renders as "the original 
self-giving evidence, the present or presence of sense to a full and primordial intuition" (SP, p. 
5). 
The notions of sense (Sinn) and meaning (Bedeutung), the presence or absence of sense 
or meaning, are at the core of this phenomenological disentanglement of the confusion between 
L'xprcssion and indication. An indicative sign, either linguistic or nonlinguistic6, for example a 
1\ In contradistinction to an exprCSSI\L' sign which is always purely linguistic. an indicati\e sign can be 
either linguistic or nonlinguistic. Husserl starts with nonlinguistic indications: snmething natural (for 
... 
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gesture, is certainly a sign (to the extent that it indicates, refers or points (Zeigen), to something 
other than itself, i.e., to an inner experience), but, according to Husserl, it expresses nothing, it 
does not bear within itself and does not convey what he calls Bedeutung, it is not bedeutsame, or 
rather it is bedeutung los. An expression, on the contrary, is always a purely linguistic, a logical or 
meaningful sign (bedeusame Zeichen.) The expressiveness of expression supposes then the 
presence of meaning (Bedeutung), which comes into the sign and transforms it into expression 
only by means of the voice. According to Husserl, only speech, oral discourse, has the power of 
expression (and therefore, as he wants also to demonstrate, the character of pure logicality). 
Speech, being in absolute proximity to what within thought as logos relates to sense (Sinn), is 
essentially ex-pressive since it consists in exteriorizing, in bringing outside a sense-content of 
interior thought. And conversely, to the extent that sense, which is defined in phenomenology 
always on the basis of an intuitive or cognitive relation to an object, is always able to receive 
expression, to be reflected or copied in a meaning, Husser! can declare as a universal rule that 
"logical meaning is an expression! Logische Bedeutung ist ein Ausdruck".7 As we are going to 
see, the essence or telos of language is determined by Husserl as logical meaning, I.e., as ex-
pressIOn. 
On the other hand, gestures or facial expressions (for example, the gestures of the hand, 
the finger showing or pointing to what is before the eyes8) are not expressions properly speaking, 
they are nonlinguistic indications: they are indicative exteriorizations (Ausserungen) of internal 
experiences. But the nature of this exteriorization is radically different from that of verbal or 
phonic exteriorization or ex-pression. According to Husserl, gestures are not logical expressions, 
because they do not sa}' something, because they do not mean or ~rant to say something. (What 
Husserl wants also to demonstrate with the difference, for example, between indicative facial 
expression and proper linguistic expression is that there is a radical difference or discontinuity 
between the language of the body and the language of words.) If the phenomenon of 
communication proper to historical subjects begins only with oral discourse, only with the 
language of words, this is because only a logical meaning - what is considered, not only by 
example. the canals in Mars indicate the possible presence of some form of life). or conventional (for 
example, the knot in the handkerchief which one uses to remind oneself to become a better man). Also a 
t:esture or a facial expression always functions as indication. More importantly for us here writing. the 
sL'nsihle inscription of signs in space is. as we are going to see, always indicative since it always indicates a 
~1honic expression. it is the signifier of the primordial phonic signifier. 
Ideas I. § 124. p. 295. 
K This deictic dimension of the finger refers or points not only to some transcendent thing. to an external 
ohject or hody, hut also to "my own proper hody (Leih). This would be the auto-deictic function of the 
finger: pointing or referring to my hody (Leih) in order to indicate "this is me" or "this is my body." 011 
TOIiChill!!, - Jellll-LIiC Nalln. translated hy Cristine Irizarry. Stanford. Stanford Unin:rsity Press. 2005. p. 
. . 
16~. 
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Husserl but also by the whole tradition of metaphysics as phono-Iogocentrism. as the 
undecostructable or undecomposable unity and immediacy of thought and phone in logos - only a 
logical meaning (bedeuten, vouloir-dire) can be an expression (proper to human intersubjectivity) 
for Husserl. Derrida writes: 
Without forcing Husserl's intention we could perhaps define, if not translate, bedeuten bv 'mean' 
or 'want to say' (vouloir-dire), in the sense that a speaking subject 'expressing himself as Hus~erl says. 
'about something' means or wants to say (veut-dire) something. One would thus be assured that the 
Bedeutung is always what a discourse or somebody wants to say: a sense of discourse, a discursi\e content. 
SP,p.18 
Now in the very first paragraph (§ 1) of the first logical investigation on Expression and 
Meaning, in which Husserl introduces the dissociation or difference between expression and 
indication, it appears that, as far as some elements of the substantially discursive order (words or 
parts of speech) are concerned and inasmuch as they are involved in communication, this 
difference is functional or intentional and not substantial. Husserl speaks of an addition of 
functions but also of an intimate association, an intimate involvement and entanglement 
(Veiflechtung): one and the same speech act, an utterance which is involved in oral synchronic 
communication functions as expression for the one who speaks and as indication for the one who 
listens. The difference then depends on the character, the purity or impurity of the intentional act 
(the Bedeutunungsintention) which animates those elements of the discursive order and makes 
them meaningful. In communicative speech, where real and existing words are animated by the 
speaking subject through an intentional act (bedeuten) in order to be heard (or understood by 
others, the animation of words (supposedly purely spiritual) encounters a definite limit: the 
sensible body of the word. Pure, spiritual animation is incarnated and to some degree hides or 
loses itself in the opaqueness of the body, under the surfaces of the sensible body of language -
precisely like the soul which animates the animal or human body. Every time the act of meaning, 
which animates the sensible body of language, takes part in a communication, pure expression 
gets involved in an indicative function. Husserl writes, " ... meaning (bedeuten) - in 
communicative speech - is always interwoven (\'eiflochten) with such an indicative relation." 
(LI, I, § I ) 
Every meaningful expression, Husserl says, is in fact and always (all~eit) interwoven 
with and, thereby, contaminated by an indicative function. In fact and always: indication enters 
into speech whenever expression fulfils the function of communication, a function that was, 
nonetheless, "originally framed" only for it. (LI. I, §7) Whenever the meaning intention 
(hedellten) of a speaking subject comes to animate a verbal expression in order to make an 
internal sense, the content of a li\'ed experience (which is present. Husserl believes. only to the 
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inner intuition of the subject and can always remain silent,) to be heard or understood by another 
speaking subject, the meaning (Bedeutung) of this verbal expression functions indicatively. As he 
writes a little further on " ... all expressions in communicative speech function as indications. They 
serve the hearer as signs of the "thoughts" of the speaker, i.e., of the sense-giving inner 
experiences [ ... J This function of verbal expressions we shall call their intimating or manifesting 
function (Kundgebende Function) "(LI, I, §7). In the communication of his lived experience "the 
hearer perceives the speaker as manifesting certain experiences, and to that extent he also 
perceives these experiences themselves: he does not, however, himself experience them (er selbst 
erlebt sie nicht), he has not an inner but an outer percept of them." (ibid) 
The manifesting function is an indicative function: in real colloquy therefore an 
expressive speech, Derrida writes, "acts like gestures" (SP, p. 38), that is, the words of the other, 
like his body and gestures, may be perceived by me, but they only indicate a content, the 
probable existence of an inner experience which is hidden for me (the hearer), which is not and 
will never be immediately present to me. But what does this mean, that "words act like gestures"? 
Does it mean that expression is a species of the more extensive genus of indication, or even that 
expression is a specific "form of gesture"? Now this is, according to Derrida, what Husserl wants 
to contest above all. (SP, p. 21) 
According to Derrida, Husserl by contesting this genus-specIes relation, and, 
consequently, by excluding facial expressions or gestures from expressions properly speaking, 
i.e., by excluding the "language of action" or "the language of the body" from language in the 
strict sense, from the "language of words", he wants first and above all "to grasp the expressive 
and logical purity of meaninglvouloir-dire as the possibility of logos" (SP, p. 20). That is, as we 
are going to see, he wants to grasp the power of the expressive phone. In order to do that Husserl 
will have to demonstrate that however incontestable and irreducible the de facto or empirical 
necessity of the contamination of expression by indication in real communication, there is a 
phenomenological situation which can, if properly investigated, prove that a pure expression (the 
pure intention to say something meaningful) without indication (without the indicative function 
which belongs to the bodily aspect of the language of words) is possible. It will then be clear that 
the de facto necessity of entanglement, intimately associating expression and indication, must not 
exclude the possibility of a rigorous distinction of essence. This possibility is purely de jure and 
phenomenological. 'The whole analysis", Derrida writes, "will thus advance in this separation 
between de facto and de jure. existence and essence, reality and intentional function" (SP, p. 21) 9 
'I Dcrrida dol'S not "rl'ject". as Rudolf Bl'rnet writes (in his "Derrida and his Master's Voice ", puhlished in 
Derrida and Phenol1;('lIology. l'dited hy W. R. McKenna and J. C. E\ans. London. Kluwcr Academic 
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In the first Investigation then Husserl believes that he has every right to make the 
hypothesis that between the two functions of expression and indication, whose unity can be 
rigorously circumscribed and delimited, there is a difference in essence and, therefore, a relation 
of a simple exteriority: indication, involved either in gestures or in words, will be a stratum in the 
activity of signification which comes to pure expression (to the pure will or intention to say 
something) from outside as an empirical and exterior stratum or cloak, like a body to a soul. 
Communication itself, either with gestures or especially with words, is for Husserl a 
stratum of experience extrinsic to inward expression, i.e., to the pure meaning-intention. Husserl 
writes, "To mean (bedeuten) is not a particular way of being a sign (Zeichenseins) in the sense of 
indicating (Anzeige) something." And after having recognized that "meaning - in communicative 
speech - is always interwoven with such an indicative relation (Anzeichensein r he immediately 
adds that "expressions function meaningfully even in solitary mental life, where they no longer 
serve to indicate anything. " (LI, I, § 1) 
Now before Husserl proceeds to the reduction to solitary mental life (einsamen 
Seelenleben) in order to bring forth and determine the unity of the phenomenon of pure 
expression within it, he must first delimit and reduce the domain of indication. He devotes three 
paragraphs to "the essence of indication (Anzeige)" (LI, I, §§2-4). What is an indicative sign 
(An;,eichen)? What is the unity of the indicative sign which may be determined sometimes as 
natural (for example, as Husserl writes, the canals of Mars are signs of, i.e., indicate, the possible 
existence of intelligible beings) and other times as artificial or conventional ("sign language", all 
marks, all instruments of conventional designation, and writing in general)? Husserl defines its 
essential character in the most general way: an An;,eigen is a motivation (or a simple because) 
that moves a "thinking being" to pass by thought from something to something else. For example, 
volcanic phenomena indicate that the earth's interior is molten. But the motivation behind this 
Publishers. 1995, pp. 1-21). the Husserlian distinction between de jure and de facto (a distinction which. to 
be sure, is not one distinction among others since it defines the very space of phenomenology), he does not 
reject "the value of the distinction" on the basis of the "impossibility" (p. 10) to find not even a single 
"cxample" which could "in fact" (p. 8) demonstrate that there is pure expression without indication. On the 
contrary, as we are going to see, it is only to the extent that the above distinction is recognized. respected 
and rigorously dcmonstrated, and only to the extent that its necessity is felt that some deconstruction may 
take place. We say "some" deconstruction in order to remind ourselves that there is no a deconstruction. the 
or one deconstruction, but rather deconstructions and deconstructions. In his attempt to approach and show 
LIS without prejudices Derrida's deconstruction and his main argument in SP. Bernet writes: "Derrida is not 
compktdy convincing when he wants to persuade us of the impossibility of the phenomenological 
reduction." As we will try to show. according to Derrida. there is nothing. at least in his work. which can 
reject the value or discredit the phenomenological reduction. The latter is rather. as Derrida put it in "As if 
it were possiblc". the only force that resists empiricism and relativism. See Negotiations, p. ~6~ 
135 
indication, which can provide us with an empirical certitude concerning "a connection of 
probability" between empirical existents in the world (the exterior and interior phenomena of the 
earth) is an empirical motivation, that is, only a limited case of motivation. The field of 
motivation, however, extends well beyond empirical factuality and the phenomena of wordly 
existence. 1O 
Anzeigen or motivation, defined more generally, goes beyond indication in the strict 
sense since it does not link only sUbjective acts or judgements bearing on wordly, existing 
realities but also judgements on the contents of ideal objectivities, for example the objective 
expressions or propositions involved in a mathematical syllogism. In the latter case, where 
motivation links or infers mathematical states of affairs (Sachl'erhalten) with evidence and 
insight, we should not speak, according to Husserl, of indication (Anzeigen) or sign (Zeichen) but 
"of demonstration (Beweisen) in the strict logical sense." (LI, §3, p. 271) And Husserl adds a 
distinction which is indispensable in his demonstration of the distinction between expression and 
indication. 
a) Hinweis covers the contingent and empirical order of indicative allusion (of nonel'ident 
demonstration) that links lived experiences and judgements bearing on wordly realities. HinH'eis 
is the pointing-out (or, as Derrida translates it, showing with the finger Imontrant du doigt) of the 
nonseen, of the existence (at best a probable existence) of what is indicated, in our example the 
real existence of volcano indicates (with the highest probability) that the interior of the earth is 
molten. Indicative Hinweis then, to employ a classical distinction, will always cover the domain 
of the "truths of fact" and will never be a Beweis, a demonstration of "truths of reason". 
b) BeH'eis covers the domain of deductive and apodictic demonstration which exhibits in 
the e\'idence of proof. According to Husserl, only the demonstration, or the "because", which 
unite the contents of ideal (for example, mathematical) objects in the Beweis is not a case of 
indication. To be sure (nonevident) indication does intervene in a Beweis, in a demonstration of 
"truths of reason", but always, as Derrida explains, "on the side of psychic motivations, acts, 
beliefs, etc., and never on the side of the content of truths involved" (SP, p. 29). 
10 HusserI defines indication in the most general way. Lets pay attention to the conc~pts of Sein 
and Bestand, (which Derrida tells us are not reducible to Dasein, existieren, Realitdt) in Husserl's 
definition of the indicative function. What is the common element of all indicative functions') Husser 
answers .. ... the fact that certain obj~cts or states of affairs of whose Bestand someone ha-. (lctllal 
knowledge indicate (anzeigen) to him the Bestand of certain other objects, in the sense that his conviction 
in the being (Sein) of the one is experienc~d (though not at all evidently) as motivating a comiction or 
presumption in the being (Sein) of the other. LL §2. p. 270. This definition includes not only the knowledge 
which l'Oncerns empirical reality. i.e .. empirical existellfs in the world. but also the knowledge of absolutely 
ideal objects or states of affairs (such as logicomathematical systems and pure ~ssential structures of e\ery 
kind). This is the reason why in the ne,t paragraph (§3) Husserl adds the distinction betw~en indicaril'c 
/lim!'l'i.\ and Cl'idellf B£'l\'cis, a distinction which. as \\I: are going to see. is indispensable for him. 
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For Husserl, the question here, in Logical Investigations and in his later work up until the 
Origin of Geometry, is to reduce empirical subjectivity, all psychic motivations and experiences, 
and wordly existence in general in order to respect and show the ideal objectivity of the logical 
Bedeutung which governs pure expression. Already from the Prolegomena to Pure Logic no 
existential thesis (Daseinthesis), no wordly experience and no empirically determined subjectivity 
is allowed to interfere and confuse the transparent, evident and objective necessities and 
significations of a pure logic. It is the same attitude, as we saw, in the Origin of Geometry where 
the sense of geometrical truth does not depend either on any empirical subjectivity or on any of 
its factual significations (or wordly writings in which this truth, nonetheless, could be sedimented 
so as to be handed over.) Derrida writes, " [ ... ] for the order of signification in general, the whole 
of psychic experience (under the surface character of its acts - even when they intend idealities 
and objective necessities) contains only indicative concatenations. The indicative sign falls 
outside the content of absolutely ideal objectivity, that is, outside truth" (SP, p. 30) Anzeigen in 
the strict sense, indicative signification in language "always connects empirical existents in the 
world". It therefore, Derrida says, "covers everything that falls subject to the reductions: 
wordliness, empirical existence, factuality, essential nonnecessity, nonevidence, etc." (ibid) 
The reduction to "solitary mental life" (LI, I, §8) has precisely this purpose: to reveal, 
after the reduction of the totality of wordly existence, a transcendental, i.e., nonempirical, 
speaking subject as the absolute origin, the constituting source of all sense and all meaning, i.e., 
as the absolute origin of the world. In the third chapter of Speech and Phenomena, "Meaning 
(vouloir-dire) as Soliloqu)' ", Derrida reflects on this reduction, on the phenomenological 
reduction to the silent intention of meaning (the vouloir-dire, or Bedeutungsintention) and tries to 
demonstrate the systematic interdependence (or complicity) of the concepts of meaning, 
expression, sense, ideality, objectivity, truth, perception or intuition. At the end of this 
demonstration we will see that what ultimately allows a consistent and rigorous articulation 
between them is the ethico-teleological determination of being in general as presence and as 
ideality. 
Focusing on the logico-epistemological concerns of the Logical Investigations Derrida 
shows how the reduction to "solitary mental life", to the inner life of a speaking subject, should 
also reveal, within the purity of inward speech, a transcendental intentionality aiming at an 
object. i.e., a relation to what is outside and to a beyond in general. For. as Derrida will try to 
show, the aim of the reduction to inward monologue is to restore or re-establish inward speech 
"not as 'talking to oneself about oneself unless this can take the form a 'telling oneself that S is 
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p''', where S is not the name of a person but of an object. (SP, p. 74) The system of Zeigen, 
Derrida writes, "the pointing finger and the eye movement" and what bounds it to space. 
visibility, to objects in general and therefore to intuition and to evidence, in a word, to light, is not 
absent in phenomenological interiority. As Husserl has determined it, the phenomenological 
voice, i.e., the silent intention to say something meaningful, belongs to the same system. The 
system of Zeigen, the whole of the visible and the spatial as such, does not break with the solitary 
mental life of the speaking subject. On the contrary, and this is Husserl's contribution to the 
metaphysics of presence, that is, to an "authentic" theory of knowledge, this system functions 
better that ever in the voice, in what Husserl calls Bedeutungsintention. According to Derrida, the 
optical intuitionism of Husserl's "theory of knowledge", his explicit philosophy of the gaze (as 
the noun Anschauung indicates), functions or works better with the support of a profound 
phonocentrism, of an acoustical intutionism. 11 Phenomenology, in its very project of criticism of 
nai've ontology and of all classical theories of knowledge, would be incomplete without the 
possibility of an incorporeal, disembodied phone which speaks and immediately hears itself. 
Expression, as we said, is a sign animated and inhabited by a meaning as vouloir-dire. 
Meaning (Bedeutung) then comes to the sign and transforms it into expression only by means of 
spoken language. The bedeuten- Bedeutung structure or correlation, "the noetic-noematic stratum 
of Logos ", as is described by Husserl in Ideas I (§ 124), cover exclusively the order of expressive 
speech, the order of "speech in the strict sense". "In the strict sense", that is, in the 
phenomenological sense: not the effectively and physically uttered speech, not speech in the 
world, but the animation of a verbal expression by an intentional and pure act of meaning (the 
Bedeutungsintention). The essential condition of expression, according to Husserl, is not the 
physical body of the word, but only this pure act of the animating intention (the spirituality of the 
breath as bedeuten or vouloir-dire) which can do without this body (which in its ideal form 
belongs to a determined facto-historical language) and can therefore remain physically silent. 
What is absolutely free and primordial for Husserl is only the will, i.e., the Geist, the animating, 
1\ As Derrida writes in On Touching, Husserl's transcendental idealism, the hegemony an "optical 
intuitionism", of eidetics, of the eidos as visible form accessible to a disembodied, incorporeal Anschauung, 
thl' privilege of sight - metaphorical and literal - or the privilege of objectivity, is indissociable not only 
from an "acoustical intuitionism," but also from a certain "haptical intuitionism", from a "quasi-
transcendental privilege of touch and of the tactile." Ideas II, § 37,38, and On Touching. especially pp. 120-
In. 159-182. What has conferred on "touch" an absolute privilege, and has inaugurated the Western 
history of touch, was the great idealist tradition itself starting from Plato's Phaedo, and Aristotle's 
Metaphysics to Berkeley to Kant and Husser\. See On Touching. especially pp .. '+0-'+ I. 98-99. 120tT 
Accordint; to this ideal ism, the idealization process pertaining to the linguistic constitution of objects ill 
gl'l/l'ral. ;nd at v,:ork, for example. in the expression "this is my body". would consist in maintaining the 
senSl' of hl'aring: within sight and in contact with touching. so as to assure for the seeing eye the fullness of 
illllllediall' pn.'sence, and for the showing finger the potentiality of a contact. 
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life-giving act of meaning (bedeuten), which, just as in the case of the human body, gives life and 
transforms the body of words into a living or spiritual flesh (geistige Leiblichkeit), into an 
expressIOn endowed with meaning (Bedeutung).12 This living act, this life-giving act, the 
Lebendigkeit, which in the history of metaphysics has taken several names, '"psyche," "will:' 
"spirit," "life," or "transcendental life," and which Husserl calls Bedeutungsintentiol1, IS 
awakened and maintained in life as much with its body as despite of it. Without this act of 
meaning (bedeuten), without this Lebendigkeit or Geistigkeit, there would be no expression, no 
discourse and no language whatsoever. 
Now if the concept of Bedeutung is reserved, by Husserl, for the order of oral discourse, 
for "the stratum of Logos", the concept of Sinn extends further, overflows the expressive sphere 
and coves the totality of noetic-noematic sphere of experience right down to its preexpressive or 
prelinguistic stratum. 13 So, as Derrida writes in Form and Meaning, "as soon as the extension of 
sense absolutely overflows the extension of meaning! vouloir-dire, discourse will always have to 
draw its sense; it will only be able somehow to repeat or reproduce a sense content, which does 
not wait for speech in order to be what it is.''14 
Considering an entire and most evident aspect of his work, starting with the rigorous 
distinctions between expression and indication (Logical Investigations) and between sense and 
meaning (Ideas /), we will try to show, after Derrida, that Husserl never wanted to assimilate 
experience in general with language and signification, and strives, it seems endlessly, to keep 
signification in general (indicative as well as expressive) outside the self-presence of 
transcendental experience or life. And indeed, as we are going to see reading his Ideas I, Husserl 
believes that there is, notably in the experience of perception, a pre-expressive and prelinguistic 
stratum of sense, which the phenomenological reduction must disclose in its primordiality by 
12 For what is at stake (nothing more and nothing less than the re-Christianization of phenomenology) in the 
translation of Leib as flesh Ichair see Derrida Jacques, On Touching, pp. 188, 233-38, and especially p. 
361n26 
11 Husserl does not accept Frege's distinction between "sense" and "meaning" in Logical Inrestigations, 
Fi r.lf Investigation (§ 15), and in Ideas I (§124) the dissociation he introduces between these two notions 
does not have the same function as for Frege. "We shall restrict our glance to the 'meaning content' 
(Bedeutung) and the 'act of meaning' (Bedeuten) Originally these words concerned only the linguistic 
sphere (sprachliche Sphiire), that of 'expression' (des Ausdruckens) But it is almost inevitable, and at the 
same time an important step for knowledge, to extend the meaning of these words. and to modify them 
suitably so that they may be applied in a certain way to the whole noetico-noematic sphere: to all acts 
therefore, be they interwoven (verflochten) with expressive acts or not. Thus we have continued to speak 
of 'sense' (Sinn) in the case of all intentional experiences - a word which is used in general as equivalent to 
'meanin{ (Bedeutung). For the sake of distinctness we shall prefer the term 'meaning' when referring to 
thc old concept and, in particular of the complex locution of 'logical' or 'expressive' meaning. We shall 
continue to usc the word 's(,lIse' as before in the most all-inclusive range." (translation modified) Ideas I, p. 
2l)..+. 
I·) Form and Meaning (hereafter cited as FM). published in Speech and Phenomena. p. 115. 
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excluding the stratum of language. Expression, as the essence or telos of language. is thus added 
as a supplementary and supervening stratum upon the self-presence of an inner life or existence, 
upon the certainty of an experience of sense which can reflect its own presence in silence. For 
Husserl, sense and the ideal presence of sense should de jure precede the act of language whose 
own value will then be that of ex-pression, a medium of exteriorization. 15 
Speech, and inward speech first of all, the speech which is not addressed to the other, 
could not operate without this sich-aiissern that Husserl talks about in his First Investigation (§7): 
speech is ex-pressive because it consists in exteriorizing a sense content that is first found "in a 
certain inside." The first distinctive characteristic of inner and pure ex-pression is then the 
exteriorization, the outward transposition of a sense which is constituted in its unity without it 
and before it. And since we are still following Husserl in this reduction to phenomenological 
interiority, we must emphasize that this exteriorization of sense does not refer to an outside of 
consciousness, to the spatiality of nature and of the world (or to the spatiality and visibility of the 
human body which, as something external, always begins by being exposed in the world). This 
exteriorization, which is accomplished or attained with pure and inward expression, remains, 
Derrida tells us, "in" consciousness, "in the with-oneself or before-oneself, which Husserl first 
determined as solitary mental life" (SP, p. 33). Moreover, the phenomenological interiority of this 
life is not compromised, on the contrary, its radicality is brought forth more clearly when we take 
into consideration precisely HusserI's "logical and epistemological concern" or criterion: to 
reveal and secure the originality of expression, of pure and inward expression. as a relation to an 
ideal object and as "meaning"lvouloir-dire. The presence of sense, which is expressed in a 
meaning (Bedeutung), which the transparency of the inward speech will reproduce or reflect 
silently within consciousness, is always a correlate of an "intending of an objective ideality, 
which stands face-to-face with the meaning intention, with the Bedeutungsintention" (SP, p. 22). 
In Ideas I § 124 Husserl resorts to a perceptual example in order to explain the difference 
between pre-expressive Sinn and expressive Bedeutung: the silent perception of a "this white" 
denotes a pre-expressive process, an intentionality which aims at a sense, a perceptual sense 
which can be constituted in its distinctiveness and clarity before and independently of the 
perceptual expression. After the noematic sense of "this white" has been constituted silently in 
consciousness we can make it explicit. we can say it, i.e., repeat it, reproduce it and transform it 
into meaning and expression, without deforming it or adding any content to it, through concepts. 
Still remaining within the pure interiority of solitary mental life, the originality of the milieu of 
logical expression consists in the fact that. even though it brings sense to the logical order of 
I.~ FM. p. 115. lOG, p. 69n. 
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conceptuality, it does not introduce something new (a new sense), it is unproductive; it effaces 
itself like an unproductive transparency before the passage of sense. Moreover, not only 
perceptual sense but every intentional sense and every lived experience can in principle be 
repeated or reflected into an expressive experience, or brought into the conceptual form which 
"belongs to the essential nature of expression itself." 16 Husserl writes 
The stratum of expression - and this constitutes its peculiarity - apart from the fact that it lends 
expression to all other intentionalities, is not productive. Or if one prefers: its productivity, its noematic 
production, is exhausted in the expressing, and in the form of the conceptual which first comes with 'the 
. , 17 
expressIon . 
If the unproductive stratum of expression comes to reflect every other intentional act, to 
"mirror (widerzuspiegeln) every other intentionality according to its form and content", that is to 
say if not only the sense of a perceptual or intuitive (i.e., cognitive) act, but also the sense of 
aesthetic, moral, etc., acts or experiences must be capable of being said, of being expressed or of 
giving themselves to logical speech controlled by the predicative form, then Husserl is able to 
declare that "logical Bedeutung is an expression." (Ideas I, § 124) 
If inward or outward ex-pression is determined as exteriorization, as the exteriorization of 
sense, this is so, according to Derrida, because in this phenomenology of the phone a powerful 
teleology is at work. All sense is teleologically destined to meaning/ vouloir-dire. sense wants to 
be ex-pressed, to be said or signified in a medium which achieves two things at once: a) it protects 
and preserves the presence of sense to intuition; it is an unproductive medium, a neutral and 
transparent element that receives, accepts or lets itself be impressed by sense without adding 
anything to it, without deforming it, without changing its original colours l8, and b) it brings this 
sense to conceptual generality, to "the universality of the logical,,,19; it is a "medium of 
universality,,20, a productive medium, a means of giving sense a conceptual form, a means of 
imposing the universality of the concept. This unproductive productivity of the medium is the 
fe/os of perfect expression: i.e., the total restitution in the form of presence of a sense actually 
If> Ideas I. § 120. p. 299. 
17 Ideas I. § 124. p. 296. 
IX FM, pp. 113-19 
II) OJ 'Expressioll' is a distinctivc form which allows for adapting to every 'sense' (to the noematic 'core') 
and raises it to the realm of 'Logos', of the conceptual and, on that account, the 'universal'. Ideas I. p. 295. 
~() SP. pp. 78, 79. According to what we said in our previous chapter considering the boulld ideality of 
L'x-pression or of the signifier and the more free ideality of the signified or conccptual sense. it is the ideality 
of the (signified) L'(mcept. of the conceptual form - an ideality which is free with regard to all de L.tL'to 
L'\.iSling L'onslituted languagcs or idioms - which makes the concept indefinitely repeatahle or transmissihle 
as thL' salllL', and which, thereby, makes it fit for univcrsality, for a medium of universality. 
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given to intuition. As we will confirm the authority or the imperative of intuition weio-hs wry o _ 
heavily on HusserI's doctrine of language. 
The privilege of phone, of oral and linguistic expression In phenomenology is not a 
matter of decision or choice that could have been avoided, it is, rather, disclosed by Husserl as 
what conditions the objectivity of the object itself: the ideality of the object (the geometrical 
object or any other type of cultural object) can be (intersubjectively) constituted. repeated and 
expressed only in a medium which will not put in danger the presence of the object before the act 
of intuition but also will protect self-presence, the absolute proximity of the acts which aim at it 
to themselves. In the first part of this thesis we saw the risks "truth" makes itself run with the 
written sedimentation of geometry's meaning: Husserl has interpreted the phenomenon of 
forgetfulness and of crisis, the crisis of mathematical symbolism, as the degradation of full 
expression, in which sense is present and expressed in its original evidence, into indication, into 
an empty letter or symbo1.21 
Now Derrida says that expressIOn IS a voluntary exteriorization because it depends 
entirely on the free, autonomous and explicit will or intention of a subject who animates his voice 
in view of the ideal presence of a sense that may remain internal and mute, and because the 
expressed sense, the Bedeutung does not exist, it is irreal or ideal, it exists nowhere in the world, 
even if it does not come from another world either. This ideality or irreality of Bedeutung comes 
into being (within the solitary life of the subject) only by virtue of the subjective acts of 
repetition: its origin and its being itself depend entirely on the possibility of repetition of a 
subjective act. The same Bedeutung, however, comes into the world at the moment when it is 
physically uttered in a real communication, when by animating the physical body of expression 
the act of meaning (bedeuten) is united with it and thereby becomes a sensible, empirical existent. 
It acquires wordly existence, and thereby the function of indication, whenever it is physically 
incarnated or uttered in order to be heard by another person. As we are going to see, as soon as 
the other (the alter ego, as another transcendental ego, as another absolute origin of the world) 
appears, the physical side of language, i.e., indicative language, becomes irreducible. 
But, on the other hand, this irreality of the purely expressive Bedeutung gives, according 
to Husser!, the assurance that pure expression, the Geistigkeit of the breath as voice, does not 
need to he effectively uttered in the world or to be physically incarnated in the body of speech in 
order to be what it is, or in order to be present to itself: the self-presence of will (Geist). the life-
giving act of the silent voice, the spiritual animating act which is first present to itself in the life 
of its living present before going outside of itself and risk death, factual peril in the body of its 
~I lOG. p. l)2n96. 
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wordly existence. 22 This silent intention of meaning (Bedeutungsintenion) for Husserl would be 
nothing else but the soul of language, which for Husserl is always the language of H'ords. 
Husserl's teleology, Derrida tells us, is a voluntarism: "Sense wants to be signified. it is 
expressed only in a meaning which is nothing other than a wanting to tell itself proper to the 
presence of sense" (our emphasis) (SP, p. 35). It is this teleology and voluntarism which also can 
explain why gestures are not considered by Husserl to be expressions, that is, meaningful signs 
(bedeutsame Zeichen): everything that cannot itself be brought to a logical discourse and 
everything that cannot bring an intentional or noematic sense to the ideality of conceptual and 
universal form is excluded from the logical character of the signifier, from the unil'ersality of the 
conceptual logos, from language "in the strict sense.',23 Facial expressions, "have properly 
speaking" Husserl tells us, "no meaning", they do not want to sa)' something, because they do not 
intent, as an act of speech explicitly, consciously and directly does, "to put certain thoughts on 
record expressively (in ausdruckliicher Weise), whether for man himself, in his solitary state, or 
for others." (LI, §5, p. 275) 
Also, if for Husserl expreSSIOns, properly speaking, are only those SIgnS which are 
animated by the spiritual breath or the act of meaning (bedeuten). if the Bedeutung comes to the 
sign only by means of the voice, it is because, as Derrida writes, "the Deutung, the interpretation, 
the understanding (or hearing, l' entente) of the Bedeutung, can never take place outside oral 
discourse (Rede)" (SP, p. 34). From the moment that one identifies Sinn (perceptual or cognitive) 
and Bedeutung as being both strictly logical, "nothing that resists the Deutung can have sense or 
be language in the strict sense" (ibid., p. 36). From the fact that I can interpret (deuten) a gesture 
or a facial expression of another person, that I can find something discursive in them, that I can 
make them "say" something (about his inner thoughts and emotions), we should not conclude that 
his gestures express something: they are only indicative, Husserl says, . '4 lnvoiuntan--
n The wordly existence of the human body (as of every corporeal thing), what bounds the phenomenon of 
the body (its moves and gestures) to perception, to space and visibility. is also what makes the soul which 
animates it vulnerable to factual disaster. The same with the soul of language: "visibility and spatiality as 
such could only destroy the self-presence of will and spiritual animation which opens up discourse. Thn 
are literal/\' the death of that self-presence" (SP. p. 35). 
~~ FM, p. 115. 116-7. We will come back to this. For now let us say only that it is because of this 
universality of the concept and of the logos that Husserl will be able to differentiate between two kinds of 
auto-affection. two kinds interiority and of relation to oneself. between speaking to or hearing oneself and 
touching oneself. 
~,l By saying imoluntary we do not mean to say that the movement of the body (Leib). of my body. of my 
hand orfinger is deprin:d of will. quile the contrary. According to Husserl what characterizes the 
mO\'L'lllent proper t(l the Lcib is precisely the freedom and immediate spontaneity of the will. See Ideas I/. 
,~ 38 "The Body as organ (~fthl' will and as seat ofIree l1lo\,cmen(', pp. 159-60. It is only to note that the 
l·B 
manifestations or exteriorizations of his inner expenences, manifestations which are not yet 
worked over by Geist, by his Bedeutungsintention, his explicit will to say with words what he 
means to say - expressly, conceptually, and consciously. It is I, the interpreter. a speaking 
subject, who brings them to a meaningful speech and thereby express myself about them. 
will to IIlOI'l' m\, hod\' is not a purely spiritual will. i.e .. a properly human will. like the will t(l speak alld 
hl'u" lIIyse(f.\p~)akil1,~. a propcrly suhjcctin:, or human will open to uni\'crsal signification. 
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2) The Phenomenological Reduction to Inward Speech 
The essential distinction, which Husserl draws in the very first paragraph of the first 
Logical Investigation, between indication and expression does not correspond to the distinction 
between non-linguistic and linguistic signs. Husserl in this investigation is particularly interested 
in the logical function of language and in the boundary that passes from within language itself. If 
oral discourse is the essential medium of expressivity, if there is no expression or meaning 
without speech, Husserl stresses that, not everything in oral discourse is expressive. After he has 
excluded gestures as indicative and non-linguistic signs and as being extrinsic to meaningful 
speech (§ 5), Husserl comes across a considerable sphere or stratum of the nonexpressive within 
speech itself (§§ 6,7).This stratum which is not expressive but belongs to language itself, to the 
effecti ve use of speech, this extrinsic stratum must also be reduced so as to make the element of 
logos, in its pure logicality and in its expressive form itself, to appear free from all indicative 
contamination. The nature of expression in its pure intentionality and pure spirituality will be 
revealed to us only if we follow Husserl's practice of the phenomenological reduction which, 
according to Derrida, opens the transcendental field of language and the solitary mental life of the 
subject. 
According to Derrida the primary interest of Husserl's analysis in Logical Investigations 
of the solitary mental life of the egological subject and the reduction of the sphere of 
communication, consists in the fact that it announces a) certain themes which will be 
meticulously and systematically elaborated in the fifth Cartesian Meditation as well as b) the 
double motif of the transcendental reduction (or epoche) and of the irreality of the noema.25 
Firstly, Derrida shows that it is precisely the metaphysical attachment of phenomenology to the 
thell/e of presence that led Husserl to exclude from the expressive phenomena of meaning "as 
belonging to indication, everything that belongs to the communication or manifestation 
(Kundgahe) of mental experiences" (SP, p. 37). 
The force of Husserl's argument, namely that expression can function as pure expression 
In the self-presence of solitary speech and as indication in communication, is not to be 
underestimated. To speak to the other and to hear the other speaking, for Husserl first of all 
means that between me and the other there is absolute separation, the irreducible distance of 
~5 Sp, pp, 19, '+7, and On Touching, p. 229. 
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absolute origins?6 Between my primordial world, the world as it appears for me (i.e., for an ego 
in general), and the world of the other (the other as alter ego, as another absolute origin of the 
world) there is no relation and no commensurability: what is proper to the alter ego can never be 
accessible, as such, to me and to my originary presentative intuition, but only to what Husserl 
calls an "analogical appresentation." To present the irreducibly indicative character of the 
manifestation of the other's lived experiences in speech, as it is argued by Husserl in the first 
Logical Investigation, Derrida will have recourse to the fifth Cartesian Meditation where Husserl 
elaborates on the theme of analogical and mediate ap-presentation as what constitutes 
intersubjectivity and the relation with the other. "Outside the transcendental monadic sphere of 
what is my own (mir eigenes), the ownness of my own (Eigenheit), my own self-presence, I only 
have relations of analogical appresentation, of mediate and potential intentionality, with the 
other's ownness, with the self-presence of the other; its primordial presentation is closed to me." 
(SP, p. 39) The most central affirmation of the 5th Meditation concerning the radical separation of 
the absolute origins can be found already in Husserl's first Investigation with regard to what 
happens in a real colloquy between two (finite) egos, the speaker and the hearer: 
The hearer perceives the manifestation (Kundgabe) in the same sense in which he perceives the 
manifesting person - even though the mental phenomena which make him a person cannot fall, for what 
they are, in the intuitive grasp (Anschauung) of the another. [ ... J The hearer perceives the speaker as 
cxpressing certain inner experiences (Erlebnisse aiissert), and to that extent he also perceives these 
experiences themselves: he does not, however, himself experience them (er selbst erlebt sie nicht), he has 
not an "inner" but an "outer" percept of them. Here we have the big difference between the real grasp of 
what is in adequate intuition, and the putative grasp of what is on the basis of inadequate, though intuitive, 
presentation (anschaulichen aber inaddqueten Vorstellung). LI, §7, p. 278. 
What in effect happens when I am involved in real communication? If my intention is to 
be heard and, indeed, understood by the other everything in my speech which manifests 
(Kulldgabe) a lived experience to him must necessarily pass through the physical side. the 
sensible body of my expressions. This necessary detour, this mediation, marks, according to 
Husserl, every communication, as communication of (egological) consciousnesses or presences, 
with an irreducible indicative function. 
Even if I (an ego in general) have an immediate intuition or perception of the other's 
body, gestures, words, I will never have a primordial and immediate intuition of the other's lived 
experiences "in person"; I will never be able to have an intuition of the sense-giving acts by 
2(' Al'L'ording to Derrida, Husserl and Lninas are \'cry close here: as for Levinas, for Husserl also, seeing 
thc other a~d the glance by itself does not respect the other. I cannot and will never han: prim! lrdial 
intuition or perception of the other's lived experiences. This is why for Lcvinas the face of the other is not 
only his gaiL' but the primordial unity of gaze and spccch: the other does not simply look at me. he can also 
speak to me, listen to understand and, cn:ntually, command mc. \'iolence and ,\f{'faphYsics, pp. 9R. 1 ()O. 
We II L'lHlle back to it 
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which he animates his voice in order to make manifest to me a content (Bedeutung) which is 
actually and immediately present only to him (to an inner intuition or perception) in the same 
instant that he expresses it. The lived experiences of the other are made known (Kundnahme) to 
me only insofar as they are mediated by the physical incorporation of his living and actual 
bedeuten, by the body of his speech which is in the world. As soon as the other appears the 
manifesting function of speech as indicative function, i.e., the relation to the other through the 
delegation or representation of indicative signs, cannot be reduced. This is why the expressions 
of the other in their function of Kundgabe, can certainly be understood but can render nothing 
manifest to me, if by manifest we mean evident, originally presented "in person". A Kundgabe 
can only announce what it necessarily conceals or dissimulates, namely the other's lived 
experiences, the subjective face of his experiences such as he has lived them. (SP, p. 40) 
The irreducibility of the Kundgabe function in communication, as it is argued in Logical 
Investigations, will be reaffirmed in the fifth Cartesian Meditation as the irreducibly mediate 
nature of the intentionality aiming at the other as other. What Husserl calls "analogical ap-
presentation" not only forbids an analogical reduction of the other to "the same", to a real 
moment of my life, it also recognizes and respects the un surpassable necessity of mediation. "It is 
evident", Derrida writes in Violence and Metaphysics, "by an essential, absolute and definitive 
self-evidence [a strange evidence, to be sure, but one that, according to Derrida, only 
phenomenology can bring to light] that the other as transcendental other (other absolute origin 
and other zero point in the orientation of the world), can never be given to me in an original way 
and in person, but only through analogical ap-presentation.',27 We shall refer later to this strange 
and unique phenomenological evidence in which the alterity of the other appears as such, an 
evidence which permits the recognition of the radical separation of absolute origins: I cannot 
approach the other immediately and silentl/8, in communion with his lived experiences, without 
going through the mediation or representation of his indicative signs. If I attained to the other 
originally and immediately, if what belongs to the other's ownness (Eigenheit), what is proper to 
the other's lived experiences was directly accessible to me the other would cease to be other, and 
I myself and he himself would be the same. This is, however, an absolute impossibility.29 
But this mediation of the physical side of speech (of its corporeal exteriority), which is 
irreducible in real communication and which involves every expression in an indicatiye 
operation. seems not to be necessary in inward speech, in the interior monologue of the ego. In 
~7 VM. p. 12-1-. 
~H This would he thL' rirst gesture of \iolencL'. for Husser! as for LL'vinas. 
~I) eM, §50, p. 109. 
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solitary mental life, when I speak to myself I do not pass (because I do not have to pass) through 
this mediation: the immediate and full presence of what is signified, the pure transparency of 
what I want to say with my expression is not concealed for me as it is for the other in the 
opaqueness of the signifier's body, beneath the surface of my speech. 
Derrida recognizes the core of Husserl's analysis of indication in the nonplenitude or 
non-self presence of the act of meaning: whenever the Bedeutungsintention, the (living and life-
giving) act which confers meaning to an expression, is not fully present to itself and to its content 
(or signified Bedeutung), expression is contaminated by indication. 'The notion of presence", 
Derrida writes, "is at the core of this demonstration. If communication or manifestation 
(Gundgabe) is essentially indicative this is because we have no primordial intuition of the 
presence of the other's lived experiences. Whenever the immediate and full presence of the 
signified is concealed, the signifier will be of indicative nature" (SP, p. 40). 
So to suspend the manifesting or indicative function of language and to reach, thereby, 
pure expression, Husserl has to exclude communication and the relation with the other. Now the 
phenomenological reduction to the solitary mental life, according to HusserL accomplishes 
precisely this: solitary discourse retains the essence of speech, its expressive function, while 
dropping its communicative function, i.e., its indicative veil. In the interior monologue, in the 
interior life of the subject the ap-presentational detour is no longer necessary, the ego does not 
have to pass through the mediation of the other's signs. the manifesting function of signification 
is absent. In silent discourse there is no indication because there is no communication, and there 
is no communication because there is no other, no alter ego in me. I indicate nothing to my self, 
because I communicate nothing to myself, because my experiences are immediately self-present, 
because they are, as Husserl writes a little further on, lived b.v me "in the same instant (im selben 
Augenblick.) " (LI, I, §8) 
Let us follow Husserl in this phenomenological reduction to the inward speech of solitary 
life: from within my interiority the indicative function of my words in communication will appear 
as an extrinsic stratum superimposed upon the stratum of pure expression, the stratum of 
meaning, of my pure intention to say something meaningful. Husserl opening the section §8 
Expressions ill solitary I~fe writes: 
So far we ha\'l~ considered expressions in their communicative function, [ ... ] but expressions also 
playa large role ill UIlCOI1l11l1l1licated, life of the soul (im Verkehr nicht mitteilenden Seelelliebell). This 
change of function plainly has nothing to do with whatewr makes an expression an expression. 
Exprcssions continuc to have mcanings (Bedeutllngell) as they had before, and the same meanings as in 
dialoguc. A word only ceases to be a word when our interest is directed at the sensible, when it become.., a 
mnL' sound formation (Lalltgebilde.) But when we Ih'c in the lInderstanding of the \\ Ofd. it expressel., 
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something and the same thing, whether we address it to anyone or not. It seems clear, therefore, that an 
expression's meaning (Bedeutung des Ausdruckes) [ ... ] cannot coincide with its activities of manifestation 
(kundgebenden). LI, §8, pp. 278-79 
What is for Husserl the "first advantage" from this reduction to interior mental life? The 
sensible, and physical aspect of language, the Lautgebilde of words, the corporeal exteriority of 
words, without which every communication with the other would be simply impossible, can very 
well be reduced whenever in speaking to myself I can hear and understand myself without haying 
to pass through the exterior surface of my words. Even if I do not physically utter them, even if I 
do not move my lips or tongue, my words, to the extent that they are "heard" by me in the present 
moment, are full with meaning and absolutely alive. And even if this need not happen in fact, it 
belongs to the teleological structure of this speech act that, when I speak to myself I hear myself, 
i.e., I understand my own expressive intention, what I want or mean to say. As we shall see when 
we come to consider the phenomenological value of the voice and its superiority over other 
signifying substances, this operation of hearing- myself- speaking, as the experience of the 
effacement of the exterior corporeality of the signifier in my voice, is an absolutely unique 
experience, "an auto-affection of a unique kind", in which I do not have to pass beyond myself, 
beyond the monadic sphere of what is absolutely my own, in order to affect, speak to and hear 
myself. 
Now if the physical event of language, this irreducible mediation of the sonorous 
substance of the voice through which the other must necessarily pass in an intersubjective, real 
communication, appears to be absent in the case of inward speech, does this mean that when I 
speak to myself I communicate nothing to myself? Are the Kundgabe and Kundnahme functions 
of indicative language, i.e., of language involved in communication, suspended? Husserl asks 
"Shall we say that, even in solitary mental life, one still uses expressions to manifest something 
(Allsdruck etwas kundgaben), though not to a second person? Shall one say that in soliloquy one 
speaks to oneself, and employs words as signs (Zeichen), i.e., as indications (An~eichen) of one's 
own experiences? I cannot think such a view acceptable" (our emphasis) (LI, §8, p. 279) 
Husserl's argumentation, according to Derrida, is absolutely decisive here. The whole 
theory of signification introduced in the first chapter, the rigorous separation between indication 
and expression, would be fundamentally compromised if the words I use in inward speech still 
functioned as indications for me, if the Kundgabe function of language, which is irreducible in 
real communication, could not be reduced or effaced in the sphere of my own Jiyed experiences -
"in short, if the ideal or absolute solitude of subjectivity 'proper' still needed indications to 
constitute its own relation to itself' (SP, p. 42). 
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At this point of his argument, and in order to secure the hypothesis of non-
communication, of absence of indications, i.e., of signs, in the interior monologue, Husserl 
describes the radical heterogeneity between the two modifications of reference (or substitution), 
whose dissociation has been introduced in the very first paragraph of his investigation: the 
expressive reference (Hinzeigen) of the sign and the indicative reference (An;.eigen) of the sign. 
But what is a sign? Husserl writes "Every sign is a sign for something (jur en·vas)", in order then, 
to immediately add in the same sentence the distinction between indication and expression, "but 
not every sign has 'meaning', a 'sense' that the sign 'expresses'" (LI, § 1) But what does "flir 
etwas" mean? What "being in the place of' in general signifies, or again what is a sign (Zeichen) 
in general? Husserl does not ask these questions. 3D He seems to avoid them and several 
paragraphs later he proceeds, supposing that we implicitly know what "being-for" in general 
means, supposing that we are already familiar with the structure of substitution or reference, to 
demonstrate the difference between "being-for" as Hinzeigen and "being-for" as Anzeigen. 
If "words function as signs here [in soliloquy] as they do everywhere else", if 
"everywhere they can be said to show or point to something (Hinzeigen)," then, Husserl writes, in 
the silent monologue "the showing or pointing (Hinzeigen) is not an An;.eigen ", for, in speaking 
silently to myself the passage from my expression (which, according to Husserl, consists of 
vorgestellt words and not of existing or wirklich words) to my sense-giving acts is absolutely 
transparent, absolutely immediate and certain: it is not mediated by empirically existent or real 
words. Whereas in real communication the other's expression gives way to indication (An;.eigen,) 
since the existence of his experiences can only be known or indicated to me, though without any 
evidence at all, through real and existing signifiers or words. The notions of existence and of 
reality (Dasein, existeren, Realitiit) which we referred to before (with regard to the indicative 
showing as Weisen In the Beweis) are also very important at this point of Husserl's 
argumentation: for as Husserl himself writes "an indication is always an existent (daseiend). This 
holds also of expressions used in communication, but not of expressions used in soliloquy" (our 
emphasis) (LI, §8, p. 279). 
Solitary discourse then, which dispenses with the wordly existence of signs, seems to 
retain the essence of speech, its expressive purity, while loosing its communicative or indicative 
function: the sense content or Bedeutung of inner speech as it is lived by the speaking subject has 
~() Or what is the relation between Zeichen and Zeigen. what is showing (Zeigen) in g~neral before its 
dissociation into Hin-;.eigen and .4.1/~cigen'? "If showing is the unity of g~stures and perception in "igns. if 
signification is assigned to the pointing finger and the eye" (SP, p. 72). nery sign. expressive or indicative. 
linguistic or nonlinguistic, shows or points with the finger. Derrida says. to the in\"isibk. to what is 
p1'(~\'isionall\' ilwisible, to what is not yet present in its \isibility to be seen, to a deferred but also 
anticipated. ·through the detour of the sign. missing presence. 
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no need to be indicated (Anzeigen) to itself since it is immediately present to itself and e\'ident. 
i.e., absolutely certain. 
The reduction to uncommunicated, interior and solitary life of the soul which isolates the 
silent Bedeutungsintention, the subjective experience of meaning or of wanting-to-say-something 
as the sphere of inner and absolute existence, the sphere of absolute certainty, is in effect, Derrida 
says, a transcendental reduction, "a putting of empirical wordly existence between brackets .. ·J ) 
The voice of the subject in its spiritual flesh (geistige Leiblichkeit), what Husserl calls the 
Bedeutungsintention, is the being which is present to itself and to what it says, the being that 
continues to speak and hear itself, i.e., to be present to itself, after the absence or radical 
transformation of the world, that is, after the complete "imaginary variation" of empirical 
existence or factuality, in our case, of the existent, wordly, and contingent signifiers. 
According to Derrida, even if Husserl in Logical Investigations conducts his description 
and the analysis of the phenomenon of expression within the realm of the psychic (the wordly 
region called psyche) rather than the transcendentae2, he nonetheless distinguishes. speaking of 
the phenomenon of pure, inward expression (the phenomenon of silent vouloir-dire) as 
Phantasievorstellung, the essential, intentional moments of a transcendental structure, the archi-
structure (Ur-Structure) that will be delineated and described twelve years later in Ideas I, and 
under the surveil1ance of a renewed and vigorous transcendental reduction. And, in particular, in 
§ 124, the paragraph which Derrida discusses in detail in his Form and Meaning, Husserl 
describes the originality and the organization of the expressive stratum of language (the bedeuten-
Bedeutung correlation) according to the noetico-noematic structure of experience. This is also 
what Husserl describes in the first Investigation (in a paragraph that we shal1 quote in full in a 
moment): the experience of pure, inward expression, even if it is an experience of an entity which 
is in the world, suspends the existential thesis of the world, it is a nonwordly or transcendental 
" SP. p. ·n. We have already noted, in our reading of Derrida's Introduction to the Origin of Geometry. 
and with regard to the eidetic intangibility of geometrical ideality and its history, the decisive role that is 
reserved in the method of the reactivating reduction to imagination and fiction: "the vital element of 
phenomenology and of all eidetic sciences. writes Husserl in Ideas I (§ 70). Similarly, in Ideas I §49, 
Husserl reveals the essence of intentional, transcendental consciousness only after he has employed a 
certain type of fiction: the reduction or annihilation of the totality of the existing world. I can empty all 
empirical content. I can imagine an absolute overthrow of the content of every possible experience. but the 
very sense of consciousness. as the ahsolute origin of the world. would remain intangihle. The clearest 
intention of this fiction. according to Derrida. is to demonstrate the eidetic intangibility of consciousness as 
thl' Ur-regioll: since pure consciousness can always with complete freedom suspend the thesis of all 
continl.!ent existence and of all contingent transcendence its very sense is de jure and absolutely 
indepe~ldent of the whole world. (lOG, p, 96) See also Paul Riceour. A Key to Edmund Husser/'s Ideas I. 
MarqllL'lte Uni\ersity Press, 1996. pp, 68.147 
1~ SP. pp, 11-13. :n. especially p, -+7. See also Bernet. Introduction to Husser/'s Phenomenology. pp, 60. 
90. and Lninas's Theon o(lntuirion. p. 5-+. 
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expenence, it does not belong to reality (Realitat), and even if the Bedeutungsintention, the 
intentional or noetic moment of this experience, is a real (reell and not real) component of 
consciousness, the noema (the expressive Bedeutung) does not really (reell) belong to it. These 
subtle phenomenological differences - the differences between the "real", the "reel!" and the 
"irreell" moments of experience which define, in Ideas I, the concept of the noema - have 
already taken shape, according to Derrida, in the first of the Logical Investigations in HusserI's 
description of pure expression as Phantasievorstellung, 
Before we proceed to the clarification of these differences in order to bring forward the 
irreality of inner discourse, let us note that, according to Derrida, the clearest intention of this 
reduction of the Factum of language, not only of every de facto constituted language, but of the 
fact of constituted language in general, is to return to the primordiality of the speaking subject, to 
the primordiality of his will, of his voice, i.e., of his Bedeutungsintention without which no 
discourse and no language would ever be possible. As we saw in our reading of Derrida's 
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry, "The question is simply to parenthesize constituted 
language, which is what Husserl continues to do in Formal and Transcendental Logic and in the 
Origin, in order, subsequently, to let the originality of constitutive language come to light. ,,33 The 
essential condition of inner and outward expression is not the mundane, contingent signifier, the 
existent and physical body of the word, but only this pure act of the animating intention, the act of 
will which can do without this body (which in its ideal fonn. as constituted language, is bound to 
a detennined historical community of speaking subjects34) and can therefore remain physically 
silent. This silent voice or Bedeutungsintention is supposed then to be independent even from the 
sensible and animated "proper body" [Leib] of language. 35 
Now, to return to what Husserl actually says in the first Investigation, in solitary mental 
life we no longer use "real (wirklich) words" but only ",'orgestellt", represented or imagined 
words (LI, §8, p, 279). The whole of HusserI' s argumentation with regard the rigorous distinction 
between expression and indication depends entirely on the status of this representation (of 
Phlllltasievorstel!ung, but also of Vergegemrartigung and of Reprasentation) that he is willing to 
concede to inward language and speech, i.e., to the inner sphere of subjective experience. When I 
speak to myself my words can appear in my imagination (Phantasie). In order to speak to 
myself, in order to hear my voice and understand what it says, I do not have to use real words, I 
do not need the empirical occurrence of the word, I am indifferent to its existence or non-
" 10(;, p. 78. 
\.l Ihid., pp. 67, 70. 
1S Form al/d ;\Ic{/I/il/g, p. 113. 
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existence, "the word's non-existence (Nicht-Existenz) neither disturbs nor interests [me]"'. says 
Husserl (LI, ibid.) . 
Obviously this is not the case in the real and actual communication of lived experiences, in the 
communication of the other's lived experiences where real (wirklich) words, the verbal sound of 
the utterances of the other in a here-and-now, and their sensible existence in the world are , 
necessarily implied in the phenomenon of perception itself, i.e., of hearing the other speak. When 
I listen to the other I have an immediate intuition of his words, his body and gestures, but I do not 
have an intuition of his sense-giving acts which animate the body of his speech and make it 
meaningful. These acts are immediately present only to his own (inner) intuition and forever 
indicated to me, that is, hidden for me under the sensible surface of his words. But when I speak 
with my self I do not have to go through any exterior, indicative detour, I content myself with the 
image of the word, with simply imagining the word. 
Derrida devotes some very important paragraphs to this difference between, on the one 
hand, the perception or primordial presentation (Gegenwiirtigung, Priisentation) of the word, and 
real presence of the word in effective communication, and on the other hand, the imagination of 
the word, ideal presence in the representation of the word as Phantasievorstellung. 
First of all, we should say that for Husserl perception and imagination are lived 
experiences, intentional-noetic acts. Considering now the perception (or the imagination) of the 
word as lived experience, we must make a distinction between the lived appearing (apparaitre 
I'CCll) of the word and the word's sensible appearing (sensible apparaissant), in order to avoid, as 
Derrida notes, the worst and most prevalent confusions. (SP, p. 44) The real word, the existent 
word (spoken or written) which is in the world belongs to a radically different order from that of 
the phenomenon of the word, from the lived experience or appearing (either in perception or in 
imagination) of the word, from the order of the word's being perceived (or imagined) by any 
consciousness whatever. 
Now in perception, which for phenomenology is the Ur-Erlebnisse, the absolute origin or 
primary source of all other intuitive acts of consciousness, in the phenomenon of the perception 
(in the hearing or seeing) of the word reference is necessarily made to the existence of the word. 
In the perception of the word the listener is present in a real communication where the speaker 
utters real (\I'irklich) and existing words with the intention to be heard and understood. The 
ex.istence of the word, however, belongs to a different and radically heterogeneous order from 
that of the lived experience of its perception. In this lived experience we must distinguish. 
according to Husserl (Ideas I. §§85. 97) between the hyle, the sense-data of hearing or seeing. the 
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sphere of pure passivity, from the noetic-noematic structure, which is the intentional moment of 
transcendental experience. 
According to Derrida Saussure was not as cautious as Husserl. Saussure in his Course in 
General Linguistics, and at the point where it was a question of determining the spoken word (the 
atomic unity of sound and sense) as the object of linguistics, was also attentive to the distinction 
between, on the one hand, the real, objective word which is in the world and, on the other hand, 
the image of the word, the impression that it makes on our senses, the psychic imprint of the 
word, what he called the "sound image". It is the sound-image that Saussure calls signifier. 
keeping the "signified" not for the thing or referent, since the latter has been immediately reduced 
by the act and the ideality of language, but for the "concept'", for what Husserl calls Bedeutung. 36 
"The linguistic sign unites not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound image. The latter is 
not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychic imprint of the sound, the 
impression that it makes on our senses. ·,37 But according to Derrida, Saussure, following a 
classical psychology of the imagination, saw the originality of this imprint, or sound-image in its 
being an internal reality coping an external one. "For such psychology, the image is a picture sign 
whose reality (whether it be physical or mental) would serve to indicate the imagined object" (SP, 
p. 45). For Husserl, by contrast, the sound-image, being the intentional object or sense of the 
perception (hearing) of the word, the noematic correlate of the lived experience of perception. the 
noema of perception, is not a reality (Realitat) duplicating another reality, it does not really 
belong either to the world or to lived experience. 
The hyle. the sense-data (Empfidungsdaten) of the hearing of the sound, the 
Abschattungen of the objective sound, is a lived experience.38 The hyletic level of consciousness 
is constituted by what Husserl calls sensations in the case of perception (presentation), and by 
what he calls phantasms in the case of memory or imagination (re-presentation)39. Now according 
to Husserl, the hyle (the nonintentional and passive moment of experience without which 
consciousness would have nothing but itself to receive) and the noesis (the intentional moment, 
the animating act which gives noema and form to the hyletic data) are reel! but not real (real) 
components of lived experience. And the noematic correlative of this intentional act of 
perception, the content of the image is a non-reel! component of lived experience.40 
It> "We propose to keep the term sign to designate the whole, but to replace concept and sound-image 
rL"I1L'L'li\c1y hy sign(fied and sign(fier . .. Saussure, Ferdinand, Course in General Linguistics, tr. Roy Harris, 
Chica~(), Open Court. 19H6, p. 67. 
l7 Ihid., p. 66. 
lK Ideas L *-t I, pp. 87-9. Sec also Lninas's Theory of Intuition, pp. 38,70. 
N Ideas L **-t L H5, and for the difference hetween "sensations" and "phantasms" * 112, p263. 
~II Ih'd !i !iUS l'7 I ., ~ ~ 0., :I • 
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Now the core unity of the noema - i.e., the word's appearing (l"apparaitre du mot) and 
not the reality of the word, the appearing word (le mot apparaissant) in the world (spoken or 
written- can be intended according to different acts of intuition and various intentional modes: 
the image of the word, being an intentional noema, can be intented and attained in its distinctness 
and in all its characteristics not only in perception and memory but also, and more significantly, 
in imagination. But this intentional noema, in its irreality, is not and cannot be attained as such 
by, or in, one, single, and unique act of perception or imagination. The noema, the word's 
appearing as such, supposes an open horizon and the breakthrough toward the infinite of an 
"again and again" (immer wieder). What is important for the noema, what constitutes it in its 
ideality or irreality, is not the type of the intuitive acts which strives to attain it, perception or 
imagination, but the possibility of its repetition ad infinitum. It can, therefore, only be the 
correlate of indefinite acts of repetition, thanks to which the same (image or noema) will appear 
in and through absolutely different acts and moments. The noema must be iterable, i.e., infinitely 
repeatable as the same, in the absolute absence of any determined, here and now factual act and 
event which attain it. As Derrida writes "the power of repetition that opens up ideality [here the 
ideality or irreality of the noema] and the power which liberates the imaginative reproduction of 
empirical perception cannot be foreign to each other; nor their products" (SP, p. 55). This is 
precisely the irreality, the essentially repetitive structure of the noema which, as we are going to 
see frequently in Derrida, indefinitely divides and defers presence, the presence of the noema to a 
lived experience (to perception or to imagination) and the presence or proximity of the lived 
experience to itself; the structure which opens up presence, i.e., living, the lived experience of 
noema, to differance, i.e., to the processes of the trace, writing, exapropriation and death. 
Why is Husserl, in this reduction to the interior life of the speaking subject, not content 
with the perception of the word? Why does he need the imagination of the world, if the essential 
and phenomenological difference between the existing word and the being-perceived of the word 
is already at work in the lived experience of perception? It is because, as we have seen, in the 
phenomenon of perception, in the intentional sense of perception (or hearing, which in our case 
takes place between two alter egos) reference is necessarily made to the reality and the existence 
of the word, whereas in the phenomenon of pure inward expression. which is described by 
Husser! as the imaginative representation (Phantasievorstellung) of the word, any such reference 
is totally absent. This is why imagination and fiction acquire a primary position over perception 
with rl~gard to the phenomenological reflection and method. (Ideas I. §§ 4, 70, ) 
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According to Husserl, imagination (Phantasie), in contradistinction with the other two 
intuitive acts of perception and memory which are positing acts (they posit the existence of what 
is so perceived or remembered)41, is a neutralizing act, and the image is not a positional but a 
neutralizing representation (Vergegenwiirtigung), it neutralizes the wordly and factual existence 
of the word. This is why imagination offers to the phenomenological reduction to solitary mental 
life, as Derrida says, "its privileged medium." Husserl writes in the first Logical Investigation: 
... [with] expressions used in soliloquy, we are in general content with represented (vorgestellt) rather than 
with real words. In imagination a spoken or written word floats before us, though in truth in has no 
existence. We shouLd not, however, confuse imaginative representations (Phantasievorstellungen), and still 
less the image contents they rest on, with their imagined objects. The imagined verbal sound, or the 
imagined printed word, does not exist, only its imaginative representation does so. The difference is the 
difference between imagined centaurus and the imagination of these things. The word's nonexistence 
neither disturbs nor interests us, since it Leaves the word's expressive function unaffected" (my emphasis) 
(LJ, §8, p. 279) 
In the phenomenon of solitary discourse (whose expressive purity Husserl wants above 
all to bring to light) the speaking subject does not need real words. he is indifferent to the 
existence or not existence of the word; the existence of the word is not implied in the 
phenomenon of imaginative representation (Phantasievorstellung,) not even by virtue of its 
intentional sense. There exists only the act of the imagination of the word, whose existence, for 
the subject who lives in it, cannot but be absolute and absolutely indubitable. In the interior 
monologue then nonexistent signs show or point to (in the sense of Hinzeigen and not of 
Anzeigen) Bedeutungen which are also nonexistent or irreal and absolutely certain, since they are 
present to an inner intuition. We attain then to the subjective experience of solitary, 
uncommunicated discourse only by means of a phenomenological reduction. Once we have 
reached this inward speech, the voice which hears itself speaking, no transcendental reduction is 
possible. The reduction to inward speech, Derrida writes "is already a phenomenological 
reduction which isolates the subjective experience as the sphere of absolute certainty and absolute 
41 With memory. where a past perception appears in the lived experience of remembering. pure 
consciousnl'ss cannot be freed from the positing of factual existence: by contrast to the image. memory is a 
positional re-presentation. As Derrida writes in a very important footnote concerning, once again. some 
essential distinctions which constitute "the very possibility of phenomenology" and on whose basis Husserl 
will criticize a classical. prephenomenological psychology of the imagination: "The original 
phenomenological data that Husserl thus wants to respect lead him to posit an absolute heterogeneity 
hetween perception or primordial presentation (Gegenwdrtigung. Priisentation) and re-presentation or 
I'l'prl'scntati\(: re-production. also translated as presentification \ \'ergegenwdrtigullg). Memory. images and 
~1~ns arc I'epresentatilllls in this sense." To this distinction "we must add that between positional [set:.elldeJ 
rl'-prl'sentation. which posits the haying-been-present in memory. and the imaginary re-presentation 
[I'hantasie- \'ergcgclll\'(irtigullg]. which is neutral in that respect" (SP. p. -l5n 1. Eyerything in Husser!' ~ 
nitiquL' of psychology depends on the possibility or \alidity of the abon: distinctions. 
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existence. This absolute existence only appears by reducing the relatiye existence of the 
transcendent world" (SP, p. 44). 
The reduction to solitary mental life, then, or to the absolute existence of inward speech 
as imaginative representation (Phantasievorstellung), free from all wordly existence or empirical 
factuality, is the move by which, according to Derrida, the phenomenologist will attain to pure 
transcendental consciousness as Bedeutungsintention, as the pure intention to say something 
meaningful, without the mediation of existent signs. The subjective experience of speaking to 
myself, however, the experience of solitary discourse, which is revealed only after the 
phenomenological reduction, is the most differentiated structure: firstly, it does not belong to 
reality (Realitiit), it is a transcendental experience. In this experience, what Busserl calls noesis as 
well as the hyle-morphe structure are real (reel! and not real) components of experience but the 
noema does not really (reell) belong to this subjective lived experience.-I2 Not only, then, does the 
imagination of the word belong to a radically different order from that of the real, existent word, 
but the image of the word (its noema) exists even less than the act of imagination. Whereas noesis 
(the noetic act of imagination) belongs to intentional consciousness, the noema (which is equally 
intentional as the noesis) does not really (reell) belong to it. It is included but not really included 
in the phenomenological life (Erlebnis) of consciousness: the noema is neither a subject (or a 
really inherent moment of the subject) nor an object (a real transcendence), since it is the 
objects's Objectivity, the appearing (apparaltre) of the object as such for a conSCIOusness. 
Derrida writes in Genesis and Structure about this "difficult and decisive theme" concerning the 
noema's being non-really included in consciousness (the Ur-Region): 
Noesis and noema, the intentional moments of the structure [of transcendental experience], can be 
distinguished in that the noema does not belong to consciousness in a real way. Within consciousness in 
general there is an agency which does not really belong to it. ... Noema, which is the objectivity of the 
object. the sense and the "as such" of the thing for consciousness, is neither the determined thing itself in its 
untamed existence (whose appearing the noema precisely is), nor it is a properly subjective moment, a 
"really" [reell] subjective moment, since it is indubitably given as an object for consciousness. It is neither 
of the world nor of consciousness, but it is the world, or something of the world for consciousness. 43 
Derrida will often return in his later work to Busserl's "surprising and forceful" analysis of the 
irregionality of the noema, to the "anarchy',-I-I of the noema cut off from consciousness as the Ur-
region, the ultimate authority, the absolute arche. Unlike the other moments of h.'de, morphe and 
noesis which belong or pertain to consciousness, the noema can appear and can be 
~2 Sec Idea.\' I, Part Three, Chapter Three §88 and especially Chapter FOUL §97, "The Hyletic and Noematic 
Moments as Rcall\' Inherent Moments. the Noematic Moments as Reali\' Non-inherent MOlllents. of Livcd 
r\peril'11cc.I" pp. '236-240, and * 124 "The Noetic-Noematic Stratum of 'Logos . . Meaning and ,\lcaning 
SOlllcthin£;", pp. 294-297. 
~ 1 ' (;SP, p.163, sec also lOG, pr. 66n, 144 . 
.j.j GSP. p. 163. 
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phenomenalized, by really pertaining neither to the appearing thing nor to the stuff of mv lived 
experience (Erlebnis). According to Derrida, "such is the law of phainesthai ,,';5: this real 
non appurtenance to any region at all, even to the archi-region, this anarch)' of the noema, whose 
possibility would put automatically to work the processes of indication, of exappropriation and of 
death in the very inside of the lived experience of the noema, this real anarchy then is, at the same 
time, the root and the very "condition of any experience, any objectivity, any phenomenality, 
namely of any noetico-noematic correlation, whether originary or modified ... 46 
From the very first publications of Genesis Structure and Phenomeology and the 
Introduction to the Origin to Speech and Phenomena, Of Grammatology and up to Specters of 
Marx and On Touching, Derrida will not stop measuring the consequences and the deconstructive 
force of the Husserlian "discovery" and thematization of this nonreal inclusion of noemata in the 
phenomenological life (Erlebnis) of consciousness. According to Derrida, if one follows 
Husserl's descriptions of this anarchic interruption at the heart of the lived experience, one would 
find oneself in a zone where phenomenology without being powerless or disqualified meets the 
strongest resistance against the authority of its principle of principles, the absolute authority of its 
intuitionistic principle of principles, namely, that of the immediate presence of the expressed 
Bedetutung to the act of pure expression (as Fantasievostellung). 
Without, however, neglecting or underestimating the novelty and radicality of the 
phenomenological description of images (as intentional noemata), we should note that, as Derrida 
writes already in his Introduction to the Origin of Geometr/7, the status of imagination in 
Husserrs work remains rather ambiguous: On the one hand, Husserl's analysis of the image (it 
is irreal, neither reel nor real) profoundly renewed the question of imagination: the power of 
imagination which frees the ideality of the image (here, of the word) from pure sensible reality 
and from empirical perception, and the power of repetition that opens ideality. the ideality of 
Bedeutung, of the noema, and of the ideal object in general, are not strange to each other. 
4~ 0 T I . T1() n I ouc ling. p. ~~ . 
41> Derrida, Jacques, Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt. the Work of Mourning. & the New 
International. translated hy Peggy Kamuf, Routledge, New York, 199-+, p. 189, And Derrida continues in 
thl' same footnote. "Without the non-real inclusion of this intentional component (therefore inclusi \c and 
non-inl'lusive inclusion: the noema is included without being a part). one could not speak of manifestation. 
of any phenomenality in general (that heing-for-a-consciousness. that appearing appearance which .is 
neither consciousness nor the heing that appears to it.) Is not such an ·irreality·. its independence both In 
relation to the world and in relation to the real stuff of egological suhjectivity. the very place of apparition, 
the l'ssl'l1liaI. ~cneral. non-regional possihility of the specter? Is it not also what inscribes the possihility (~r 
the other and ;if mourning right into the phenomcnality 4 the phenomenon'?" 
47 lOG, p. 125n. 
158 
But, on the other hand, as Derrida stresses, Husserl also reduces imagination by 
describing it as a merely reproductive and derived ability. He reduces imagination (but also, at the 
same moment, the power of repetition) to the extent to which the image refers still to an origin or 
to an originary perceptive intuition. As Husserl's analyses and descriptions make clear. in 
particular in Ideas I (§lll), the image in phantasy is not a pure neutralization: it is classified, like 
memory, as re-presentation (Vergegenwartigung), i.e, as the re-production of a full and simple 
presentation (Gegenwartigung), the reproduction of a primordial perception, even if the product 
of this re-presentation is a purely fictitious object (for example, the imagined centaurs). Better, 
imagination does not loose its neutralizing function, rather - and this how Husserl can show that 
the irreality of the essence or eidos (the eidos horse) attained through the neutralizing imaginary 
variation is not fictitious48 - it applies it to memory: imagination neutralizes a positional re-
presentation, i.e., a re-presentation which posits the having-being-present in memory. But by 
retaining a primary reference to a primordial presentation or perception, Husserl makes 
imagination a derived and founded re-presentation, a representative re-production of a full and 
simple presentation. 
These essential distinctions, the distinction between perception or primordial presentation 
(Gegenwiirtigung or Priisentation) and imagination (Phantasievorstellung as neutrali::.ing 
representation, as Ver-gegenwiirtigung), and the distinction between the lived appearing of the 
image of the word (an appearing that is no more sonorous than luminous, since it is indifferent to 
the existence of the word and, therefore, to whether the word is spoken or printed) and the 
sensible appearing of the word, is, as Derrida writes, the indispensable instrument for a critique of 
a classical psychology of the imagination and of the sign. With the critique of classical 
psychology, phenomenology overcomes the naturalization of the psychic and the naturalistic 
opposition between "internal" and "external" experience.49 "But can't one accept the necessity of 
this critique of na'ive psychology only up to a point" (SP, p. 45n)? For the reason that, as Derrida 
writes, phenomenology is also an accomplice of this classical psychology: to the extent that 
Husserl posits an absolute heterogeneity between perception and imagination and believes that a 
pure and primordial presentation is possible and given in the original, he reduces or derives 
imagination from primordial perception (Gegenwiirtigung. Priisentation). To the extent that 
Husserl maintains this difference, the difference between intuitive perception or presentation of 
4K This is the Husscrlian thesis of the non-fictive irreality of eidos about which Derrida wrote also in lOG: 
"an irreality which is nothing other than the sense and possibility of factual reality to which it is always 
related, immediatelv or not. as the rigorous prescription of the eidos' essential mode of appearing." (p. 1..+..+) 
4lJ Of (;rammafolog~\'. p. 64 
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the real word in real communication and the ideal presence of the word in imaginary 
representation (Phantasievorstellung), in order to legitimise and secure the rigour of the 
distinction between indication and expression, phenomenology does not break with the 
psychology of intuitive consciousness and thereby reaffirms its attachment to the metaphysics of 
50 presence. 
~()Ihid .. p. 40. 
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3) The Ideality of Speech: Presence and Repetition 
According to Derrida, the metaphysical attachment of phenomenology. its complicity to 
the metaphysics of presence is evidenced in the very last paragraph of (§8) "Expressions in 
solitary mental life (Ausdrucke in einsamen Seelenleben)", where Husserl gathers the entire thrust 
of his argument about the essential distinction between expression and indication and about the 
status of representation pertaining to them. The reduction to soliloquy, to the inward speech of the 
solitary subject is necessary for Husserl in order to isolate and define the pure function of 
expression and meaning, and, thereby, pure logicality. As we said, the pure function of expression 
(which is indissociable from the power of the voice) is not to communicate, inform, or manifest a 
lived experience to another subject. The infinite distance that separates the absolute origins, the 
ego (the hearer) from an alter ego (the speaker), makes the indicative function of expression 
irreducible. The expression of these experiences is always, and necessarily, carried off into 
indication whenever they are animated by a meaning (bedeuten) in order to be heard by another 
person. But when I speak to myself, the meaning (Bedeutung) or sense of these expressions are 
not indicated (Anzeigen) to me through existing signs, rather "the expression seems to direct 
interest away from itself towards its sense (von sich ab und auf den Sinn hinZlIlenken) and to 
point (hinzuzeigen) to the latter" (LI, §8, p. 279). The purely expressive reference of the sign 
(Hinzeigen), supposedly at work in soliloquy, is rigorously distinguished by Husserl from the 
indicative reference (Anzeigen) of the sign, from the sign as it functions in real communication. 
The exclusion or reduction of indicative speech (i.e., of the communication with the other) in the 
interior monologue, will reveal to us the strange prerogative of the voice, of oral discourse, for 
the whole of phenomenology, as well as the allegedly essential and irreducible tie between phone 
and expression. Husserl writes in the last paragraph of §8: 
One of course speaks. in a certain sense, even in soliloquy, and it is certainly possible to think of 
oneself as speaking, and even as speaking to oneself, as, e.g., when someone says to himself: "You hare 
ROlle wrong, )'011 can't go on like that." But in the genuine sense of communication, there is no speech in 
such cases, nor does one tell oneself anything: one merely represents oneself (man stellt sich vor) as 
speaking and communicating. In a monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence 
(Dasein) of psychic acts. since such indication would there be quite purposeless (ganz zwecklos ware). For 
the aCls in qucstion are themselvcs experienced by us in the same instant (im selben Augenblick). LI. *8. 
pp. 279-280. 
Now Derrida before asking why Husserl has chosen this example "You have gone wrong, 
you can't go on like that". why take his example from the practical order (as if inner life or inner 
spL't'ch is always essentially practical or axiological), or whether and how the choice of the 
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example is revelatory of HusserI's project, he poses the question of representation in language. 
Derrida devotes three out of the seven chapters of his Speech and Phenomena to this paragraph of 
the §8. He will return to the first Investigation (§9) in his last chapter and only after he has 
meditated at length on the questions of repetition, of fiction, of imagination, of memory. and of 
internal-time consciousness which accompany and gather together around the question of 
representation as it is posed in the above quotation from §8. 
In the above paragraph Derrida discerns two arguments concerning the external relation 
between inward language (pure expression, which is the pure spirituality of the 
Bedeutungsintention and not the body of words) and outward language (indication, the effective 
practice of speech, the sensible and bodily aspect of language). Husserl seems to argue that 
between, on the one hand, the subject as he is in his inner life, that is as he represents or imagines 
himself speaking or communicating with the other and, on the other hand, the subject as he is, or 
presents himself in real communication, as he is in his effective experience of the other, there is 
only a relation of exteriority. Let us try to formulate these two arguments. 
a) In truth, in inward language I communicate or indicate nothing to myself, I can at most 
represent or imagine myself doing so. When I imagine myself speaking, and even speaking to 
myself as if to a second person ("You have gone wrong"), as if there was an indicative 
communication between the self and the self (the self taken as other and the self taken as self), 
this communication is only an imagination (Phantasie). Whenever I speak to myself, my 
(imagined or nonexistent) signs do not function as An;,eigen but as Hin;,eigen. Furthermore, it is a 
purely fictitious speech, a feigned communication: in my inner life there is no relation to the other 
as in indicative and real communication between two alter egos, there is no alter ego within me. 
When such an alter ego appears in inward speech this is only afiction or an illusion: in reality the 
subject simply reproduces or repeats in himself an expression that can effecti\'ely and tntly take 
place only in real communication. 
b) If indicative communication with the other in the sphere of inner life is only 
imaginary, if it is only fictitious or illusory, if, in truth, in inward speech I communicate or 
indicate nothing to myself, if I learn nothing about myself, that is, if I do not give any knowledge 
to myself in the sense of either Kundgabe or Kundnahme, this is because there is no need and no 
reason for 111(' to do so. The speaking subject indicates nothing to himself. Husserl believes. 
bl'cause such an indication would be useless, without purpose (ganz ZH'ecklos): the existence of 
livcd cxperiences (in Husserl's example, the feeling of remorse) does not have to be indicated 
through the intermediary of signs. i.e .. of indications (An;,eigen), because these experiences are 
immediately present to the subject in the present moment. Husserl writes. im .'Ie/ben :\ugeniJlick. 
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This expenence of the absence or uselessness of signs in the subject's relation to itself, this 
purposelessness of inward indication or communication of the lived experiences to themselves is. 
according to Derrida's commentary, nothing else than "the nonalterity, the nondifference in the 
identity of presence as self-presence" (SP, p. 58). 
Husserl in order to maintain the argument about the extrinsic relation between expression 
and indication (the inside of pure expression comes only in real and factual communication, i.e., 
only contingently, to be associated or conjoined with indication), seems to apply to language a 
fundamental distinction, the distinction between, on the one hand, reality (real presence or real 
communication, where the speaker is present to himself, to what he actuaIIy says, and to the 
other) and, on the other hand, representation (ideal presence to imaginative representation, where 
the speaker is present to himself and alone with himself), imagination and fiction. 
According to this argument, it seems not only that reality, real communication or real 
presence can dispense with all representation (in the sense of Vorstellung, but also in the sense of 
Vergegenwartigung and Repriisentation51 ) but also that the difference between them is such that 
the act of representation, the representation or imagination of self as speaking subject, can be 
added only as an accident, as an extrinsic and empirical fact to the act of real, present and 
effective communication. Accordingly, representation or represented speech is not essential to 
real communication, the possibility of representation itself does not constitute that which is said 
to be simply represented by it, that which is supposed to be simple and simply present to itself, it 
only befaIls the latter from without as a subsequent fact foreign to the essence and unity of real 
communication. Husserl then seems to allow, on the basis of an example taken, let us note it, 
from the practical sphere, that as concerns the same signifiers, the same signification! Bedeutung 
("You have gone wrong, ... ") an essential and rigorous distinction can be drawn between outward 
speech and inward speech, and within each of them a further distinction between real, effective or 
veridical speech and imaginative or fictitious speech: the same signifiers animated and uttered 
effectively in a real, veridical communication, the same words used effectively by the speaker in 
order to enjoin a decision and blame a second person, may also be animated in solitary mental life 
but give rise therein merely to an imaginative or fictitious communication.52 Husserl's argument 
51 "Representation can be understood in the general sense of Vorste!lung. but also in the sense of re-
presentation, as repetition or reproduction of presentation, as the VergegenH'drtigllllg which modifies a 
Priisentatioll or Gegellwiirtigung. And it can be understood as what takes the place of. what occupies the 
place of another \'or,l(ellulIg (Repriisentatioll. Reprdsentant. Steth'ertreter)." SP. p. 49. It is this structure 
of substitution or reference (renvoi) that is of major interest for Derrida. We will deal with it later. 
,~ This Lioes not mean that, for Husser!. inward language is always and purely fictitious. According to 
Derrida, Husser! allows the possibility that in rea!. effccti\e speech but also in soliloquy an essential 
distinction can be made between fictitious and effecti\\;~ use of language. This is what Husserl wants ahme 
alitn demonstrate: "Inside the pure interiur 'representation' in 'solitary mental life' certain kinds of __ peech 
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comes down to this: unlike effective speech, "represented" speech in soliloquy does not ha\"e the 
function of either Kundgabe or Kundnahme. (SP, pp. 71, 89) 
Now, Derrida asks, can we apply the difference between reality and representation to 
language, can we legitimately maintain a border line between effective real communication (in 
the case of which indication would be irreducible) and "represented" communication (in the case 
of which internal speech would preserve its expressivity while losing its indicative exteriority, the 
external surface of words), between real presence in (effective, indicative) communication and 
ideal presence in represented (vorgestellt) communication? Is the representation or imagination 
involved in inward speech external to real and effective communication, so that it can be 
excluded without danger from the latter and from its essential conditions of possibility'? Is not the 
possibility of representation and imagination then constitutive of real communication? But 
Husserl himself, Derrida says, has given us to think the reasons why the latter is indeed the case. 
"But there is every reason to believe that representation and reality are not merely added 
together here and there in language, for the simple reason that it is impossible in principle to 
distinguish them. And it doesn't help to say that this happens in language; language in general -
and language alone - is this" (SP, pp. 49-50). Is it not Husserl who described the structure of 
language and of the sign in general in terms of ideality and repetition? Is it not Husserl who gave 
us to understand that "the sign is not an event, [ ... J an irreplaceable and irreversible empirical 
particular", that "a sign which could take place but 'once' would not be a sign, that a purely 
idiomatic sign would not be a sign," in other words that the identity of the sign, its signifying 
form - which should not be confused with the multiple events of its empirical, phonetic. or 
graphic materialization, since it is what allows it to be issued again and again and recognized as 
the same through all possible linguistic acts or events - is ideal, and therefore that, as ideality, 
depends entirely on the possibility of repetition and representation? 
Derrida can assert then, and precisely by following Husserl's description of the ideal 
Objectivity of languageS3 , that ~rithin language and within the sign the difference does not take 
place between reality and representation, neither between simple presence in real communication 
and its reproductive repetition in imaginative re-presentation, nor between veridical and fictitious 
communication, nor between the represented and the representative, nor even between signified 
and signifier. Since every sign (as signifier and as signified) as well as every act of signification. 
evcry signifying event in general, whether it is purely expressive and involved in interior and 
could (:t!ectil'ely take place. as (t!ectil'elr represcntati\l~ (this would be the case with expressive language 
and language with a purely objecti\'e. theoretico-Iogical character) while certain others would remam 
rurdy fictitious ... .. (SP. p. 56). this would be the case with the axiological language of our example. 
1 lOG. pr. 67-72. SP. pp. )2-5~ and Husser!'s LI §§/I. I:;. pp. 2X~-89. 
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silent monologue or indicative and involved in real communication, is ideal, it necessarily implies 
repetition and representation. But this representation does not have only the sense of Vorstellung, 
the locus of pure ideality reached by the neutralization of the wordly existence of the sign. Which 
is precisely what Husserl wants to demonstrate by supposing that it is only pure expression and 
not signification in general that belongs to the order of representation as Vorstellung. In the 
sphere of subjective interiority, in the sphere of ideal presence in representation as Vorstellung, 
"expressive phenomena in their expressive purity are, from the start, taken to be imaginati\'e 
representations (Phantasievorstellungen)." (SP, p. 56) Since the sign is ideal it implies not only 
Vorstellung but also re-presentation "as Vergegenwartigung, the possibility of reproducti\'e 
repetition in general, and as Reprasentation, insofar as each signifying event is a substitute (for 
the signified as well as for the ideal form of the signifier)." 54 
If that is so, I (an ego in general) cannot speak to myself or enter into effective dialogue 
with the other without beingfrom the start, always already involved in unlimited representation: I 
must from the outset operate within a structure of repetition whose basic element is 
representative. But if the primordial structure of repetition belongs to and governs the function 
of every speech act and of every sign in general, then, whether speech is involved in 
communication or in soliloquy, the distinction between effective speech and representation of 
speech, between effective usage of the sign and imaginary or fictitious usage of the sign, becomes 
not only questionable but also suspect. If the structure of language is ideal, i.e., originally 
dependent on the acts of repetition, "there is every chance", Derrida tells us, "that effective 
language is as imaginary as imaginary speech and that imaginary speech is just as effective as 
effective speech" (SP, p. 51). If we admit that all signs are of an originally repetitive structure, 
then we must also admit that, "in both expression and indication the difference between reality 
and representation, between the veridical and the imaginary, and between simple presence and 
repetition has already begun to wear away" (ibid). 
For Husserl, however, this system of differences is indispensable in order to prove that 
indication (the indicative function of the sign in real communication) is external to inward 
expression (pure expression in soliloquy). By declaring this system of differences "illegitimate," 
'i~ SP, p. 50. Let us recall here that for H usserl (who wri tes "E very sign is a sign for something/ fi.ir etwas") 
thl' structure offill' ctwas sein, the structure of "being in the place of' or of "being for". that is. the structure 
of substitution or reference (renvoi) belongs to every sign in general, and to e\ery act of signification, 
cxprl'ssi\e (Hin~cigen) or indicali\L' (AI/~eigen). It is only by assuming the possibility of substitution as a 
matter of course. by neglecting to put in into a critical questioning, Derrida writes. that Husser! was ah~e to 
maintain the rigorous distinction between the represented (the for itself of simple and real presence of the 
suhleet) and th~ represenlati\e (the in the place of the suhject) in general, hetween real preselll'e of the ~clf 
in ~ffecti\e communication and representation of the self as speaking subject in imagination and in fiction. 
We will lome back to this. 
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and by deconstructing them, starting precisely from the repetitive structure of the sign, \\ e 
anticipate a whole chain of formidable consequences for phenomenology" (SP, p. 57). According 
to Derrida then, the maintaining of these differences "in the history of metaphysics and in Husserl 
as well- answer to the obstinate desire to save presence and to reduce or derive the sign and with 
it all the powers of repetition" (ibid., p. 51). Now how is this metaphysical desire to eliminate the 
sign, to submit the sign to the presence of sense, the desire to save presence, i.e., desire itself, to 
be deconstructed? First of all by avoiding this kind of circle, this "unique circle" within which all 
"destructive discourses" find themselves trapped when they are not ready to recognize that, as 
Derrida writes in Writing and Difference, "we cannot pronounce not a single destructive 
proposition which has not already had to slip into the fonn, the logic, and the implicit postulations 
of precisely what it seeks to contest.")) 
There are two heterogeneous ways, Derrida says, of eliminating the sign and the power of 
repetition: the first, the classic philosophical way, consists in a move which derives the sign (and 
with it re-presentation and repetition) from the fullness and simplicity of the self-presence of 
experience. Vergegenwartigung, re-presentation and re-petition are simple modifications or 
redublications which befall a simple presence, a primordial perception or presentation 
(Gegenwartigung or Vorstellung/6• To the extent that the Husserlian concept of transcendental 
experience remains governed by the intuitionist motif, i.e., by the possibility or the telos of full 
and simple presence (the ideal presence of the object to intuition and of intuition to itself), it 
participates, according to Derrida, in the philosophical movement of the reduction of the sign, of 
the exterior, contingent signifier. 
The second way consists in restoring and affinning the primordialit:; of repetition and the 
irreducibilit)· of the sign by putting into question the whole philosophical and teleological system 
of oppositions and concepts (presence, representation, repetition, difference, supplement etc) 
which allowed the reduction of the repetitive structure of the sign in the first place.57 But because 
it was the Western philosophy itself, that is, as Derrida writes 
.\~ Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, published in Writing and Difference, 
cr. 280-~81. . . . . .. . .. "" 
. If the IdealIty reached wIth Vorstellung IS always that of an Ideal ob-Ject (Gegenstand) whIch stands In 
front of (open to view), or is pre-sent (Gegenwart) before the act of repetition or reproduction. then \ '0,.-
stellung is "the gcncral form of presence as proximity to a viewing." (SP, p. 53.) And as Derrida writes a 
little further on "The pre of the presellf objcct now-before us is an against (Gegellwart, Gegenstand) both in 
the sense ofthc 'up-against' [tout-counre] ofproxilllity and as the opposition [/'encontre] of the op-posed." 
SP. p. 75. ~7 RefclTint! to the deconstruction of the oppositional logic of metaphysical conceptualization 
(prcscllcelrcprcscntatinn. prL~SenL'\: /repetition. expressivc speechlindicati\"e writing. etc) .Derrida writcs in 
Signature El'ent Context that this opposition "is ne\cr the confrontation (Ie \'is-d-vis) ot two terms. but a 
hierarchy and an order of suhordination. Deconstruction cannot be restricted or immediately pass to a 
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. the philo~op~y and history of the West, which has so constituted and established the ver) concept 
of the sIgn, the sIgn IS from its origin and to the core of its sense marked by this will to derivation or 
effaceme~t. T.hus, to restore the original and nonderivative character of signs, in opposition to classical 
metaphYSICS, IS, by an apparent paradox, at the same time to eliminate a concept of signs whose whole 
history and meaning belong to the adventure of the metaphysics of presence. SP, p. 51. 
To affinn that full and simple presence, either real presence (Gegenwiirtigung or 
Priisentation) in communication or ideal presence in imaginative representation as Vorstellung, is 
not primordial, that there is no absolute "beginning", that re-presenation is "older" than 
presentation, or that re-presentation and re-productive repetition in general are more primordial 
than what is phenomenologically primordial (i.e., intuitive presence), that "somehow everything 
begins by 're-presentation (Vergegenwiirtigung)'" (SP, p. 45n), is not to go against or "reject" 
phenomenology, or "to retreat from the level of transcendental phenomenology toward either an 
'empiricism' or a 'Kantian' critique of the claim of having primordial intuition" (ibid., p. 46n). 
What Derrida describes as "primordial repetition" or 
[as] primordial representation can be provisionally designated with this term only within the 
closure whose limits we are here seeking to transgress by setting down and demonstrating various 
contradictory and untenable propositions within it, attempting thereby to institute a kind of insecurity and 
to open it up to the outside. This can only be done from a certain inside. SP, p. 57n. 
This would perhaps mean that Derrida's deconstructive discourse does not take a step 
outside the epoch of metaphysics whose closure it, nevertheless, can outline, that it is not a matter 
of crossing a border, an indivisible border or line (i.e., of a border or line identical with itself) and 
remaining exclusively there, pure and uncontaminated by metaphysical conceptuality. 58 Now 
what is this inside, this opening from within philosophy, from within Western philosophy which 
is always a metaphysics of presence and which relentlessly exhausts itself in trying to 
circumscribe and close it? 
neutralization: it must through a double gesture, a double science, a double writing - put into practice a 
rel'l'I"sal of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. It is on that condition alone 
that deconstruction will provide the means of intervening in the field of oppositions it criticizes and that is 
also a field of nondiscursive forces." SEC, p. 21. 
5H The question of metaphysics and of closure, of the relation between the inside and the outside of 
philosophy, between belonging to the tradition that one inherits and responding to the tradition, is a 
frequent and important question for Derrida in his early but also later writings. For instance in Violence and 
Metaphysics, and with regard to the metaphysical concepts of "inside/outside" "same/other", Derrida poses 
the question of the responsibility of one's own philosophical discourse (pp. 116, 130). For him the question 
as to whether one can shake the ultimate foundations of the tradition (of philosophy) one inherits while 
renouncing all philosophical discourse, is an ahistorical and absurd question. "And, if you wIlL the attempt 
to adlinc an opening toward the beyond of philosophical discourse, hy means of philosophical discoursc. 
which can ncycr be shaken off completely, cannot possihly succeed u'irhin language - and Lc\ Inas 
nxo~ni/cs that therc is no thought before or outside of it - except by formally and thematically posing the 
qlll's~ion of the relatiolls /Jl'fll"l'l'1I helonging and the opening. the question of c/osure. " V,\!. p. Ito. 
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The concepts of idealization and of repetition are at the centre of Derrida' s 
deconstruction of the system of differences which Husserl applies to language. These concepts 
have been used or worked over as deconstructive concepts59: the ideality and repetitive structure 
of the sign allow the deconstruction of what they make possible, namely Vorstellung itself. ideal 
presence to an ideal or transcendental consciousness, to a consciousness as meaning (voll/oir-
dire, Bedeuten). We thus come to make - with the help of Husserl's description of the movement 
of the idealization of the sign (both as signifier/expression and as signified/meaning) and by 
contradicting his explicit intention to take pure expression in solitary mental life to be a pure 
Vorstellung, i.e., an ideal and simple presence of the Bedeutungsintention to itself and to its 
content, anterior to and free from representative re-production or reproductive repetition - "we 
thus come to make", Derrida writes "Vorstellung itself, and as such, depend on the possibility of 
re-presentation (Vergegenwdrtigung). The presence of the present is derived from repetition, and 
not the reverse." (my emphasis) (SP, p. 52) 
The concepts of ideality and repetition (but also, as we are gomg to see, of 
difference, of substitution and of supplement) have a deconstructive value: they allow the 
deconstruction of what they make possible, or as Derrida puts it in A Taste for the Secret, they 
offer "the locus where what we hold to be deconstructible is constituted." 60 
Our claim is that, with regard to the concept of the sign (ideality, etc), everything depends 
on how one sets it to work: it can at the same time reassure the phono-Iogocentric system of 
metaphysical thought (in which this concept was born and destined to serve) and shake or disturb 
it, by uprooting it from its own soil (the metaphysical system of differences between presence and 
representation, the represented and the representative, signifier and signified, the sensible and the 
intelligible). Having said this we also maintain our disbelief in decisive breaks, in unequivocal 
transgressions, since the latter are always and fatally inscribed, undertaken and understood, in an 
old code or discourse, to which metaphysics is tied irreducibly, and which must interminably be 
undone. There is no metaphysical and nonmetaphysical concepts, there is work, metaphysical or 
not, performed and to be done on conceptual systems. Deconstruction, as the "transgression" of 
metaphysics. implies that this "transgression" will never present itself as afait accompli, that the 
limit will and must be always at work, and that the task of transgression, of the work to be done 
on one side and the other of the limit, is an infinite task. It was never then a question of rejecting 
'i'l 'There is no concept that is metaphysical in itself. There is labor - metaphysical or not - performed on 
conceptual systems" SEC, p. 21. SL'e also especially Of Grammatology. p. 1-+. 
flO Derrida Jacques. Ferraris Mauri/io. A Taste for the Secret. translated by Giacomo Donis. Polity Pres~. 
2001. p. 77. "The paradox of this concept or idealization. as I make use of it within a decon"tructi\'e 
process. is that it is horrowed in some way from a sort of Platonism that. from Plato to Husser\. pri\ iJeges 
the form of sensihle-insensihle or insensihilized intuition."' (ihid) 
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or OppOSIng another discourse on the same "thing", but of interminably analysing the whole 
conceptual machinery and its interestedness, a question of transforming, displacing and 
reinscribing the old concepts in new chains and texts, and therefore of modifying the field and 
performatively producing new contexts for future work, for the work to come. Moreover 
Husserlian phenomenology is itself, according to Derrida, in the grips of autodeconstructive 
movements, precisely when it determines the structure of the sign and of expression in terms of 
ideality and repetition. 
As we have already seen in the first part of the thesis, the structure of speech is described 
by Husserl exclusively in terms of ideality, and more precisely in terms of more or less free 
ideality. Derrida in the Introduction to the Origin of Geometry discerned three degrees of ideality: 
the ideality of the signifier (or expression), of the signified (or Bedeutung) and of the object. Only 
the absolute ideality of the geometrical object, which is a transcultural objectivity. we said then, 
can assure the ideal transparency and univocity of the expressive Bedeutung. Now this ideality 
does not belong to reality, it is irreal. It does not exist in the world (as real things exist), but it 
does not come from another world either. The being (Sein) of ideality is nonreality and non-
existence; ideality does not exists but it is. 61 This non-existence or nonwordliness "is not another 
wordliness, this ideality is not an existent that has fallen from the sky; its origin is always the 
possible repetition of a productive act" (SP, p. 6). When Husserl affirms the non-existence or 
nonreality of ideality, it is always in order to acknowledge the authentic mode of ideality, i.e., 
ideality as a way of being that is irreducible to sensible existence or empirical reality. This is 
indeed, according to Derrida, the abc, the first word of phenomenology. In the very first pages of 
Speech and Phenomena he cannot emphasize enough the importance of the concept of ideality for 
the Husserlian critique of "degenerated" metaphysics. By affirming Being (Sein) as the nonreality 
of the ideal, that ideality is unreal, but it is, by providing an access to the sense of Being that 
cannot not be exhausted by reality, Husserl has begun to restore an "authentic metaphysics 
(which will owe its accomplishment to phenomenology)". 
The unique and permanent motif of all the mistakes and distortions which Husserl exposes in 
'degenerated' metaphysics [ ... ] is always a blindness to the authentic mode of ideality, to that which is. to 
what may hc indefinitely repeated in the identity of its presence. because of the very fact that it docs not 
nist. is not real or is irreal - not in a sense of being a fiction. but in another sense which may have sc\cral 
names. whose possihility will permit us to speak of nonreality and essential necessity. the noema. the 
(,j Husserl writes "Each attempt to transform the being of what is ideal (das Seill des Idealell) into the 
possibk hcing of what is real. must tlh\iously suffer shipwreck on the fact that possibilities themseh es are 
in turn ideal objects. Possibilities can as little be found in the real world. as can numbers in general. or 
triangks in !2eneral." Lo~icaI11l\·(',\rigatiolls. Second Investigation. §8. p. 352. 
~ ~ , 
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intelligible object, and in general the nonwordly. This nonwordliness is not another wordline'>s. this ideality 
is not an existent that has fallen from the sky; its origin will always be the possible repetition of ~ 
productive act. In order that the possibility of this repetition may be open, ideally to infinity, one ideal 
form must assure this unity of the indefinite and the ideal: this is the present, or rather the presence of the 
living present. SP, p. 6. 
Being is determined, by Husserl, as ideality i.e., as infinite repetition, and, paradoxically 
as Derrida writes, as presence. Why paradoxically? Because, on the one hand. only pure ideality 
- the ideality of the Bedeutung and of the expression, the ideality or irreality of the noema, 
noema's non-real (reell) inclusion in consciousness,62 and the ideality of the object, for example, 
the geometrical object - only pure ideality then can give Husserl the assurance or the promise that 
presence to consciousness can be infinitely repeated, ideal presence to an ideal or transcendental 
consciousness. This presence of an ideal object whatever to an intentional act of consciousness as 
well as the presence of the temporal present as the living present (the ultimate ground of all 
intentional acts aiming at objects), is the presence of nothing existing in the world; it is the 
correlate of acts of repetition. Pure ideality then is "the preservation or salvation (saillt) and 
mastery of presence in repetition" (SP, pp. 9-10). For ideality is the form in which the presence 
of an object in general may be indefinitely repeated as the same, but also the form of the living 
present. And the living present is the ultimate form of ideality, i.e., the ideal and the absolute 
form of all experience and of all life, the form within which the possibility of the infinite 
repetition of the same can be accomplished and assured. 
We underlined the word life, lived experience because, on the other hand, Derrida tells 
us, a certain relation of an existent, of an existent subjectivity to its own death. lurks in this 
determination of being as presence, as ideality and as infinite repetition. The passage to infinity, 
to the infinite repetition of the same, characteristic of the idealization of object, can appear in the 
acts of a speaking subjectivity only by virtue of its finitude and mortality. This relationship with 
death produces ideal objects but also produces signification, bedeutsame Zeichen, meaning, and, 
as Derrida wants to show, it produces intuition, intentionality and the living present itself. 
What are the consequences of describing the sign in general exclusively in terms of 
ideality (as an ideal form)? Is there a case where I effectively use signs. either in writing or in 
speech, either in a monologue or when I address a second person, where my signs do not have an 
ideal identity. where the ideal identity of my signs does not entail the possibility that my speech 
or writing can always function (make sense and be intelligible) quite independently from my here 
and nOlI' actual intention. from my present desire to say what I want to say. consciously and 
62 An includedness. which as Dcrrida writes. "is neither a suhject nor an ohject. and therefore is nothing hut 
the ohjects' Ohjectivity. the appearing of its 'as such' for a consciousness." lOG. p. l'+-L 
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explicitly, i.e., expressly? Is not my hic et nunc nonpresence or absence, my death not only 
tolerated but most fundamentally required by the ideal identity of the sign, i.e .. by the originally 
repetitive structure of the sign and of the signifying event? We will come back to this. For the 
moment let us say that, according to Derrida, to the extent that the Husserlian concept of 
experience, and in particular the experience of the voice or inward expression, of speaking and 
hearing myself as the experience of the absence of indication, remains subordinated to the theme 
of presence it participates to the reduction or elimination of the sign and to the dissimulation of 
this relationship to death. However, it is Husserl's descriptions of the movement of 
temporalization, the descriptions which do not tolerate the simplicity and domination of the 
metaphysical form of presence, that can reveal to us to what extent phenomenology belongs to the 
classical metaphysics of presence. 
Let us come back to the second argument we mentioned above in order to see the 
adherence of phenomenology to metaphysics. The communicative discourse that a subject may 
address to himself ("you are thus and so") is completely imaginary and fictitious, because it is 
useless. The subject communicates or indicates nothing to himself because his lived experiences, 
and in particular the acts by which he gives sense to his expression, are immediatel.v self-present. 
they are in absolute proximity to themselves and immediately certain. The manifestation of self to 
the self through the delegation or the representation of an indicative sign is impossible because it 
is superfluous and without finality, without reason and without purpose (;'H'ecklos). In the sphere 
of my own lived experiences I do not need the mediation of signs, i.e., indications63 in order to 
constitute a relation to myself. It is the possibility of such self-relation in silence which would 
make signs, i.e., An;.eigen, useless and without purpose. This purposelessness (zwecklosigkeit) of 
indicative communication in solitary mental life supposes, however, the pure and simple 
presence, the immediate belonging to itself of the living present, the simple self-identity of the il1l 
sclben A ligen blick, "the non-alterity, the non-difference in the identity of presence as self-
presence" (SP, p. 58). 
The self-presence of the living, of experience (the Erleben), what is called in the history 
of metaphysics "consciousness", the self-presence and direct immediacy of the pure intention 
which gives sense and meaning to signs, must be produced in the present taken as a now, in the 
undivided unity of a living present, so as to have nothing to reveal to itself by the agency of signs. 
(" Fnr Husserl only indications (the external surface of language. and the dements of spatiality, sensihility 
and wordly existence that are implied there) are signs. since pure expression as pure living intention. as the 
animating act of expression has Ilut yet gone out of itself and into the wnrld. space and sensihility. SP. pp. 
40.42. 
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The immediate presence of the signified Bedeutung (it is immediately present to an inner intuition 
or perception,and not, as we have said, to the perception of the other person in communication), 
and what supposes, the present or the now of self-presence would be indivisible as the blink of an 
eye. As re-presentations, language and signs in general are added on to a consciousness that is 
simple and simply present to itself, they are added on to an experience that could reflect its own 
presence in silence. Signs are foreign to this self-presence of the present in the living present, 
which is the ground of presence in general. (Only in this way, can Husserl claim that they are 
foreign to presence in (external) intuition or perception.6~) Such self-presence, such perception or 
intuition of self by self in presence, such self-relation would be the case where signification could 
not occur, but also the case which could "assure the general possibility of a primordial perception 
or intuition, i.e., of nonsignification as the principle of principles" (SP, p. 60). As Husserl argues: 
In a monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence (Dasein) of psychic 
acts, since such indication would there be quite purposeless (ganz ::.wecklos ware). For the acts in question 
are themselves experienced by us in the blink of an eye, or in the same instant Urn selben Augenblick von 
uns selbst erlebt}. (U, §8) 
Now Derrida devotes his fourth chapter, Signs and the Blink of an Eye, to what he calls 
"the metaphysical assurance par excellence", to the privilege assigned to the temporal present 
taken as a now, to the present and actual now as the absolute source, the living core of time itself. 
The force of the Husserlian argument, namely the Zwecklosigkeit of inward communication, the 
uselessness of indications in self-presence or self-relation, the absence of another in myself, 
should indeed be diminished as soon as this confidence or self-confident presence of the living 
present starts trembling. 
As Derrida shows, the im selben Augenblick refers to the undivided unity of the actual 
and living now, i.e., to the identity of the source, of the absolute beginning, to the non-
displaceable centre or arche of temporality, the absolute perceptual source or the eye of 
temporality. 'The force of HusserI' s demonstration presupposes the instant as a point, the identity 
of experience instantaneously present to itself' (SP, p. 60). "A certain concept of the now, of the 
present as punctuality of the instant, discreetly but decisively sanctions the entire system of 
essential distinctions" (ibid., p. 61). 
This is, according to Derrida, in agreement with phenomenology's principle of principles. 
with the idea of original)' presence and of the self-identity of the now as a "source point." Only a 
temporality, we said before, determined on the basis of a living present as its source can ensure 
(,4 For example. as Husser! writes in Ideas I § 12 ... 1-, in the silent perception of a "this white" the passage to 
enunciation adds nothing new (a new sense content) to the perceptual (precxpressive) sense of experience. 
And in .~43 we read that "hetween perception. on the one hand. and snnbollc representatioN hy /Il('(/ns oj 
image'S 0,. signs. on the other hand. there is an unhridgeahk eiddic difkrenee." 
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the purity of ideality, i.e., openness to the infinite repeatability of the same. The living present, 
the most primordial and concrete lived experience, is also the universal form of all experience. 
(SP, p. 53) But if the metaphysical theme of presence, the motif of the living present, the !i\'ing, 
punctual now as the "primal form ", the Uiform of consciousness is at the heart of the argument 
about the rigorous distinction between expression and indication, we should expect that "if the 
punctuality of the instant is a myth, a spatial or mechanical metaphor, ... , and if the present of 
self-presence is not simple, if it is constituted in a primordial synthesis ... then the whole of 
HusserI's argumentation is threatened in its very principle" (SP, p. 61). 
Even if Husserl himself, as early as the Phenomenology of Consciousness of Internal 
Time (1905), has recognized the impossibility of spatializing and dividing the flow of time into 
parts, phases or points, the impossibility of isolating the now as pure punctuality, as a pure instant 
(stigme) or a point which could be by itself, even if he spoke instead of an irreducible running-
off (or spreading-out, as another translation puts it) of inner phenomena65 , and of an essence of 
lived experiences "that must be extended in such a way that a punctual phase can never exist by 
itself,66, he nonetheless cannot give up the idea of a primordial presence, of an "absolute 
beginning", the "myth" of an arche, as source or centre, of temporality: the primal datum, the 
primordial character of the living now in its self-identity, as evidence itself and as the absolute 
source of certitude in general. He also emphasises, then, that "first of aIr' temporal phenomena 
and experiences "have a beginning, a source point. This is the running-off mode with which the 
immanent temporal object begins to exist. It is characterized as now".67 And as Husser! famously 
puts it in Ideas I, "the actllal now is necessarily something punctual and remains so, a form that 
persists through continuous change of matter.,,68 
Now despite the motif of the punctual and actual now as a form, the form in which an 
infinite diversity of (materially determined) contents can be produced, Derrida, following 
Husser!'s descriptions, brings to light those instances which undermine, from ~rithil1 
phenomenology, the possibility of a self-identical, absolutely present to itself living now, and a 
fortiori the possibility of a purely expressive language in soliloquy, in the monadic sphere of 
"~PCIT !iIO '19 
. s ,p. - . 
"" Ihid., § 19. p. -l9. 
h7 Ihid .. § 10. p. 30. 
hN Ideus I. §RI p. 195. With this phenomenological detem1ination of the concrete and lived experience of 
the /lOW (or present) as the uni\l~rsal and ahsolulL' form of all experience in general. the oppo~ition ~etween 
form and matter. the opposition which according to Derrida inaugurates metaphysIcs. f lllJ" 111 
phl'nomenology its ultimate and radical justification. 
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egological subjectivity, the possibility, that is, of a monadic subject speaking with himself and 
hearing himself at the same time that he speaks. 
Derrida argues then that, despite this metaphysical theme, Husser! in Phenomenological 
Consciousness of Internal Time demonstrates the irreducibility of the processes of repetition and 
reproduction to a primordial impression or perception, to the pure actuality of the living present 
or now: "Following the rigorous development of this text. .. one sees quickly that the presence of 
the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch it is continuously compollnded with a 
nonpresence and a nonperception, with primary memory and primary expectation (retention and 
protention)" (SP, p. 64). 
What Husser! demonstrated in his critique of Brentano, according to Derrida, is that if we 
do not want to collapse retention (primary memory) to reproduction (secondary memory or 
recollection), or perception to imagination, the difference between perception and retention H'ithin 
the "continuously flowing, absolutely originary phase, i.e., the moment of the living now .. 69 
should not be as radical as the difference between perception and reproduction (secondary 
memory and imagination). In this sense Husser! says that retention is a perception inasmuch as in 
it "we do see what is past", inasmuch as it gives us to see, not in a re-presentative but in a 
presentative way 70, not an actual present (which is given only in a primordial perception or 
impression), but a just-present, that is, a nonpresent, a past and inactual present. 
According to Derrida, it is "fidelity to the things themselves" that led Husser! to keep this 
retention (as perception of the just-now) in the sphere of primordial certitude (understood "in the 
broader sense") together with primordial perception or impression, and to move the frontier 
between primordial re-tention and re-productive or secondary recollection, between the absolute 
certainty pertaining to retention and the relative certainty of representation. Which does not mean 
that there is no difference between primordial impression or perception and primordial retention 
(or primary memory) 71, but only that it is less radical than the difference between the primordial 
and the nonprimordial (re-presentation, Wiedererinnerung). 
69 Ideas I, § 78, p. 180. 
70 " ... if we call perception the act which all 'origin' lies, the act that constitutes originally, the primary 
memory is perception. For only in primary memory do we see what is past, only in it does the past ?eco~e 
nmstituted - and constituted presentatively, not re-presentatively. [ ... ] On the other hand, recollectIOn, lIke 
~hantasy, merely offers us re-presentation." pelT §17, p. 43. 
I Husserl writes "If we now relate what has heen said ahout perception to the difference.1 of the gi\'ennes.1 
with which temporal ohjects make their appearance, then the antithesis of perception is primary memory, 
and the primary expectation (retention and protention) that occur here: in whieh case, perception and non 
perception continuously blend into one another," pelT, § 16, p. 41. It is not that there IS no 
discontinuity hetween perceptil1l1 and retention. it is rather that is not so radical as hetween re-trntlOn and 
re-production. 
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But as soon as Husserl admits that "perception and non perception continuously blend 
into one another", that there is a "continual transition from perception to retention" ~rithin the 
sphere of primordial certitude, when he says that there is an "interweaving! Velfioc/ztene" of 
"sensation as actual presentation with retention and protention,,72, when he thus admits the 
continuity of the actual now and the not-now within the living now within the blink of the eye, 
then Derrida can say, without forcing him, that Husserl admits "the other into the self-identity of 
the A ugenblick. " And he goes on 
This alterity is in fact the condition for presence, presentation, and thus for Vorstellllllg in 
general; it precedes all the dissociations that could be produced in presence, in Vorstellung. (my emphasis) 
SP, p. 65. 
The other and alterity in general do not reside "outside" the same (i.e., the living 
present), which would suppose that the same is first constituted in its absolute interiority. i.e .. in 
its self-identity and self-presence, before it is exposed to the outside, to the alterity of the other. 
Alterity is already "in" the same: this is the structure of what Derrida calls the trace. 
Whatever the importance for phenomenology of the difference between retention (or 
primary memory, in which I see or perceive a non-now, a past or inactual now) and re-
presentation (or secondary memory, the representative reproduction of a past now in 
recollection), and however irreducible the difference or indeed "the abyss" which may separate 
them, retention and reproduction are both modifications of nonperception (of the actual now or 
present) and of nonpresence, they are, as Derrida writes, "two ways of relating to the non-
presence of another living present." 
From this difference between re-tention and re-production we can also infer, Derrida 
writes, '"two forms of the re-turn or re-stitution Q[ the present." But again, whatever the 
phenomenological difference between retention and reproduction, "we should be able to say a 
priori that their common root, is the possibility of repetition in its most general form, that is. the 
trace in the most universal sense, a possibility which not only must inhabit the pure actuality of 
the /lOW but must constitute it through the movement of differance it introduces". SP, p. 67. 
Such a trace, or movement of differance within repetition, what Derrida calls also an'/ze-
tract.'. is more primordial than what is phenomenologically primordial, since it is the origin and 
the condition of the phenomenological origin. The presence of the perceived actual now, of the 
living present, is derived from the possibility of a repetition retaining the other as other in the 
samt.'. This is already inscribed within the form of the living present itself, which. as we saw. is 
determined by Husserl as the ideal and absolute form of all experience. The form of the living 
7~ Ihid. Appendix III. p. 112. 
175 
present IS always already a trace.?3 If, as Derrida describes it, the ideal form of presence 
necessarily implies 
a) that it be infinitely re-peatable, that its re-tum, as the return of the same, is necessarily ad infinitum: and 
is inscribed in presence itself; 
b) that the re-turn is the return of a present which will be retained in a finite movement of retention: 
c) that the relation with infinity can be instituted only in the opening of the form of presence upon ideality. 
as the possibility of a re-tum ad infinitum (SP, p. 67) 
then we can say that the presence of the perceived present, of the actual now and of primordial 
impression arises from the movement of repetition, from the folding back of a re-tum, and not the 
reverse. It is the movement of repetition which, being older and irreducible to presence, produces 
the presence of the living present and relates or opens the present to its other and its outside, i.e., 
to another living present, and which thereby makes the simple self-identity of the living present. 
of the im selben Augenblick, radically impossible. The structure of the trace describes the most 
intimate relation of the living present with its other (or its outside) in the movement of its 
repetition, the relation to the non-presence of another living present, to the absence of another 
absolute origin: to "the absence of another here-and-now, of another transcendental present, of 
another origin of the world appearing as such, presenting itself as irreducible absence within the 
presence of the trace.,,74 
Without an originary synthesis, not preceded by absolute simplicity, without an arche-
trace in which the present is produced by means of this very relation to what it is not, to what 
absolutely is not (not even a past or a future as modifications of presence). no temporalization and 
no effect of the living present would be possible. It is this constitution of the present as syntheses 
or traces of retentions and protentions that Derrida calls arche-trace or arche-HTiting or 
differance. Derrida speaks of an'he-trace in order to wrench the concept of the trace from the 
classical scheme which would derive it from presence or from an originary nontrace and which 
would make of it an empirical mark. 
Derrida speaks also, in Of Grammatology, of the general structure of the trace as that 
which opens and connects within the same possibility the movement of temporalization, the 
relationship with the other (the alter ego), and speech as writing. 75 However, it is in Speech and 
Phenol1lcna where Derrida brings out, and from within Husserl's text; from within his 
7\ FM. p. Inn. 
7~ 
. OGr.p . ...J7. . . 
7.~ ihid .. pp . ...J 7, 60. Derrida speaks of the general structure Df the trace since this structure artICulates 11'. 
pnssihilitv in the entire field of heing-prt·sent. 
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descriptions of the movement of temporalization and of the constitution of intersubjecti\,ity. an 
irreducible nonpresence, a lack of plenitude, an emptiness or void in need of a supplement: that of 
speech and writing, of speech as writing, of a mark in general, i.e., of a trace. But first we ha\'e 
to see in what sense Husserl's thematization of transcendental experience as presence - seen from 
within the horizon of another experience, the experience of the subject hearing itself speak in the 
present, the experience of the voice that is heard and understood (s' entendre) immediately by 
whoever emits it - is a metaphysical gesture, the metaphysical (and humanistic) gesture par 
excellence: the reduction of the movement of the trace. 
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4) The Will to Hear- Oneself- Speak 
Husserl can reach phenomenological silence, the solitary mental life, or the silent and 
inward speech of the subject, by putting to practice a double reduction or exclusion: the reduction 
of the indicative stratum of speech (i.e., speech addressed to or heard by the other) but also of 
expression itself as a supplementary stratum that is external to the presence of sense and to the 
self-presence of transcendental experience or life. But even before one practices the method of 
the reduction, phenomenological silence can be attained quite spontaneously (and rather naively). 
" ... Even before becoming a method the 'reduction' would be at work," Derrida tells us, in the 
most spontaneous exercise of the voice, in the most simple experience or "practice of the spoken 
word".76 Now the voice that keeps silence is heard only insofar as the spoken word does not have 
to be physically incarnated or effectively uttered in the world in order for the lived experience of 
the word to be absolutely certain and present to itself (the word taken, quite naively, to be the 
calm, present, undeconstructable unity of the signified concept and the voice). This experience of 
the voice can be considered in its greatest purity, and in the condition of its possibility, as the 
experience of "being" pure and simple. It is the relation between voice and being, voice and the 
word or the sense of being, voice and the ideality of sense or meaning, as well as the complicity 
between voice and objecti vity which are Derrida' s themes in the penultimate chapter (The Voice 
That Keeps Silence) of Speech and Phenomena. 
Husserl will be able to exclude signification from the presence of sense, from the 
experience of the voice as the most primordial and concrete lived experience of being, because, 
as he has determined it, inward expression - when it is full, i.e., when the Bedeutungsintention 
which animates the expression is fulfilled in a perceptive intuition, as in the perceptual expression 
"this white,,77 - departs in a certain manner from the concept of the sign. The expression "this 
white" does not function as a sign, i.e., as an indicati\'e reference (renvoi indicatl\'e, An::.eigen) for 
the one who thinks it or silently states it while looking at it, but as expressive reference 
(Hin::.eigen). In this lived experience, the existence of the perceptual sense does not have to be 
indicated or manifested through the intermediary of existent words because it is immediately 
71> SP. p. 31. scc also lOG. p. 67. 
77 Wc ha\"l~ already referred to Ideas I § 12-+. wherc Husserl resorts to a perceptual example, the perception 
of a "this white", in order to clarify the distinction between pre-expressive sense (Sinn) and expressivc 
meaning (Bedel/fling) and in order to isolate the logical stratum of expression and to delimit rigorously its 
unity on the hasis of its strictly reproductive function. The expression "this white" simply makes explicit. 
restates or proffcrs a constituted perceptual semc. it is only reproductive. that is. accord~ng to Husser\.. 
unproductivc. Or rather the whole pruductivity of the function of ex-pressing is L'Xhau~tcd III "the il)rm 01 
the L'lHlceptual" introduced with this function (Ideas I. p. 295.) 
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present to the speaking subject, and therefore absolutely indubitable. But Husserl is not content 
with the exclusion of indication, he wants also to exclude the stratum of inward expression itself 
as a secondary event superadded to a primordial and pre-expressive stratum of sense. According 
to Derrida, it is in the relation between these two exclusions, the exclusion first of the stratum 
indication and then of expression, and in their common logico-theoretical determination, that the 
absolute prerogative of the living voice (under the fine control of the "is") will become clear. 
In order to question the phenomenological privilege of the vOIce (the 
Bedeutungsintention), which as Derrida tells us in the Introduction to Speech and Phenomena, 
has radicalized "the necessary privilege of the phone, which is implied by the whole history of 
metaphysics, and exploited all its resources with the greatest critical refinement" (SP, p. 16). we 
should ask whether there is not a metaphysical complicity between what we call sense (Sinn) and 
meaning (Bedeutung, vouloir-dire), between being as being-present in the pre-expressive form of 
sense and being as being-present in the voice, in the expressive form of meaning, a complicity so 
powerful that not only implicates but fuses and articulates the two strata (that of sense and of 
meaning) by already having teleologically destined the one to the other. And finally, we should 
question the unity of sense and phone in the word, and from all words, in the word "is" (esti), 
whose privilege or authority is, ever since the origin of philosophy, indissociable from the 
historical determination of the sense of being as presence.78 
Now when Husserl determines, in Ideas I § 124, the unproductive productivity of 
expression as the telos of language 79, and thereby sanctions the very idea of an expressive 
language (i.e., of language as a transparent medium for the exteriorization of sense, as the best 
medium, a medium which does not deform or add anything to the sense that it faithfully ex-
presses), is there any reason why he should take a certain type of statement or proposition as more 
proper than any other? The same question applies for his earlier work: the answer to this question, 
1M While it is rightly stressed in the literature around Derrida as a reader of Husser!' that Derrida's 
descriptions of the reduction to the interior monologue are faithful to Husserl's spirit and letter, that 
DLTrida is after the "transcendental-phenomenological postulations that govern language" (Kates, p. bOot. 
130-5, 1 .. +7, Lawlor, p. 188, 192). that Derrida faithfully renders this phenomenological reduction to an 
incorporeal and disemhodied voice, the Bedeutungsinrention, something important in Derrida' s reading is 
neglected, namely that Husser1 privileges this phone only to the extent that its speech can take the form "S 
is p." This failure to acknowledge the importance of the formalist motif in Husserl's analysis of Bedeutung 
in Ideas I is due, in our opinion, to the fact that none of Derrida's readers include in their reading of Speech 
Derrida's Form and Meaning, which is what we undertake to do here. 
79 Husserl writes" [ .... J the stratum of expression - and this makes up its own peculiarity - is not 
productive. Or, if onl' prefers, its productivity, its noematic production, is exhausted in the expressing 
tHuSSLTl's emphasis) and with the form of the conceptual which is introduced with the expression." Ideas I. 
p.296. 
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Derrida says, will tell us a lot about Husserl's intentions and his project in the First of his Logical 
Investigations. 
To recall the last paragraph §8 of his first Investigation, why has Husserl chosen to take 
his example from the practical order ("You have gone wrong")? Is it because inner language is 
essentially or exclusively practical, affective or axiological? Are there not any other types of 
propositions (or statements) that a subject may effectively address to himself (or even to the 
other) without compromising the expressive purity of his intention?80 How important is it for the 
phenomenological distinction between pre-expressive sense, expressive meaning and non-
expressive indication the form of propositions in their relation to the expressive stratum of 
experience? Is there some excellence deserved for the relationship between expressiveness and a 
certain sentence form, namely that of the form "S is p? Is there any decision concerning a 
hierarchy and the relationships between different types of statement - to take Husserl's example, 
statements as expression of axiological experiences ("you are thus and so") and statements as 
expression of cognitive judgements ("it is thus") - within the general system of expression? Is 
there, and for what reason, in the expressive order of meaning or vouloir-dire an unquestionable 
privilege attached to the third person present indicative of the verb to be? What is so unique or 
special about this word "being"? 
These questions are posed by Derrida in Speech and Phenomena but also in Form and 
Meaning where the problem was once again the relationship of the pre-expressive stratum of 
sense or noema with the formality, the conceptual form of expressive Iloema, the relationship 
between the sense of being and the formality of the expression (or word) "being", "between is 
and formality in general.,,8) In question was above all a certain decision about the status of sense 
in general, its de jure anteriority in its relation to vouloir-dire. to logos, and, a fortiori, in its 
relation to indication. 82 
The questions we are following here concern the unquestionable, by the whole history of 
metaphysics, unity of sense and word in the "is", the complicity between the "is" (esti) and 
"form" (ousia, morphe). In other words they concern the limit which has always constrained us, 
X(} An example for such a proposition can be taken from mathematical sciences, about which we have said 
that it is not a case of indication: as the correlate of a deductive. evident, and apodictic demonstratIon 
(Beweis). a mathematical expression is an absolutely objective expression and therefore an absolutely pure 
expression, i.e., frci' from indicative contamination. (L1. I. §Il, p. 285) 
XI FAI. p. 127. ' , 
X~ This decision, concerning the de jure anteriority of sense to the act of speech, whose own \alue Will 
always be that of exteriorization. of ex-pression, does not depend on phenomenology, on the contrar), as 
Derrida writes. "it opens up phenomenology in a noncritical movement", F,\/, p. 118, In his IIltrodllclfl}Il to 
thl' Uf/gill (?f Geometry, Derrida has shown how difficult it is for Husser! to reconcile this decision with the 
latter thelllL's l If historicity and sense- sedimentation in language and wri ting. 
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Derrida says, as inhabitants of a language and a system of thought, to fonnulate the sense of 
being in general as presence. This complicity discloses itself in the link between what makes us 
think the sense of being (and, as Derrida reminds us, Heidegger and Aristotle ha\'e always 
insisted that this sense must precede the general concept of being) in the verbal form of the third 
person present indicative and the metaphysical detennination of the sense of being as presence, 
indeed as the present. 
True to this metaphysical tradition of the concept of form, which Husserl wants to 
reactivate in its primordial sense, he detennines the living present as the universal, absolute form 
of all experience, and therefore of all life. As we have already seen with regard to Husserl's sense 
investigation of "fonnal generalities", according to the "principle of principles" of 
phenomenology which define the archetypal fonn of evidence and the source of all sense, fonn 
and only fonn, i.e., the form of the living present and the form of the clear and present intuition of 
an object whatever, is evidence itself. According to Husserl only fonn is evident, only a form 
presents itself as such, and only a fonn has or is sense.83 As Derrida writes in Form and 
Meaning, with regard to this profound complicity in phenomenology between the authority of the 
"is" (the word "is" as the verbal fonn of the present) and the detennination of the sense of being 
as presence, indeed as the present: 
It is through the evidence of the (present) is, in evidence itself, that the whole of transcendental 
phenomenology is put forth in its supreme ambition: aiming to achieve both an absolutely forma/logic and 
a transcendental description of self-presence or primordial consciousness.84 
According to Derrida, Husserl would not be able to detennine the relationship between 
the pre-expressive stratum of sense and the expressive stratum of meaning (but also of 
indication), if he had not taken from the beginning the "predicative judgement" and fonn, the 
third person present indicative of the verb "to be" as absolutely privileged: as the pure and 
teleological form, the irreducible core of all expression. This move certainly corresponds to and 
reveals once again Husserl' s logico-epistemological interests and their subordination to the 
authority of intuition which is already at work from the first pages of the Logical Investigations: 
the model of language in general (whether expressive or indicative) is determined, in the most 
traditional manner, Derrida tells us8S , on the basis of logical theory, of theorein. It is only if H'e 
H.1 FM, p. 108, SP, p, 98. 
H4 FM, p. 127. , 
X'iAccording to Derrida, Husserl's relation with the tradition is neither simple nor una~lblguoUS: the 
phenomenological critique of na'lve ontology, of all classical theories of knowledge and of all precedIng 
formalisms h;ve as their clearest aim nothing hut the reanimation of the "primordial sense'" of form, as well 
as the rl'activation of an authentic and metaphysical theory of knowledge, "Husserl works always to reston: 
a primordial Sl'nse to thcsl' terms, a sense which began to he perverted as the time of its inscription into the 
tradition: thus Husser! oftcn gllCS against the first thinkers. against Plato and Aristotle. \\'hether it is a 
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pay attention to the concept of form that we could assess the critical project of phenomenology 
and the privilege which is assigned by Husserl to theory therein. As Derrida says, the concept of 
form (eidos, morphe), since the very origin of philosophy and including Husser!" s profound 
reactivation of its primordial sense, has "assigned to the sense of being the closure of presence. 
the form-of-presence, presence-in-form, or form-presence". 86 More particularly. Husserl's 
reactivation of the concept of form is guided by the concept of sense (Sinn): and sense, which is 
not a pure spiritual interiority, is always determined on the basis of a transcendental relation to an 
object, to some thing that is accessible and available in general for a pure consciousness, and first 
of all for its gaze. In this way, within Husserl's project of an authentic theory of knowledge, 
logical theory is subjected to intuitive perception, and sense (Sinn) in general is subjected to 
seeing, to the sense of sight, and to light. The whole relationship between sense and expressive 
meaning and the distinction between the stratum of sense and the expressive stratum of meaning 
is understood and posed by Husserl with regard to this putting on vieH', with regard to light or 
visibility (intelligible rather than sensible visibility.) 
According to Derrida, here we can find the necessity which pushed Husserl to study 
language from a logico-epistemological point of view. If, as Husserl has determined it, only a 
logical meaning (Bedeutung) is an expression, nowhere can speech be in conformity to its essence 
or telos, i.e., nowhere can it be both more productive and at the same time more llnprodllcti\'(' (in 
compari son to affecti ve, axiological speech which is thoroughl y producti ve87 ), than as an element 
of theory. It's whole productivity, according to Husserl in Ideas I, is exhausted in bringing sense 
to conceptual form (and thereby to a universal form). However careful Husserl may have been in 
respecting and showing the novelty and originality of practical or affective experience and 
speech, he never stopped reaffirming the reducibility of affective or axiological experiences and 
expressions to logical speech, that is, to a speech controlled by the uni versality of the predicati ve 
question of determining the eidos against 'Platonism', the form (Form) (in the problem of formal logic and 
ontology) or morphe (in the problem of transcendental constitution and in its relations with hyle) against 
Aristotle. the force, vigilance, and efficacy of the critique remains intrametaphysical in its motives." (FM. 
B' 108) 
(1 FM, p. 127. But in order to pay justicc to Husserl's reactivation of the concept of form in the Logical 
IIlI'(,STigations and in Ideas I, we should not think that "the sense of being has been limited by the 
imposition of form", that the thought of heing as form, or that thought as the thought of form and the 
formality of form has only limited, restrained or prohihited a more open thought of being. We might instead 
try to think something else: "that thought. controlled hy the concept of form, has the power to extend itself 
heyond the thought devoted to heing" (ihid., p. 128). 
X7 Contrary to what Marrati maintains, the predication in an axiological proposition ("You are wrong"), in 
comparison to a perceptual or theoretical judgement which is totally unproducTil'e (or rather whose 
productivity is exhausted in a simple. unproductive reduhlication of pre-expressive sense). is thol'Oughh 
producril'c, it producl's ncw sense or new noematic contents. since it em clops a valuative and produL'ti\'c 
;}l't. Ideas I. §ll6, p. 277 and §127. p. ~OO-1 and rH, pp. 12-1--26. See Marrati. Gencsis and STrucTure. p. 
74. 
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fonn, by the present indicative of the verb to be. In some very suggestive paragraphs in Ideas I 
Husser! confinns, rather than discovers, in the pre-expressive and silent stratum of sense. in 
perceptual but also in practical or affective experiences, a "doxic core", a core of logical sense 
under the universal and silent form of being-present. 88 
Every act, as also every act-correlate, harbours explicitly or implicitly a logical factor [ ... ] From this results 
the fact that all acts generally - even acts of feeling and will - are 'objectifying (objectivierende) acts. 
original factors in the 'constituting' of objects, the necessary sources of different regions of being and of 
the ontologies that belong therewith. [ ... ] Here lies the deepest of the sources for shedding light on the 
universality of the logical, in the last resort that of the predicative judgement. Ideas L § 117. p. 282 
It is this universal and silent form of "being present", which Husserl brings out in the pre-
expressive stratum of all acts (theoretical, practical or aesthetic), which guide his analyses of 
expression and indication. In the last analysis, the axiological proposition "You have gone 
wrong" that a subject may address to himself is not indicative because, as we have seen. a) 
nothing is shown with it, in the sense of Zeigen as indicative reference (AI1:eigen): the subject 
communicates nothing to himself, he does not inform himself in the sense of either Kundgabe or 
Kundnahme. His language refers to or indicates (Anzeigen) nothing that ·'exists." As we have 
said, only an existence (Dasein, Existence) is indicated, an existing sign motivates or refers to 
content (a Bedeutung) whose existence is only probable. 89 
And b) it is not indicative, according to Husserl, because it is not expressive either, and it 
is not expressive because as non-theoretical, non-cognitive, and non-logical, it does not give us to 
see and know an object. Nothing is shown (Weisen) directly or indirectly, either in the sense of 
indicative showing or pointing-out (Hinweis), which connects empirical existents in the world, or 
in the sense of apodictic or evident demonstration (Beweis) which links evident idealities and 
ideal objectivities. It does not promise any knowledge, since it does not recognize knowledge as 
its nonn, or telos. Nothing is indicated or communicated in this proposition, it is an example of 
xx Not only the originality of practical, ethical, etc., sense is not diminished with its "a priori possihle 
conversion" (§ 114) into logical or predicable speech, but rather. as Derrida says, it is this possibility of 
conversion which "will assure them the possibility of an unlimited formalization." According to Derrida. in 
§ 11..+ of Ideas I HusserI tried to bring forth "the evidence for a 'doxic' core which, still allowing us to think 
of values as states of being (the wished-for as the being-wished-for, the agreeable as the being-agreeahle. 
etc.), constitutes, so to speak, the logicality of the pre-expressive stratum. It is because it can always 
convert its affectivc or axiological experience, its relation to what is not present into an experience that has 
the form being-present (the beautiful as being-beautiful. the desired as being desired. [ ... ] and. as a 
limited casc. the absent as being-ahsent), that it gives itself unresencrdly to logical speech. speech 
l'Ol1trollcd by the predicative form. that is, by the present indicative of the verh 'to he ... · FM, p. 12"+. 
H<J But when I speak to myself I do not have to go through the ap-presentational detour of existing sings: in 
inward SpCCL'll nonexistent. vorgestellt signs show. or refer (Hin~eigen) to Bedeutlll1gel1 which are also 
110l1elistcl1t. that is, which are ideal and which are also absolutely indubitable, since they are Immediately 
presl'nt to my inncr intuition, that is, livcd hy me at the same instant (im selben Augenblick). In this sense 
my experiences cannot be indicated C\l1~cigel1) to me. 
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fictitious communication, an example of false language. Not only expression then but also that 
which is excluded from it, i.e., indication, is determined by Husserl strictly on the basis of 
theorein, of logical theory. Moreover, Derrida notes, the temporal modality of the proposition is 
also highly significant for Husserl: its grammatical form is not in the present, "You have gone 
wrong" refers to a past in the form of a reproach. Which again means that this type of proposition 
which expresses an axiological, evaluative experience or act, is not directly or explicitly logical, 
insofar as it does not offer directly the possibility of relation to a being-present.9o If we determine 
the essence or telos of speech as logical, as Husser! authorizes us to do in Ideas I, and if "'S is p' 
is the fundamental and primitive form, the primordial apophantic operation from which every 
logical proposition must be derivable by simple construction," we then have to recognize that, as 
Derrida writes, "the third person present indicative of the verb to be is the pure and irreducible 
core of expression", and therefore of indication. (SP. p. 73) 
It is on the basis of this common theoretico-Iogical determination of expression and 
indication that Husserl will exclude indication from expression and then reduce both of them in 
order to reach phenomenological silence (i.e., the silent presence of sense) in its primordiality. 
Between the Hinzeigen proper to expression and the Anz.eigen proper to indication, there is, 
according to Husser!, the essential unity of Zeigen, of showing or pointing to an object in its 
visibility (sensible or intelligible). Signs (Zeichen), then, refer to Zeigen, and signification in 
general, expressive or indicative, "is assigned to the pointing finger and the eye." (SP. p. 72) In 
this way Husser! recognizes that expression, and especially the expression of a perceptual act, is 
necessarily contaminated by Zeigen: the relation to the object as indicative showing, the pointing 
out of what is before the e)'es, of what in its visibilit), is al~t'Q.\'s capable of appearing to an 
intuition. As Derrida put it "In the final instance signs (Zeichen) always refer to Zeigen, to the 
space, visibility, field, and compass of what is ob-jected and pro-jected; they refer to 
phenomenality as a state of encounter [comme \'is-a-~'is] and surface. as evidence or intuition, 
and first of all as light." (SP. p. 72) 
Husserl, however, is not worried about this contamination, the contamination of the 
purely inner life of inward speech with the exteriority, spatiality and visibility of the Zeigen. 
What Husser! is trying to show is that the latter far from threatening inward life, is rather 
interiori::'l'd and functions better than ever in the voice, in the voice that is heard. So the solitary 
90 Husser\. in Ideas I § 127 referring to all these sentences which are not of the type "So ist {'s ", sentences 
which emhody questions. presumptions. wishes. reproaches, and so forth. writes. that '~as far as their 
meaning is concerned. are not in truth predicative propositions. [ ... ] all pertinent act-formatIOns. e.g .. tho"e 
or the e;110lional sphere. which in themsehes are not acts of judgement. can achie\e "expression" only in a 
roundahout wav through the mediation of an act of judgement founded on them." (lhid. p. 301) 
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mental life of the subject, the inner discourse, the talking to oneself that Husserl wants to re-
establish and secure in its pure expressive function is not a talking to oneself about oneself. It is 
rather a "telling oneself that S is p", in which the S is not a person that one could replace with a 
personal pronoun (I, you, he, ... ) but the name of an object: for in real speech the personal 
pronoun, as we are going to see, has only an indicating value. 
As we have said, the telos of logical expression, I.e., its unproductive productivity, 
consists in the total restitution in the form of presence of a sense actually given to intuition. And 
since sense is determined by Husserl only on the basis of a relation with an object "the element of 
expression must protect, respect, and restore the presence of sense, both as the object's being 
before us, open to view, and as a proximity to self in interiority" (SP, p. 75). In chapter 6 "The 
Voice that Keeps Silence ", Derrida brings forward the systematic interdependence of the concepts 
of intuition or perception, objectivity, sense, meaning, and expression and then tries to show that 
what brings them together, under this teleological determination of expression as logical meaning 
and as relation to an object, is the determination of being as presence, i.e., as ideality. 
Now before we see why words get involved with the determination of being as presence 
and as ideality let us remind ourselves that for Husserl there is an essential relation between the 
history of language and the history of idealization. We have seen in our discussion of the Origin 
of Geometry that the power of the voice or speech and the privilege which is attached to it by 
phenomenology has to do with the constitution and tradition of ideal objects, with their history, 
i.e., with history as such. According to Derrida: "in order to understand where the power of the 
voice lies, [ ... ] we must think through the objectivity of the object" (SP, p. 75). At the same time 
we will begin to understand why Husserl privileges in a teleological manner the experience of the 
voice, the experience of hearing oneself speak, in comparison to seeing oneself or touching 
oneself. According to Husserl what is possible for hearing, and first of all, for hearing the voice 
(but is there hearing in general without this possibility of hearing one's voice?), is in no way 
possible for the other senses: only the experience of hearing one's voice, and not of seeing or 
touching oneself, makes a subjective experience of sense open to universality.91 Husserl 
privileges the phone to the extent that it can say with words that "S is p". That is to say, to the 
I)) The power and originality of the voice. of the vocal medium of expression. consists precisely in its 
unproduclin: productivity: in the fact that it restates the preexpressi\\.: sense by giving it conceptuaL i.e .. 
logical, form. At the heart of what unites Husserl's phonologism and his logocelltrism lies this 
unproductive production of the logos. of the logische Bedeutung, as the medium. the element and meam of 
lInivL'('sal signification. (Ideas I, § 114) The phenomenological excellence of the \oice that is heard. can be 
c\plained and justified by the fact that it alone is an absolutely pure auto-affection. and thereby. It alonc IS 
open to unive'rsal signification: every other form of auto-affection (visual or tactile) "remain purely 
empirical for they could not helong to the medium of universal signification." SP. p.79. 
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extent that it can constitute human transcendental intersubjectivity, i.e., to the extent that it can 
make us see and know an object. If Husserl was not the first philosopher of the tradition who 
privileged the sense of hearing92, he was, according to Derrida, the one who radicalized the 
necessary privilege given to oral speech by thinking through what necessarily links it with the 
objectivity of the object (the "as such" of its objective unity) and the subjectivity of the subject 
(the subject in its innermost properness.) 
An ideal object, for example, the geometrical triangle which is more objecti ve than a real 
object, can be constituted, repeated, expressed in a medium which does not impair but secures 
and protects the presence and self-presence of the acts of intuition to which this object is given 
"in person". It also appears that I (an egological subject in general) can constitute, repeat and 
express this object, i.e., its sense or noema, without going outside ideality or without having to 
pass through the exteriority of the world: this is according to Husserl where the power of the 
voice lies. Derrida writes: "The ideality of the object, which is only its being-for a nonempirical 
consciousness, can only be expressed in an element whose phenomenality does not have wordly 
form. The name of this element is the voice. The voice is heard. Phonic signs ("acoustical images" 
in Saussure's sense, or the phenomenological voice) are heard/understood by the subject who 
proffers them in the absolute proximity of their present.·' SP, p. 76. 
Let us examIne more closely the phenomenological value of the phonic element of 
expression that makes it fit better than any other signifying element (that of writing, for instance) 
to express, to respect and to save the presence of sense to the acts of intuitive cognition. The voice 
is heard. When I speak, it belongs to the phenomenological essence or telos of my operation that, 
I hear myself in the present. This is also the teleological structure or essence of speech: the 
speaking subject hears himself at the same time that he speaks. When I speak to myself I am in 
absolute proximity to myself: I don't have to go outside myself, outside the sphere of what is 
absolutely my own, outside my Eigenheit and into the world, in order to affect myself. Every 
other time that I write, make gestures, see or touch myself, it is necessary to go forth beyond 
myself. to go outside the interiority of my own self-presence and into the world, into the visibility 
and corporeality of space, and first of all the spatiality of my own body. In all those cases the 
surface of letters as well as the surface of my body as something external must begin by being 
exposed in the world. In seeing or touching myself. the experience of auto-affection itself and as 
')2 In Spccch and Phenomena (p. 77). \'iolence and MeTaphysics (p. 99-100) and Of Gra11lmaTology (p. 12). 
Ikrrida singles out Hegel's pri\ikge of hearing and his attention to the essential proximity that exists 
oL'tween sound. \'oiee and ideality. hetween sensihle sound and the sound of thought as intdligiok speech. 
OL't\\'cen sensihility and signification. and especially hetwcen the scnses and sensc (in the wnrd Sinn). 
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such admits the world as a third party, space and visibility are irreducible. Tactile or \'isible auto-
affection, therefore, cannot be pure and complete since I always have to borrow from the world, 
from what exists outside the sphere of what is my own (mir eigenes), outside the interiority of my 
self-present life, the very substance of my auto-affection. Requiring the use of no instrument, no 
accessory, no force taken from the world, and depending on nothing but my free spontaneity and 
pure will, the operation of hearing myself speak, belongs to a higher order of experience as self-
relation. Hearing myself speak is experienced as an absolutely unique and absolutely pure auto-
affection, "occurring in an absolute self-proximity that would in fact be the absolute reduction of 
space." (SP. p. 79) 
Now what is the substance of speech that makes it fit for this unique experience? This 
sonorous substance appears to be purely temporal. It appears that the phenomenological voice 
exercises and accomplishes the operation of auto-affection purely in time: it does not borrow 
from outside of itself, i.e., from space (and space is this being outside itself proper to time) that 
by which it is affected. Auto-affection has necessarily the form of time, and time for Husserl is 
"absolute subjectivity." (SP, p. 84) We will come back to this. Now how can it appear that wa/3? 
How is this reduction of space possible? What happens to the spatial exteriority, to the 
corporeality of the signifiers the moment I use them in order to speak to myself, in order to relate 
to myself? Do they not intervene or impose themselves as an element of mediation and opacity in 
the proximity or transparency of self-relationship, in the purity of audio-phonic auto-affection? 
What about the substance of speech, the substance of sound then, does it reduce the indicating 
spatiality, the mediation and opacity of my signifiers, does it temporalize them without 
remainder? And since when I speak to myself it is, as we said, in order to say that "S is p" (S 
being the name of an object) how can I reduce the other indicating spatiality or mediation, that is, 
that of the relation to the "S", to an object in general, to the positing of its existence, as indicative 
showing (as Anzeigen, or as Weisen in the Hinweis )? 
We said that pure expressIOn, uncontaminated from the indicative function, is a pure 
animating act, a bedeuten that animates the body of a speech whose content (Bedeutung) can be 
present to the inner intuition of the speaking subject and not to the originary intuition of the 
hearer. "Is present to an inner intuition" means that the Bedeutung "is present to the self in the life 
')1 For. as Derrida wants to demonstrate. the reduction of exteriority in the hypothesis of the "interior 
monologue" is only an appearance. an illusion. But this appearance. as he writes i~ Speech a1ld Phe1lome1la. 
and in Of Crammatology. is not an illusion among others. this appearance IS the "very .essence 01 
ulIlsciousIless and history" (SP. p. 77) or "this illusion is the history of truth and it cannot he dISSipated so 
quickly" (OCr. p. 20). 
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of a present that has not yet gone forth from itself into the world, space or nature" (SP. p. 40). As 
soon as it is effectively uttered in the world, the expression of a lived experience is covered with 
an indicative veil. Let us now see again how the teleological structure of hearing-oneself-speak 
supposes the presence of the act of meaning (bedeuten) to itself and to its content (Bedeutung.) 
When I speak to myself, the phenomenological body of the phonic signifier (that is, its 
ideal form which is not to be confused or mistaken with any sensible plenitude, with any of the 
empirical incarnations or materializations of the word), the words that I emit in soliloquy do not 
escape my intention or attention94, they do not fall outside my breath, outside the self-presence of 
my Bedeutungsintention at some visible distance (like the letters of my writing). They, rather. 
seem to fade away, to efface themselves (efface the surface of their body) at the very moment 
they are emitted in front of the presence of the signified. The words (i.e., or acoustic images, as 
Saussure calls them) that I use or, as we said, that I imagine in inward speech, are not real words, 
they are vorgestellt or imagined words (i.e., words reached through Phantasiel'orstellung) and 
they belong from the very beginning to the element of ideality. The unity or the sameness of the 
word is ideal: it depends entirely on the possibility of acts of repetition95 . Being an expression for 
me, in my silent monologue, in hearing myself speak, the expressiveness of the word does not 
depend on its empirical existence: I do not need the existence of the word, its empirical body, but 
only the ideal form of this body, insofar as I can explicitly, consciously and intentionally 
reanimate, as many times as I want, this body by an act of meaning (Bedeutungsintelltion). 
Here idealization is the movement by which sensory exteriority, that which affects me or serves 
me as a signifier, submits itself to my power of repetition [to an I can, which in this sense precedes the I 
am, as its quasi-transendental condition of possibility] to what thenceforward appears to me as my 
spontaneity and escapes me less and less.96 
The signifier that I produce does not fall outside the ideality of the signified (or 
Bedeutung), it rather remains, in its ideal identity, sheltered and well protected within the pure 
interiority of audiophonic auto-affection, within the purity of my inner and absolute existence. 
And since the act of meaning, the animating or life-giving act, the act that confers Bedeutllng is 
the aim of a relation with an ideal object, in soliloquy my Bedeutungsintention shows (in the 
double sense of Zeigen in Hinzeigen and Weisen in Beweis) the ideal object, and the Bedeutllng 
connected to it, without going outside ideality, without falling outside the interiority of my acts 
1.)4 This is precisely Socrates argument in the Phaedrus (275e) against Theuth (or Hermes) the senil~ god 
of wrting: auto-production of speech declaring itself alive and capable of helping, assisting or attendmg 
itsdf. hy contrast to writing which "has no power to protect or help itself'... .. . 
l)~ "The power of repetition that opens up ideality and the pOH'a w~lch hherat~s the In~agmatl\'e 
reproduction of empirical perception cannot he foreign to each other: nor theIr products. SP. p. 5). 
lJh OGr. p. 166. 
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and of my own self-present life. Considered from a purely phenomenological point of view, this 
effacement of the wordly and bodily opacity of the signifier (i.e., of the exterior surface of 
language) in my voice, will reveal to me, who live in the understanding of my expressive 
intention, the unique experience of a signified (Bedeutung) producing itself spontaneously from 
within my self. What appears in my voice as the signified, as the expressed Bedeutung, that is as 
an ideality that is idealiter indefinite repeatable as the same, is immediately present in the act of 
meaning, itself ideal. This effacement of the exteriority or wordly opacity of its body in front of 
the pure spirituality of the living Bedeutungsintention, this transformation of the signifier into a 
perfect, unproductive transparency in the voice (the spiritual flesh) is nothing but the self-
presence of a silent vouloir-dire in the fullness of its living present, i.e., the inwardness of life 
with itself. This effacement of exteriority and spatiality is also the absolute inside, the inside of 
the nonspatial that we call "time" or "internal time consciousness." This effacement is the living 
voice, the voice without writing, i.e., without differance. 
Here again a phenomenology of speech will confirm the absolute proximity of voice and 
the ideality of meaning (Bedeutung), voice and the sense of being, voice and being: the 
experience of the voice is the experience of being in its simplest, purest and universal form, i.e., 
being as presence. Within the closure of this experience, the word that I (a speaking egological 
subject in general) emit is lived as the absolute proximity of the signified concept or Bedeutung 
and the transparent signifier. 
This is not the case with writing where, even if the ideal form of the written signifier (the 
grapheme) does not belong to the world either, a reference to spatiality, to what is outside my 
interiorir.v (i.e., the self-presence of my will to signify, of my vouloir-dire) is necessarily implied 
in its very phenomenon. In phenomenology to hear myself speak is not the same as to see myself 
write: the proximity of sense to the signifier (the phoneme) in the voice breaks with writing, and 
so the proximity or presence of the original intention (of the vouloir-dire, which animated the 
written signifier) to itself. Here we see again, with regard to the printed word (the written 
signifier), the same essential differences and phenomenological nuances which were involved in 
our discussion of the perception and imagination of a spoken or written word. Derrida affirms the 
importance and necessity of this phenomenological distinction between these two relations to 
self. between hearing myse(f speak and seeing myself write, by responding to an objection: "The 
objection will perhaps be raised that this interiority [reached through the spiritual transparency of 
the voice, or of the phoneme] belongs to the phenomenological and ideal aspect of e\ery 
signifier. The ideal form of a written signifier, for example, is not in the world, and the distinction 
between thl' grapheme and the empirical body of the corresponding graphic body separates lIll 
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inside from an outside, phenomenological consciousness from the world. And this is true for 
every visual or spatial signifier. And yet every nonphonic signifier involves a spatial reference in 
its very phenomenon, in the phenomenological (nonwordly) sphere of experience in which it is 
given. Apparently [our emphasis] there is nothing like this in the phenomenon of speech" (SP, p. 
76). 
It is on the basis of this appearance ("Apparently there is [no reference to exteriority, no 
necessary detour by way of a foreign exteriority and spatiality] in the phenomenon of speech"), 
and on the basis of the most rigorous phenomenological distinctions that we could confirm 
Husserl's adherence to the entire tradition of metaphysics as logocentrism and phonocentrism. 
Derrida writes that Husserl cannot reduce the substance of oral expression, he cannot question the 
metaphysical value of the voice, "its transcendent dignity with regard to every other signifying 
substance", that is, he can not question the supposedly irreducible simplicity, the elementary unity 
of sense and the phone, the transparent substance of expression, without menacing his whole 
enterprise, without diminishing the founding value or axiom of the transcendental arche or telos: 
pure egological consciousness as meaning (bedeuten or vouloir-dire) in self presence. (As we will 
see in the last section of the thesis, Husserl (LI, L §36) makes a distinction, with regard to the 
expression "I am", between speech and writing.) 
Within this experience of the effacement of the signifier in the voice, the word is lived by 
the speaking subject as the elementary, natural and therefore undecomposable unity of the 
signified (Bedeutung) and its silent voice, of the concept and the transparent substance of 
expression. Now it seems that this living and absolute unity comes to be threatened as soon as I 
start to write. A new possibility opens then, the possibility that my signifiers can function (like a 
sort of machine97 ) free from my attention or intention, free from my actual and living intention to 
say what I wanted to say by writing, that is, they can function without my being present, without 
my desire and assistance. Writing. the act of writing. the distribution and articulation of sings in 
space. comes only to be added up and from the outside to the primordial experience of being. i.e .. 
ql speaking and hearing oneself speaking. As we are going to confirm again and again, writing 
for Husserl, who never questioned the proximity of the phone to thought, will always be phonetic 
and therefore always indicative. It indicates a pure phonetic expression: hence it is the occasion 
and the cause, as we saw in Crisis and in the Origin of Geometry, for the degradation of the sign-
expression into a sign-indication, of the pure and clear intention to say or express the truth into a 
symbol empty of sense. 
n SEC. p. g. 
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What governs here, in this subordination of writing to the absolute arche of the li\'ino-
~ 
VOIce, is the absolute difference between body and soul. Writing, Derrida shows in Of 
Grammatology, the letter, sensible inscription in space has always been considered as the body 
and the matter external to the spirit, to the breath of speech and to the logos. Writing, the letter as 
the signifier of the primordial signifier, is an exterior body that has meaning (Bedeutung) only if 
we can actually reactivate, that is, pronounce or proffer again, the word, the verbal expression 
(the primordial signifier) which has supposedly animated it in the first place. The body of the 
letter can express something only if the space of its inscription is interiorized, i.e .. temporalized in 
the experience of the voice, in the pronouncement of the living word. (At the same time. and 
conversely, that a speech supposedly alive and primordial can lend itself to spacing and to 
visibility in writing is what relates it to its own death, to its own factual disaster.) 
Now this phonocentrism, as logocentrism, merges, according to Derrida, with the 
historical determination of being as presence. The epoch of the logos is the epoch of the sign, of 
the metaphysical distinction between signifier and signified. The experience of being as the pure 
immediate experience of hearing-oneself- speak (proper to human, egological subjectivity), the 
experience of the effacement of the signifier, or, in other words, the phenomenon of mastery of 
the exteriority of the word in the voice (Husserl's Bedeutungsintention) will reveal the formal 
essence of the signified (Bedeutung): presence, that is, the life of an intention, of a voice present 
to itself and to what it says, living consciousness itself. In this sense Derrida can write that "the 
prerogative of being cannot withstand the deconstruction of the word" (SP, p. 74). 
The system of hearing-myself-speak through the phonic substance has gIven nse and 
dominated an entire historical epoch within which writing, and the essence or te/os of writing. has 
been confined to a secondary, instrumental function: writing as the sensible inscription of a full, 
living phone that is present to itself. is a phonetic writing. Within this epoch of the logos, the 
essential and original link with the phone is never broken. from Plato's Phaedrus and Ari stotle' s 
De Interpetatione to Husserl's Logicallm'estigations. 98 The essence of phone is immediately and 
absolutely proximate to what within thought as logos relates to sense, produces it, recei\'es it. and 
speaks it. Since the voice is closest to the signified, all signifiers, but first of all the written 
signifier. are derivative with regard to what weds the voice (the phonic signifier) and sense. The 
pri\'ilege of the proximity of the signified to the voice is the privilege of presence. The difference 
between signifier and signified belongs to this epoch of logos which debases writing as a 
'lK OGr. pp. 1 I .. ~.f. 37. 
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mediation of mediation (or the signifier of the signifier) and as a fall into the exteriority of 
meaning. It is a difference whose age is, Derrida has taught us, essentially theological.99 
Derrida asks in Of Grammatology: is not this subordination of writing to the primordial 
signifier, to the living phone, is not the recognition of this massive fact of phonetic writing (but 
since this fact commands our entire culture, scientific or not, is certainly not one facts among 
others) also Saussure's gesture at the moment, precisely, when he institutes the science of 
language, when he determines (to be sure, by responding to the most legitimate of the exigencies 
of the science of linguistics, namely, by securing that its field have hard and undivided frontiers, a 
system of internal necessity) the inner system of language, i.e., the field of its objectivity, by 
taking the spoken word as its sole object and by excluding what is exterior to it?IOO Modem 
linguistics then must recover the "natural", i.e., simple and original. relationships between speech 
and writing, between an inside and an outside, and thereby restore and secure the purity of 
language's origin. This is exactly the project of Saussure: to institute a science of language on the 
basis of the privileged immediate unity, which founds significance and the acts of language, the 
unity of voice and concept, of sound and sense within the voice or within the spoken word, the 
unity or bond, "the natural bond (lien nature!), the only true bond, the bond of sound and 
word."IOI With regard to this (preconstituted) unity, writing, which must necessarily operate from 
already constituted units of signification in the formation of which has played no role, would be 
always derivative, accidental, exterior, doubling the primordial signifier, that is phonetic: Sign of 
the sign. said Aristotle, Hegel, and Saussure. The system of language, intimately associated with 
phonetic or alphabetic writing ("On all accounts the most intelligent", writes Hegel in 
l)l) The age of the sign, the age of the difference between signified (which is intelligible) and signifier 
(which is sensible). of this strange separation of their parallelism, and the exteriority of the one to the other. 
"is essentially theological". since it belongs "in a profound and implicit way to the totality of the great 
epoch covered by the history of metaphysics and in a more explicitly and more systematically articulated 
way to the narrower epoch of Christian creationism and infinitism when these appropriate the resources of 
Greek conceptuality." The difference signified /signifier. the idea of the sign itself, is inseparable from the 
dilTerellce intelligible-sensible, and the latter imply "a reference to a signified able to take place in its 
intelligihility before its 'fall' or expulsion into the exteriority of the sensible here below. As the face of pure 
intelligihility, it refers to an absolute logos to which it is immediately united. This absolute logos was an 
infinite creative suhjectivity in medieval theology: the intelligible face of the sign remains [limed toward 
rhl' word and the face of God. " (our emphasis) "The sign and divinity haH the same place and time of 
birth. The age of the sign is essentiall~' theological. Perhaps it will never end. Its historical closure 
hllWL'\LT, outlined." OGr, pp. 13-1-L 
100 Ih'd 10-11 I ,p. _ _ 
101 Course in Gel/eral Linguistics. translated hy Roy Harris. Chicago. Open Court. 1986, p. 26. The whole 
pf chapter \'/ is de\oIL'd to "the representation (~llanguage by writing ": this "represelllationist" L'll1lception 
pI' writill" l'omes to fulfill the exil!enev of linguistics hv excluding writing from the interiority of ih ~y~lell1. 
:::.. .....,...... w 
hy suhordinating writing to an originally spoken and full language, 
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Encyclopedia, sec. 459), is, according to Denida, that within which logocentric metaphysics. 
determining the sense of being in general as presence, is produced. 
Chapter Four: Speech, Writing and Subjectivity 
1) Speech and Writing: the Inside and the Outside 
In our prevIOus chapter, we tried to explain if not justify the phenomenological 
excellence of phonic auto-affection and the importance of the radical difference between hearing-
oneself- speak and seeing- oneself-write or gesture. In the last part of the thesis we tum to the 
question of language and human (inter)subjectivity. We will try to show that Hus~erl'~ 
phenomenology of the phone is also "a great philosophy of the transcendental subject" where "the 
origin of the world" is described, after the phenomenological reduction to inner discourse, as an 
originary speaking egological consciousness. The experience of hearing oneself speak and the 
phenomenon of mastery over the exteriority of the signifier is the experience of a free, voluntary, 
auto-affecting subjectivity conscious of its voice and speech. 
In Speech and Phenomena and in Of Grammatology, Derrida reads the history of western 
philosophy, the history of metaphysics of presence, in which Husserl's phenomenology remains 
the most radical and most critical moment,102 as the powerful and "ab~olute will-to-hear-oneself-
speak", through the phonic element which presents itself. in its pure logicality, as the nonexterior, 
nonwordly, nonempirical and noncontingent signifier. This metaphysics of logos i~ also a 
metaphysics of li'ill and has necessarily, but provisionally, according to Derrida, dominated the 
history not only of episteme but also of the world, as well as the concepts of "~cience", of 
"history" and of "the world". This epoch of living logos, of full speech has always subordinated 
writing and suspended or suppressed, for essential reasons, a free reflection on its status and 
origin. This will. or "transcendental voluntarism" (SP. p. 35), has also limited the ~cope of a 
consistent problematic of writing in Husserl too, even though, as we saw in the first part of the 
thesis, the necessity of such reflection or problematic had been marked out in the Origin of 
Geometl)' with such an unprecedented rigour. 
The subordination of the exteriority of writing to phone, however, supposes that the latter 
IS purely phonetic, i.e., in absolute proximity to itself and to the signified (Bedeutung), and 
therefore, absolutely alive. Derrida reconstructs Husser!' s argument. in which hi~ phonologi~m 
and his optical intuitionism merge into each other, as follows: 
102 ()G' 10 I. p. -t!'. 
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the [phonic] signifier animated by my Bedeutungsintentiol1 is in absolute proximity to me. The 
living act, the life giving act, the Lebendigkeit, which animates the body of the signifier and transforms it 
into a meaningful expression, the soul of language, seems not to separate itself from itself. from its own 
self-presence. It does not risk death in the body of the signifier that is gi \ en mer to the world and to 
visibility of space. It can show the ideal object or ideal Bedeutung connect to it without venturing outside 
ideality, outside the interiority of self-present life. SP, p. 77. --
So we can say that, according to Husserl, not only IS the self-presence of the 
Bedeutungsintention in the experience of telling my self that "S is p" not threatened by "the 
system of Zeigen, the finger and eye movements", i.e., by the externality of the ob-ject which 
stands face-to-face with my pure intention to express its noema or sense, but, on the contrary this 
system is interiorized and works better than ever in the phone. The phenomenon becomes an 
object for me (for an ego in general) only in my phone and my phonems. The power of the phone 
can be understood if we understand its relation to techne, to the technical mastery or domination 
of objective being. "The phenomenon continues to be an object for the voice: indeed insofar as 
the ideality of the object seems to depend on the voice and thus becomes absolutely accessible in 
it, the system which ties phenomenality to the possibility of Zeigen functions better than ever in 
the voice. The phoneme is given as the dominated ideality of the phenomenon" (Derrida's 
emphasis) (SP. p. 78.) And the phenomenon of the phoneme, the lived and spontaneous reduction 
of the sensible signifier, is the origin of what we call "presence". 
The experience of hearing myself speak, this inwardness of inner speech or life with 
itself, is an experience of a unique auto-affection. For Husserl consciousness is precisely the 
possihilify of this experience of auto-affection through the medium of logical meaning 
(Bedeutung), which is for Husserl the medium of universality. No consciousness (and we should 
add, no "consciousness-of-being-in-community in one and the same world,,103) without the living 
voice, without the animating act or Bedeutungsintention which is present to itself and to its 
content (Bedeutung). This is again the teleological essence of the voice: it requires that it be heard 
and understood immediately by whoever emits it or breaths with it. I hear my voice. is this also 
what we call conscience? 
In agreement with the whole metaphysical tradition which links subjectivity with the 
:00/1 logon echon (the animal rationale). and with the power of the voice, Husserl determines 
audiophonic auto-affection as the condition of all subjective egological experience. of all human 
subjectivity. 104 It is affirmed then that only a subject capable of self-identification. of being with 
103 lOG. pp. 79ff. . . 
104 Let us hac note that the experience of the voice is resencd. and Husser! IS J1(?t an exception .here. onl~ 
for human slIhjecti\'ity. only for thc human relation to self. that is. as an expcnence or Opc~~Hlon on the 
hasis of \\hid~ a dear cut distinction. if not Opposition. hctwcen animal reiallon to sell and human 
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itself (in speaking to itself or in speaking for itself before the other), of being for-itself (fur sich) 
and with itself, capable of indefinitely turning and re-turning to itself, and affecting itself. 
speaking to and hearing itself, only a subject conscious of its speech, an entity capable of 
consciousness, of language, of self-detennination, may let itself be affected by the other in 
general. No human subjectivity, no sovereign subjectivity without this power of an "I can". 
without the power or possibility of sovereign self-detennination, of automobilic or autonomic re-
petition, the power of indefinitely turning and re-turning toward the self and upon the self. no 
subjectivity without an autonomous and sustained relation to self, without pennanent presence, 
without the possession or positioning of the self as oneself, without master)' over its 0\1'/1 self-
presence in repetition, over its own voice and its signifiers. 
With regard to the possibility of pure auto-affection as the phenomenon of mastery over 
the exteriority (or the wordliness) of the signifier in the subject's voice, Derrida writes 
Requiring the intervention of no determinate surface in the world, being produced in the world as 
pure auto-affection, it is a signifying substance absolutely at our disposition, For this voice meets no 
obstacle to its emission in the world, precisely because it is produced as pure auto-affection. This auto-
affection is no doubt the possibility for what is called subjectivity or the for-itself, but, without it, no 
world as such would appear. SP, p. 79. 
It is the "as such" of the world, of the intersubjective constitution of the world's objective 
unitr which is decisive here. In particular it distinguishes human speaking intersubjectivity (from 
that which created between animals, men and animals, children, etc.) as the constituting origin of 
the world "as such": as such, i.e., in its independence or objectivity and as a pole of infinite 
determination. The phenomenological "as such" distinguishes human intersubjectivity by 
revealing the world as the infinitely open common place, the infinite horizon of every possible 
experience, of every experience which is linguistically expressible, i.e., communicable or 
translatable. 105 
Now what is said for the interior monologue of the monadic subject appears to be also the 
rase in the oral (present, synchronic and immediate) communication of two egological 
subjectivities. i.e., of two absolute origins of the world, which are also two origins of audiophonic 
subjectivity could be legitimately posed and rigorously demonstrated. But what about the animal relation 
to self? Why are animals not granted subjectivity e\'l.'n if they are capable of auto-affection? How about the 
structure of the relation to self. and of re-appropriation in animals. if it is acknowledged that they arc 
l'apable of (non-linguistic. i.e .. according to Husserl's teleological detemlination of language. rlOn-logicaL 
non-theoretical. or non-objective) audio-phonic auto-affection (animal sounds. cries. etc.)".) We will come 
back to this in our conclusion. 
10) For the phenomenological as stich see lOG. p. 81n and Eating Well. pp. 267, 27'+-5. publ~shed in 
1'0ill!'l ... .Infcrl'iell'.\, 1974-19<)..J, translated by Peggy Camuf & others. Stanford. Stanford Unl\er\lty Pre"". 
1995. 
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auto-affection. The phenomenon of mastery over the signifier, and the latter's reduction. the 
purloined body of speech in the voice (speech stealing its body by itself, concealing it in front of 
'-
the present and diaphanous meaning) is also the myth of immediacy in the live comersation 
between two egos. If to speak to the other is to hear myself but also to be heard by the other, to 
speak is to auto-affect the other: to make him repeat as immediate echo in himself the auto-
affection which I produced with my voice; it is "to make him repeat immediately in himself the 
hearing-oneself-speak in the very form in which I effectuated it" (SP, p. 80). 
As Derrida notes, it is the absolute proximity of the signified to the signifier (and the 
reduction of its sensible exteriority) in the experience of the voice that speaks and hears itself, 
which provides for Husserl the condition for the teleological detennination of the essence of 
language as expression, as a transparent element, an unproductive medium that accepts and 
reflects the presence of sense by giving it conceptual fonn (Ideas I, § 124). In as much as it is 
assigned an unproductive and reflective function, a pure and diaphanous expression facilitates 
things: it can then be reduced by Husserl without any cost so as to affinn that there is, especially 
in perception (both internal and external), a pre-expressive and prelinguistic stratum of lived 
experience or sense, an intuitive ground or base of silence that absolutely founds all acts of 
signification, both expressive and indicative. Now Derrida asks "how can we understand this 
reduction of language [and of expression as such, since the essence or telos of language is 
detennined in Logical Investigations as expression] when Husserl, from the Logical 
Investigations to The Origin of Geometry, continually thought that scientific truth, i.e., absolutely 
ideal objects, can be found only in 'statements' and that not only spoken language but inscription 
as well was indispensable for the constitution of ideal objects, that is, objects capable of being 
transmitted and repeated as the sameT (SP, p. 80) 
It is because, on the one hand, true to the whole Western tradition that controls in theory 
and in practice (even in the principle of its practice) the relationships between speech (the living 
word) and writing (the letter, the body of the word, which by itself alone is soulless or lifeless. 
needs the voice, the soul of language, in order to be animated, and thereby to acquire meaning). 
Husserl does not recognize in the latter more than a derivative function subjected to a full and 
originarily spoken language: writing is only a phonetic writing. i.e., a writing which retaim an 
immediate relationship with the presence of the represented voice. 
But if. on the other hand, Husser! had to recognize the neces"ity of this incorporation of 
the pure spirituality of the voice (of Bedelltlll1gsintention) in a body. that of a word but abo that 
of a letter. even as a critical moment for the history of reason and truth, a" a beneficial threat (it 
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allows the transmission of sense over distant generations of investigators at the same time that it 
brings about the degradation of full speech into empty symbol, of the sign-expression into sign-
indication, and makes passivity and forgetfulness the faithful shadow of the progressi\'e advent of 
reason), it is because, according to Derrida, "an underlying motif was disturbing and contesting 
the security of these traditional distinctions from within and because the possibility of writing 
dwelt within speech, which was itself at work in the inwardness of thought" (SP, p. 82). 
Examining this possibility (the capacity or power) of the phenomenological vOIce to 
protect and conserve, to save presence, the possibility that we also call "life ", or "living" ( in the 
spiritual or teleological sense and not in the physiological sense), Derrida finds once again, 
following Husserl' s descriptions, all the incidences of nonpresence and otherness (indicative 
language, writing) which have a constitutive value, that is, which do not simply befall or surround 
the identity of presence, the presence of sense in its self-identity, but rather make it possible as 
"the self-identity of non-self identity.,,106 
We should note then that, as Derrida writes, "even while repreSSIng difference by 
assigning it to the exteriority of the signifiers, Husserl could not fail to recognize its work at the 
origin of sense and presence" (SP, p. 82). But for Husserl difference does not concern only the 
order of the sensible and exterior signifier in its relation to the inward, spontaneous production of 
the signified content or Bedeutung. Husserl also recognized that difference is indispensable to the 
movement of temporalization, to the temporalization of all lived experiences and of the living 
present itself. On the one hand, Husserl speaks of a pure difference within auto-affection, of a 
pure difference that comes to constitute originaril.v and, at the same time, to divide the im selben 
Allgenblick, the absolute and ideal form of the living present. 107 But, on the other hand, as 
Derrida will try to demonstrate at the end of his chapter on the "phenomenological voice", within 
this pure difference is rooted the very possibility of everything that Husserl has excluded from the 
solitary mental life of the subject and its pure audiophonic auto-affection: the outside, vi-,ibility, 
space, the body, etc., all the predicates, that is, by virtue of which we traditionally dissociate 
speech from writing. And it is Husserl's descriptions of the movements of temporalization and 
inter-subjectivity which orient or turn Derrida's thought to another differance, written this time 
with an "a" instead of "e". 
With the reduction of the indicative sign, i.e., of the sensible body of language. of the 
exterior, mundane, empirical and contingent signifier. in interiority. in the experience of pure 
IOf> '';\t. p. 132. 
1117 OGr. p. 67. 
198 
auto-affection, phenomenological reduction will meet its most radical IlliSSlOn and final 
destination: "as soon as it is admitted that auto-affection is the condition of presence no pure 
transcendental reduction is possible" (SP, p. 82). It is indeed necessary to pass through the 
transcendental arche, consciousness as vouloir-dire, through the living present of the voice as the 
absolute origin of the world, in order, as Derrida writes, to "come closest to the movement of 
differance," or in order to start thinking about, what he calls, "arche-writing" or "arche- trace" 
outside the classical scheme which derives it from presence or from an originary non-trace, and 
which makes of it an empirical mark, an indication or sign (Anzeigen) of another self-presence. 
The value of the transcendental arche or telos (hearing -oneself speak is the absolute arche and 
telos of all human, subjective and egological relation to self) must be felt, recognized and 
respected before being erased: "That is why a thought of the trace can no more break with a 
transcendental phenomenology than be reduced to it."lOS 
The notions of differance, arche-writing or arche-trace, ex-appropriation, etc., come to 
describe, according to Derrida, the movements or processes which are at work in the constitution 
and appearance of what we call the subject - and the sub-ject always assumes presence, i.e., sub-
stance, stasis, stance, as well as the power of an I can, the power to determine oneself, of self-
determination, the possibility to possess oneself, to be master of oneself, the autonomy of the self, 
of the autos, of the ipse. "Differance within auto-affection" does not befall a subject which would 
choose it or would passively let itself be drawn along with it. It rather constitutes the subject at 
the same time that it dislocates it, it makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible: the 
simple self-identity of the subject, actually and fully present to itself, master of itself before the 
presence of the other. Derrida inverting an apparently absolute order which could authorize the 
thinking of differance on the basis of presence, of a being present to itself as (empirical or 
transcendental) consciousness, as will, intentionality, freedom, ego or subject, writes 
This movement of differance is not something that happens to a transcendental subject: it 
produces a subject. Auto-affection is not a modality of experience that characterizes a being that would 
already be itself (autos). It produces sameness as self-relation within self-difference; it produces sameness 
as the nonidentical. SP, p. 82. 
The question now can be put like this: if a subject in his self-identity, in his 
consciousness of his identity with himself, becomes a speaking subject only by involving himself 
in language, in the transcendental disquietude of language (in the movement of idealization, that 
is, in unlimited representation, repetition or substitution), or. having recourse to Saussure's 
discourse, only by drawing from the system of rules of language as a system of differences. if the 
lOX lh'd 6" I ., p. _. 
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speaking subject cannot be present to itself outside the play of linguistic differences, can we 
conceive of a subject which would be able to gather itself together and into its presence (i.e., able 
for a sovereign and reappropriating gathering of self) before distributing its signs or signifiers in 
space and in the world? Returning to Husserl's vocabulary, Derrida asks whether we can 
"maintain the possibility of a pure and purely self-present identity at the level of pre-expressive 
experience, the level of sense prior to Bedeutung and expressionT' (SP, p. 83) 
Let us see why this possibility is contradicted and effectively undermined by the very 
movement of transcendental temporalization of Erlebnis, and precisely as it has been described 
by Husserl himself. Phonic auto-affection has necessarily the form of time. According to Husser!, 
the experience of auto-affection as the experience of a spontaneous production of sense from 
within the self, is not an experience of a sense that is itself nontemporal: on the contrary all sense 
or noema, as ideality, is temporal through and through. Its "supratemporality implies 
omnitemporality", and omnitemporality is only "a mode of temporality".109 Now in the very 
process of this temporalization of the noema (or experience of sense), in the experience itself of 
auto-affection, which is supposed to be a purely temporal process, we will find once again all 
those instances of nonpresence and otherness that have a constitutive value in the emergence and 
functioning of the sense or noema itself. 
What is the relation between phonic auto-affection and the temporalization of the lived 
experience? First of all, auto-affection does not concern only the operation of the voice: "as soon 
as one takes the movement of temporalization into account, as it is already analyzed in The 
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, the concept of auto-affection must be employed 
as well" (SP, p. 83). We have already seen how important is the motif of the living present as a 
form, the punctualnoH' as the Uiform of consciousness, for the whole system of the distinctions 
put forward in Logical Investigations. Only a temporality determined on the basis of a now as the 
"absolute beginning" (as the "source point" or "primordial impression") can assure the purity of 
ideality (of sense), i.e., openness to the infinite repeatability of the same. And the form of the 
living present or now as the primordial absolute is ideal, the ultimate form of ideality, the ideality 
of ideality: the universal form in which, starting from which, or in vie~t' of which, an ego ill 
general may anticipate or recall all repetition. To the extent that Husser! believes that the voice of 
the speaking subject hears itself im selben Augenblick. that the self-presence of the \'oice is 
produced in the undivided unity of the present, the present is that from which he still believe" he 
lOll /:"'flcr;mce (lnd JudgclIIl'nt. §64 and lOG, pp. 77, I..J.~, 
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is able to think time, effacing the inverse necessity, namely, that of thinking the present from time 
as differance within autoaffection. 110 
In what manner, however, IS Derrida gIven by Husserl himself the reason and 
justification to proceed to such an inversion? First of all, the living present, the now, that out of 
which the movement of temporalization is produced, is already a pure auto-affection. Derrida 
quotes from The Phenomenology of Consciousness of Internal Time (Appendix I: Primal 
Impression and its Continuum of Modifications, where the question for Husserl is to bring 
forward, in relation to the actually present now (as the "zero point" or "the absolute beginning"). 
the peculiarity of the primal spontaneity of consciousness. What is this peculiarity? According to 
Husserl it consists in the fact that the living now and each new living noH'. the absolute 1/01'£,1(1: of 
each now is not a new being, it is not a produced object; its generation is not a production of a 
being (Sein): the new now is pure spontaneity, it consists in a "primordial impression" that 
spontaneously engenders itself. Husserl writes 
The primordial impression is the absolute beginning of this generation - the primordial source, 
that from which all others are continuously generated. In itself, however, it is not generated; it does not 
come into existence as that which is generated but through spontaneous generation. It does not grow up (it 
has no seed): it is primordial creation. (The Phenomenology of Consciousness of Internal Time, Appendix I, 
p.106) 
Now how can we describe this movement (infinitely open in its content) by which a new 
now, the next now continuously forms on the living now which, in its turn, passes over into a 
non-now (a past now) assuring thereby the indefinitely renewed upsurge and virginity of the 
actual living now? How to describe this movement of temporalization by which the living now 
(of primordial impression) affects itself in order to be retained and gone beyond itself as past 
now, and in order to constitute a new and another living now? How, in other words. to describe 
this movement without borrowing one's own concepts "from the order of the objects of 
experience, an order this temporalization makes possible"lll? The peculiarity of this pure 
movement consists, according to Derrida, in the fact that it not only makes possible the absolute 
novelty and presence of primordial perception or impression (the Ur-Erlebnis) but that. at the 
same time, it undermines the possibility of a simple self-identity of primordial impression, i.e., of 
1111 OGr, p. 166. 
III What is indescribable, indeed ineffable or unnameable. here. namely the primal source of time, will he. 
neverthekss. designated hy Husser! as "absolute subjectivity." Speaking of the immanent flow, of this 
strange and pure movement. Husserl writes" This flow is something we speak of in conformity with what 
is constituted. hut it is not 'something in ohjective time': it is absolute subjectivity and has the ahsolute 
properties of something to he designated metaphorically as 'flow': of something that originates in a point of 
actuality. in a primal source point. 'the now'. and so on. In the lived experience of aClualit) we have the 
primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation. For all this. we lack names." pelT. ~'h. 
p.79. SeL' also Derrida's A To.lfCfor the Se Cl'l'! , pp. 67-69. and his lOG, p. 82n. 
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the actual and living now. This movement is a pure auto-affection which indeed constitutes "the 
same as the nonidentical" or "the absolute identity of the living now as the self-identity of non-
self identity." Auto-affection constitutes the auto, the same, as it divides the same. Hetero-
affection does not wait, it is already at work in the pure auto-affection of the Ii vi ng present. 
Derrida writes: 
The process by which the living now, produced by spontaneous generation, must, in order to be a 
now and to be retained in another now, affect itself without recourse to anything empirical but with a nell' 
primordial actuality in which it would become a non-now, a past now - this process is indeed a process of 
pure auto-affection in which the same is the same only in being affected by the other, on!."\, by becoming the 
other of the same. This auto-affection must be pure since the primordial impression is here affected by 
nothing other than itself, by the absolute "novelty" of another primordial impression which is another now. 
SP, p. 85. 
Within the temporal, constantly flowing stream of my consciousness, it is precisely this 
pure difference between my living absolute origin and other absolute origins, which are still mine 
despite their radical alterity, the difference between my actually living present and my other 
presents (as past or future presents), that introduces all the instances of nonpresence and 
otherness into the relation to self, and therefore, as Derrida wants to show, the absolute necessity 
of indication and signification. 
As we said before (Ch3, sec2) with regard to the fifth Cartesian Meditation, nonpresence, 
otherness and indicative language are the essential predicates for the definition of every 
intersubjective relation between different origins of the world, between transcendental alter egos. 
We have seen that in the case of oral communication between two egological subjects there can 
be only analogical ap-presentation and the detour through indication, i.e., through signs, the 
structure of which is determined by Husserl as "Anzeigen" and as "fiir etwas sein. " Now it is 
precisely in Husserl's description of the relation to the self and to the other involved in immanent 
experience and in the movement of primordial temporalization where Derrida finds the origin of 
indication and therefore the roots of everything that participates in the determination of indication 
as impure expression, the roots of everything that Husserl excludes from the supposedly pure 
inwardness of solitary life: spacing, the world, writing, death. 
Considering the temporalization of the lived experience of sense, Derrida often recalls 
this "instructive comparison" to which Husserl refers in the Cartesian Meditations (~52). The 
comparison is to be made between the constitution of the other as other present and the 
.. f h h I JJ2 constItutIOn 0 t e ot er as a ter ego. 
ll~ lOG, p. g6, 1190, ,'jo/elle£' and Mctaphysics, p. 132-33, SP, p. 68-69, On TOllrhing. p. 176 
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According to Husserl the appresentational constitution of "another monad ... in mine·,113 
can be illuminated by having recourse to the movement of primordial temporalization: within the 
absolute identity of the living present (but it is precisely the effraction of the "within" that we are 
approaching here) which dialectically maintains and projects itself, all temporal alterity and all 
alter egos can be constituted and appear as such: as other absolute origins of the world. Derrida 
writes, "the possibility of constituting within the absolute and universal form of the Ii ving present 
(unchangeable in itself and always other in its material content) another now, another absolute 
origin of my absolutely absolute origin, this possibility is the root of intersubjectivity.',II-l We 
should note, however, that, given that both constitutions or movements are dialectical through and 
through, there is not just an analogy between the dialectic of temporalization and the dialectic of 
intersubjectivity, and no question of anteriority in the relation between the one and the other: they 
are rather inseparable and refer to the same structural root, i.e., the possibility of noema or sense. 
Now, even before sense enters an intersubjective circulation acquiring thereby (and with 
the help of speech in which it is deposited and sedimented) its ideal objectivity, it must appear 
and be repeatedly identified as the same within an intrasubjective circulation and verification: 
speech is therefore necessary for the constitution of the ideal identity of sense in thought and for 
its intersubjective transmission. 
In as much as sense is, like all ideality temporal through and through, it is never simply, 
immediately and actually present to a self-identical intuition. The irrealify of the inclusion of 
sense in consciousness, the presence of sense to consciousness is not the presence of some thing 
existing in the world (or in some other world). Rather, as we have repeatedly said, this "strange" 
presence, this "inclusive and non-inclusive inclusion" is, in its pure form, the correlate of acts of 
repetition. Since the unity of sense, within the "solitary mental life" of the subject, owes nothing 
to an empirical or wordly existence, since it is ideal, its sameness is nothing but the ideal 
possibility of an indefinite repetition of a subjective and productive act: once sense has appeared 
in an egological subjectivity, after an originary and transitory evidence, after a finite and 
passive lls retention, it does not return to nothingness by the vanishing of the retentions of 
I U eM. §52. p. 115. See also Violence and Metaphysics where Derrida maintains, ~den.ding the Hus~er1ian 
expression "alter ego" against Levinas's interpretation of the "alter" as an epIthetIcal and aCCidental. 
modification of my real empirical identity. that the alter ego, according to Husser\. is not a re~l moment .(:1 
mv egological life. that the inclusion of the another monadic ego in mine is not a reel inclUSion SInce II It 
w~Te ~ I ~ould have a primordial presentation of the other's lived experiences: this is an ahsolUil: 
impossibility. YM, p. 125-2h. 
114 lOG. p. 86n. . . 
11<; On the olle IIalld. this passage from passive retention to memory. to the mtenllonal actIvity 01 
recollection. the passage which "produces ideality and pure Objectivity as such and makes other absolUTe 
origills appcar as such, is always described by Husser! as all already girell possibiliTY. as a structural 
retentions. This sense can, always and in principle, be repeated, reanimated and reproduced as 
identically the same in another lived experience, in the act of recollection. I 16 The ideality of sense 
is announced then in this coincidence or overlapping (Deckung) of identity, which can 
undoubtedly be repeated indefinitely and verified anew in and through absolutely other moments 
and acts of the same egological subject. So before becoming with speech "the ideality of an 
identical object for other subjects", Derrida writes, "sense is this ideality for other moments of the 
same subject. In a certain way, therefore, intersubjectivity is first the nonempirical relation of Ego 
to Ego, of my present present to other presents as such; i.e., as others and as presents (past 
t ) ,,117 presen s . 
According to Derrida we should think the two movements at once, that is a) the transition 
from passive retention as primary memory to the activity of intentional recollection 
(Wiedererinnerung) as secondary memory and re-presentation, the transition which "'produces' 
ideality and pure Objectivity as such and makes other absolute origins appear as such .,118. And b) 
intersubjectivity, i.e., the necessary transition by way of ap-presentation and indication in relation 
to an other ego, to an other present, to an other absolute origin, that is, in relation to what makes 
the ideal Objectivity of sense possible. It is because there is such a circulation of different, 
nonidentical absolute origins that the same sense can appear tn, through. and in view of 
absolutely other moments and acts of repetition. Intersubjectivity is then inseparable from the 
movement of temporalization, to the extent that the later, as Husserl has described it. is taken as 
the irreducible openness of the present upon an outside of itself, i.e., upon another absolute 
present. (SP, p. 84n) 
This necessary transition, however, from one present to another present as SllCh. from ego 
to ego, as the condition of ideal objectivity in general, necessarily happens, as Husserl himself 
shows in the fifth Cartesian Mediation, by way of analogical ap-presentation and of signs. This 
entails that the relation of ego to ego in the movement of temporalization, that is, the relation of 
one absolute origin to another absolute origin as "a nonderived re-presentation", as interval. 
genuine separation or distance. i.e., as spacing119. produces and makes necessary the structure of 
abi/it)' whose source is not made a problem." (lOG. p. 86, and especially p. lOOn) But. 011 the other halld. 
as D~rrida also writes in Genesis Structure and Phenomenolog\': the possibility of seme. and its originary 
iteratin: structure. is for Husserl the common root of passi\'ity and acti\'ity. WD. p. 158. 
116 For the description of the passage from retention to memory in the constitution of the ideal object of 
geometry see Husscrl's Origin (~t Geometry. p. 163. 
11" lOG. p. 86. 
IIX ·\...·d 8 IlIl . p. 6n . 
Ill) "lntersuhjL'cti\,ity is insL'parahle from temporalization taken as the openness 01 t~e. present. up(~n an 
outside of its·df. upon another ahsolute present. This heing outside itself proper to tlllle IS ItS spa CIIl g: It IS a 
proto-stage !archi-.\('(;/le}. This stage. as the rdation of one present to another present as J/Ich. that IS. as a 
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the sign as indication (Anzeigen) as "reference" and as "being-for-something", and thereby makes 
the reduction of indication in my "solitary mental life" radically impossible, 
Speech, the incorporation of sense to the body of the sign which is exposed in the world, 
IS therefore structurally necessary to the intersubjective and intrasubjective circulation or 
repetition of sense, i,e" to the constitution and temporalization of sense. Being ideal or irreal. 
which means neither bound to the objective time of the world nor to a pure subjective interiority. 
sense must await being said, i.e., incarnated in sensible spatiotemporality, in the wordly element 
or body of speech which belongs to an intersubjective horizon, in order to inhabit itself but also 
in order to maintain and lengthen its sojourn there, in order to become what it is: omnitemporal 
(i.e., nonspatiotemporal, free from the factual historical temporality to which Greek or Gennan 
words, in their ideality, are still bound)120. It must be able to be said, to go forth beyond and 
engage itself with the expressive and then indicative "stratum" of real communication. i.e .. it 
must be able to defer itself and differ from itself, in order to become what it is: ideal. virtually 
present for every speaking subject whatsoever. It is not simply by accident then that the linguistic 
"stratum" is intermixed with the silent "substratum" of sense, or that the inside of expression 
comes to be affected by the outside of indication. Their entanglement (or contamination) is not 
dictated simply by a factual or empirical necessity, that of a real and actual communication, as 
HusserI wanted it in order to keep the distinction between inward speech and indicative 
communication, between expressive phone and indicative graphe. To the extent that indication 
must come to be added to the stratum of expression, and the latter must come to be added to the 
stratum of sense, in order for an ideal Objectivity to be fully constituted, their addition and 
entanglement, far from denoting an extrinsic or contingent necessity, is essential and absolutely 
irreducible. 
We say that "sense must await being said" but we should also say that it must await being 
written so as to gather all those elements which we usually associate with writing. i.e., spacing. 
visibility of the letter, exteriority, the world, death, etc, all the elements therefore which find their 
origin in the movement of temporalization and threaten from the "inside" the "absolute inside", 
i.e., the immediate self-presence of the living present, as well as the myth of the living \'oice. 
Hearing oneself speak then is not the absolute inside (the spontaneous reduction of the expressi Vc 
or indicative signifier in front of the presence of sense) because it is not purely temporal (which 
also means, in our case, that it is not purely living), and because time ihc If and the 
nondcri\'cd rc-prescntation (\'ergege/nl'iirfigullg or Repriisellfafion), produces the strlletur~ of signs i~ 
, , ., h' (fi"· .' .) d' d' "'11\' pr'L'ludes thclr n:ductIOIl. gencral as 'rdcrcllL'l.' . as hcmg-tor-sllmct II1g VUl efH a,1 sel1l . an ra Ilu. l . 
Sp, pp. H-t-X5n. 
12() lOG, pp. H9n. 90.92. 
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temporalization of a lived experience of sense are not purely temporal either. not more acoustic 
than luminous, not more sonorous than luminous, no more in time than in space. "The 
temporalization of sense is", Derrida writes with emphasis, "from the outset, a 'spacing '." And he 
goes on 
As soon as we admit spacing both as 'interval' or difference and as openness to the outside, there 
can no longer be an absolute inside, for the outside has insinuated itself into the movement by which the 
inside of the nonspatial, which is called 'time', appears, is constituted, is 'presented'. Space is 'in' time: it 
is time's pure leaving-itself; it is the 'outside itself' as the self-relation of time. The externality of space. 
externality as space, does not overtake time; rather, it opens as pure 'outside' 'within' the movement of 
temporalization. SP, p. 86. 
If we recall now that the inwardness of pure audiophonic auto-affection supposed the 
purely temporal nature of the living voice, the externality or spatiality of indicative signification 
and of writing, could only destroy the self-presence of the living present, it is literally the death of 
that self-presence. 121 The consequences of this irreducibility of indication in inward speech are 
more disquieting than ever. We will never stop counting them. 
The privilege of the living voice (together with the radical distinction between pure 
inward expression and outward indication), the solitary mental life of the SUbject, seems to be 
threatened and undermined then not by something that is "external" to it, which would 
presuppose that the subject is first constituted by itself in its self-identity, in the self-identity and 
self-presence of its life and then faces, confronts or lets itself being affected by what is outside. 
by the other, the alter ego, or death. It is, rather, as Derrida writes, "undermined hy its OWfl origin. 
hy the very conditions of its self-presence, by time to be conceived now on the basis of differance 
within auto-affection, on the basis of identifying identity and nonidentity within sameness" (SP. 
p. 68). But what is called here "time" is not the proper noun or name to designate this movement 
of differance within auto-affection, which is not even a movement or an operation. an operation 
of a substance or a SUbject. of a thing in general, i.e., of a being identical and present to itself that 
would come eventually to defer and differ. Time, as differance within auto-affection, cannot be 
conceived on the basis of an "absolute subjectivity", on the basis of a present being. a being that 
is present to itself and to its voice, present whether speaking to himself or to the other. 
Constituting it and dislocating it at the same time, "time" is other than the subject. (SP. p. 84n.) If 
the living present is the absolute form of all subjective and egological life. then "time" produce". 
121 Thi" writing as spacing. D~rrida \\TllLs. "marks the dead time within the pn:scncc of th~ Jiving pre"cnt. 
within th~ g~neral form of presence." Of Grammatology, pp. 6R. 70. 
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what if forbids, or, as Derrida put it in Of Grammato[ogy, it makes possible what it makes 
impossible: the absolute identity of the subject as self-presence. 122 
The hypothesis of the voice, of the purely spiritual breath, of a fully present and a!i\'e 
voice, a voice without differance and without writing, that is, of a purely inward speech, of the 
pure and absolute inside of an inner life, and therefore the hypothesis of pure and simple life 
identical and present to itself is contradicted by time itself, by the temporalization of lived 
experience and of sense itself. Since time is conceived of as the openness upon another absolute 
present, i.e., as the openness of the present upon the outside of itself, then spacing, yisibility, the 
world, death, writing, etc, are primordially implied in the movement of temporalization. Which 
again means that they do not simply befall and overtake the pure interiority of the Jiying present 
from without, for the very reason that space, the world, death, etc, open as pure "outside" 
"within" the movement of the temporalization and presentation of the living present itsdf. There 
can no longer be neither an absolute inside (called presence, life), nor an absolute outside (called 
nonpresence, nonplenitude or death). As it always happens the outside bears with the inside a 
relationship that is anything but a simple exteriority. The sense of the outside was always 
inscribed in the inside, confined outside the outside. "The living present is originally marked by 
death." 123 
The above can be confirmed if we think through what we referred to at the end of the 
previous section as the "paradoxical" relation between the determination of being as presence and 
its determination as ideality, i.e., as the infinite repetition of the same. The possibility of the 
infinite repetition of the same in different acts and moments, which is the common root of the 
intersubjective and intrasubjective constitution of sense in its ideal Objectivity, the possibility that 
presence to consciousness (the presence of sense to consciousness and of consciousnes,> to itsdf) 
can be indefinitely repeated, is experienced by the subject as sense and right, as life itselfl~~ Thi,> 
experience, itself ideal and absolute, signifies the absolute certainty of the subject that the 
universal form of all possible experience, and of all life is the presence of the liying present. 
There is no experience, past or to come, which can be lived other than in the present (other than in 
1'1 . 
-- Ihld, p. I-B. 
I~' Viokncl' and Metaphysics. p. 133. 
I'~ 
- lOG, p. 137. 
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an originary or modified form of presence.) The notion of a past whose sense (Sinn) could not be 
thought in the form of a (past) present is an absolute impossibility for phenomenology. 125 
But in order for such a relationship with presence, as the absolute and universal fonn of 
all experience and of all life, to be instituted, the subject must open itself to the knowledge (which 
is not one knowledge among others) that after its empirical death or factual disappearance, or 
even after the annihilation of the totality of the existing world in general, the living present alone 
is and will ever be. Consequently this relationship with death becomes the concrete structure of 
presence, indeed of the living present. Derrida writes 
The relation with the presence of the present as the ultimate form of being and of ideality is the 
move by which I transgress empirical existence, factuality, contingency, wordliness, etc. - first of all my 
own empirical existence, factuality, contingency, wordliness, etc. [ ... J I can empty all empirical content. 
imagine the absolute overthrow of the content of every possible experience, a radical transformation of the 
world. I have a strange and unique certitude that this universal form of presence, since it concerns no 
determined being, will not be affected by it. The relation with my death (my disappearance in general) thus 
lurks in this determination of being as presence, ideality, the absolute possibility of repetition. SP. p. 5-l, 
Similarly, the possibility of sense and of language in general is given only by this 
relationship with death. Hence the transcendental sense of death 126. My death, my factual or actual 
disappearance will not be comprehended as sense (as having or making sense). but neither simply 
as a factual horizon, as an empirical possibility or a contingent eventuality extrinsic to the living 
production and movement of sense and signification. The possibility of my death, of my 
nonpresence or disappearance in general is an essential possibility inasmuch as it is necessarily 
inscribed in the functioning of my signs, of my meaningful speech or writing. My mortality, the 
possibility of death, of my factual disappearance, and as we are going to see, the factual absence 
of my hie et nunc meaning or \'(Jldoir-dire, is necessarily implied in the pronouncing of any 
meaningful expression whatsoever, for example, in the statement I am. or I am alive. Derrida 
writes about this strangely murmured implication of death and mortality in the statement I am: 
If the possibility of my disappearance in general must somehow be experienced in. order t:or a 
relationship with presence in general to be instituted. we can no longer say tha~ the exp.enence of the 
possibility of my absolute disappearance (my death), occurs to an I am. and modIfies a subJec~. The.1 am. 
being experienced as I am present. itself supposes the relationship with presenc~ m general. with bemg L\\ 
presence. The appearing of the I to itself in the I am is thus originally a relatIOn. With Its own po<.,\lhk 
disappearance. Therefore, I am originally means I am mortal. I am immortal is an Imp0<.,<.,lhk propo ... lllon. 
Sp, p. 54. 
12." It' tl" 'h 'I't that W' are attempting following Derrida in Speech (llId Phellomella. here to IS liS II1l-POs.1Jl I I Y L ,........ . 
think otherwise, hy putting into question, hy deconstructing the dommant thmkmg of the pO ... \lhk. thl'" 
slipelpOll'o1iJI concept of the possible in Husser)'s transcendental phel~~)men~)ILlg:. . .. 
12(1 lOG. p. ~~. And in Signature E\'cllf Context, p. 8 "the \a~~e or etleL'! of tran\(endentalIt) is link.ed by 
Hussnl to the possihility of writing and 'death' thus analy ... ed. 
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I am immortal, is an impossible proposition, I.e., absurd (with the absurdity of 
Widersinnigkeit), and a fortiori false according to the distinctions that Husserl him"elf has 
elaborated for his pure logical grammar, but since, as we are going to see in the next section, the 
very (teleological) idea of truth, i.e., of knowledge, which guides from afar these distinction-.. 
conceals the relationship with death, this false proposition is the truth of metaphy"ics, "the wry 
truth of truth." (ibid., p. 54n) 
Only by employing rigorously the logic and the rules of the distinctions which Husser! 
establishes in his pure logical grammar, Derrida in the last chapter of Speech and Phenomena. 
will engage in a discussion about the "possibility of m)' death ", and write, without absurdity, that 
"my death is structurally necessary to the pronouncing of the /." (ibid., p. 96) 
.209 
2) The Supplement of the Subject: Speech as Writing 
In the last chapter of Speech and Phenomena, "The supplement of Origin ", Derrida 
returns to Husserl's §9 but only after having taken a long detour. The three preceding chapters of 
Speech were devoted to a close commentary on the last paragraph of §8 in which Derrida brought 
forth and described the experience of audio-phonic auto-affection in the living present as the 
egological and subjective form of all experience (transcendental or empirical) and of all life. 
Derrida, however, does not deny this experience on the basis of being a solipsistic hypothesis. 127 
Breaking away from solipsism, was never, for Derrida, a question of abandoning 
phenomenological justification. This experience describes, in its most general and universal but 
also most concrete form, the human relation to self, human (inter)subjectivity.128 Hearing-oneself 
speak is the hypothesis l29 or the ground on the basis of which phenomenology can describe the 
objectivity of the object (Gegenstand) and the presence of the present (Gegenwart) from a certain 
inside, which, as we have seen, is not a simple inside but the intimate possibility of a relation to 
an outside and to a beyond in general. Hearing oneself speak is a unique operation, the pure 
production of the phenomenon as an objectfor a subject and its voice; it is also the possibility for 
what is called subjectivity or the for itself (jur sich): the subject relates to itself, reflects on or re-
turns to itself and reappropriates itself through the power (the possibility or capacity) to repeat 
presence, through the technical prosthesis of the voice and the power of repetition which 
idealizes itself. "Here idealization is the movement by which sensible exteriority, that which 
127 And indeed Husserl wanted to describe it as such, by insisting that the processes of indication is absent 
in the interior monologue and "solitary mental life" of the ego, and that "analogical" and "empathic ap-
presentation" comes afterward (as the exiting moment out of solipsism), only to find itself grounded in the 
intuitive presence of an "/ am". On the other hand, only prejudices could give to an investigation into the 
solipsistic sphere of the ego a bad name. Speaking of the egoic essence of experience as Urtatsache. of 
"'his / am" which "is for me, for the I who says it and understands it accordingly, the primordial intentional 
foundation of my world", Husser! writes "Whether convenient or inconvenient. and even though (due to 
whatever prejudices) it may sound monstrous to me, / must hold fast before the primordial facr 
(Urrarsache), which L as a philosopher, must not disregard for a single instant. For children in philosophy. 
this may be a dark corner haunted by the spectres of solipsism and, perhaps of psychologism. of relativism. 
The true philosopher, instead of turning away, will prefer to fill the dark comer with light." Formal and 
Transcendental Logic. p. 237 and particularly §95 with the title "Necessity Of Srarring. Each From His 
Own Subjectivit\'. pp .. 236-7. 
12H "Eating Weli" or the Calculation of the Subjecr. p. 79. The distinction hetween human intersubjectivit) 
and that which is created between animals is also the distinction between. on the one hand. the human 
relation to self. that of a being capable of phonic auto-affection. capable of consL'iousne~~ and of ~reech. 
i.L' .. capable of the phenomenological as such and. on the other hand. the nonhuman or animal relatIon to 
sL'lf incapahle of the phenomenological as sl/ch. lOG. p. 81 n. 
\2'1 For the Greek notion of hypo-thesis as "the base or basis. the infrastructure posed heneath or at the 
hottom of a foundation". or as "the subjeL'l. substance. supposition of a di~cour~L'" ~ee Roglles. Two Dsa", 
Oil Reason, p. 1 ~6. 
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affects me or serves me as signifier, thenceforth appears to me as my spontaneity and escapes me 
less and less".130 This possibility of inward speech and of the consciollsness of speech. is the 
phenomenon of auto-affection lived as the immediate presence of the signified and the effacement 
of the exterior, empirical or contingent signifier. This limitless power over the mundane signifier. 
this lived and spontaneous reduction of the opacity of the signifier is the origin of presence. 
This origin, however, which according to "the principle of principles" of phenomenology 
constitutes the absolute point of departure, the rightful beginning, the unique origin of a principal 
responsibility and accountability, this origin present to itself and identical with itself, is what has 
already been deconstructed and what has deconstructed "itself', offered itself since for ever to the 
deconstruction "of itself'. If analogical appresentation and indication partake and are irreducible 
in the solipsistic operation of auto-affection, then the self of the origin, the autonomy of the self. 
of the "ipse" or "autos", has opened and subjected itself, from the very beginning, starting at the 
threshold of the speaking-hearing, to the processes of differance, of writing. of substitutive 
supplementation, of exappropriation, 
Now even if Husserl has recognized the necessity of the linguistic incarnation of sense, 
the necessity of the linguistic threads to be woven with the pre-linguistic threads of experience for 
an experience of auto-affection to be possible, for subjectivity, and the for-itself of a self-present 
egological SUbjectivity to be possible, he never gave an unambiguous answer to the question 
concerning the ultimate reason, the raison d'etre of their interweaving or addition. Why does the 
ego (that is, the transcendental ego as the absolute origin of the world) have to say I. 1 am, so as 
to affect or hear itself, if the silent, but full, immediate and actual intuition or perception of itself 
were possible? What is the raison d' etre of this prosthesis of the expression I, 1 am, etc.? What is 
the cause or foundation of this supplement, if the immediate presentation of the ego to itself were 
possible, if the lived experiences of the ego were instantaneously self-present in the mode of 
absolute certitude? 
If indication, for example, writing in the colloquial sense, does not simply come as a 
supplement to be added to speech, if the "inside" of expression is not accidentally affected by the 
"outside" of writing, and if expression itself is not added from the outside like a stratum to a pre-
expressive, silent stratum of lived experience or sense, then one should suspect that their addition 
or interweaving is not simply an empirical accident but an absolutely irreducible and essential 
necessity. The constitution of ideal objects and their transmissibility. history ihelf, is at .... take 
here. If writing, as the sensible and durable inscription of a sign or a mark in space. /1lwt 
Il() . 01 Grammatology. p.166. 
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supplement speech (which is supposed to be alive and fully present to itself), and speech mllst 
supplement sense (which is supposedly immediately present as evidence at the same moment it is 
produced), then this perhaps means that the "presence'" of speech and the "presence'" of sense 
have already from the start fallen short of themselves. 
If that is so, if "presence" is marked by an anterior default or deficiency (an emptiness or 
void) which needs to be filled up by a supplement, we can speak of speech and writing as 
"primordial supplements", of that "strange" structure that - contrary to all good and traditionaL 
that is, metaphysical logic - comes to dislocate, to replace or to hold the place of that \\hich is 
supposed to supplement. Its strangeness consists in the fact that, "by a delayed reaction" (SP. p. 
89), the possibility of an addition, of a simple supplementation produces presence, the origin 
itself, i.e., that to which it is supposed to be added on. The supplement thus becomes the origin of 
the origin, which means either that there is no absolute origin or that the absolute origin is only 
the supplement of the supplement. 131 
Now this supplementary and technical prosthesis 132 of the signifier or mark to the purity 
of self-relation, to the simplicity of a consciousness that is simply present to itself, Derrida calls 
differance. Differance takes the place or stands in the place of "presence" (i.e., of the living, self-
identical origin) due to the latter's primordial self-deficiency. What is supplementary is the 
process of differance which submits presence simultaneously to a primordial division and 
delay. 133 
[The] concept of originary supplementation not only implies nonplenitude of presence (or, in 
Husserl's language, the nonfulfillment of an intuition): it designates this function of substitutive 
supplementation in general, the in-the-place-of (jur etwos) structure which belongs to every sign in 
131 OOr. pp. 298, 313ff 
In If we speak of the technical addition of the phone this is in order to argue that there were never such a 
thing as a natural phone, a natural unity of sense or thought and phone, of sense and the sense of sound, and 
in order to highlight the primordial unity of phone and techne: without the voice there would be no "world 
as such ", that is to say, no idealization of sense (Sinn). no culture. no objectivity of the object, no project of 
truth, and no history whatsoever. 
m According to the most traditional and classical semiology, the sign is put "in the place of'. it takes and 
ucclipies the place of the thing itself, of the present thing (sense or referent): it represents and supplements 
the absence of presence. Whenever the present. sense or referent. cannot be presented, we signify. The sIgn 
is deferred presence: the circulation of signs defers the moment in which we encounter. percei\t~. touch. 
elc., the present thing itself. The sign is thought on the basis of a presence. of a presence that is deferred 
and at the same time anticipated or foreseen through the sign. According to this semiology the substitution 
of the sign for the present thing is both secondary and provisional. It is this "provisional secondarine",," 
which is put into question with the notion of "primordial substitution" or "primordial differance". But agaIn 
we shouldn't even call it "primordial" since the values of primordiality. of absolute beginning. of arelle., 
origin (and telos) have always denoted presence, ousia or parousia. See DUferanCl'. p. 9 and O.t 
Grammatology p. 61. The notion of supplement has the same deconstructi \'e value as the notion of the sign: 
to reston; the original and nonderivative structure of the supplement. to speak of the primordIal s.uppkment 
is at the same time to upset or disturb the binary and hierarchical oppositions on the ha"j" 01 whIch. within 
the history of metaphysics. the function of suhstitutivc supplementation was alway" suhurd\lla\Ld to the 
absolute and founding \aluc of presence. 
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g~neral. [ .. ) W~at we would ultimately like to draw attention to is that the for-itself of self-presence (jiir 
slch) [ ... ] ar~ses In the role of su~plement as primordial substitution. in the form of "in the place of' (jur 
etwas), that IS, as we have seen, In the very operation of signification in general. The for-itself would he an 
in-the-place-of put for itself, instead of itself SP, pp. 88-89. 
In order to approach this "strange" structure of the supplement of origin we haye to 
investigate more closely into the primordial interweaving (Veiflechtung) between indication and 
expression. As we saw, according to the intuitionism and phonologism which commands the 
whole of Husserl's discourse (and the distinction between expression and indication), expression 
is more full, more immediate, than indication since the ap-presentational detour which is 
irreducible in real communication is no longer necessary in inward speech, and since it can 
function as pure expression in the alleged self-presence of a silent and fulfilled 
Bedeutungsintention (LI, §8). But in §9 speaking again about confusions and the interweaving 
(Veiflechtung) of several relations which remain to be disentangled, Husserl invites us to the last 
reduction, "the most audacious one", according to Derrida, whose aim is to isolate and reveal "the 
specific purity of expression." 
Considering the strange and "dangerous" supplement of onglO, Derrida presents 
Husserl's last and most audacious reduction: in §9 of this first logical investigation he reduces as 
nonessential components of expression the acts of intuitive cognition which "fllifil" the meaning-
intention (the Bedeutungsintention). According to Derrida, with this move Husser! goes "against 
the whole philosophical tradition" (SP, p. 90) by recognizing that intuition, cognitive 
intentionality, the fulfilment or actualization of the aim of meaning in a plenitude (in intuitive 
perception), is not essential to the functioning of meaning (Bedeutung) or of expression. Even 
though the movement toward plenitude, the telos of fulfilment in a plenitude is not an accidental 
element of intentionality, even though it has been described by Husserl as being constitutive of 
the Bedeutungsintention itself, it is not necessary, says Husser!, that it be attained for an 
expression to have meaning and, thereby, to acquire the status of genuine speech. The question 
we have to tackle now is how Husserl can maintain these two moves, which are not simply 
antithetical: how he can organize the subordination of language to the norm of knowledge and 
how at the same time leave open a space for the description of language's freedom. As Derrida 
writes 
It is important to see how from a distance - an articulated distance - an intuitionist theory of 
knowkdge determines Husser! 's conception of language. The II'hole origina.lity (~f this cOl1ccp~ion lie'> in 
the fact that its ultimate subjection to intuitionism does not oppress what mIght he calkJ the freedom of 
language. the candor of speech (jranc-parla d'un discourse) even if it is false or L'ontraJlctory. SP. p. Xl). 
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Here, in order to estimate or measure the "originality" of Husserl's conception, we must 
consider the formalist motif of his "pure logical grammar".134 Employing the distinctions from 
this logical grammar we can say, with Husserl, that one can speak without knowing and this 
speech is still genuine speech. One can speak without seeing, one can \'ery well speak outside the 
horizon of truth, provided one's speech conforms to grammatical rules which do not immediately 
figure as rules for knowledge. When Husserl speaks of "pure logical grammar" what he means 
by it is an elaboration of a formal doctrine of conditions, a building up of a universal system of 
rules which a speech or a discourse must satisfy in order to have sense, in order to mean. ewn 
where it makes no knowledge possible. In this sense, pure logical grammar. i.e., the general 
morphology of that meaning, is independent of all logic of truth. The cognitive intuition through 
which we come to see and know objects is not essential to normal speech, to the meaning of a 
speech which obeys purely grammatical forms J35 : the absence of intuition does not imply the 
absence of the meaning of speech. Speech, to be sure, must make sense, but the question now 
becomes: is a contradictory, false or absurd speech, a widersinnig speech also an unintelligible or 
sinnlos speech? Husserl' s institution of a pure logical grammar depends entirely on the 
distinctions between Sinnlosigkeit and Wiedersinn igkei t, Gegenstandlosigkeit and 
Bedeutungslosigkeit: expressions like "a golden mountain" or "the circle is square"' may offer no 
knowledge, since they give us no object to see (for empirical or a priori reasons). may even be 
~\'iedersinnig, but they are definitely neither sinnlos, nor Bedeutunglos. The absence of the object 
(Gegenstandlosigkeit) is not the absence of meaning (Bedeutullgslosigkeit). Since it obeys certain 
grammatical rules, an absurd expression "the circle is square"' is not nonsense (Unsinn). Pure 
n4 Both in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic (§§ 67-69) and in Formal and Transcendental Logic (§§ 12-15), 
Husserl designates, but also arranges and hierarchizes, the most essential tasks of pure logic: 1) in the first 
place, at the most fundamental level or stage. comes the" pure logical grammar" also called "the pure 
morphology of Bedeutungen", 2) the logic of consequence or noncontradiction and 3) the theory of the 
possible form of theory. The aim of the forth Logical Investigation is to distinguish in this stratification of 
logic the first most fundamental and most elementary logical stratum as the ground on which the remainder 
logical edifice is founded. The question pertaining to the most elementary logical stratum is: how can one 
put Bedeutungen logether in order to make a new, more complex Bedeutung, by considering exclusively 
their form and by disregarding the question of their objective validity, i.e., the question of the possible 
truth of Bedeutungen'? For the importance of the "pure morphology of Bedeutungen" in Husserl's projL'ct in 
Logical InvestigationsI and in Formal and Transcendental Logic see also S. Bachelard's Stud" or 
Husserl '.\ Formal and Transcendental Logic. pp. 5ff. 
I ''i In order to explain the purely grammatical. Husserl refers to a general morphology of Bedeutull,l!.l'Il, and 
he 1l11les that this l!eneral. meta-empirical grammar does not cover the entire a priori of language but \ lilly 
the IORical a prio;i of language. Husserl writes in the forth edition of the forth Logical Irl\L'stigallllll: "In 
the first edition I spoke of 'pure grammar'. a name conceived and expressly devised to be ana]ngllus to 
Kant's 'pure science of nature'. Since it cannot. however, be said that the pure morphoillgy of Bcdelltuflgl'1l 
comprehends the entire a priori of general grammar - there is, e.g .. a peculiar a priori go\ernmg rd~tlons 
Ill' mutual understanding among pSYL'hic subjects. relations very important for grammar - talk of pure 
logical grammar is to he preferred." L/, Vol II. p. 527. 
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logical grammar excludes from normal discourse only what is nonsense, the agrammaticalness of 
Sinnlosigkeit, for example "abrakatabra" or "green is or." (LI, § 15, p. 293) 
Now in order to support this last and most audacious reduction of coo-nitive intuition 
o ' 
Derrida follows one by one the distinctions on the basis of which Husserl was able "to redefine a 
pure logical grammar" and thereby to isolate and "delineate the logical a priori of language 
within the general a priori of language." (SP. p. 9) These are mainly the distinctions between the 
pure intention (the Bedeutungsintention, the intention to signify, to say something sinnvoll or 
meaningful) and the (fulfilling) intuition, between Bedeutungslosigkeit and Gegenstandlosigkeit. 
between Widersinnigkeit and Sinnlosigkeit, and finally between meaning, expression (as 
idealities) and the object (which need not be ideal). "Without such distinctions, no pure logical 
grammar would be possible. The possibility of pure forms of judgements, which supports the 
entire structure of the Formal and Transcendental Logic, would be blocked" (SP, p. 91). 
According to Derrida, with the constitution of a general and pure morphology of Bedelltllngen, 
Husserl shows how language can function freely and entirely by itself when its intention 
(bedeuten) is cut off from cognitive intuition, i.e., from intuitive presence. 
It is only by following the logic of these distinctions that Derrida can bring to light the 
essential possibility of nonintuition or of nonpresence, a possibility which, even if it seems to be 
simply negative, has a constitutive and positive value: it constitutes the Bedeutung as such. Here 
an apparently negative possibility of form, the possibility of an im-possibility, i.e., the im-
possibility of plenitude, of full intuitive presence, or, as we are going to see, the im-possibility of 
adequation between perception and expression, is not simply negative but also a chance, the 
positive condition of signification itself. Now as we have seen in the first part of the thesis, 
Husserl has examined and determined this possibility of nonplenitude, i.e .. of nonintuition or 
nonpresence, in a teleological manner, as a simply negative, inferior, and even dangerous or 
critical possibility: it opens the phenomenon of the crisis of sense, as the crisis of logos itself. But 
Husserl also recognized, as we read in Derrida's Introduction to his Origin of GeometrY. that this 
critical possibility is also an eidetic possibility or necessity: crisis, as the forgetfulness of the 
origin, is linked to the very moment of truth and the constitution of ideal Objectivity, and thereby 
it is bound to the essential possibili~\' of \\Titing. The negativity of crisis. of forgetfulness is not a 
mere accident. It is then the notion of "crisis" that becomes suspect, together with what ties it to 
"a dialectical and teleological determination of negati\'ity.',136 
1
1('Nq!lltiations. p. -+()~. OGr. p. 40. lOG. p. 36n .. 
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What Derrida intends to show, following Husserl's pure morphology of meaning. is that 
signs (Zeichen) as expressions endowed with meaning (bedeutsame Zeichen) not only do not 
necessarily imply fullness in the intuition of the object, but that, on the contrary, what is 
structurally original about the Bedeutung is the absence of any object given to intuition, the 
Gegenstandlosigkeit. 
Let us now look more closely at the relation or, indeed, the tension between, 011 the one 
hand, Husserl's formalist motif, the formality of pure logical grammar, the institution of a pure 
morphology of Bedeutungen137, and, on the other hand, Husserl's intuitionism (optical or 
acoustical), the motif or telos of plenitude in a perceptive intuition and in the living \'oice or 
Bedeutungsintention. According to Derrida, it is Husserl's phonologism, his "nai've treatment of 
the concept of word" (SP, p. 16) that left unresolved the tension between these two major motifs: 
the purity of formalism and the radicality of intuitionism (which is also a teleologism). This 
tension can explain how "Husserl describes, and in one and the same move effaces the 
emancipation of speech as nonknowing" (SP, p. 97). 
Derrida takes two examples of speech acts which according to the intuitionist motif or 
imperative (the norm or telos of intuitive knowledge, of the intuition, external or internal, that is 
adequate to its object, and of the meaning that is adequate to itself) should prove the hypothesis 
that in the full presence of the perceptual sense which comes to realize or actualize the aim of 
signification or expression (the aim of a logical meaning). the fulfilling intuition and the 
meaning-intention "form an intimately blended unity of an original character" (LI, L § 10, p. 
282.). As Husserl put this hypothesis in the previous paragraph: 
In the realized (realisierten) relation of the expressIon to its objective correlate. the sense 
informed expression becomes one with the act of meaning-fulfilment (Bedeutungseifiillung). The sounded 
word is made one with (ist einst mit) the meaning-intention (Bedeutungsintention). and this in its tum is 
made one (as intentions in general are made one with their fulfilments) with its corresponding meaning-
fulfilment. (my emphasis) LI, §9, p. 281 
1) First Derrida takes the case where a perception comes to fulfil the meaning-intention 
of the speaker, the statement about a perception, "I see a man by the windov,' ... Now is this 
fulfilling perception necessary or indispensable for the functioning of the BedeUTllng of this 
statement? Husseri himself says that it is only contingent, an e\'entual possibility \\hich Joes not 
m Husserl in Logical Imcstigations determines the catcgory of the sign in general as aform. and not a" a 
genus. LI. I. §23. SP. p. 23. 
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affect what is essential to the perceptual expression, to what is aimed at by the meaning-intention 
(Bedeutungsintention). 
This objective somewhat [what is intended by perception] can either be actually present. through 
accompanying intuitions (Allschauungen aktuell gegenwartig), or may at least appear in representation 
(vergegenwartigt) e.g., in a mental image, and where this happens the relation to an object is realized. 
Alternatively this need not occur: the expression function significantly (sinn vall), it remains more that a 
sound of words, but it lacks any basic intuition that will give it its object (den Gegenstand gebenden 
Anschauung_entbehrt). LI, §9, p. 280 
Even if, as we have said, the Bedeutungsintention is always determined in view of a 
relation to an object, the acts of intuition which give the object and fulfil the Bedeutungsintention, 
Husserl writes, are "not essential (auj3erwesentlich) to the expression as such" (ibid), only this 
Bedeutungsintention, the living and life-giving act which animates and gives meaning to the body 
of expression (and thereby transfonns it into a living flesh) is essential and indispensable. It is 
enough that the Bedeutungsintention animates this body for speech to take place; the absence of 
the object does not compromise the meaningfulness of the expression in the sense that it does not 
reduce it to an unanimated, physical body, to a "mere sound of words." (ibid) An expression 
acquires the status of speech then only if it is endowed with a meaning (Bedeutung) which can 
function in the absence of its object, in the absence of intuitive presence, and provided that this 
speech also conforms to grammatical or semantic rules. 
As Husserl will later (and after having first demonstrated the difference or non-
coincidence between expression, meaning and object in § 12) write: "We distinguish, in a 
perceptual statement, as in every statement, between content and object; by content we 
understand the self-identical meaning (identische Bedeutung) that the hearer can grasp even if he 
is not a percipient" (LI, § 14, p. 290). The proposition "I see a man by the window" will still ha\'e 
meaning and be intelligible by anyone who is listening to me, even if he does not see any man, or 
even if 1 do not see any man, if I do not see him clearly, or even if I want to mislead my 
interlocutor etc. Not that this is always the case but this proposition can be said and be understood 
by any speaking subject without the presence of the objece 38 aimed at by the acts of perception or 
intuition. Better, it belongs to the structure of possibility of this proposition that it can be uttered 
and function despite the absence of the subject's perception here and now. Without this 
possibility there would be no meaningful speech whatsoever. Derrida writes 
I 'K We distinguish a statement whose object (and correlati\'c1y the perception of the object) is onl~ po~sib\c 
from a statement whose object is impossible, for empirical or for a priori reasons, as in the case of "a 
~()Iden mountain" and "a squared circle", The absence of the object is neither a Silllllo.ligkeir nor a 
Bl'de /I t till g sl osig kei t. 
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Since this possibility is constitutive of the possibility of speech, it should ~tructure the ven act of 
him who speaks while perceiving. My nonperception, my nonintuition. my hic et nunc abse~ce. are 
expressed by that very thIng that I say, by that which I say and because I say it. SP, p. 93. 
A perceptual statement then requires, as its essential condition of possibility, the absence 
of perception, and therefore the absence of the empirical subject of perception, as well as the 
absence of the object he was able to describe. This absence of the object, the Gegenstandlosigkeit, 
as nonperception or nonplenitude, does not prevent the statement from functioning, i.e., from 
meaning something, on the contrary, it is this possibility of nonperception which gives birth to 
meaning as such, gives it out to be heard and read. Whether or not perception accompanies an 
expression about perception is, therefore, quite indifferent to the function of its meamng 
(Bedeutung.) 
And if what IS structurally original In a meaningful expressIon IS the 
Gegenstandlosigkeit, its ability to dispense with the presence of the object aimed at by intuition, 
this also means, according to Husserl and Derrida, that a linguistic expression which can only 
function in the presence of its object, or a meaning which can be fused into intuitive presence not 
only looses its originality but also disappears, gets paralyzed or dies. 139 An expression without 
iterability, and, as we are going to see, a voice without differance or without writing is absolutely 
alive and absolutely dead. 140 
2) With the second example, the speech act which involves the personal pronoun /. 
Derrida wants to demonstrate how writing, in the generalized sense, is involved in the so-called 
"lil'ing" speech. In the last analysis, if a "'living," or "original," or "'natural", i.e., "'innocent", 
m Husserl has to admit that the hypothesis of the intimate fusion of meaning- intention and intuition is 
absurd and contradictory. According to Marrati, Husserl was never able to think the originality of the 
Bedeutung: "although the originality of language lies in its ability to function without a full intuition, its 
essencc is still that it is fulfilled b:v intuition." Genesis and Trace. p. 79 According to our interpretation, the 
telos of fulfillment belongs to the essence of meaning but, what Husserl writes, is that the fulfillment in 
intuition is not essential (auj3en"('sentlich sind (§ 10), that the fulfillment is not necessary to the functioning 
of meaning. Like Marrati, John Caputo believes that "the teleology of fulfillment obscures Husserrs 
achievement," and proceeds to a set of distinctions in order to describe deconstruction as "a politics of 
Iiheration": the distinction between the "police work" of Husserl's a priori grammar and Derrida's work of 
Iiheration in Speech. between "'the unemployment or uselessness of signs" in Husserl and the "ful\". 
"gainful", "useful" employment, and "honest work" of signs in Derrida! John Caputo. "The Economy of 
Signs in Husserl and Derrida: From Uselessness to Full Employement". published in Deconstruction ami 
Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp .. l04, 108. This text. full with so many capitalistic. 
liberalistic, and Christian connotations (the "'full", "gainful" employment. the "honest work" of signs in 
Derrida) runs contrary to Derrida's most explicitly stated intentions. Unlike Marrati and Caputo. Gasche's 
interpretation wants to bring forth Derrida's indebtedness to Husserl's "remarkable project" and to 
rccogni/c the importancc and radicality of Husserl's "rigorous distinction between meaning intention and 
Its possible fulfillment by an intuition of an object" The Tain of the Mirror, p. 2.+)\. 
140 SP /\"1 L' ., II' 1 ')8 ')l) 
. . p. /_. 1111ltll 11(, p. - -- . 
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language has never existed, never been intact and uncontaminated by writing, this is because, as 
Derrida emphasizes in Of Grammatology, it has itself always been a species of writing. 
What are the essential predicates of writing? Derrida in Signature Event Context refers to 
three rigorously interrelated predicates. We have already referred to one of them: spacing, writing 
takes place in space. The other two reminds us what HusserI himself wrote in the Oriain with 
~ 
regard to the "decisive function" of writing in the constitution and transmission of aeometrical 
o 
objects: with writing communication becomes virtual. In the most minimal and classical 
determination of this notion, writing is a sign or a mark that subsists or remains. that does not 
exhaust itself in the moment of its inscription, that can give rise to an iteration despite the total 
absence of its author. This is also what enables us to distinguish written from oral 
communication: the possibility that a mark or a text can go on functioning despite, and beyond, 
the absence or death of its author (or any determined receiver). Thirdly, a written sign breaks with 
its context "that is, with the collectivity of presences organizing the moment of its inscription." 
Writing carries a force of rupture especially with regard to the so called "real" context of 
communication: "the 'present' of the inscription, the presence of the writer to what he has 
written, the entire environment and horizon of his experience, and abo\'e all, the intention, the 
wanting-to-say-what-he-means (vouloir-dire) which animates his inscription at the given 
moment.,,141 
As it was the case with the distinction between expression and indication, the play of 
presence with absence (of the Bedeutungsintention) is at the core of the most traditional 
determination of the distinction between speech and writing. But, as Derrida tries to demonstrate, 
these predicates (death, spacing, uproodedness from the context, i.e., the infinitization of 
contexts) cannot be limited to the graphic mark alone, they are generalizable, that is. they are to 
be found in spoken language itself, and finally in the totality of every lived experience. Derrida 
tries to show that the possibility of the mark (that remains), the possibility of its functioning when 
cut off not only from the referent (or the object) but also, at a certain point, from its context and 
its original Bedeutungsintention, from every present and actual intention of communication, that 
is. the possibility of (I nonpresence which would make every oral mark a grapheme in general. 
this possibility then is not simply an accident, an empirical anomaly of spoken language, but a 
I~I SEC, p. 9. To he sure. if writing hreaks with the determined context of its original inscription this uoe,", 
not mean that there is no context for writing. that writing can he valid outside of all context. hut rather that 
no context can entirely enclose it. "Every sign. linguistic or nonlinguistic. spoken or written. [···1 (an he 
cited. put hetween quotation marks: in so doing it can hreak with e\ery given ((lntext. engendenng an 
infinity of new (ontexts in a manner which is ahsolutely illimitable. This doe" not Imply that the mark I" 
valid outside of a context, hut on the (ontrary that there are ollly contexts without any center (ll ahsolute 
anchoring" (SEC. p. 12), 
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structural and a necessary one. This possibility of the mark in general, the functioning of a certain 
iterability of the mark, is anterior to the dissociation, and therefore anterior to any subordination 
or hierarchy between oral and graphic marks. Like the trace it is, the mark that remains, is neither 
present nor absent; it is, on the contrary, the condition for this presence or absence, and the 
condition of what the latter commands: the difference between oral and written marks in the 
traditional sense. 
Now in the example of the subjective expression with the personal pronoun "r. it is 
supposed that whenever I (or an ego in general) say I, I am, my life is, etc, whether I utter these 
expressions for communicative ends or not, the aim of my vouloir-dire, of my pure intention to 
express something concerning myself or my life, is immediately realized, i.e., it is "filled" and 
actualized in an internal intuition or perception, in the present and actual intuition of myself. 
However, is that so? 
In §26 of the First Investigation Husserl makes another essential distinction between 
subjective or essentially occasional expressions and objective expressions. Personal pronouns (f. 
you, etc., just as demonstrative pronouns and "subjective" adverbs, for example, here. there. 
above. below, now. yesterday. tomorrow. before. after. etc) are classed by Husserl among 
"essentially occasional" expressions, that is, among those meaningful expressions "in whose case 
it is essential to orient actual meaning to the occasion, the speaker and the situation." 142 
Occasional expressions, as subjective expressions and as essentially equivocal expressions (i.e., 
expressions which function indicatively in communication), are to be distinguished mainly from 
objective expressions (for instance, geometrical expressions, the three perpediculars of a triangle 
intersect in a point) in whose case the univocity of their meaning (Bedeutung) cannot be affected 
by the circumstances of the utterance, the context. and the situation of the speaking subject. We 
saw in Derrida's Introduction to the Origin of Geometry that absolute ideality is found only on 
the side of geometrical or mathematical expressions. W These expressions are absolutely 
objective and absolutely pure expressions, expressions whose Bedeutllng is precisely free from 
every wordly or empirical synthesis, free from every empirically determined subjectivity which in 
a here and now reactivates them, utters or writes them down, free therefore, according to Husser\. 
from all indicative contamination, free from equivocity (which is always of subjective origin). 144 
1~2 LI no 'J15 .s~ . p. ,"l • 
I·n See L1. §II and lOG. p. 7-+11. 
144 lOG. p. 101. Nowhere is speech closer to its essence or telos. nowherc is it more unproducti\t~ and more 
producti\c than as an element of an c:\aL'l scicncc. like that of gcometry. Geometry requires strict unl\ ocit~ 
and as a matter of fact it can attain it more easily than other (descripti\c or eidetiL') scienccs. for instancc 
220 
Personal pronouns, however, as subjective expressions, are without "objective sense" and In 
communicative speech, Husserl tells us, always function as indications: 
Every expression, in fact, that includes a personal pronoun lacks an objecti \e sense. The word I 
names a different person from case to case. What its meaning is at the moment, can be gleaned only from 
the living utterance and from the intuitive circumstances which surround it. (. [ ... ] In solitary speech the 
meaning of I is essentially realized in the immediate presentation (unmittelbaren Vorstellung) of one's own 
personality [ ... ] Each man has his own I presentation (and with it his individual notion (Individllalbegriff) 
of /)145 ... [In real communication, however] the word "I" has not itself directly the power to arouse the 
specific I-presentation; this becomes fixed in the actual piece of talk; It does not work like the word "lion" 
which can arouse the presentation of a lion in and by itself. In its case, rather, an indicathe function 
mediates, crying as it were "your vis-a-vis intends himself. LI, § 26, pp. 315-316. 
The expression I achieves or realizes its meaning only within solitary mental life, when I 
speak to myself and say I, at the same time that I have a present, full and actual intuition of 
myself (if that were possible), whereas the same word functions outside my own self-presence, 
outside the sphere of my ownness (Eigenheit), Husserl says, as a "universally operative 
indication." (ibid.) The Bedeutung of a subjective expression, of the personal pronoun I is carried 
off into indication whenever my Bedeutungsintention animates a real speech for someone else in 
a real communication. Here Husserl imposes again, this time with respect to the expression /, the 
distinction between expression and indication as well as the boundary between internal and 
external speech, pure expression in soliloquy and indication in real communication. 
Now, if the absence of the object (Gegenstandlosigkeit) is structurally necessary to the 
functioning of the meaning of a perceptual statement, if there is no need to have a perception of 
the object in order to utter a meaningful or intelligible expression about it, what happens if the 
object of my perception, internal this time, and of my expressions is myself, my own lived 
experiences and self-presence? Are not the distinctions, on the basis of which Husserl himself 
was able to establish a pure logical grammar, between intuition and intention, between 
Gexenstandlosigkeit and Bedeutungslosigkeit valid in the case of the personal pronoun I? 
The experience of saying I, I am, etc., while speaking to myself, is not one experience 
among others. This experience would sanction the essential distinction between indication and 
expression since it would satisfy not only the hypothesis of the adequation between (internal) 
perception and its expression, but also the hypothesis of the adequation between meaning and 
phenomenology. But the freedom of the geometrical Bedeutung from indication (.whi~h is essenti~lIy 
l'qui\'()cal) will never, in fact, he absolute. Absolute univocity, the absolute UIl1\ocIly of ohJectl\e 
l'\pression, like "ohjective. absolutely firm knowledge of truth" is, according to Husser!' an 1l1access1hlc 
ideal. an infinite idea, an Idea in the Kantian sense. (OG, p, 166, and lOG. p. I O.t) 
1450errida underlines twice his astonishment at this individual concept. Indi\'idualhegr~tf Doe" the clement 
of Illli\'l'/'salitv proper to expressin:ness as such, to the s;lInvol expression ''1''. just ~s it has heen descrlhed 
hy Husscrl himself, not forhid the possibility that a concept be individual'? SP. p. 9)n. "el' also p. nn 
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saying, the hypothesis, in other words, of saying what I mean, of meaning to say what I say. and. 
finally, this experience would prove that I understand what I say, that I ha\'e afull understanding 
of the meaningfulness of my expression I. My vouloir-dire, then, according to these teleological 
hypotheses, would be absolutely present to what I say. But, Derrida asks, is this certain? 
Is it absolutely certain that when I say I in speaking of myself this expression is 'fulr and 
absolutely alive for me, that the meaning (Bedeutung) of the expression I is fulfilled or actualized 
for me (since no ap-presentational detour is any longer necessary within me). that my intention to 
signify (bedeuten) is present to itself and to its content (Bedeutung), whereas the same expression 
functions as indication for the other (the hearer) in communicative speech. since. as Husserl says. 
the other can never have a presentative intuition of "my individual concept of r? LI, § 26. pp . .316 
[cited above] 
But as we have seen, I cannot use effectively any word, and in particular the word or 
expression I, I cannot give it Bedeutung, whether speaking to myself or speaking to another 
person, without being involved from the beginning in the order of substitutil'c representation 
(Repriisentation), or without operating within a structure of repetition or iteration 1~6, which is the 
essential structure of ideality in general, and in particular of the ideality of Bedeutung. 
Now with regard to the statement I am, is it not structurally implied in my operation that 
the ideality of "my" Bedeutung (that is to say, its sameness, its objective unity, its appearing as 
such in different acts and moments) cannot be endangered in any way by the factual absence of 
my empirical life, of my self presence? Is it not structurally necessary that "my" Bedeutung, as 
Derrida writes, "gives itself out as capable of remaining the same for an I-here-now in general, 
keeping its sense even if my empirical presence is eliminated or radically modified?" (SP, p95) Is 
not precisely the ideality of this Bedeutung which implies that, to the extent that it is distinct from 
its "object", will remain necessarily the same for every ego in general who every time he speaks 
of himself says I? Can I (or every other ego in general) give meaning to or utter the expressions 
"'I am ", ., I am alil'c ", "my life ", etc., without being implied in my operation that this Bedeutung 
will never change, i.e., will keep its ideal objectivity even if the expressed is a different object, 
i.e., the lived experiences of an other ego, or even if its object, my life (the life of every other in 
general) as self-presence, does not accompany any longer the uttering of the "I", that is. even if I 
am dead at the moment when it is still functioning? 
140 Iteration is not reducihle to a repetition. to a reproducti\'l~ re-presentation or reduhlication which hcfalb 
a simple presence: which is what the word repetition always wanted to say. Derrida has written a. great. deal 
ahollt the use of this word in SEC and Limited Inc: "iterahility - iter, again. prohahly comes trom Itara, 
other in Sanskrit. and C\'erything that follows can he read as the working out of the logic whIch ties 
repetition to alterity." SEC, p. 7 and Limited Inc, pp )h-57. 61-h2. 76.120.126-29. 
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Couldn't we rather say that what is structurally original about the appearing of Bedeutung 
"/" is the absence of myself, of my self-presence, and the possibility of substitution? Here 
nothing seems to be less substitutable (everyone's life, the life of every other who can say "1 am" 
"I am alive," "my life is", is irreplaceable, i.e., absolutely singular) and yet nothing seems to be 
more substitutable than the factual and actual singularity of the Bedeutungsintention (namely, the 
living and life-giving act) which animates and bestows the "1 am". each time in a here and now, 
with meaning. 147 "My life", every other's life can precisely be taken as an example and 
illustration of this singularity. Tout autre est tout autre. 148 But whatever the singularity of the 
lived experience that the functioning of the Bedeutung "I am" could ever hold or possess, the 
declaration "I am" or "my life is" does not imply any less iteration and the possibility of 
substitution than every other expression, for example "m)' umbrella", "/ forgot my umbrella.",149 
In this sense, is it necessary to know or see who is speaking, in order to understand the 
expression / am, or even utter it? Is the universality proper to expressiveness as such threatened if 
the speaker is not seen, if he is unknown, fictitious or dead? Shouldn't we rather say that the 
functioning of iterability, i.e., the minimal making sense of the expression, a minimal legibility or 
readability (its conformity to grammaticality, to a semantic and syntactic code) that is operative 
beyond the death of the factual and actual speaker, excludes the requirement for a full 
understanding of the meaningfulness of expression / am (or of the phrase "My life is"), and the 
hypothesis of a full or adequate understanding of the original intentionality of its meaning 
(Bedeutungsintention )? 
Derrida describes the autonomy of meaning (Bedeutung), the deconstructive force of its 
formality or emptiness, with regard to intuitive presence in a formula which reveals at the same 
time the play of life and death, the silent implication of death in the expression or declaration /, or 
I {/m: 
147 If we recall here that the possibility of substitution, i.e., the possibility of being-for, of in the place of. is 
the possihility of signification in general. and therefore for expression and meaning. then the for-itself of 
the self-presence of the Bedeutungsintention which animates the expression "I am" would be an in the 
place of itself: put for itself. instead of itself. 
14M Derrida Jacques, Aporias, translated by Thomas Dutoit, Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 22. What 
Derrida writes in Aporias ahout the "dangerous law" of supplementarity or iterahility in "the syntagm 'my 
death'" is also \'alid for the expression "my life", "my life is", for e\'erything that entails a first-person 
frammatical form: this the law that forces the impossible by forcing the replacement of the. irr~placeahle. 
49 Limited Inc. pp. 62-3. "There cannot be a 'sentence' that is fully and actually meanIngful and hence 
there is no 'corresponding speech act' that would be fulfilled, fully present acti\'e and actual." (ihid., p. 5g) 
We can therefore say that the possibility of understanding and the possihility of misunderstandIng a 
meaningful sentence lind their common, structural root in the graphics of iterahi lity. Derrida. \\Tites 
"Iterahility altL'l's. contaminating what it identifies and enables to repeat "itself'; it leaves us no chOice hut 
to mean (to say) somethine that is (already, always. also) other than what we mean (to say). to sa) 
somethine othe~ than what ~we say and would have wanted to say. to understand something other than 
... etc." (ihid.. p. 120) 
Whether or not I have a present intuition of myself, "I" expresses something; whether or not I am 
alive, 1 am "means something". [ ... ] 
Whether or not the I functions in solitary speech, with or without the self-presence of the speakine: 
subject, it is sinnvoll. [ ... ] ~ 
Whether or not perception accompanies the statement about perception, whether or not life as self-
presence accompanies the pronouncing of the I, is quite indifferent with regard to the functionine: of 
meaning. My death is structurally necessary to the pronouncing of the I. SP, pp. 95- 96. ~ 
Derrida writes "my death", but we can certainly say that: my disappearance in general. 
my absence pure and simple, the absence of my actual Bedeutungsintention. i.e .. of my present, 
explicit and conscious intention to say what I want or mean to say, is structurally necessary to the 
sovereign declaration of the "[ am ", "my life is", etc. 
What seems to be the essential predicate of writing (in the traditional sense. I.e., the 
absence or death of the subject or author) is no less so of any element of spoken language, of 
words or parts of speech. The functioning of iterability, in the constitution and appearance of the 
meaningful expression [ am, is anterior to all regions of sensibility, and it is. therefore, not more 
luminous than sonorous, not more proper to the visibility of the letter than to the audibility of 
spoken words. ISO Because of its iterative structure, every phonic element, every phoneme divides 
its own identity a priori. Iterability makes possible the idealization of the element. and therefore a 
certain self- identity in repetition, that of the sign(/)'ing form whose identity is ideal. i.e., 
independent of the multiplicity and diversity of factual events or acts of signification which 
intend it. But at the same time iterability limits the idealization and divides or removes the 
identity it makes possible: broaching it and breaching it at once. Being involved from the very 
beginning in the graphics of iterability, and supplementary substitution, the IVord, what is taken, 
quite naively we said, as the immediate, undivided unity of sense and sound, of the concept and 
the phonic signifier, lends "itself' to deconstruction: 
Why is this identity [of the signifying form] paradoxically the division or dissociation of itself. 
which will make of this phonic sign a grapheme? Because this unity of the signifying form only constitutes 
itself by virtue of its iterability. by the possibility of being repeated in the absence not only of its 'rdcrent' 
which is self-evident, but in the absence of a determined signified or of the intention of actual signification, 
as H:cll as of all intention of present communication. This structural possibility of being weaned from the 
referent or from the signified (hence from communication and its context) seems to me to make every 
mark, including those which are oral, a grapheme in general.]5] 
I~() In both cases, the functioning of itcrability supposes the neutralization of the sensible plenitude. of the 
phonic or graphic substance. The process of iterability does not depend on any sen~ibk plenitude: it. i~ 
rather the condition for such a plenitude. Although iterabilility does not exist outSIde all pkl11tude Ih 
functioning is anterior to what we call word, letter. sign. phonic or graphic signifier. signified conc~pt. 
sensibility or intelligibility. There are neither sensible phenomena nor intelligible no~mena. n~IthLr ~enslbIe. 
prl'SCI1Ce of the signifier nor intelligible presence of the signified before or outSIde the funcllonmg of 
iterahilitv. 
I~I l" . L~ C 10 
.. 1lgnature LI'l'nt (II/text. p. . 
What is valid for the mark, and then for the phonic or graphic element, which is iterable, 
is also valid, correlatively, for the meaning intention which is directed toward it. which animates 
it endowing it with meaning. This graphics of iterability inscribes alteration, otherness and 
nonpresence in repetition and identification: the very moment 1 say "I am", "my living present 
is", the very possibility that permits the expression "I am" to function beyond this moment. the 
possibility of its being repeated another time (and of taking the place of another I-presentation or 
Vorstellung), broaches and breaches the plenitude and identity of my self presence, of my actual 
vouloir-dire and therefore divides and expropriates the plenitude of any adequation between 
saying and meaning, or of an adequation of understanding to a phrase, written or oral. Given the 
structure of iterability, as the a priori structure of the bedeutsame Ausdruck, the intention (the 
Bedeutungsintention) animating the expression will never be through and through present to itself 
and to what it says. The iteration, Derrida says, introduces into the Bedelltllngsintention a 
dehiscence which is essential. This limit without plenitude, this dehiscence is also the positive 
condition of possibility of what is thus limited. "Dehiscence (like iterability) limits what it makes 
possible, rendering its rigor and purity impossible.'.J52 Iterability then will be described as the 
condition of possibilit}, of Bedeutungsintention and as the condition of its impossibility, of the 
impossibility of its rigorous purity. 
The general possibility of writing, of the repetition of the mark, i.e., the trace l53. and the 
possibility of substitution which belong to the structure of the mark (oral or written), produces 
that to which it is supposedly only added up: the origin, the self-presence of the subject in a living 
present. This trace which is "more ancient", "older"' and "more primordial" than the 
phenomenological origin, is not simply, Derrida insists, the disappearance of origin: the origin 
i.e., the constituting origin of sense and of signification in general, does not disappear. It is. 
however, never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, the supplement, which 
then becomes the origin of origin, i.e., the origin of the subject. l54 Which does not mean that there 
is no effect of origin or presence, no effect of identity, no effect of monologue or of 
communication between subjects: on the contrary. as we just said, the possibility of repetition and 
I)~ L' , d I ")9 lint te lie. p.. , 
1)1 L , , dl C'J 1'1 1I111te lie, pp .. . J."'. ~ , 
1)4 Here, with rcgard to the concepts of "tracc", "supplement" (as of "difference", "itcra~i~ity": Ltc.) we, 
hu\e again a douhle gesture, a douhle writing: the trace or the supplement is the ~hsolu.te ongm of sense, ot, 
the scnse of heing as prcscnce, which amounts to say that there is no ahsolute ong~~ ot s~ns~" Thc ongl,n ot 
SL'IlSe, to put it otherwisc, is more constituted than constituti\l~, it is a produced effect at dIlterance, ot the 
supplemcnt which thcrehy reintroduces a priori the constituted into what IS constItutmg, 
of substitution, which is irreducible to presence, makes not only these effects possible but at the 
same time undermines the possibility of their rigorous purity, the possibility of a plenitude, of a 
nonalterity or nondifference in the fullness of a parousia. And returning once again to the 
distinction between pure expression and indication, iterability is what blurs the purity of the 
distinction, what at once tends indefinitely to attain pure expression, i.e., the purity of the 
Bedeutungsintention present to itself and to what it says, and what forbids it, what bars access to 
it. Until death. 
This work of iterability, this graphics of differance - this dehiscence of the outside and 
the other within proper phenomenological interiority, within the voice, that disturbs, but also 
makes the "living present" effects of consciousness, the incomparable fortune of !i\'lng effects, 
possible - becomes, as Derrida writes, "the finitude of life as an essential relation to oneself and 
one's death" (SP, p. 102) 
The differance within the phone, that Derrida describes in Speech and elsewhere, this 
heteroaffection within autoaffection, does not mean that, as Marrati writes, "there can no longer 
be any trace of purity, no auto-affection,,,155 that there are no longer effects of acoustic, optical, 
tactile, etc., auto-affection, no fortune of immediacy effects, but that these happy or indispensable 
effects are indeed constituted, constituted precisely by differance, and reintroduce a priori the 
constituted into what is constituting. Without differance there would be no auto-affection, auto-
affection would not appear, but with this differance auto-affection is never pure. It does mean, 
then, that the analysis of these auto-affection effects cannot escape from the hetero-affection that 
makes them possible and keeps haunting them. Through its signs, the phone has imposed on the 
monadic ego the possibility of an analogical and empathic appresentation, i.e., an 
exappropriation, the interminable appropriation of the nonproper, of the nonego, which conditions 
and, as Derrida writes in Limited Inc, On Touching, and Eating Well, constitutes any process of 
appropriation at the same time. In this sense we cannot agree with Kates who, even if he is right 
in insisting in the fact that Derrida remains very close and faithful to Husserl's intentions in his 
exposition of the phenomenological voice, thinks, against Marrati, that Derrida's deconstruction 
does not cal1 into question this "genuinely pure auto-affection", and that Derrida's "own talk of 
differance, archi-writing, and spacing, ... proves to be an unexpectedly autochthonous 
phenomenon".156 (our emphasis) What Derrida has shown in Speech is that, more than any other 
signifying substance given to consciousness, the phone has imposed a differance or hetero-
affection, leading through re-presentation and a certain "intersubjecti\'ity" to indication and 
155 Gcnesis and Tracc, p.76 
1511 Essential History, pp. 15h. 279. 
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writing, when it was meant by Husserl to illustrate the pure auto-affection of the solitary and 
monadic ego. What we want to argue is that if Derrida's analysis of differance within audio-
phonic auto-affection puts something into question this is precisely its purity, its uniqueness and 
exceptional excellence, the pure and immediate experience of the voice (in comparison, for 
example, to the impure and mediate experience of writing), of the voice that is living and purely 
living. As well as the purely egoic essence of this experience: the living ego is auto-immune says 
Derrida. 157 This autoimmunity does not compromise this or that particular thing of the ego auto-
affecting itself, but more fundamentally the ego, the self, the I, the autos, ipseity itself. so as to 
rob auto-affection itself of its self-referentiality and supposed unity or immediacy. 
1'i7 Specters (~lMan, p. 1-1-1. The living. sovereign and mortal ego auto-affects itsdf hy way of ih \'(lIce and 
lhcrehy hctero-atTcL'ts, and 'cruelly infects itself." Rogues. p. 109 
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3) The Non-End: The Infinite Differance is Finite 
What Derrida tries to show in the Speech and Phenomena, following Husser!' s 
distinctions between the absence of object (Gegenstandlosigkeit) and the absence of meaning 
(Bedeutungslosigkeit), between intention and intuition, between expression, meaning and object, 
is that: not only the absence of intuitive presence, the absence of my life, of my self-presence, of 
my self-present and actual intention to say what I mean, does not threaten to impair with falsity 
the ideality of an I am, I am alive etc, but also and more importantly that, the possibility of my 
absolute disappearance or death gives birth to the Bedeutung "I am alive" itself, gives it Ollt to be 
heard, understood, and uttered again by every other. 
Given the repetitive structure of every Bedeutung, how can we still maintain the border 
between pure expression and indication, solitary mental life and real communication, between the 
reality and the representation of speech? Is not rather this law of the a priori repetitive structure 
of this bedeutsame Ausdruck that which makes the ego's intention animating the expression never 
be present to itself and to its content, that which, in other words, dispossesses the ego of the full 
intuition of the Bedeutung I, and ultimately of his self-presence? Is not the play between presence 
and absence, life and death, the same and the other, proper to the ideality of the Bedeutung I, but 
in truth proper to the ideality of the mark itself (psychic, oral, or graphic), a limitless play, a play 
which overflows all the boundaries between inward and outward speech, real speech and 
representation or fiction, and between speech and writing? 
Now why is writing mixed up by Derrida with the metaphysical determination of being as 
presence, with the desire to save presence and living speech, or with the desire to save the 
distinction between effective speech and representation of speech, between effective and fictitious 
usages of the sign? It is because Husserl himself evokes writing (the anonymity of the written L 
the indicative sign par excellence) at the moment when he strives to save presence, the presence 
of the living speech to itself, and to reduce or limit the deconstructive force of the sign as the 
empty form of bedeutsame Ausdruck (empty from intuitive presence).158 By supposing: that there 
is an essential tie between expression and phone or "living speech" and by saying that "the word 
T names a different person from case to case, and does so by e\'er altering meaning", Husser! 
makes the meanin o of the word T a modification of intuitive presence. Husser! writes 
eo 
L~K According to a distinction that HusserI makes in LI. L § 13 the catq;ory of the sign in general is not a 
gl'nus hut afarm. Sec also SP. p. 23. 
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What, its ~~ani~g is at the moment, can be gleaned only from the living speech (Iebendigen Redel 
and from the mtmtive CIrcumstances (anschaulichen UmsUinde) which surround it. If we read this word 
without knowning who wrote it, it is perhaps not meaningless (bedeutung!oses) but at least estran2ed 
from its normal meaning (normalen Bedeutung). LI, §36, p. 315 '-
But since the ideality of the Bedeutung I gives itself out as capable of remaining the same 
for me and for every other ego who says it, keeping its sense even if we do not know who says it. 
even if we do not have an immediate intuition of the sense-giving acts which animate it always in 
a here and now, Derrida is perfectly justified to confirm exactly the opposite of what Husserl says 
about speech, writing and "the normal meaning". 
Every time I say "I", speaking either to another person or to myself (and Husserl, as we 
said, does not examine the raison d' etre of this supplement if it were possible that I haw a 
primordial intuition of my self presence), the ideality of the Bedeutung "I", insofar as it does not 
require the intuition of its object, insofar as it does not coincide with its object (namely my self-
presence), puts me in an abnormal situation: it is as if the word ''I'' were not uttered by me but 
written, not necessarily by me, but by someone unknown or anonymous. Every time that 1 say "I" 
the border between expression and indication, between solitary mental life and real 
communication, the supposedly indivisible line between real and imaginary or fictitious usage of 
the sign seems less certain, less rigid and all the more permeable. The experience of speaking to 
myself, then, is not only or simply an experience of an egological subjectivity certain for its 
presence or self-identity: by virtue of the primordially repetitive structure of the Bedeutung there 
is every chance that the person who I hear speaking and says 1 is not really me, me alone with 
myself, alive and fully present or identical to myself, but someone else, someone fictitious or 
even dead. 159 The question is the following: how can we still apply those distinctions (expression-
indication, normal-abnormal, reality-fiction etc.) to language while maintaining at the same time 
the autonomy of language, of the Bedeutung, with regard to intuitive knowledge? This autonomy 
with regard to intuitive knowledge, which makes speech, Husserl tells us, to be genuine speech 
even if it is false or contradictory, is an autonomy with regard to what has always operated within 
the system of phenomenology as the source and the horizon of all value, as the fe/os or ideal 
norm, as what gives sense to all normality: this norm is knowledge, the intuition that is adequate 
15lJ When I speak to myself and say "you have gone wrong, you shouldn't go on like this" ~ho is speaking 
to whom? Where does this "you" arise from in my inner life, who is this "you", where does It taKe place, In 
reality or only in imagination, is it real or fictitious'? Who says "you" \\'ithin me speaking of me and to me'.) 
Who speaKs and who is listening? Can I know with all certainty whether it is the same person. me or 
someone clse, a real person or an imaginary one, alive or dead'? But. by virtue of the repetitive structure of 
the sien. the general distinction between effective and fictitious usages of the sign is threatened in its core. 
"The ~ign is l;riginally wrought by fiction." SP. p. 56. See also WD. p. l7X. 
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to its object, "the full presence of sense to consciousness that is itself self-present in the fullness 
of its life." (SP, p. 98) 
Derrida asks: why did Husserl, starting from the same premises and particularly from the 
distinction between meaning-intention and intuition, and between Bedeutungslosigkeit and 
Gegenstandlosigkeit, which supports the entire structure of pure logical grammar, refuse to draw 
the same conclusions with regard to this arche-writing, to the graphics of iterability (or of 
supplementarity), that is, to the graphematic structure of Bedeutung, of all signs and speech acts. 
and of all communication ? This is, Derrida writes, "because the theme of full ·presence.· the 
intuitionist imperative and the project of knowledge continued to command - at a distance we 
said - the whole of the description" (SP, p. 97). What is this distance which allows Husserl to 
describe, and in one and the same move to efface the freedom of language, the emancipation of 
speech as nonknowing? 
According to Derrida, the originality, indeed the deconstructive force of meanmg 
(Bedeutung) and of expression as meaningful sign (bedeutsame Zeichen), as it is elaborated by 
Husserl in his pure logical grammar, in the institution of a general morphology of Bedelltllngen, 
lies precisely in its formality, in the emptiness and pure intention of intentionality, which is 
independent from all fulfilling intuitions, from intuitive presence and cognition. 160 But the 
formality of meaning, i.e., the formality of its pure logical grammar, is limited since the 
difference between intention and intuition must, according to Husserl's profound teleologism, be 
pro-visional: the telos of actualization (which belongs to the structure of intentionality) the telos 
fulfilment in a plenitude, which is promised for later (and deferred ad infinitum), has from the 
very beginning destined all sense to an expressive language controlled by the predicative form, 
and all language to the horizon knowledge. 161 "The originality of meaning as an aim is limited by 
the telos of vision" (SP, p. 97). The true and authentic meaning is the conscious, explicit and 
clear intention to express and say the truth, i.e., to make us see and know an object as such. This 
telos of vision or of putting-in-view, which has also subjected sense in general to seeing, to the 
sense of sight, and to light, the telos of truth-intention, of the clear intention of knowledge merges 
then with the determination of the essence or telos of language as (logical) expression. 
160 FM. especially pp. L~O-I23. and Ideas I. §126. . 
161 By delineating. in his pure logical grammar. the logical a priori of language Husserl deSignates th~ 
essencc of the destination of language, its telos or norm. Poetic language and expreSSIOns which transgress 
the norms or tclos of a pure logical language. and which do not promise any knowledge. an:. to he sur.e. not 
relegated to nonsense. their undisputahle force of signification is not reduced. H~sse.rI "wo~ld Simply 
refuse them the formal quality of heing expressions endowed with sense. that IS. of hemg logical. m the 
sense that they ha\"e a relation with an object" (Sr. p. 99). 
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Here we see once agam the necessity that pushed him to study language from an 
epistemological point of view and to take logico-scientific speech as the model for all speech. As 
we saw in our reading of Husserl's Origin of Geometry, only the exactitude of scientific speech 
can promise strict univocity and bring scientific sense to conceptual generality without deforming 
or adding any sense-content to it: a linguistically sedimented sense can thereby maintain its ideal 
identity throughout all historical development, it can remain beyond the reach of the empirical 
and de facto historical subjects intending it, i.e., beyond indicative concatenations, and open itself 
into the universal. In the first Logical Investigation §§ 11, 12 where Husserl considers the ideal 
distinctions, and the noncoincidence between expression, meaning (as ideal unities) and object, 
geometrical objects or state of affairs are taken again as an example of what can ensure the 
perfect univocity and purity of expression, that is, the telos of all scientific or geometrical 
meaning: universal intelligibility or translatability, infinite traditionality, and so forth. 
Absolute ideality, truth, can be only on the side of objective expressions: When I say "the 
three perpendiculars intersect in one point" my judgement does not indicate or manifest a 
subjective experience. Nobody would happen to relate my judgement, what my assertion asserts, 
its sense, to an inner experience of mine: "for while what is intimated consists in inner 
experiences, what we assert in the judgement involves nothing subjective. My act of judging is a 
transient experience: it arises and passes away. But what my assertion asserts, the content that the 
three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a point, neither arises nor passes away. It is an 
identity in the strict sense, one and the same geometrical truth" (LI, § 11, p. 285). Only objective 
expressions then are absolutely pure expressions, i.e., free from all indicative contamination, 
whether they are uttered in soliloquy or for communicative ends. 
h . f I 162 b d f' h But what happens w en some assertIOns are a se or a sur, or mstance, w en 
someone says "the circle is square"? The assertion's intention is absurd (in the sense of 
countersense) but in order to be so, in order at least for me (an ego in general) to judge it so, in 
order to make an a priori judgement about the absence of any possible object for this expression, 
it must still make, in spite of itself, some sense, it must still point in some way, like a symbolic 
lo~ For example "the automobile is the fastest means of travel". The content or objecti\t~ sense of a false 
assertion (whose theme remains bound to factuality, or to a determined temporality) is or can be ideal. i.e., 
omnitemporal. It can be infinitely repeated as the same without affecting its ideality and while it is known 
that it is false and out of date. In our example ("the automobile is the fastest means of traver') the ideality 
of its objective sense symbolically puts up with a dated and now (in the age of the airplane) illallrhcllrical/y 
satisfied' intention to say the truth. 'This is because I know that such an outdated proposition had been Tru£' 
and still remains unified and animated by an intention of truth. authenticity. or 'clarity' (Kfarheit) - these 
terms are in cLTtain respects synonyms for Husserl - that I can maintain and repeat the ideal unity of its 
SL'llSC," lOG, pp. 74-75. 
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intention 163, toward the telos of truth-intention, the telos of the clear and authentic intention to say 
the truth: "the circle is not square." An absurd expression must say the telos. e\'t~n if 
"symbolically". Husserl writes in the first Investigation: 
If 'possibility' or 'truth' are lacking, an assertion's intention can onlY be carried out 
symbolically: it cannot derive any 'fullness' from intuition or from the categorical func·tions performed 011 
the latter. in which 'fullness' its value for knowledge consists. It then lacks, as one says. a true, a genuine, 
meaning. LI, § 11, p285 
According to Husserl then, the authentic and true vouloir- dire or meanin a is the will to b 
say the truth. One can very well speak and say "the circle is square" but one speaks well when one 
says that is not. No doubt the sense of a false or absurd assertion is also ideal, i.e .. it can be 
indefinitely repeated and thus becomes omnitemporal. I64 However, the ideality of sense must 
always keep up a certain relation with the absent truth, with the absent object. In truth, the te/os 
which announces the fulfilment or actualization of the intention has already and beforehand 
opened up sense as a relation with the object. The telos is knowledge, the intuition that is 
adequate to its object, the clear evidence of sense, the full presence of the signified in truth. "It is 
the full presence of sense to a consciousness that is itself self-present in the fullness of its life, its 
living present" (SP, p. 98). It is this teleology which, according to Derrida, commands the entirety 
of phenomenology and which led Husserl to attribute to the possibility of nonintllition the status 
of something inferior, even though dangerous and critical. 
Let us return once again to the distinction between Widersinnigkeit and Sinnlosigkeit. it is 
at the centre of Husserl's pure logical grammar. As we said, if it obeys certain rules, which are 
not immediately rules of knowledge, an expression may be contradictory or false without being 
either sinnlos or bedeutunglos. Expressions like, "a golden mountain" or "the circle is square", 
are not like "abrakatabra" or "green is or". The first two may be false or contradictory but they 
still make sense, they are intelligible (sinnvol). The grammatical form of these expressions is such 
that it does not prohibit the possibility of sense: put in the same form, in the third person present 
indicative of the verb "to be", i.e., in the form "S is p", another content would allow the 
possibility of the intuition of objects given in person and signified in truth. It is the minimum of 
sense and intelligibility, i.e., the possibility of an intuition of an object, which is denied us in the 
agrammaticalness of "green is or" or "abrakatabra". It is then solely on the basis of a powerful 
teleology, as Derrida says, "solely in the context determined by a lI'ill to know, by an epistemic 
163 "And so expressions, LYen when they function outside of knowledge. must. as symbolic intentions point 
to l'ategorically formed unities," LL § 13. p. 289. . 
1M .. It is the same in the case of all assertions. en:n if what they assert is false or absurd. Even III ~uch l'a~e~ 
Wl' distinguish their ideal content from the transient acts of affirming or asserting it: it is the meaning of the 
assL'rtion. a ullIty in plurality." LI. § 11. p. 2RS. 
intention, by a conscious relation to the object as cognitive object, within the hori::oll of truth, 
solely in this oriented contextual field is the 'green is or' unacceptable.'·165 But then. the 
institution of a pure morphology of meaning is only apparently independent from fulfilling 
intuitions, since it is ultimately governed by the epistemological (or intuitionist) criterion of a 
relation with objects, by the form of the relation with an object, the form of a unitary intuition. 
(SP. p. 99) 
We must say then that the formality of pure logical grammar and the general morphology 
of Bedeutungen are limited. The thought of form, of the conceptual form of expression and of 
meaning, and of the formality of form, which, as Derrida tells us in Form and Meaning, lies at the 
centre of Husserl's critical and profound reactivation of the original project of philosophy, 
namely to institute itself as theoria l66, is limited by the sense of being as presence. The critical 
purification of the concept of form (ousia, morphe), the phenomenological revitalization of its 
primordial sense, is guided by the concept of sense which is itself determined on the basis of 
seeing and knowing an object. Derrida writes about this limitation of the formalist project (i.e., of 
a project which has the power to go beyond the thought of being as presence l67 ) to the intuitionist 
motif: "Form is always a form of sense, and sense opens up only in the knowing intentionality 
relating to an object. Form is but the emptiness and pure intention of this intentionality. Perhaps 
no project of pure grammar can escape this object-related intentionality, perhaps the telos of 
knowing rationality is the irreducible origin of the idea of pure grammar, and perhaps the 
semantic theme, "empty" as it is, always limits the formalist project. In any case transcendental 
intuitionism still weighs l'ery heavily upon the formalist theme in Husser!. "(my emphasis) SP, p. 
98. 
According to Derrida, the fact that Husserl took an interest in language only insofar as it 
remained within the compass of rationality, within the limits of theoretical reason alone l68 , the 
fact that he determined logos from logic, and the essence of language by taking the logical ("the 
universality of the logical", i.e., Husserl says, "of the predicatil'e judgemenC, of the third person 
present indicative of verb to be) as its norm or telos, all these facts suggest that this telos. the felos 
the organizes and orients the project of phenomenology in its capabilities. its achievements and in 
IfI) SEC, p. 12. 
1M Derrida writes in Form and Me(/I/ing. "although the privilege of theoria is not. in phenomenology, a'-, 
simple as has sometimes heen claimed, although the classical theories are profoundly ~eexa~ined therein. 
the metaphysical domination of the concept of form cannot fail to effectuate a certatn suhJ~L'l.lon to. the 
IOll"-. This suhjection would always he a suhjection of sellse to seeing, of sense to the '-,ense ot sIght. stnce 
scnsc in general is in fact the concept of e\ery phenomenological fIeld." p. 108 
Ifl7 FM, p. 12H. . . 
IflX Let ll'-, recall here that for Husserl theoretical reason is first of all and ultimately a practical rea'-,on. I.e .. 
a reasoIl of the infinite task. 
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its responsibilities, is being as presence in the form of ideality. And, as we have seen time and 
again, there is in phenomenology no ideality without reference to the "Idea in the Kantian sense" 
i.e., to the Idea which opens the possibility of something indefinite, the infinity of possible 
repetitions. 
The concept which holds together all the concepts we have referred to, the concepts of 
phone, expression, meaning, sense, intuition, truth, objectivity, is that of "being as presence in the 
form of ideality". As Derrida put it, this concept of presence as "the absolute proximity of self-
identity; the being-in-front of the object available for repetition, the maintenance of the temporal 
present, whose ideal form is the self-presence of transcendental life, whose ideal identity allows 
idealiter of infinite repetition", is "the common matrix" of all phenomenological concepts. (SP, p. 
99) 
But, Derrida immediately introduces a clause whose clarification will be very important 
in our reading and interpretation of Speech and Phenomena: "While everything that is purely 
thought in this concept is thereby determined as ideality, the living present is nevertheless ill fact, 
really, effectively, etc., deferred ad infinitum. This differance is the difference betH'een the ideal 
and the nonideal." (ibid) 
Now let us see how we can clarify and confirm this proposition if we think over the 
whole system of the essential distinctions on the basis of which Husserl was able to elaborate in 
the first of his Logical Investigations the question of language. The distinctions between pre-
linguistic (gestures, facial expressions) and linguistic signs, pre-expressive sense and expressive 
meaning, expression and indication, objective expressions and subjective expressions, between 
intention and intuition, but also between ideality and nonideality. objectivity and nonobjectivity, 
all these distinctions, Derrida tells us, have a purely teleological value: the possibility of these 
distinctions is "deferred ad infinitum". 
Thus these "essential distinctions"' are caught up in the following aporia: de facto and realiter 
they are never respected, and Husserl recognizes this. De jure and idea liter they vanish, since. as 
distinctions, they live only from the difference between fact and right, reality and ideality. Their 
possibility is their impossibility. SP. plOl, 
How can we conceive this aporia169, the possibility and impossibility of these 
distinctions then? What does it mean here that the possibility of the distinction is deferred ad 
11><) In a text hearing the same title "Aporias" Derrida will descrihe the "experience" of deconstruction as the 
"expLTience"' of the aporos and of the aporia: not only there is no more path (odos. methodos. Weg or 
HolzWl'gL hut the impasse itself is impossible too. The experience of the aporos: not only the difficult path 
or passage hut the impossible passage. the prohibited passage. indeed the nonpassage. where what come'> to 
pass. the coming of the (future) event. has nothing to do with passage. path. way or step. :\nd more 
infinitum? And if we take up again the distinction between expression and indication and in 
particular the distinction between objective expression and subjective expression, what does pure 
expression, what does presence in vouloir-dire mean, taken as differance ad infinitllm? What 
does the life of the living voice and of the living present mean as differance ad infinitum? 
As we saw with regard to the distinction between objective expressions (which are 
absolutely ideal, that is, free from indicative contamination, free from all de facto, empirical 
subjectivity) and subjective expressions, the personal pronoun "I am" is an essentially occasional 
expressIOn, an expression without "objective sense", i.e., an expression with an essential 
plurivocity whose meamng IS always bound to original and singular intentions 
(Bedeutungsintentionen) and to new experiences. "Since each person in speaking of himself says 
'1', the word has the character of a universally operative indication of this fact.·· (§26) Whether it 
is uttered in soliloquy or in real communication, this expression cannot be replaced by an 
"objective expression" without being distorted and without ending up in absurdities. For instance. 
instead of saying "I am pleased", by replacing the ''I'' with what could be taken as it objective 
conceptual content, I should say "whatever the speaker is now designating himself is pleased~" 
(§26) The attempt to replace a subjective or essentially occasional expression by an objective 
expression, the attempt to describe a sUbjective experience in an objectively fixed fashion fails 
and must, Husserl says, be simply abandoned as being impracticable and vain. (LI, p. 322.) 
But, as Husserl actually will write two paragraphs later in §28 with the title, "The 
fluctuation of meanings (Bedeutungen) as fluctuation of the acts of meaning (Bedeutens)", and 
precisely with regard to subjective expressions, the fluctuation cannot be assigned to its objective 
content (Bedeutung) without thereby impairing its ideality, the ideal unity of meaning. which is as 
always a unity in plurality. (LI, § 11, p. 285.) The fluctuation then has exclusively a subjective 
origin: it can only be on the side of the transient and finite subjective experiences or acts 
importantly, what forbids or blocks our way. our step forward, but also what commands our response, here 
and now and without delay. has nothing to do with what we call problem. "There. in sum. in this place of 
aporia, there is no longer any problem". (Aporias, p. 12) Problematization. the articulation of themata. the 
organization and elaboration of questions, is already an articulated organization of the response. Referring 
to all those historical figures and configurations of philosophy and science. however they might be named: 
episteme, paradigm. themata. etc. Derrida writes in "As If Were Possible". that "they pre-organile. they 
make possible the event. the apparent invention, the emergence and reallaboration of the questions. their 
problematization, the reappropriation that momentarily renders them determinable and treatable." 
Negotiatiolls, p. 355-56. Also in Passions Derrida, reading Sophocles's tragedy Philoctetus, has abo 
remind us another designation of the Greek word problema: not only the "shield" used to protect one-.dL 
but also "the substitute, the replacement, the prosthesis. the thing or the person that one puts for\\ ard to 
protect oneself while concealing oneself. the thing or person that comes in the place or in the name of the 
other." Passiolls. published in Derrida: A Critical Reader. edited hy Da\id Wood. Blackwell. 1992. p. 
30n6. 
(bedeuten) which always in a here and now animate the identity of the objecti\e content of 
expression. This allows him to conclude apparently against his former demonstration (in §26 
about the ill-fated attempt to replace the subjective expression ''1'' with an objecti\ely fixed 
expression, from which he inferred, surprisingly enough, that there is an individual concept of the 
I, and that the Bedeutung I differs from person to person), that in the utterance of the ''1'' the act 
(bedeuten) may be non-ideal and always subjective but its content may and must be replaceable. 
If it is to have any unity or identity at all, the content of my SUbjective intention must be 
replaceable by an ideal and objective content (Bedeutung), i.e., it must tend to be ideal and 
objective, it must tend to approximate what in fact is an inaccessible ideal. Now if the content of 
the "I" mayor must always be replaceable by an objective and therefore ideal content, in order 
that the identity of the selfsame be repeatable and identifiable through different acts, then only the 
singular and transient act which animates this content is lost for ideality, i.e., in need of a 
supplementary substitution. But this last replacement or substitution is for Husserl ideal: i.e., the 
substitution of an objective expression for a non-objective expression and the substitution of an 
ideal bedeuten for a nonideal, actual and subjective bedeuten, is deferred ad infinitum. Husser! 
writes "... ideally speaking, each subjective expression is replaceable (erset;:./Jar) by an 
objective expression which will preserve the identity of each momentary (augenblicklich) 
meaning intention (Bedeutungsintention)." And he goes on "We shall have to concede that such a 
replacement is not only impracticable, ... but ... will, in fact. never be so capable. (LL §28, p. 
321.) 
At this point Derrida in Speech reminds us of what Husserl writes In his Origin of 
Geometl)' with regard to the univocity or objectivit), of geometrical expression as the teleological 
condition of geometry's historicity: the absolute univocity of geometrical expression, the absolute 
transparency of geometrical language is not an actuality, an accomplished fact but the Telos, i.e., 
an infinite task of objective reason, an infinitely inaccessible ideal. But in fact, as we said in the 
first part of the thesis, univocity is deferred ad infinitum and equivocity turns out to be absolutely 
irreducible, always renascent and developing along with the very progress of geometry. Absolute 
univocity, the accomplishment or realization of the telos of geometrical meaning, would paralyze 
geometry's history, it would bring its end, sterility and immobility. 
Similarly then, with regard to the subjective expression "I am", the substitution of 
ideality for non-ideality and of objectivity for non-objectivity is itself, Husserl says, ideal. and, ill 
fact. it is deferred ad illfinitlll11. 170 This ideal substitution would confirm. according to Derrida. 
170 Husser! in fact writes in the next page. after he has referred once more to ideal task of "objectivc rea~()n" 
(ibid. p. 321) "We are infinitely remo\'cd from this ideal ... Strike out the essentially (lcca~i(lnal 
what is said before about the play of life and death in the Bedeutung I am (whether or not 1 am 
alive, the Bedeutung "1 am" means something which, even though is different from the 
Bedeutung "I am dead", it is not necessarily different from the fact that "I am dead"). If the telos 
were to be attained, if the substitution were to be completed, and so become real or factuaL if the 
subjective meaning or vouloir-dire were to be permanently replaced by an objective expression or 
Bedeutung, then this would be the end, the end of the intention and of its telos. its 
accomplishment, i.e, death. The presence of meaning to what it says. adequation, completion, 
plenitude, is the end (the goal) but were it attained it would be the end (death.) 
It belongs to the essence or telos of the voice, to the telos of !i\'ing speech and of the 
Bedeutungsintention to move toward plenitude, yet were this telos to be attained or fulfilled, were 
the monadic subject to hear itself immediately in the living present (which entails the reduction or 
exclusion of indication, i.e., of analogical or empathic appresentation, of substitutive 
supplementaion, of differance, etc), that will have been the end: a voice without indication, 
without writing or differance, would be "at once absolutely alive and absolutely dead." (SP, 
p.102) The realization, the accomplishment of a pure expression, of a Bedelltungsintention 
absolutely present to itself and to its content (and free from substitutive supplementation and from 
all indication) is deferred ad infinitum. Differance does not op-pose reappropriation: it does not 
resist it, it begun by broaching expropriation, indication, representation and appresentation, and 
ends up by leaving reappropriation, the circular and indefinite movement by which the speaking 
subject turns and returns to itself in order to take possession of itself, breached. "Until death. 
Death is the movement of differance in so far as this movement is necessarily finite.,,)71 This 
differance is no more infinite than it is finite, no more present than it is absent, rather, according 
to Derrida, it makes the opposition of finiteness and infinity, and of presence and absence 
possible. 
Speaking of the nonplenitude of presence, of the essential possibility of nonplenitude and 
of non-presence, as the non-end or non-telos of intentionality, as the necessary possibility for the 
appearing of the life of the living present (and of the living voice or Bedelltungsintention), but for 
appearing as an infinitely deferred presence, Derrida invokes the finite infinite of differance. 
But this appearing of the Ideal as an infinite differance can only be produced within a relationship 
with death in general. Only the relation to my death could make the infinite differance of pre~encc appear. 
By the sanlL' token, compared to the ideality of the positive infinite. this relation to my-death hecomes an 
expressions from one's language, try to describe any suhjective experience in unamhiquous. objectively 
fixed fashion; such an attempt is always plainly yain." (ihid .. p. 322) 
17) or GralllIllatolllgy, p. I-no 
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accident of empirical finitude. The appearing of the infinite differance is itself finite. Consequ~ntly. 
differance which does not occur outside this relation, becomes the finitude of life as an essential rdation 
with oneself and one's death. The infinite differance is finite. It can therefore no longer be conceived 
within the opposition of finiteness and infinity, absence or presence, negation or affirmation. (SP, p. 102) 
What Derrida calls into question In the Introduction to the Origin, in Speech and 
Phenomena, in Signature Event and Context, and elsewhere, is not the concept of intention (or 
intentionality) but its telos which orders, organizes and orients the movement of intention and the 
possibility of fulfilment in a plenitude which would be present to itself and identical with itself. 
Derrida calls into question the founding, supposedly unconditional, value or authority of being-
present, the presence of a fulfilled and actualized intentionality (the Bedellfllngsintention) 
adequate to itself and to its content, the presence, in other words, of an absolutely meaningful and 
living speech master of itself. 
But, we should emphasize again and again that, the movement toward plenitude, the felos 
of plenitude, as Husserl showed (and "he was right" according to Derrida l72 ), is not an accidental 
element separable from the concept of intentionality. Quite the contrary, the telos of fulfilment, of 
realization and of actualization in a plenitude, constitutes the intentional structure itself, it is 
therefore an integrated and essential part of its concept. But to the extent that this telos defines the 
essence of intentionality, it is not necessary that it be attained. Now what is the status in 
phenomenology of this last necessity of nonplenitude? What is, and this amounts to the same 
thi ng l73, the possibility of nonplenitude, i.e., of nonintuition or nonpresence? 
It can happen that there can be intentional acts of meaning, speech acts (for example, 
perceptual propositions or theoretical propositions) without plenitude, and in this sense plenitude 
is not necessary to the functioning of meaning. Nonplenitude then can be taken, and treated, as an 
extrinsic accident, an empirical eventuality, even though in fact it is always happening. e\'en 
though it almost always affects the entirety of our speech. The possibility of non plenitude can be 
interpreted then as an empirical possibility, a contingent e\'enfuality which comes from the 
outside to befall an intentionality which in its essence implies a telos. i.e., a movement toward 
172 Limited /IIC, p. 1 :21. 
In For a clarification of the Dcrridian distinction between possibility as e\'l'lItlwlity and possibility as 
necl'ssity. and for the impossihility of their rigorous dissociation see Limited /IIC. pp . .tH. 57. 
fulfilment. Nonfulfi1ment, nonplenitude IS then reduced to "an extraneous vestige of the 
teleological essence of intention".174 
But this nonfulfilment or nonplenitude can also be interpreted, according to Derrida. quite 
differently. To recognize that nonplenitude is a massive fact and to say that it is not necessal)' for 
the intentional act that it be fulfilled in a plenitude, to say that intentionality does not necessarily 
imply plenitude is not enough, we must also say that "intentionality cannot and should not attain 
the plenitude toward which it nonetheless inevitably tends. ,,175 
Firstly, as we saw with regard to perceptual statements and to the subjecti ve expression "I 
am," the intentionality which bestows speech with meaning (Bedeutung) cannot and will ne\'er 
attain the plenitude which, nonetheless, it promises to deliver. The intention or attention, which is 
directed toward something iterable and which is thereby made iterable in its turn, will strive 
vainly to actualize or fulfil itself in a plenitude: either in the perceptive intuition of its object (in 
some pre-expessive experience of a present content) or in the experience of adequation between 
perception and (pure) expression, or in the adequation of meaning to itself. This plenitude, due to 
iterability (structure of the mark in general, and in particular of the bedeutsame Ausdruck), IS 
always already inaccessible both in perception (external or internal) and in its expression. 176 
What Derrida calls iterability or differance is what makes plenitude impossible: but this 
impossibility of a full and actual presence of the intention to its object and to itself, and the 
possibility of this impossibility, the possibility of nonpresence or nonplenitude, is not simply 
negative, but the positive and essential possibility of the intentional structure itself, of what we 
call experience or the relation to something in general. The very structure of the utterance, of a 
meaningful expression, the minimum of iterability that it implies, demands the possibility of 
nonplenitude, of nonpresence, that is, the possibility of functioning without the full and actual 
presence of the intentional act: that of the conscious (responsible) subject fully present to itself, to 
what it says, and to the other in "real communication". Without the possibility of this 
impossibility, the impossibility of a self-identical and full parousia, there would be no utterance, 
no meaningful expression, and, therefore, no history of (human) language and no history of mall. 
174 Ihid., p. 128. 
175 Ih'd 1 ')8 "9 I ., p. ~ -_ . 
176 It is in Ideas I, §§ 124,126 that Husserl poses the difference he tween complete and incomplete (I/n\'()l1-
sftindingcll) expression and brings to light an irreducihle inadequacy. an essential incompleteness of 
expression that no effort can e\er surmount, that no teleology could e\er mclude (s.n as to reduce: 
domesticate, tame and en:ntually overcome). as an accident or prcnisional deficiency. withm the honzon of, 
an infinite task. It is again the concept of/orm. as Husserl uses it there, which deconstructs the aXIomatIc of 
the intuiti\e. pre-expressive presence of sense and its reduhlieation. unproductIve or retlectl\e 
reproduction. in cxpres\ion. See FM. p. 121-23. 
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We cannot therefore say that the de facto nonplenitude is reduced by a teleology of history or that 
it is included as a provisional obstacle, within the horizon of an infinite task. The telos of historY. 
which is also the telos of man, and as such, involve the eschewing of plenitude, of the fullness of 
parousla. 
What holds for the utterance holds also and correlatively for the act of meaning or 
speaking, but also for all acts of signification (discursive or nondiscursive): the graphics of 
iterability spear no object (as signified or referent) of intention and correlatively no intentional 
act, from the very beginning. Every intentional act is, in advance, divided and removed from 
itself, deported toward others, by its iterability.l77 Iterability, which makes a certain identity in 
repetition possible (promising thereby to deliver the fullness of parousia through idealization). is 
differential, it contains in its functioning both identity and difference: it alters. breaches, divides 
and defers ad infinitum the self-identity or self-presence of intention, of the pure 
Bedeutungsintention it makes possible. Iterability or differance makes possible the very thing it 
makes impossible, namely, plenitude, presence, mastery. "Limiting the very thing it authorizes, 
[ ... J, the graphics of iterability inscribes alteration irreducibly in repetition (or in identification): a 
priori, always and already, without delay, at once, aussi sec".178 
Iterability, as well as the supplement or differance, began by broaching non-plenitude 
and the movement toward plenitude, by announcing or promising, through the idealization that it 
makes possible, its realization, and it ends by leaving plenitude breached, divided, suspended and 
indefinitely deferred. Until death. 
But it is not enough to say that intentionality will never attain plenitude either: we should 
also say that it should not attain this telos (even if, as we said, there would be no intentionality 
that does not move toward it). The movement towards plenitude, we said, is essential to 
intentionality, the fulfilment in a plenitude is the telos, the end, the goal of all intentional acts, but 
the structure of this telos is such (let us recall, it has been defined by Husserl as an infinitely 
inaccessible ideal) that if intention attained this telos, if it were realized or actualized in a 
plenitude it would be the end, i.e., paralysis, immobility, death. Non-plenitude is not then only an 
empirical possibility, nor is it simply negative, but the possibility without which there would be 
neither life, nor mobility. nor intentionality, nor ideal objects (language, writing, etc). and "the 
desire for presence would not find its breathing space." 
177 But cvcn in the case where 1 say "I am" while 1 am also "alin:". in the case were the expression "I am", 
in fact. functions in the presence of my actual intention to say what 1 want to say. consciously. nplicitly 
and expressly. Derrida asks "isn't the apparent fact" of my presence "complicatcd. di~idcd. CO~1tall1lnatco. 
parasited hy the possihility of an ahsence inasmuch as this possihility is nccessanly Illscnheo III the 
funclionint! of the mark". here of the "I am"? Limited. p. 48. 
I7X Limited Illc. p. 62. 
2.+0 
The relation to the te/os is necessarily dual, divided, split. What is understood as Telos must 
the~efore be reth?ught. And it isyrecisely to th~ ext~nt that this relation to felos is also intricate, complex. 
sph~, tha~ there IS movement, life, language, intentIOn, etc. Plenitude is the end (the goal) but were it 
att~lned,.lt w?uld be the e~d (d.eath). T~is .non-e.nd is n.ot an extraneous vestige of the teleological essence 
of intentIOn, It belongs to It as Its most intImate IrreducIble other, as the other itself in it. It lasts as lone as 
there is life, intuition, language, or, as I prefer to say in general, the mark (or vice versa.)!79 ~ 
To move towards our conclusion, the concept of iterability (like that of differance, 
supplement, trace, mark, writing) is not a concept like the others: it is at once internal and 
external to the conceptual or theoretical system which makes possible and organizes in a qllasi-
transcendental manner: for which it renders an accounting, presents and analyses its 
presuppositions, questions its interestedness, criticizes and transforms its axiomatics, interrupting 
and intervening at the same time, in the system of oppositions it criticizes. 180 
If the concepts of iterability or differance are strategically privileged by Derrida it is 
because they do not oppose or efface intentionality while they can reveal and show the "structural 
limit" of its telos, of its accomplishment or fulfilment, and of its hegemony. This hegemony of 
intentionality in the field of meaning and language is "no more the telos (the end) than the arche 
(beginning or commandment) of experience".181 The graphics of iterability or differance limits 
the archeo-teleological structure of intentionality: it is the condition of its possibility (of the 
movement of intentionality toward the telos) and the condition of its impossibility (the 
impossibility of full parousia, of pure re-appropriation of the same.) 
But if the graphics or law of iterability and ex-appropriation exceeds the arche-
teleological structure of intentionality it makes possible, if it transgresses, Derrida writes, the law 
it makes possible, if it is the law not only of intentionality (not only of human language or 
writing), if it is not what is proper to man alone, if it is also the law of the nonhuman, for 
example l82, of the animal relation to selfl83 , then the specificity of (human) intentionality in this 
179 Ibid., p. 129. 
!MO This is the also the case with Derrida's use of the expression "quasi-transcendental" ...... , the u~e of 
'quasi' and of 'ultra-transcendental' to which I have resigned myself. is still - it was already - a way of 
saving, even if I betrayed it, the legacy of philosophy, namely, the demand for the condition of possibility 
(for the a priori, for what is originary or the foundation, so many different forms of the same radical 
L'\igency of every philosophical 'question'): to use these terms was also to engage in the task, wit!10Ut 
concealing the difficulty from oneself. of rethinking the meaning of the 'possible', as well as of the 
'impossible,' and to do so in terms of the so-called conditions of possibility. often shown to be the 
'condition of impossibility' .Derrida, Jacques, As If It Were Possible, in Negotiations, translated by 
Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford, Stanford Uni\'ersity Press. 2002. p. 35'+. 
1M! Limited Inc. p. 130. 
lX~ En~n if the occasion arises quite often, according Derrida, for example, in Ideas /I, SeL'lion Two 'The 
Constitution of Animal Nature" where Husserl defines the phenomenological project concerning the 
e,\,\CnCl' 0/ the solll, the hllman or animal soul" in its connection with the hody. the proper budy (Leibl and 
field without limits is not lost but remains entirely open: this is why it requires a thinking of 
differance and not of opposition. Derrida asks "what is intentionality? What does 'intention' 
properly mean as the particular work, the mise en oeuvre of iterability?,,184 
the experience of tactile auto-affection, Husserl will defer, at seems for ever, to make any serious reference 
to animals or to examples drawn from the nonhuman world. According to Derrida, "it stands to reason", 
that Husserl continues to link subjectivity to man, even if he acknowledges that animals are capable of 
auto-affection, and even if he says that "the point of departure for our constitutive analysis ... , is related to 
animal subjects (anima/ische Subjekte) Ideas II. §35, p. 151 and On Touching, pp. 166-67. 
IX3 Eating Well, p. 267-70. 
IX4 Limited Inc, p. 130. 
Conclusion: The Self-Interruption of Phenomenology 
What is intentionality? Derrida asks persistently since his Introduction to the Origin of 
Geometry, Violence and Metaphysics, and Speech and Phenomena, to Limited Inc, A Word of 
Welcome and Eating Well? What is the Bedeutungsintention, this properly human intentionality. 
the intentionality of human language and writing, the intentionality of the human subject. as the 
mise en oeuvre of differance and supplementarity, or iterability? 
What are the consequences of redefining the Husserlian and profoundly humaninistic 
notion of intentionality, of subjectivity, of historicity and of responsibility? As we showed in the 
first part of the thesis, these notions are also the great questions that Husserl has investigated and 
developed as a "responsible" response to the Crisis of the European sciences and humanity. Our 
investigation into Husserl's teleological discourse of history and responsibility has shown that 
this crisis, which is anything but an empirical accident, threatens the very thing that Husser! 
wants to keep safe and sound: the transcendental freedom of an egological subjectivity. For 
Husser! the possibility of crisis (of the subject) remains linked with the production and tradition 
of scientific objectitivities, and in fact has an essential link to writing. Husserl's teleological 
determination of writing as phonetic writing is an attempt to limit, tame and economize the 
essential ambiguity of writing: it threatens with passivity, forgetfulness and irresponsibility the 
very thing that makes possible, i.e., the transcendental and ideal community of a we-human-
subjects-investigators-responsible-for-the-history-of-truth. We showed that Husserl's call for an 
intentional return to forgotten sense and to the hidden ground of techno-scientific objectivity, for 
a free and voluntary reactivation of the origin, for an essentially voluntary Selbstbessinung and 
Verantwortung, is guided by the idea of a transcendental community of egological subjectivities. 
the subjectivity of a \\'t'. 
In the second part the thesis we showed that Husserl's phenomenology of language and 
of phone is also a great philosophy of the transcendental subject. The essential and 
phenomenological distinctions between linguistic and non-linguistic signs. indication and 
expression, sense and meaning, which is at the centre of Husserl's doctrine of signification. ha\"e 
also a teleological character: they are destined to define the arche and te/os of language, a" 
human language or human (i.e .. phonetic) writing. 18) According to this teleology. if the pO\\cr of 
l'xprL'ssion, as logical meaning, is reserved only for spoken language and not for ge"turc" (the 
IH.~ See also Ot' Gral1llllafologr (p. 83ft) and 011 TOllching (pp 152--.+). where deconstructio~ I" organized, 
OIKl' a~ain. ar~)Und the que"lions of the \oice. of the halld and the ere (i.e .. of writing. of the "II1£1llllal-
\·i.\llal.~cripf "), and the question of the concept and the "name of man". 
2·+3 
movement of the hand, the pointing finger) it is because the latter are not worked over b~ the 
Geist, the spiritual will, the pure intention to say what I mean to say, by what Husserl call" 
Bedeutungsintention. The experience of hearing oneself speak is the experience of the human 
subject, the experience of a free, voluntary, auto-affecting egological subjectivity conscious of its 
voice and speech. We argued that if Husserl gave such an exceptional privilege to oral speech 
and to the phone it is because of what necessarily links it with the subjectivity of the subject (the 
subject in its innermost properness) and the objectivity of the object (the "as such" of its 
objective unity.) 
By way of conclusion to our thesis186 we will bring forward some of the consequences of 
the Derridean reinterpretation or reinscription of the Husserlian concepts of intentionality and 
subjectivity: for the question of ethics of politics, and of law (for example, of legal and, 
especially, of human rights I87). It is in texts like VioLence of Metaphysics, A Word of Welcome 
and Eating WeLL/xx that the ethical and political implications of Derrida' s thought on Husserl are 
most evident and straightforward. 
As it is clear from our reading of Derrida's reading of the Origin of Geomefly and the 
first Logical Investigation, Derrida never meant to oppose another discourse on historicity, on the 
transcendental subject and language, but to ceaselessly reconstitute and analyse, in the style of 
"commentary and interpretation", the whole conceptual machinery, the conceptual differences or 
distinctions of HusserI's discourse, and also to bri ng forward their ethico-teleological limits and 
interests. Deconstruction was not imposed on HusserI's discourse by Derrida, rather 
phenomenology throws itself into deconstruction, "in a quasi-autoimmune fashion", as Derrida 
writes in Rogues. As we saw in the last section about the finite infinite differance the essential and 
lKIi We do not intent to close this thesis with simply adding a concluding chapter on ethics, as if ethical 
implications, considerations or decisions were absent from our previous discussion of intentionality, as if 
ethical decisions did not play any role in Husserl's call for the reactivation of origins or in his most central 
determinations of theoretical reason as practical reason and of being as ideality and repetition. Neither to 
offer our last word "ahout Derrida's ultimate stance toward history" (Kates, pp 225, 293), ethics or politics. 
lK7 The example of human rights is at the centre of Derrida's political thought. As Derrida writes 'Toda) 
the renewed and reelahorated declaration of "human rights" (1948) or, as we ,>ay in French. "des Droits de 
l'homme," the rights of man, and the institution of the juridical concept of "crime against humanity" 
(19'+)), form the hori;,oll of mOlldialisation and of the internatio1lal law that is supposed to keep watch 
OVCf it. (I am keeping the French word l1101ldialisatio1l in preference to "globalization" or Globalisicrllllg so 
as to maintain a reference to the world -m01lde, Welt, mU1Idus- which is neither the glohe nor the co"mo'>.) 
The concept of man, of what is proper to man, of human rights, of crimes against the humanity of man. 
or[!anizes, as we know, such a l11olldialisatio1l or \\orldwide-ization. Without Alibi, p. 2()3. 
lK~~ This lext is an interview with Nancy, ahout the exigency and limits of calculation (in politics. law and 
morality). It is puhlished in Poi1lts ... .IlltervieH's. 19N·1994. translated by Peggy Camuf (.\: other". Stanfnrd. 
Stanford Unin.:rsilY Press. Il)l)5.ln Rogues Derrida returns to Nancy and to the "arne que"tions in ~§ ~.--l of 
the firsl Essay on Reason. 
teleological distinctions (between expression and indication, intention and intuition) are caught up 
in a aporia: their possibility is their impossibility. Given the functioning of differance. the 
intention animating the expression "/" will (and should) never be through and through present to 
itself and to its content. The functioning of differance introduces a priori into the 
Bedeutungsintention a dehiscence which is essential, and which dispossesses the subject of the 
full intuition of the Bedeutung "/". 
According to Derrida, every time phenomenology addresses the question of the other. 
i.e., of the alter ego, it interrupts or deconstructs itself; it interrupts or renounces its "principle of 
principles". As Derrida put it in Eating Well, this "great philosophy of the transcendental 
subject", which has described the origin of the world as originary and constituting consciousness 
(as transcendental living consciousness) in the form of egological subjectivity. this great 
philosophy of the "subjective Apriori,,189 is tormented from within, tormented and contested by 
Husserl's persistence or preference to betray, in the name of phenomenology. the themes of 
immediate, full presence, of primordial intuitive presentation, by obstinately denying to transform 
analogical and indirect appresentation into intuitive, direct and immediate presentation. 
To understand better "this betrayal of phenomenology in the name of phenomenology" let 
us follow Derrida's demonstration in Violence and Metaphysics and see how Husserl's notion of 
intentionality in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation190 recognizes and respects the absolute separation 
189 Speaking, in Formal and Transcendental Logic, for the irreducibly egoic essence of all possible 
experience. for this "I am" which "is for me who says it and understands it accordingly the primordial 
intentional foundation of my world" (p. 237). Husserl also writes: "The relation of my consciousness to a 
world is not a matter of fact imposed on me either by God, who adventitiously decides it thus, or by a world 
accidentally existing beforehand, and a causal regularity belonging thereto. On the contrary. the subjective 
Apriori precedes the being of God and world, the being of everything, individually and collectively. for 
me, the thinking subject. Even God is for me what he is, in consequence of my own productivity of 
consciousness; here too I must not look aside lest I commit a supposed blasphemy, rather I must see the 
problem. Here too, as in the case of the other ego, productivity of consciousness will hardly signify that I 
invent (erfinde) and that I make (mach e) this highest transcendency." Formal and Transcendental Logic. p. 
251. 
190 Derrida reads the fifth Cartesian Meditation as a response to Levinas's reinterpretation of Husserlian 
intentionality in Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority (1961) (translated by Alphonso Lingi~. 
Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1969). Derrida has argued that Lninas. who often claims his 
fidelity to Husserl's "intentional analysis" (see his "Intentionality and Metaphysics" (1959). puhlished in 
Discovering Existence with Husserl. translated by Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith. Evanston. 
Northwestern University Press. 1998. pp. 123-4) when he redefines "in a profound way". at the end of his 
Totality and b~finity. intentionality, "consciousness of ... " as "attention to speech or welcome to the faCt'. 
hospitality and not thematization" (p. 299) is vcry close to Husser!. Levinas does not believe so: the Other. 
Lninas says. cannot be constituted as an intentional phenomenon of the ego. as Husser! de~LTlhe~ It tn hIS 
fifth Cartesian Meditation. it cannot be constituted as an alter ego hy and for a monadic ego proceeding 
through analogical appresentation. By making the other a phenomenon of the ego~ Husser!' aCCllr~ing to 
Lt'\inas. represses the infinite alterity of the Other. and he fails to recognl/e that tn. the l)n~tnal LKe-to-
face. the emcr~cnce of absolute alterity. of absolute exteriority cannot he den\'\:d. engenderL'd or 
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of the other, i.e., the radical irreducibility of the other to the same, yet of an other appearing as 
other for the same (ego). It will take three steps. 
a) The first step passes through the phenomenological "as such", through the possibility 
of "appearing as such" (which, according to Husserl's humanism, would allow us to make the 
hypothesis of the distinction of human intersubjectivity from that which is created between 
animals, or between men and animals) For without the phenomenon of the other. of the other 
appearing as such, without the evidence of the totally other as such, one, an ego in generaL could 
neither encounter, nor speak nor have any sense of the totally and infinitely other, and therefore 
nor any respect for it. According to Husserl, the appearance of other as such, i.e., as infinitely 
other, is the ego's intentional phenomenon. Husserl is first of all concerned with describing "how 
the other as other, in its irreducible alterity is presented to me. Is presented to me, as we will see, 
as originary nonpresence. ,,191 
b) It is evident for Husserl, as for Derrida, that the other, as another absolute origin of the 
world, is radically separated from me, it is inaccessible to my originary perception, or rather, it is 
accessible only by way of analogical ap-presentation 192 and indicative language. Between my 
lived experiences, my self-presence or ownness (Eigenheit) and the self-presence of the other 
there is infinite difference, absolute separation. As we saw, in our reading Husserl's First Logical 
Investigation with regard to the irreducibility of indication in the communication between two 
egos: I can have an originary intuition of the other's body (of his Korper and not his Leib) and of 
his words, but I cannot have an originary intuition of the other as such, i.e., of the presence of the 
other's lived experiences. The lived experiences of the other are made known to me only insofar 
as they are mediated by linguistic signs, by his speech. It is this evidence, this phenomenon of the 
other as totally other, i.e., as that which will remain eternally irreducible and inaccessible to me, 
as that which I can never be, which is the ego's intentional phenomenon. Husserl describes then 
the phenomenon (the appearance or evidence) of a nonphenomenality (the appearance of the 
other as other, as that which I myself am absolutely not). He themati;,es the impossibility of 
thematizing the other. he speaks of this evidence of a nonevidence or nonpresence, of the 
phenomenological evidence which respects and maintains absolute separation. 
constituted on the hasis of anything other than itself. The other is not myself. But Husser\. W~ argu~ 
following Den'ida, ncver said that it is, evcn if he strongly and persistently maintained that it is all £1;0. 
191 Ihid., p. 123, , . 
I!)~ Analogical appresentation is a "co-presentation"' (Mitgegenwiirtiglillg) of that whIch cannot he pres~nted 
primordially and immediately, hut only through an external hody (Korper): :-vhen I apprehend ~he e\tcrn~1 
hodv of the other in analogy With my own proper hody (Lcib) I apprehend hIS hod) not a~ a umty helongmg 
to Il~Y primordial spherc h~t as a sensing, perceiving hody (Lcib), i.~., as other. Cartesian ,\/t'lfifafi(lfls. §50, 
pp 108-11. 
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As Derrida emphasises, the Husserlian reference to analogical appresentation doc" not 
signify only the resistance of the other as a finite being193 to an analogical re-appropriation. the 
other's infinite resistance to an assimilatory reduction to the same (ego). Rather the reference to 
analogical appresentation (which, let us recall, as the necessary passage or transition in relation to 
the alter ego, is the essential condition for the possibility of an ideal objectivity in generaL of 
science, and of history itself) allows us, according to Derrida, to glimpse one of the most precious 
treasures of deconstruction, which is also its secret. It is (at) the heart of deconstruction. Respect 
for the secret of absolute separation as the experience of the other, as the experience (~l the 
alterity of the other: this is the condition of deconstruction and what will remain for ewr 
undeconstructable. Deconstruction has a respect and a taste for the secret: this respect is also the 
fidelity that makes deconstruction unfaithful to phenomenology's principle of principle·s. 
According to Derrida, this limit of infinite separation, this interruption or unbinding is not 
simply a negative condition, but a chance, the essential and necessary condition of the relation to 
the other (to the neighbour or the one far off, to the friend or the enemy), the positi ve condition of 
sociality, of the social bond, of peace or war: those who are separated come together or face to 
face without ceasing to be what they are destined to be, that is, wholly other. infinitely other in 
their absolute singularity, incomparable, solitary, transcendent, nonpresent to my ego. 
c) The other appears as other for an ego in general but in the form of an alter ego, in the 
form of a transcendental alter ego. Husserl is interested in the ego as the forl11 of alterity in order 
to distinguish it from the alterity of things belonging to the world, for example, from that of the 
animal or of the stone. 194 For Husserl the other is absolutely other, forever irreducible to a reel! 
moment of my life, only if he is an ego, if he can say. as I do, "I am": the other as stone is 
simultaneously less other (not absolutely other) and less the same than 1. 195 The Husserlian access 
to the alterity of the other as to its egoity, does not mean to imply, as Levinas writes. that "the 
other is known through empathy, as an other like my self, as alter ego", as if "alter" were an 
epithetical, accidental modification of a real, empirical subject, i.e., of a subject detem1ined on an 
pre-eidetic level. Husserl describes the eidetic relationships between nonempirical egos and he 
speaks of the "transcendental alter ego": "transcendental" insofar it is not entirely in the \\mld. 
and "ego" since it is rather the absolute origin of the world. Derrida writes: 
IlJ.l YM. p. 11..J.. The other would not be for me (for an ego in general) what it is. infinitely other. except if it 
is finite and mort a!. as I am. and only as soon as it comes into language. 
Il).j The other. the alter ego. for Husser!' is always a human subject. Only a human subject can be a 
transcendental alter ego. a~other absolute origin (1' the world. According to this teleological humanism. the 
animals. incapable of~langliage and of the phenomenological "a~ such> arc. ~s Heideggcr also said. poor if! 
11'0 rid. \\'dfarm. According to Derrida. with regard to the questIon of the ammaI. the dl..,~~nce hcl\\ecn the 
thought of Husserl, Heilkggcr and Lninas. is not so great. See Eating Wdl. pp, 208. 277ft. 
Il!~ ') YM. p. L7. 
If the other were not recognized as a transcendental alter ego it would be entireh in the world and 
not, as ego, the origin of the world. To refuse to see in it an ego in this sense is. within th~ ethical order. the 
ver~ gesture of violence .. If t~e other ~as n,ot recognized a~ e~o, its enti.re alterity would collapse .... The 
egOlty of the other permIts hIm to say ego as I do; and thIS IS why he IS Other, and not a stone, a being 
without speech in my real economy. This is why he is face, can speak to me, understand me and eventually 
command me. l96 
According to Derrida, in Husserl's thought there is a place for the infinite secrete of the 
other, for the irreducibility of the alterity of the other, a secret that is arguably shared also by 
Levinas. We could say that if there is something common to Husserl. Levinas and Derrida, is a 
taste for the secret. There is, however, also a crucial difference, according Derrida, between 
Husserl and Levinas. Although both do in fact speak of the infinitely other, their difference is that 
"by acknowledging in this infinitely other as such (appearing as such) the status of intentional 
modification of the ego in general, Husserl gives himself the right to speak of the infinitely other 
as such, accounting for the origin and the legitimacy of his language. He describes the 
phenomenal system of nonphenomenality." 197 
At this definite and irreducible limit, at the limit of absolute separation and dissociation, 
the limit of the impossibility of thematizing or phenomenologizing the other, the alter ego, "in 
person", phenomenology, by recognizing that there is such a non-intuitive relation, that I cannot 
be on the other side, that I do not know who or what the other is. phenomenology then interrupts 
itself and, according to Derrida, becomes "unfaithful to itself out of fidelity to itself'. What 
Derrida stresses in Violence and Metaphysics, as well as in A Word of Welcome. is that this 
thematization, the theme of the impossibility of thematizing the other, rigorously develops the 
discovery of intentionality. Husserlian intentionality, an intentionality that interrupts or 
renounces, where necessQ/Y, thematization, is respect itself: the development and becoming 
language of the respect (or the taste) for the secret of absolute separation. Phenomenology, then. 
imposes this interruption upon itself; it interrupts itself. 
The interruption is not imposed on phenomenology as if by decree. In the very course of 
phenomenological description, following an intentional analysis faithful to its movement. it-, "I \Ie, its 
norms (my emphasis), the interruption is produced. It is decided in the name of ethics. as interruption of the 
self by the self. Interruption of the self by a phenomenology that gives itself O\er to its own necessitity. to 
1% Ib'd 1'1') I .. p. ~_. . . 
197 Derrida writes. "Levinas in fact speaks of the infinitely other. but by rei USIng to acknowledge an 
intentional modification of the ego - which would be a violent and totalitarian act for him - he depri\ e\ 
himscJf of the very foundation a~d possibility of his own language. What authori/e\ him to say 'inrInitel~ 
other" if the infinitely other does not appear as such in a zone he calls the same. an.d ,~hlch.ls the neutral. 
k\c1 of transcendental description'.)" YM. p. I ~5, According to Derrida. the IIltelhglbI1lly of the whole of 
Lninas's ethical discourse on intentionality as hospitalit\' depends entirely on a certaIn phclwmenology. a 
phenomenology that interrupts or renounces. where necessary. its principle of prinCIples: the mOnadlL" ego 
cog ito, suhjcctin: cg(llngical experience as the sphl'fl' nf absolute certaInty and ahsolule C\lsIL'nee, 
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its own law, right where this law orders it to interrupt thematization, which also means to be unfaithful to 
itself out of fidelity to itself .... " 198 
Derrida calls this interruption, "the interruption of the self by the self as other" eX-
appropriation. The other, we said, even if he is a finite being, is infinitely other and this infinity is 
precisely what resists any reappropriation. 1 cannot appropriate the alterity of the other, whether 
in the other person or in myself. As we saw with regard to the structure of "hearing myself speak" 
and the irreducibility of indicative communication in solitary mental life, there is something in 
myself irreducible to identity, to property and positionality (i.e., irreducible to the living 
egological subjectivity present to itself in the fullness of its life), and absolutely resistant to 
appropriation. As we argued in part two, Derrida wants not only to be faithful to Husserl' s 
analysis of analogical and emphatic appresentation in the constitution of the alter ego, but also to 
extend the field of appresentation, even further than Husserl would readily admit, and to 
recognize its irreducible gap or differance even in the pure expressivity of inward and solitary 
speech of the subject, in the hearing-myself-speak of the monadic ego. My self-presence, my own 
life, the life of an ego, who can speak and say "r", "1 am", "my life is", cannot be accessible for 
an originary, immediate intuition any more than the alter ego. This passage outside the monadic 
sphere of properness (Eigenheit) and through the other, this interruption or spacing, this 
dehiscence or differance m audiophonic auto-affection, determines the structure of 
reappropriation and the structure of the relation to the self (and to the other) as such as ex-
appropriation: as the interminable appropriation of an irreducible non-proper, of an irreducible 
alter ego or non-ego. Speaking of this "paradoxical ex-appropriation", i.e., of this movement of 
the proper expropriating itself in the very process of (re)appropriation, Derrida says in EatinR 
Well 
The logic of the trace or of differance determines this reappropriation as an ex-appropriation. Re-
appropriation necessarily produces the opposite of what it apparently aims for. Ex-appropriation is not 
what is proper to man. One can recognize its differential figures as soon there is a relation to self in it-. 
most elementary form (but for his very reason there is no such thing as elementary) .... Of course the 
relation to self in ex-appropriation is radically different (and that's why it requires a thinking of 
differance and not of opposition) in the case of what one calls the "nonliving." the "n:gctaL" lh~ 
"animal." "man," or "God".199 (our emphasis) 
Why we have insisted on this "differance within the phone", or on "the ongmary 
graphematic structure of speech'''? Because the Husserlian pri \'ilege of speech. of the phone. of 
lLJH '",\ Word of Welcol1/c. p. 52. puhlished in Jacques Derrida. Adicli. translated hy Pascale-Anne Brault and 
Michael Naas. Stanford. Stanford Uni\l~rsity Press. 1999. 
lLJLJ Eating Well. p. 269. 
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the pure spirituality of living VOIce, and of the hearing oneself speak. is essentially and 
teleologically linked to the question of the subject and of man: only a man is capable of 
consciousness, of speech, of sovereign and autonomous auto-affection, of freedom and of righb. 
only a man is capable of being a subject, a subject of rights, of knowledge, of culture. etc. The 
question of truth and of the logos, of the phone whose speech can take the form "S is p", has 
always been linked to the question and to the concept of man, of what is proper to man, to the 
human as zoon logon echon, as well as to the question of ::.oe, of life.2oo The concepts of 
differance, iterability, ex-appropriation has shown us that the horizon of what is proper to man, to 
human life, and therefore, the horizon of human rights, is not a very determinable limit. It can be 
determined only on the basis of a series of oppositions. Hence the right to deconstruction, to a 
rational deconstruction: the "unconditional right" to endlessly question the limits of human 
rights, and their presuppositions, the interests and calculations that order their deployement, says 
Derrida in Eating Well or Calculating the Subject. 201 
As long as the conventionally accepted limits, the oppositions, the supposedly linear and 
indivisible boundaries between the so-called human living being and the so-called animal one, but 
also between the living and the nonliving, the spectral, the machine, etc .. have not been 
deconstructed, we will continue to reconstitute under the name of the human subject "an 
illegitimately delimited identity, illegitimately, but often precisely under the authority of rights! -
in the name of a particular kind of rights. ,,202 
This right or demand to deconstruction, to ask questions about truth, conSCIOusness, 
language, culture, technicity, and so forth. - so many powers, capacities or possibilities of which 
the animal is said to be deprived and poor - and the right or demand to do so performatively, by 
writing, by transforming and producing new analyses, new events and texts, new events of 
thought in the history of the concepts of man, of truth, of the subject and of human rights, is 
200 In texts like Specters of Marx and Rogues (pp 145ff) Derrida has tried to show the difficultr) of 
maintaing the traditional distinctions and limits we thought pertained to life. between the living and the 
dead, the living present and its spectral others, but also between the human and the animal living: and in 011 
Touching Derrida put again the question of what is proper to the living body (Leibl in relation to the 
processes of iterability and of the technical prosthesis or supplemenarity (heart transplants, clones. etc) p. 
229. 
201 "There has to be some calculatioll, I have ne\er held against calculation that condescending reticence o/" 
'Heideggerian' haughtiness. Still calculation is calculation. " Eating Well, p. 272. Derrida deals exten<,ncly 
with the question or exigency of calculation. and of measure (for example. In a d~mocracy. the n~ce""lty to 
count votes or \'oices), and with the rational necessity to endorse. de\elop, perlect and deterrnme human 
rights in Rogues, especially rr ~2-55. 151. We are not going to enter into the im~en"e question of 
Derrida's "aporetology" concerning the double exigency, or the doubl.e. billd of calculation (/nd 
incalculahilitv. of decision and undecidahility, of possihility and imposslhllIt). of the I call alld the I 
(,(111not. In t;ur thesis we only wanted to situate some of the place" of DerriJa'" ooaporetology" or 
"aporctography" where the Husscrlian heritage IS indispensahle. 
2()2 Eating Wel/. p.273. 
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according to Derrida, an ethical and political demand, the demand "to put a stop to a certain kind 
of rights" and to "call for a different kind of rights·,.203 
"Who" will then call for a different kind of rights, "who" will then take the place or 
replace the subject, once the most essential of its predicates (that is, presence and identity to self. 
positionality, property, consciousness, Ego, will, freedom, responsibility, humanity, etc) ha\e 
been deconstructed? "Who" will respond thereon, for what and before whom? If there is still, not 
in philosophy or theory but in the text and in writing in general, an instance of some "who", in its 
irreducible alterity and singularity, this singularity of the "who" will still ha\'e to go through the 
experience of deconstruction: a singularity given over to non-self-presence, a singularity that 
dislocates or divides itself in gathering itself together to answer to the infinite other. A discourse, 
a concept or, indeed, an experience of responsibility can come only at this price: at recognizing 
that the processes of differance, iterability, trace or writing, are at work everywhere, "well beyond 
humanity." Derrida does not hide the "essential excessiveness" of this responsibility, neither its 
"monstrosity": a discourse thus restructured would have to leave open a space for a relationship 
to the incalculable singularity of the other, to a singUlarity that does not end at humans but 
extends to all nonhuman living beings, or even beyond that, to all the nonliving. 204 
A discourse thus restructured can try to situate in another way the question of what a human 
subject, a morality, a politics, the rights of a human subject are. can be and should be. Still to come, this 
task is indeed far ahead of us. It requires passing through in particular the great phenomenological question 
of the as such.,,205 
The question of the phenomenological "as such ", of appearing as sllch, has been at the 
centre of Derrida's demonstration: it has taken the whole weight of the distinction between 
human and animal relation to self and to the other as such. The experience or the opening of the 
as such, which is, as we have shown, indissociable from the experience of the voice, the 
welcoming of the other as such, the opening of the finite threshold from which the infinite other 
may come to pass, is, at the same time, "that to which one cannot and should not submit the other 
in general, the 'who' of the other that could only appear absolutely as sllch by disappearing as 
other.,,206 Is not this possibility of the other appearing, coming from out of some horizon, and 
presenting itself as such, at the same time, the impossibility of ever arriving as infinitely other. as 
an absolute surprise, without expectation? The question for Derrida is: is the as sitch. the 
'111 . 
- EatIng Well, p. 2T1, . . _ " 
211.t "Hence the enormity of the task. its cssential excessi\cncss. a certaIn unclasslllahIlJl:- or t~.c m(~nstn)~'IIY 
of the for which we havc to answer here, or before which (whom'; what'?) wc ha\c III answer. Earlflg 'Wc/l, 
C. 278 
_II~ Ih'd "17 1 I . p. _ -t, 
211h Ihid. p. 275. and Of Graml1lar%gr. p. 47. 
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phenomenon, the being as such of the unique and of the other, ever possible? Is the ad\ent (the 
event, or the invention), the coming or welcoming of the other ever possible? Yes, Derrida 
answers, yes the advent is possible only as im-possible, that is, never and nowhere as SllC/z. ;-.JeWf 
and nowhere from out of some horizon. 
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